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This thesis is an exploration of Plato’s understanding of the power of disorder as it is 
presented in his cosmology, The Timaeus and in his predominantly religious work, 
Laws X. In the former work this causal force is presented as the disordering power 
responsible for the physical chaos prior to the generation of the universe, as well as 
for any residual disorder found within the cosmos after it has been ordered and is the 
antithesis of ‘nous’ or reason. In the latter work, however, Laws X, the causal force 
for disorder is now understood as a disordering power capable of endangering the 
soul, active long after the cosmos has been generated and itself, a ‘Soul’. What 
ultimately emerges is a dynamic theory of disorder and a metaphysics supporting that 
theory, weaving through, connecting across and separating apart these two works. 
In Part I, consisting of five chapters, I provide the Greek, an original translation 
and commentary on seven key passages from The Timaeus where Plato presents his 
ideas on disorder, both as an effect within the cosmos and as a causal power or force 
for disorder prior to its generation. In this regard, I look closely at Plato’s use of the 
Greek word & V & Y K ~  in its role as a disordering power, but which has also been 
commonly understood and translated as ‘necessity’. I contrast this with Plato’s 
understanding of the role which the ‘Demiurge’ or the ordering power of the cosmos 
has played, with its faculty of ~06s or ‘reason’ and its access to ideal ‘Forms’ or 
‘ideas’ when ordering or generating the universe. 
In Part 11, consisting of four chapters, Laws X is similarly presented, providing the 
Greek, a translation (for the most part, that of A. E. Taylor) and commentary on eight 
key passages. Here I investigate Plato’s understanding of disorder as it pertains 
specifically to the ‘soul’ and of the soul’s relation to the disordering power(s) and to 
‘evil’. In the final chapter a theory of disorder is proposed, in which an epistemology 





He had all the highest conditions for making the most of his passage through 
earthly life. Of noble ancestry, he inherited a bodily strength and power 
enabling him to sustain the efforts necessary in order to acquire all the 
knowledge of his times and to increase it; he was not compelled in any way 
to struggle for material existence, being a wealthy citizen in the wealthiest 
city of his times; he was born after a generation which included some of the 
greatest poets of mankind, and had himself an exceptional poetical talent, 
which he reserved entirely for the purposes of his philosophical teaching. 
He did not live in isolation, like Descartes or Spinoza, nor in a whirl of 
worldly interests, like Leibniz, nor in humiliating dependence upon an 
absolute government, like Kant or Hegel, his freedom of speech and 
teaching.. .secured by the crime committed against Socrates. . . . . What limits 
can be set to the intellectual progress of such a philosopher? He stands far 
above his great teacher, far above his great pupil, alone in his incomparable 
greatness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Not even the gods can war against Ananke” 
(from a poem by Simonides, as quoted by Plato in the Protagoras 345d) 
This thesis is an exploration of Plato’s understanding of disorder as it is found in his 
later works the Timaeus and Laws X. Additionally, it is also a study of the emergent 
metaphysics, which follows upon such an investigation. Although a position which 
claims Plato has a discrete theory of disorder, which this is, is open to dispute, given 
that for the most part it is couched in mythic terms within his cosmology (the 
Timaeus) and in religious terms within Laws X, it is my hope to challenge, or at least 
diminish, some of the doubts which may be raised concerning such an endeavour. It 
is my hope, moreover, to demonstrate that when a fuller account of Plato’s 
understanding of disorder is considered, within its own terms and as can be 
demonstrated within core works touching upon his metaphysics at large, a deeper and 
more substantial understanding of Plato’s overall metaphysics becomes possible, 
whereby age-old philosophical problems become less formidable. 
I will now summarise some of the main points made and conclusions arrived at 
within this thesis, necessarily leaving out most of the argumentation and support for 
these to the reader’s own judgement following a fuller reading of this work. Firstly, 
this thesis is not in any way a compilation or critique of the huge body of secondary 
literature which has been written on the Timaeus and Laws X concerning ‘necessity’ 
or ‘evil’. Although ‘necessity’, or more properly ‘ananke’, and ‘evil’ are discussed, 
these ideas form part of a larger discussion concerning Plato’s treatment of ‘disorder’ 
as it appears in each of these two works. For practical and scholastic reasons, I have 
narrowed the commentators whose writings I discuss within the body of the text to 
Cornford, A. E. Taylor and Archer-Hind, since the groundwork of these scholars 
forms the tone of modem-day scholastic opinion concerning Plato’s understanding of 
‘disorder’. More recent writers (although regrettably only a few), I confine, due to 
the limitations imposed on this thesis, to the footnotes, whose opinions, for the most 
part, form a refinement or amendment to the conclusions of these earlier writers. It 
is, I suggest, Cornford’s view (which heavily followed upon that of Archer-Hind), 
which has persisted to the present day as the one predominantly held by most 
scholars today concerning ‘ananke’, although many twists and turns of nuance have 
invariably refined it. Notably, Luc Brisson is a contemporary champion of the 
Cornfordian position. It is a view, broadly put, which affords no metaphysical or 
ontological status to ‘ananke’, understood by Cornford as mechanical motion within 
an ungenerated cosmos and by Brisson, as the secondary causes outlined by Plato. 
A. E. Taylor, on the other hand, would have been uncomfortable with a view that so 
opposed Plato’s own story of the cosmos that it reduces his myth to mere myth, 
thereby challenging almost every aspect of it. As a result, Taylor leaves much of 
Plato’s cosmology unchallenged, but also uninvestigated. In this thesis I attempt to 
move on from Taylor’s position and investigate that part of the cosmological myth 
from the Timaeus wherein we find ‘ananke’ and which causal force persists, I argue, 
to some degree into Laws X as the ‘Non-beneficent Soul’. Namely, therefore, this is 
an investigation of Plato’s understanding of ‘disorder’ and its cause. However, 
rather than dismantle the myth, notably that concerning ‘ananke’, from the Timaeus 
or dismiss the metaphysical content from Plato’s theological railings in Laws X, I 
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look at them as written to see if what they represent or explain can stand on their own 
terms and if they can, whether they afford elucidation to the broader spectrum of 
Plato’s metaphysics. My conclusion is that they can and do, and that a softening of 
any reinterpretation of Plato concerning what have become metaphysical cast-offs, to 
wit, ‘ananke’ and the ‘non-beneficent soul’,’ is not only warranted, but demanded by 
a serious investigator of Plato’s thought. 
I begin my research with a study of the Timaeus, in which seven passages, 
roughly divided up into five areas of investigation, form Part I of this thesis. These 
passages are translated anew and presented in both the Greek and English. Chapter 
one opens with a core passage relating to ‘ananke’ (Ti. 47e3-48d7), which most 
commentators have translated as ‘necessity’, but which I argue is wrong. By looking 
afresh at this passage it can be shown that a close parallelism is drawn by Plato 
between ‘nous’ (translated here as ‘mind’) and ‘ananke’ (translated as ‘might’), in 
which the suggestive imagery of a race, soon enlarged to a battle for victory, 
emerges. Notably, from this vantage these two powers are presented as parallel 
although unequal powers, much in the same way as a racer is paired at the start of a 
race with another racer of unequal ability. This opening image of a ‘race’, although 
soon dropped, is ultimately won by ‘nous’, which power is described as “impelling” 
‘might’ to bring about the greatest good during the Demiurge’s activity (the source of 
‘nous’) through sensible persuasion. I argue against the position that ‘ananke’ is at 
any time a power for good or that it was somehow “persuaded” by ‘nous’ to act 
T. M. Robinson (Plato’s Psychology, p. 163) denies in Plato any claim to what can be termed two 
souls, one ‘good’ and one ‘bad’, dismissing this as a result of Plato expressing himself “most 
unfortunate 1 y . ” 
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intelligibly thereafter. I argue, rather, that ‘nous’ was de facto a stronger primary 
power than ‘ananke’, with the consequence that the universe came into being, further 
arguing that the idea of ‘persuasion’ forms part of Plato’s mythic language. The 
idea, I suggest, of friendly collusion is used by Plato solely to turn the reader’s 
attention towards the formation of the cosmos and the intelligent work of the 
Demiurge (the stated purpose of the Timaeus) and away from further considerations 
of ‘ananke’ other than how it served the Demiurge at the outset of generation. 
Chapter one, therefore, centres chiefly on considerations of ‘ananke’ as understood 
from this passage. 
I also discuss the possible development of & U & Y I C ~  (‘ananke’) as a technical term 
for Plato, appropriated from the Greek words &U& (meaning ‘up’) and &YICI) 
(meaning ‘arm’) with its associated meaning of physical force, which does not 
appear to have been previously considered by other commentators. In light of this, 
however, I do not then interpret ‘ananke’ in terms of physical force and subsequent 
to this, reinterpret it as the collective term for secondary causes. I argue, rather, that 
Ananke is first of all to be understood, along with the Demiurge, as one of two 
powerful and primal metaphysical powers existing outwith the cosmos before its 
generation into an organised universe and therefore, outside of all time and change. 
It is only later, in the final third of the Timaeus, where Plato, with his concerns now 
totally earthward (the cosmos having been fully generated), relinquishes all 
metaphysical references to Ananke, long subdued (for the most part) by the 
Demiurge. As a technical term serving his metaphysics and this part of his 
cosmology over, ‘ananke’ is then dropped by Plato and this word is returned to its 
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ordinary use or understanding as physical force or ‘necessity’ as found in the 
common prepositional phrase kk &vdcy~?l<, ‘necessarily’. The mistake, which I 
argue that Cornford and his followers make, is in understanding ‘Ananke’ for the 
whole of the Timaeus according to this later development. 
In chapter two of Part I, I continue an earlier discussion concerning Plato’s 
understanding of what it is to be a ‘cause’ and demonstrate from this key passage (Ti. 
46c7-e6) that Ananke cannot possibly be a secondary cause and that the ‘two kinds 
of causes’ referred to here are represented by the Demiurge and Ananke as their 
source and not by the G ’ U U C X ~ C X ,  which, as its name suggests, is not an ~ L T ~ C X  or 
true cause. 
I also undertake a listing and study of the phrases in the Timaeus relating to the 
notion of the English translation ‘as far as he could’ to see how they are used in this 
work, detailing several meanings, namely, the ideas of ‘likeliness’ or a ‘copy’ as it 
relates to its ‘Form’, ‘curtailment of perfection’, as well as ‘perfection’ (i.e. used as a 
superlative). My conclusion is that these various Greek phrases offer little support to 
the idea that the Timaeus, although containing mythic material, is itself a myth. 
Finally, I present Plato’s understanding of ‘cause’ as it relates to that reported of 
Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Thucydides. Additionally, an in-depth comparison 
between the physical theories of Democritus and Plato is also drawn up, where I 
conclude that Plato borrowed or accepted many of the same ideas as Democritus, 
differing essentially only in his understanding of causality. Thus, I argue, Plato had 
developed a theory of causation, namely, that of the ‘soul’ with regard to ends and 
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motion within the Cosmos, and of the Demiurge and Ananke with regard to primary 
causation, which Democritus had failed to do. 
Chapter three is a study of the passage at Ti. 29d7-30cl. I begin by looking at the 
phrase ‘as far as possible’ with its meaning here of ‘the very best’. I argue that it is 
only before its generation or after its generation that Plato will allow imperfection or 
disorder to exist in the Universe, but not during it, when only the Demiurge’s hand is 
at work and Ananke is left with no active role. The so-called ‘persuasion’ of 
Ananke, in the sense of anthropomorphically ‘assisting’ the Demiurge during this 
process, is therefore denied both figuratively and mythically. 
In this chapter I also discern two kinds of disorder, namely, ‘natural’ disorder and 
‘unnatural’, with only the latter relating to Ananke and ‘evil’, just as I discern two 
kinds of order, ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ (as in ‘chance’ order), with again, the latter 
relating to Ananke. In both cases that which is ‘natural’ relates to ‘nous’, pointing to 
its generation as an object or end by the Demiurge. 
I highlight in this chapter the phrase ‘all that was visible’ with its meaning of the 
naturally visible, as in ‘not too small to be seen’. I further note the possibility latent 
within Plato’s cosmology, not only of a ‘non-visible’ substratum (too small to be 
seen), but also an ‘invisible’ substratum, discussing in some detail Plato’s theory of 
triangles and its relevance to this notion. I conclude that Plato, without ever 
compromising his metaphysical position regarding the primal powers, the Demiurge 
and Ananke, proves himself to be a profound realist, gifted with great scientific 
imagination, as regards his understanding of the physical world. 
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Chapter four and the three passages from the Timaeus presented here (41a3-b6, 
42e7-43a3 and 68c7-d7) highlight the sharp divide which Plato draws between the 
creative ability of the Demiurge and that of the natural order, which latter while it 
includes within it ‘the divine’, does not include the Demiurge. This division has 
given both cause and rise, perhaps more than any other feature of the Timaeus, to the 
widely held position that this work is essentially mythic and its metaphysical players 
pure myth. The Demiurge is then understood as ‘reason’ within the cosmos and 
Ananke, if discussed, as ‘unreason’ in its various guises. If, however, the notion of 
the Demiurge is retained as meaning ‘God’, allowing Plato some theological 
perspective, inevitably and with no exceptions to my knowledge, Ananke is still 
understood as being entirely a mythic figure and is invariably understood to represent 
either secondary causes or physical motion within the cosmos. I argue, however, that 
while Plato does make use of myth to explain what cannot be seen or the 
metaphysical realm generally, neither the Demiurge nor Ananke are mythic figures 
in the sense of being less real than portrayed, but rather, are at least as real. They are 
mythic only in the sense of being essentially unknowable and therefore unknown and 
because of this, necessarily imagined. To this end I present Plato’s axiology with 
regard to his cosmology, his adherence to the notion of ‘like generating like’ and his 
use of descriptive names as opposed to mythic names when referring to the 
Demiurge and Ananke. 
Chapter five forms the closing chapter of Part I and brings the reader’s attention to 
the passage at Ti. 68el-69c6. This chapter focuses on Plato’s move in the final third 
of the Timaeus from the metaphysical realm and the generation of the cosmos to a 
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cosmos now long generated and fully operational. As a consequence of this change 
of aspect from a metaphysical perspective to that solely of the physical world, I argue 
that the primary causes, the Demiurge and Ananke, existing for Plato entirely 
outwith the generated cosmos, give way to kznds of causes, ‘the divine’ and ‘the 
necessary’, as active within it. Thus, dropped is Plato’s interest in the primary 
causes, Ananke and the Demiurge, bringing his vision full forward from that of 
chaotic beginnings and powerful causal players to a finished and reasonable cosmos, 
viewed and understood entirely from within and in its own terms. However, while I 
argue that there is a change, it is not a material or essential change with regard to 
Plato’s previous understanding. Rather, what guides Timaeus’s speech now is his 
earlier promise to his friends to end with the story of man. What become of 
importance, therefore, and are stressed to the end of this work, are the secondary 
causes (‘the necessary’) and their ends (‘the divine’), causal echoes of primal 
beginnings, in turn serving an end far removed from that of the generation of the 
cosmos, namely, the happiness of man, thereby bringing Plato’s cosmology and this 
‘likely’ account to its envisaged completion. 
Whereas an investigation of the relevant passages from the Timaeus opens my 
research on Plato’s understanding of disorder, it is a study of eight passages from 
Laws X, sometimes in smaller sections and roughly divided up into four areas of 
investigation, which completes it and forms Part I1 of this thesis. These passages are 
not translated, the Greek presenting few problems, but are presented in both the 
Greek and English, with the English translation by A. E. Taylor. Chapter one 
focuses on the passage at Lg. 887c5-888a2, which sets the tone for the subsequent 
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chapters, presenting unequivocally Plato’s belief in the gods, namely, that they are 
the “most certain of realities” and “their being beyond the remotest shadow of a 
doubt,” which he will set out to prove in Laws X in the face of those, who with 
contempt “force us into our present argument.” I argue against the position, 
however, that what follows is simply a polemic centred round a philosophical 
discussion or that it has little to offer of philosophical value to Plato’s metaphysical 
scheme from the Timaeus. It proves much more than this. Not only does he offer 
several arguments for the existence of the gods, whose existence in the Timaeus was 
assumed, Plato is now prepared in this work to account for disorder and evil within 
the world of change, and in particular, within man. This is a major step forward for 
Plato, where earlier in the Timaeus his philosophical gaze rested almost exclusively 
on the creator (the Demiurge) and the created (the generated cosmos), leaving 
Ananke, the disordering power, “persuaded” and its works of chaos as vestiges only. 
Chapter two presents the passage at Lg. 895e10-897b5 (which, for the purpose of 
explication, I have divided into ten smaller sections), wherein Plato outlines his main 
argument for the existence of the gods, namely, the primacy of soul and its identity 
with primal becoming and movement, ultimately arguing that ‘soul’ is the universal 
cause of all change and motion. I argue that whereas in the Timaeus ‘soul’ was 
understood as generated, in Laws X Plato has substantially developed his notion of 
‘soul’, so that it has now become ‘that which generates’. Thus, except for the World 
Soul, which is not discussed, ‘soul’ is presented as though it were eternal or 
‘begotten’, but never generated, and where it seemingly takes over the role of the 
primary causal powers. 
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I point out that what is crucial to Plato’s understanding of causality and movement 
in Laws Xis  his earlier understanding fiom the Timaeus that there is no beginning to 
physical movement, rather, there is only a beginning to organised physical 
movement, preceded by chaos, a state untouched by ‘nous’ or its ends. This leads to 
the question of dualism, concerning which I argue that Plato is an incontrovertible 
dualist. This dualism, however, which I describe and detail as a ‘parallel account’, 
does not relate to the Forms, but rather, to Plato’s developed notion of ‘soul’ and the 
ability which these psychic powers have to impact the physical world with either 
order or disorder, whilst remaining themselves entirely psychical. I argue that the 
Forms, on the other hand, are not featured in Laws X, having been subsumed under 
the noetic singularity of ‘nous’ as understood and now identified with ‘soul’ and as 
identified earlier with the Demiurge. Their metaphysics, moreover, was never 
discussed in the Timaeus, although here the Forms appear to have been given the role 
of stabilising reality for the observer, so as to allow a measure for discerning truth 
over true opinion and thus, in a sense, acting as an early analytic tool. I argue, 
however, that Plato does not provide support in his ontology for the separate 
existence of the Forms apart from the thinker reflecting upon them, with the 
consequence that their existence is entirely dependent upon ‘nous’. Thus, if retained 
the Forms become redundant with respect to ‘nous’ as it is understood within Plato’s 
developed notion of ‘soul’. For this reason I suggest he does not in the end retain the 
Forms and is why they do not feature in Laws X. 
In chapter two, I also argue that whereas ‘soul’ appears to be ‘begotten’ rather 
than generated, God (the Demiurge) for Plato is not begotten and remains the 
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ultimate source of begotten ‘soul’. Equally, I argue that the primal souls in Laws X, 
the Beneficent Soul and the Non-beneficent Soul, are not begotten, but represent for 
Plato a hrther development in his understanding of the primal powers, the Demiurge 
and Ananke. Where formerly they were drawn solely as transcendent primary causes 
in the generation of the Cosmos, they are now redrawn and consequently understood 
from within the Cosmos as powerful primal souls, immanent in a world long 
generated. 
Chapter three focuses exclusively on ‘soul’, not as part of an argument for the 
existence of the gods, but rather, with questions regarding its nature and role in the 
world. The passages chosen are Lg. 897b7-dl and 898a3-c5, divided into seven 
segments. Plato asks what manner of soul controls the heaven and earth and their 
whole circuit and answers that it can only be the “supremely good soul.” This also 
raises the question of the hypothetical existence of another kind of soul, namely, that 
which is the cause of a procedure that is distraught or without order, answering this 
time with the “evil [soul].” I note that in the Timaeus questions concerning the kznd 
of soul would never have been raised, since in that work ‘soul’ was always good 
precisely because it had been generated by the Demiurge. This is not the case in 
Laws X, however, since ‘soul’ is not described as generated. Thus, questions 
concerning the ‘kind’ of soul can now be asked, since there is no guarantee that a 
soul will be good. This in turn raises the possibility of the existence of a ‘non- 
virtuous soul’, which the Athenian proposes will account for motion that is never 
regular or uniform, has no order, plan or law and has “kinship with folly of every 
kind.’’ 
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In the fourth chapter of Part I1 and the final one of this thesis, I note the change of 
perspective in Laws X over that of the Timaeus, where timeless eternity and the 
‘unmoved mover’ and its assistants (meaning the ‘heavenly gods’ and not the 
accessory causes or Ananke) of generation give way to timely events and the ‘self- 
moved movers’ or primal souls of regeneration, in particular, the ‘Beneficent’ and 
‘Non-beneficent’ Soul(s). The passages chosen are Lg. 898d9-e3, 899b3-10, 905d8- 
e3 and 906a2-c6. By the time Plato wrote Laws X the reasonableness of the world is 
not in question and the World Soul, I argue, is assumed. What Plato attempts to 
account for in this work, therefore, is the unreasonable behaviour of man and what 
for Plato were irrational beliefs, particularly those concerning the gods. For this he 
must draw upon an all but forgotten notion from the Timaeus, namely, an irrational 
primal power, or Ananke, infusing it with new power and presence in its disordering 
role, now within the world as the ‘Non-beneficent Soul.’ For Plato, mankind can 
never be the source of its own evil, having been generated by a perfect God. The 
human soul, however, can will wrong ends and thus make wrong choices concerning 
its own good, which is due, Plato argues, to both its human condition and the counter 
influence of irrational soul(s). Thus, adhering to the principle of ‘like with like’, it is 
‘soul’ or specifically, the ‘Non-beneficent Soul’, which Plato suggests can move the 
human soul into making wrong choices. How it does this, Plato is not prepared to 
say, again arguing for a purely dualistic understanding of ‘soul’. 
Finally, it is the notion of the human ‘will’ in its ability to make right and wrong 
choices and therefore, of choosing ‘good’ or ‘evil’, upon which I end this thesis. 
Such choice is never for Plato an entirely human issue or is it a deterministic one, 
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which principle I argue is foreign to Plato’s thought, given the freedom of the human 
soul to choose not only well, but also wrongly. In the end Plato leaves us with what I 
call his ‘theory of disorder’, which theory traces a long anoetic trail, from that of 
Ananke, to the Non-beneficent Soul and finally, to its emergence in the human soul. 
What Plato’s theory encompasses, I argue, is a bold epistemology, an ancient 
ontology and ultimately, a persistent metaphysics of disorder and evil as found in 
man and the world. 
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PART I 
COMMENTARY on the TIMAEUS 
A u & ~ K ~  PAnanke’ (Necessity) and the Original Text 
Chapter 1 
1 TI. 4733 - 48D7 
1.1 Original Greek 
The above passage from the Timaeus will be presented in full, first in the most 
authoritative critical edition of the Greek2 text, and then with a new English 
translation, followed by comments and comparative notes on other translations. 
Burnet, Timaeus, OCT, 47e4-48e7. All future references to the Timaeus unless otherwise indicated 2 
will be to this edition. The lineage follows very closely with that of the Oxford edition. 
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1.2 Translation 
The ideas which have guided our discu~sion,~ except for a small portion, demonstrate 
the workings of Mind. But one must also set aside for inquiry4 the creations of 
See R.G. Bury, trans., (Plato) Timaeus, p. 109: “The foregoing part of our discourse”; D. Lee, trans., 
(Plato) Timaeus, p. 66: “In almost all we have said”; Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (hereafter 
abbreviated as PC), p. 160: “our foregoing discourse.’’ Tdc.. .nap&hqhuQbza zov 6tpqpEuov. 
By translating nap&hqhueOza as ‘ideas which have guided’, I have not mistakenly taken 
naprhqhuebza from the verb nap~hobvo (‘to drive by’), which is incorrect, but rather, have 
reflected in my translation the accepted primary meaning given in Liddell & Scott’s Greek-English 
Lexicon (henceforth abbreviated LSL) for napkp~opa~,  a deponent, meaning ‘to go by’ or ‘pass by’, 
while at the same time taking into consideration the form which this verb has taken. Since 
napehqhuebza is both a perfect and neuter plural participle, the nuance which must be retained is 
not only the idea of a present state resulting from a past action, but it must be shown in relation to the 
tense of the leading verb ~ C L ~ E ~ E L K T ~ L  from knt- ~ E L K U V ~ L ,  ‘to show forth’, E ~ L ~ ~ ~ E L K K X L  itself 
a past, 3rd person singular, indicative. Hence, I have translated zap&hqhuebza as ‘ideas’ (since 
words said, zch dtpqpEuov, become ideas) which ‘have guided’ (a slightly weaker and more 
suitable notion for this passage than to ‘have driven’) the discussion, since such a translation properly 
acknowledges the subtlety of the tense relationship of the past participle to the past main verb. To say 
‘have guided’ indicates a certain priority in time, yet a present state, of the ‘ideas’ to the action of the 
main verb. In other words, these ideas, by ‘guiding’ the discussion, exist before they demonstrate. In 
the other translations the participle and the leading verb are represented as taking place 
simultaneously. 
A possible alternative reading for z@ koyq is “in fair game.” The primary meaning given for 
hoyq in both the abridged and intermediate versions of the LSL for Attic Greek is ‘talk’ or ‘pretence’, 
with 26 hoyq  meaning ‘in pretence’, opposite to kpyq, ‘in reality’. One of the meanings of 
‘pretend’ is to play a game. If “in fair game” were chosen as the translation for z@ hoyq this would 
work well, since not only is the notion of a game in keeping with the imagery Plato has in place, ‘fair’ 
at the same time strengthens the idea that attention is now to be given to the other contestant. 
Moreover, when z@ hoyq is translated as a dative of respect using ‘fair’ (“in fair game”), this retains 




Might. For, in fact, the origin of this Cosmos5 is a mixture of both Might and Mind 
battling together. However, Mind was the ruler of Might, impelling it to bring about 
the greatest good for most of the things generated. Thus, in this manner, by sensible 
persuasion of inferior Might, this universe was wrought together. 
Consequently, if, of whatever came into being, one inquires truly after these matters, 
then the inquiry must also bring into view this particular cause which leads astray 
and how it grew to be nurturing. Therefore, it is necessary to go back again and 
grasp all that belongs to these matters, starting anew, once more, from another origin. 
So thus, concerning these same matters now, just as those earlier, one must start 
again from the beginning. 
It is necessary to look at the nature itself both of fire and water, air and earth, then, 
before the birth of the heavens and at the nae-fi or chaos before this. For up to now 
no one has explained their birth, and yet, as one who knows what fire possibly is, and 
each one of these, we talk of origins, rendering them as building blocks of the 
universe. Nor is it appropriate for them, even by someone of little understanding, to 
be considered as reasonably represented, as it were, by mere ‘syllables’. 
But now then, at least with us, let the following hold. Whether explained as a first 
principle, principles or whatever way it seems to be concerning all things, it must not 
be presented now, and not for any other reason, but due to the difficulty in giving a 
fbll account of our views after the manner of our present discussion. You must not, 
therefore, suppose that I want to expound. Nor, moreover, would I be able to 
persuade myself that it was right should I attempt in attending to so great a task. 
While preserving the meaning of the likely account, which was laid down from the 
beginning concerning all things individually and as a whole, I will undertake nothing 
of less likelihood, rather more, recounting an even earl.ier beginning. 
And now then, let us begin again our discourse, invoking God at the outset of what is 
being said, as Protector, to guide us safely through unnatural and strange territory to 
grounds of probability. 
1.3 Commentary and Notes 
1.3.1 Discussion of T i  47e3 - 48a5 and the imagery of a racehattle 
In this first selection from the Timaeus the language which Plato employs is 
suggestive of the imagery of a race, enlarging it to a battle for victory, between ~065 
and &V&YKV. To this end, he uses ~ a p ~ h @ d h a  from the verb ~ a p k p ~ ~ p a t ,  
The words ‘Cosmos’ and ‘Universe’ are for the most part each written with a capital letter 
throughout to reflect Plato’s belief that the physical cosmos or universe is a single, living and divine 
being. See Ti.30dl-3 l a l ,  34b8-9, 55d4-6 and 92c4-9. However, when referred to at the beginning of 
his discussion or in a general way these words are not capitalised. 
5 
16 
‘to go by’ or ‘to pass by’; napafk68at from napazieqpt, ‘to set before oneself 
or ‘to have set before one’; and Z@ h6yq, translated ‘for inquiry’, but also possibly 
a dative of respect with the sense of ‘talk’ or ‘in pretence’ and translatable as ‘in fair 
game’! At least initially, the contenders of this race and battle are presented as 
equals, which idea is supported by the use of exact literary parallelism between the 
phrases presenting the two principal actors or subjects, ~06s and & u & Y K ~ :  
Thus, Plato, at the outset of his portrayal of the beginning of the Cosmos presents 
~06s and &u&YK~ ,  translated here respectively as ‘Mind’ and ‘Might’, on an equal 
footing. Both operate as causal agents’ in the creation of the mix or p&pyp& l /~~  ... 
Z O ~  K ~ G ~ O V  Y&UEOI< and both are presumably endowed with the ontological 
See my note 3. 
A. Vallejo, in his article “No, it’s not a Fiction” (in Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias, eds. T. Calvo 
and L. Brisson, pp. 14 1-148) distinguishes two kinds of causes within this passage, but denies that 
the cause(s) which works with intelligence (nous) has existence before the generation of soul, 
thereby not identifying this cause with either the Demiurge or with ‘nous’, but with ‘soul’. With 
respect to the cause(s), which, destitute of reason (ananke), “produce their sundry effects at random 
and without order,” he interprets this cause as an ‘event’ (as do those who hold that ‘ananke’ refers 
to secondary causes or mechanical motion) or more properly as a “chain of events” without 
purposeful causality existing prior to generation in an eternal precosmical chaos. This interpretation 
of these causes, however, breaks down when pitted against Plato’s developed notion of ‘soul’ 
introduced in Laws X as Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, akin to the major causal players of 
the Timaeus (see Part I1 of this thesis). Whereas Vallejo’s claim is that what Plato means by chaos 
is the “absence of teleological causality,” whereas ‘necessity’ is to be understood as the “co- 
operative agent of the demiurge,” always present in the world (p, 143) and the two are not to be 
equated, he does nothing to solve the problem of why, if these events or this “co-operative agent” 
needed the Demiurge to become organised, that the earlier disorganised events did not equally 
require a cause to sustain their disorganisation. In saying, moreover, that the “precosmical world as 
a whole does not have a cause, because y k v ~ o t ~  is eternal” (p. 142), even to sustain that chaos, 
Vallejo is stating more than what Plato was prepared to say. Although the y h ~ o t ~  is argued to 
have existed “before the Heavens came into being,” this is not sufficient to say that it is eternal, but 
only that the triangles had to have taken form prior to the generation of the Heavens. Just as Plato 
claims that the ordered cosmos had a cause (the Demiurge), so I will argue throughout the remainder 
of Part I of this thesis (as well as in Part 11), that Plato was fully prepared to admit to a disordering 





status of having existence or being before the yku~otq takes place, and therefore 
also of being eternal. 
Neither Cornford, nor Taylor comment on this opening sentence or on what 
appears to be the imagery of a race or contest between two equal contestants. From a 
philosophical perspective, however, I would suggest that by using this imagery Plato 
is making an important claim. Not only is he giving & u & ~ I c ~  similar, if not the 
same, ontological status as U O G ~ ,  he is also placing it within his scheme of things 
before the generation of the K O C J ~ O ~  and thus, is endowing & U & Y K ~  with some of 
the same essential features as U O G ~ ,  namely, with that of being uncreated and eternal 
with respect to the cosmos. It is from this perspective, moreover, in sharing a degree 
of equality, that one begins to understand the open disdain which Plato feels towards 
the ‘non-benevolent soul’, which I argue is a further development of his 
understanding of & u & Y K ~ ,  later on in Laws X. 
Even more crucial to our discussion here, however, is the rational basis behind 
having set the stage in this way. The main question with which the Timaeus is 
concerned is ‘how the universe began’. At 27a2 Plato writes: 
Consider now the order of the feast we have arranged for you, Socrates. 
Seeing that Timaeus is the best astronomer among us and knows the most 
concerning the nature of the universe, having made it his expertise, he shall 
speak first, beginning with the generation of the cosmos and ending with the 
nature of man. 
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The order of this “feast” is to begin with the origin of the universe and end with the 
nature of man. In keeping with the celebratory tone of this original opening, Plato 
ends his discussion on the “workings of Mind” and begins his next main section on 
the “creations of Might” by alluding to the imagery of a race, yet another social event 
or continuation of such an event. It is essential to both the backdrop, which Plato 
now has in place (a cosmology) and the direction in which his philosophical 
understanding of these metaphysical powers, ~06s and & V & Y I C ~ ,  is moving (as 
opposing forces) that this race be between two equal contestants. To this end his 
writing at this juncture becomes a synthesis of both his literary acumen and 
philosophical understanding.’ Accordingly, Plato places these two clues within the 
prose, one through literary device, i.e. the parallelism noted above and the other 
through literary style, i.e. the imagery of a race, subtly informing the reader of his 
intention. This imagery, I suggest, becomes an important part of the evidence which 
Plato wants considered and which will ultimately help form the fuller answer which 
he wishes to give in regard to the origin of the cosmos. 
In this instance Plato is grappling with the difficult philosophical problem that 
‘soul’ cannot be the cause of inharmonious and disordered motion. He builds slowly 
the solution to this problem. Already at Ti. 28a Plato states that everything which 
becomes and thus changes must do so owing to some cause: 
* Which expertise Plato had gained from being a founding and leading member of the Academy for 
over 20 years. Along with the Laws, the Timaeus likely belongs to his last main group of writings 
written in the remaining ten to twelve years of his life (e.g. see Lee, p. 22). In addition to being well- 
honed in dialogue-writing technique when he wrote the Timaeus, having already composed over 
fifteen dialogues, the fact that Plato chose the dialogue format to present his philosophical treatises is 
of itself enough to warrant a careful look at the prose settings. With regard to the Timaeus, although 
after the introductory section the dialogue form is dropped and the main body of the work then 
becomes a continuous exposition by Timaeus, the prose style nonetheless persists, which Plato will 
use to present his philosophical views contained therein. 
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And again, everything which comes to be must’ come into being by 
some cause. For nothing is able to have come into being without a 
cause. 
He repeats this again at 28c: 
But again, with respect to that which has come into being we say it 
must have come to be by some cause. 
I have used ‘must’ here rather than ‘might’ to distinguish a pending change in Plato’s 
focus, namely, his introduction of an axis of comparison between &u&~Ic?- )  and u06< 
at Ti. 47e-48a. At neither Ti. 28a, nor 28c has Plato yet distinguished &U&YICT as a 
cause itself, merely acknowledging causal force generally, i.e. implied in ‘must’ or 
‘of necessity’, in all acts of Y ~ U E O I S .  At this juncture the causal power behind 
generation is still under consideration by Plato. He is aware, however, that the 
physical forces within the ~60po<, like the Cosmos itself, are subject to change, 
forming part of the process of ‘becoming’ and therefore point to another cause or 
causes as the source of generation.” It is this idea, I suggest, which drives the 
I have chosen ‘must’ rather than the stronger sense of ‘necessarily’ or ‘of necessity’ in order to point 
to the possibility that the original meaning of kc &u&y~qs as a prepositional phrase, deriving 
etymologically from a combination of the preposition &ua’ = ‘up’ combined with & y ~ f i  = ‘arm’, has 
a direct bearing on its later usage and may have a specialised use with respect to physical force by 
Plato when discussing the generation of the cosmos. See Dictionnaire ktymologzque de la Langue 
Grecgue, ed. P. Chantraine, Klincksieck, Paris, 1968, p. 83. Further, whereas ‘must’ still retains a 
possible connection to this idea of ‘physical force’ and can be understood in this sense, ‘of necessity’ 
implies a logical or practical necessity, in which no reminiscence of an earlier provenance need be 
discerned. “you must have twisted your ankle” on proposing a 
diagnosis, but would not say “you necessarily twisted your ankle.” Lee has also chosen “must” for 
this passage (p. 40). At both Ti. 28a and 28c Taylor and Cornford have translated dcudy~q in the 
stronger sense of ‘necessity’. 
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For example, one might say, 
See Ti. 27d5-28a6; see also Ti. 46c7-e6. 10 
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change of focus Plato introduces later at Ti. 47e-48a, where, with UO.?><, & U & Y I C ~  is 
first presented as a substantive and potential cause in its own right. Thus, although at 
Ti. 28a and 28c & u & Y H ; ~  is very closely tied with the idea of the Y&U&OLG, by being 
part of the common prepositional phrase &e & U & Y I C ~ <  and treated as a modal (must) 
or adverbial (of necessity), it is still subordinated to the idea of finding the cause 
behind the ~&v&oL< and is not yet considered as a causal contender itself. However, 
the idea of & U & Y K ~  remains a close linking concept between the Y&U&OI< and the 
~ L ~ C X ,  which proximity Plato makes full use in further developing his causal ideas 
involving &U&YKT. 
At Ti. 28c there are two possibilities for Plato’s treatment of &u&YH;T). First, it 
would appear odd that Plato should repeat within such close proximity two almost 
identical statements, the other being at 28a. The first possibility and the one which I 
propose is that in this second passage &U&YKTU is the subject of the infinitive &hat 
forming part of the indirect discourse introduced by the verb @@U. By the 
introduction of & U & Y I C ~  as a substantive, therefore, but still following very closely 
upon its prior meaning in reference to bd ~ L Z ~ O U  T L U ~ <  and its use at 28a, Plato has 
now fully prepared his reader in a two-stage fashion, at 28a and 28c, for what 
appears to be a decisive move at Ti. 48a1, where in combination with u~.?>G,  
& U & Y K ~  is named as the general cause of the Universe. Thus, at 48a & U & Y H ; ~  is 
now directly contrasted with UO.?>< in which instance I have translated this not as 
‘must’ or ‘of necessity’, but as ‘might’ to note the development which &U&YICT is 
undergoing. This historical movement of & U & Y I C ~ ,  therefore, begins with the idea 
of ‘force’, moves to that of ‘cause’ and specifically, the primal cause, Ananke, and 
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finally rests with the idea of ‘necessarily’, where it has now been separated from both 
the source and effect of any causal agency, i.e. (brute) force. My further suggestion, 
which is shown in my translations of 28a and 28c by the use of the word ‘must’, is 
that Plato has signalled this change of meaning in &V&YKV at 48a, from that of 
‘force’ to ‘cause’, earlier at 28c. The following diagram illustrates this possible 
development of & V & Y K ~  as it was first understood apart from its later use within the 
prepositional phrase kk &U&YKV< (‘necessarily’) or in its close association with the 
idea of an ~ L T ~ O U  or ‘cause’: 
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1.3.2 
The meaning of &u&YK~\ as it came to be understood: 
Diagram A - proposed historical development of &U&yKq/ananke as ‘force’ 
Things created come/came to be through ‘necessity’ 
(logical or physical force) 
i.e. ‘necessarily’/ ‘must’ 
through/of ‘Might’ /and ‘Mind’ 
(6 i  &U&KqG) 
This idea of & v & y ~ q  as ‘force’, in turn, had its even earlier development: 
FORCE + MODAL FORCE/ NECESSITY 
- an early etymology: 
&v& +&ylcfi 
(UP + arm) 
= physical force 
+ 
- a later, derived meaning: 
& v & y q  
(must, necessarily, of necessity) 
(28a: &U&YKqs ) 
(28c: &U&yK‘?lU ) 
Thus, it is with regard to its historical background (rich for purposes of myth and 
metaphor) or one similar to it, that I suggest Plato gives free play in his use of 
& V & Y K ~  when describing the generation of the cosmos. 
The second possibility is that this mirroring of 28a by 28c is unimportant, with the 
introduction of &V&yKq, in its substantive form &U&yKqV, likewise carrying no 
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importance. A u & ~ K ~  as & V & Y K T ~  can simply be glossed over as though it were in 
its prepositional form kc & v & Y K ? ~ ~  and then be translated as ‘necessarily’. I reject 
this second possibility on the grounds that it is not only inaccurate, but fails to 
capture the meaning of Plato’s richly nuanced prose, which when taken at face value 
is fully comprehensible. The first reading also better aids the understanding of what 
follows, with less having to be interpreted as metaphor. 
1.3.3 
Beyond its historical development within the Greek language, however, Plato also 
imposes on &~dcyKT a technical meaning specifically for use in his cosmology.” 
By drawing upon the idea of physical force from its original etymology and 
combining this with the idea of ‘necessity’ fiom its later usage, Plato allows 
& V & Y K ~  to take on substantially more meaning and importance than it previously 
had, becoming in its own right a ‘cause’. Accordingly, at 47e5-48a of the Timaeus 
& V & Y K ~  has now become a cause of the K ~ ~ O S ,  although its nature is still to be 
articulated and initially is described only metaphorically as a cause: 
A new meaning for &U&YKT 
I agree with Teloh that “we cannot assume that Plato uses a rigorous, regimented technical 
vocabulary; odds are, and in several cases we have strong evidence, that the same word has different 
uses in different contexts” (The Development of PZato s Metaphysics, p. 15, hereafter abbreviated 
DPM), which, in this case, I suggest, is substantiated by Plato’s highly skilled use of the word 
‘ananke’ . 
1 1  
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1.3.4 Diagram B - development by Plato of &v&yKq/Ananke as a cause 
&v&yrCq 
(physical force + modal/ logical necessity) 
now becomes a casual agent in the origin of the Cosmos, which origin is 
metaphorically described as a mixture of both & U & Y K ~  and UOGS battling together: 
= one of two Causes 
a‘tTLOL 
47e5,48al &V&ylC‘ll(q) H 
Might 
47e4,48al V O 6  
Mind 
soon specifically referred to as a cause 
48a7 TfiG*..&MOq dLTiaG12 
Thus, by 48a7 Plato refers to & U & Y K ~  as a particular cause. Moreover, as a cause 
‘which leads astray’ but ‘grew to be nurturing’ Plato announces his intention to 
inquire further into its singular nature and role in his cosmology. The development 
of & U ~ Y K ~  from being the object of a somewhat innocuous, albeit important, 
prepositional phrase at 28a, namely, that everything which comes to be must have a 
cause, to something, which at 48a, along with UOGS, has being of a grand stature, i.e. 
is uncreated and therefore eternal, and a being, moreover, which, possessed of a will, 
is capable of leading astray, presents a huge development of this concept and in a 
very short space. The extent of the development of & u & ~ I c ~ ,  combined with the 
Plato changes from using the neuter noun a’!~ztov at Ti. 28a and 28c to using the feminine noun 
a’tzia here. 
25 
brevity in which this takes place and the explicitness by which Plato now states his 
concerns and intention to explicate it further, preclude an analysis which understands 
this development as mere hyperbole, metaphorical speech or symbolism of 
something else. Such brevity and explicitness, I would argue, by minimising 
confusion, is in keeping with the borrowing of a well-known term, but now used in a 
new and technical way. Not only has Plato prepared the reader for this move at Ti. 
28a and 28c, but he explicitly acknowledges it at 47e3-48a5. 
Furthermore, just as a careful reading of the Greek text shows Plato to have a 
dynamic sense of & v & Y K ~ ,  taking on new meaning as the context changes, likewise 
different words need to be used when translating it in order to avoid not only 
falsification by oversimplification, but also ambiguity. The above, I suggest, is 
compelling evidence not to retain for every instance of & V & Y K ~  the adverbial sense 
‘of necessity’ or ‘necessarily’, a meaning derived from the common, but later usage 
of the prepositional phrase kc &v&YK~< .  With respect to the latter, Plato clearly 
acknowledges its later use by using this prepositional phrase exclusively in the final 
third of the Timaeus, where the cosmos as fully operational is being described. 
Moreover, the issue of whether this ‘necessity’ is modal, practical or logical is easily 
glossed over, yet would impact the overall meaning of a passage. Additionally, the 
possible early etymology from &U& and & y ~ f i  with the associated meaning of 
physical force is too quickly passed over or simply forgotten. Finally, in explicitly 
stating at 48a7 that & V & Y K ~  is a cause in its own right, Plato discourages subsequent 
readings in the Timaeus which would indicate it functioned merely as a modifier, 
which readings, should they arise, would have to be carefully substantiated. 
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Thus, to use the adverbial sense of ‘necessarily’ or any other such single meaning 
throughout the Timaeus or to build upon the idea of ‘necessity’ a derivative meaning, 
e.g. mechanical motion, when trying to understand or translate & U & Y K ~  is, I 
suggest, erroneous. l 3  First, no 
compelling evidence is given for retaining one meaning throughout, on the contrary, 
a careful reading of the text would indicate otherwise. Second, when the 
development of &U&YKT is mapped in the Timaeus a subtle but dynamic movement 
with regard to its meaning is revealed. Third, the idea of ‘necessity’ is itself 
ambiguous, there being several different kinds of ‘necessity’. Should this ambiguity 
or dynamism go unrecognised, it commits the reader to the fallacy of equivocation or 
to misunderstanding in general. l 4  The modem philosophical notion that the 
correctness of an argument depends upon a word or expression maintaining a 
constant meaning throughout must be very carefully applied when drawing 
conclusions concerning & v & Y K ~ .  I would argue that in choosing the dialogue 
The reasons can be summarised as follows. 
In Leucippus’s remark that “Nothing happens at random, but everything from reason and necessity” 
(B2), which ‘reason’, as Vlastos explains, is the reason of necessity or “the reasoning of mechanistic 
explanation which excludes rigorously and systematically considerations of value from the 
determination of matter of fact” (Plato’s Universe, p. 30, hereafter abbreviated Pv) is clearly at odds 
with Plato’s understanding of v o e ~  and & U & Y K ~  discussed here. Value is intrinsic to Plato’s 
metaphysics and is perhaps why, I suggest, Plato chose to highlight these two primal powers in just 
the way he did in the Timaeus and later in Laws X (transformed in this later work as ‘Souls’ - see Part 
I1 of this thesis), expressing in this way his opposition to the atomist position regarding these causal 
powers and their relation to the world. The Leucippus fragment is in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 
Understanding hvdylcq variously as modal, practical or logical necessity is an example of the 
possible equivocation which might occur, causing at the very least a lack of clarity and at worst, 
confusion and erroneous conclusions concerning certain passages. Further, by translating & I & Y K ~  
by the word ‘must’ or ‘necessity’ in the course of drawing a particular conclusion where certain of the 
passages upon which the conclusion rests have actually reverted to its earlier and more basic meaning 
of ‘physical force’ or alternatively, to Plato’s newly derived meaning of metaphysical ‘cause’, would 
also result in general misunderstanding, since the subsequent interpretation would assume the 
meaning of ‘must’ or ‘necessity’ (or some notion developed from these, e.g. mechanical motion) in all 
instances used in drawing its conclusions, whereas in fact the meaning of &u&y~q would, I argue, 




format, consistency of this kind was of less concern to Plato than the dynamic quality 
and possibilities of conversation and the ideas which would consequently emanate, 
and that his treatment of & U & Y I C ~  attests to this. Thus, to apply rules of consistency 
to the whole of the Timaeus becomes an anachronism if applied too strictly, since 
evidence for argumentation dependent on such consistency is almost entirely 
missing. Rather, Plato presents his cosmology as an observer making reasonable or 
what for him were likely, deductions about the universe and how it came about. As 
he builds his cosmology he develops his own understanding of it and in so doing 
builds a vocabulary capable of supporting this cosmology and one in which he allows 
for fluidity of usage and changes in meaning. 
1.3.5 Discussion of Ti. 48al (p&p&~ypkq ydp OGU...ky&vVq8q) and the 
meaning of OUO.C&OECO~/OUU~O.C~~L. 
In the sentence which immediately follows I would suggest that by employing 
OUOZ~~O&CO< Plato follows through with the two central ideas already introduced in 
his prior opening sentence, that of a contest between two equals and of the force 
which such a match would create. What is essential to note here is that it is neither 
& V ~ ~ Y I C T  on its own, nor U O ~ < ,  which is considered the cause of the universe, but 
rather the force created by their ‘striving t~gether’,’~ with the consequence that it is 
this force which brings about the universe. To take the meaning of OZW.C&OEO~ 
here in the weaker sense of ‘combination’ as Bury,16 Lee” and Cornford” have all 
The meaning of ‘strive’ used here is that of ‘to struggle in opposition’ or ‘to contend’. I argue that 
Plato’s understanding is that the physical universe was wrought out of the force created by this 
‘striving’ between Ananke and the Demiurge, and not to any conjugal striving between these powers, 
which its other meaning, ‘to make effort’, might imply. The fact that the universe originated out of 
this contentious striving, however, makes ‘strive’ uniquely suitable, since the organised universe was 
also generated as a result of their combined, albeit acrimonious, effort. 
15 
Bury, Ti. p. 109. 16 
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done belies the imagery which Plato is carefully creating, namely, that of a battle 
between two combatants, who between them create enough force to shake the 
Cosmos into existence. What is clearly being emphasised by Plato is the idea of the 
force created by this union and not merely the fact that &v&YK?~ and ~065 were 
combined. Strengthening this idea, moreover, is the fact that OUOZ&OEW~ 
translated as ‘combination’ adds nothing new to the idea already stated by 
p ~ p ~ ~ p k ~ q  or ‘mixture’, with the consequence that it appears superfluous. 
Conversely, except in this one instance OWT&OEW~; is not understood anywhere 
else in the Timaeus either by Bury, Lee, Comford or Taylor to mean ‘combination’ 
in the sense of joining two disparate, unordered physical or metaphysical objects. 
Rather, once Plato has moved on from this short opening metaphor the essential 
meaning of OUOZ&OEW< in each of the four remaining instances is that of a 
completed ‘structure’, which instances are invariably those of something which has 
already been ordered and do not involve either ~065 or hV&yKq.19  Thus, to accept 
‘combination’ as the meaning of OWZ&OEW< at Ti. 48a2 where references 
elsewhere are consistently to a completed structure is awkward, and therefore, I 
suggest, unlikely. 
There are two further points worth considering. First, the verb O U V ~ O Z ~ ~ I  while 
used in a general sense throughout the Timaeus, does not appear to be used in a 
technical way, i.e. reserved for a specific context. It presents as only one among 
Lee, Ti. p. 66. 
Cornford, PC, p. 160. 
o u o z & o ~ ; o ~  is translated variously as a ‘compound’, ‘construction’ or ‘combination’ (of a fifth 
regular solid) at Ti. 55c4, as a ‘structure’, ‘texture’ or ‘cubes’ (of earth) at 60e4, as the ‘structure’ (of 





several verbs or verb formations used in the Timaeus by Plato to mean ‘combine’ or 
‘construct’. Thus, for example, whereas OUUIOZ&< is used for the ‘Constructor’ of 
the Cosmos (Ti. 37~7)’  so is &r\ptoupyb< (29a3) and frequently (e.g. 4Ocl-2; 41c5; 
42e8; 69c2; 75b820). Likewise, while O U U ~ O Z ~ ~ I  is used to mean ‘construct’ (in the 
sense of ‘combine’) when referring to the Cosmos (i.e. 29el), so is the verb 
6qptoupyko’ 29a7-bl ; 69c4), its use preceding that of O U U ~ O Z T ) ~ ~ .  Moreover, not 
only 6qptoupyk01, but several other verbs appear throughout the Timaeus carrying 
similar meanings of blending, mixing, compounding (sometimes translated as 
‘fashion’ or ‘fabricate,2’ but with the idea of ‘compounding’) or combining, e.g. 
z & K ‘ d ~ o p a t  (28~6 ;  33bl; 36el), ~ 0 t h  (34b3), O U ~ K E P ~ U U U ~ ~  (37a.3-4), 
&pp6@ (41bl), n;poou@ai~w (41dl-2), ouy~ohhdw (43a2), ouukxw + 
6&op6~ (43a2), O’UUZ~KW (43a3), &tpi + oupn;ay&< (56e7), ~uppiyuup~ 
(57d4; 60b8; 74c7; 76d5), piy~upt (59d4; 59e8), ~upn;qy~upt (60e3), 
K&pduI)Z)pl (68cl; 68c3), O U ~ K E ~ ~ U U U ~  (68c2), o ~ a p p 6 @  (74~7)’ 
~ W Z Z ~ ~ C J O  (83b7) and o~pn;hdooo (83d6). An interesting example is the verb 
o ~ 6 k ~ 0  at 32b1, meaning ‘to bind’, for while 6k0 is joined by ~ a i  with 
O U U ~ O Z ~ ~ ~  ( O U U ~ ~ T ) C J E  ~ a i  G ~ V & G Z ~ ~ ~ Z O )  and has the meaning of ‘joined’ (i.e. 
the four elements), the latter ( G V U E G Z ~ ~ G ~ Z O )  is clearly referring to what has just 
been ‘constructed’ or the 0 b p a ~ 6 ~ .  Thus, Plato here is purposely not choosing the 
verb ~ U U ~ O Z ~ ~ L ,  but rather, another one, O U U ~ ~ O ,  to carry the meaning of ‘to join 
~~ ~ ~ 
This last example is in the plural, referring to the ‘Constructors of our being’, also called the 20 
‘tuczficavz~q at Ti. 7 1 d6. 
21 E.g. Bury. 
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together’, retaining for G V V ~ G T ~ ~ L  the more general sense of ‘constructing’ or a 
‘construction’. 
A second and important observation is that the opening structure of the Timaeus 
as a whole supports what can be taken as a metaphorical opening to Plato’s 
description of its second beginning, while at the same time giving evidence for the 
dynamic use of G V U ~ J % ~ ~ L .  To wit, Plato, in the opening of the Timaeus moves 
from a mythical setting at 25a6 ( O V U ~ G Z ~ ) ,  passing quickly to a description of the 
physical Cosmos with its metaphysical implications at 29e 1 (GWLGT&S). Likewise, 
when introducing his new description of the universe, Plato moves from what I argue 
is an imaginative battle at 48a2 (OUGT&OEOS), at the same time re-introducing his 
two key metaphysical players or forces, but then moves immediately to a description 
of the physical universe (GVV~GT~ZO )  where, once again, he begins anew a working 
out of the metaphysical implications. I would proffer the opinion that Plato’s reason 
for staging his entries in this way, i.e imaginatively, when attempting to give 
description to the beginning of universe is to emphasise that what he is about to offer 
is a ‘likely’ or possible account rather than an exact or compelling one. Moreover, 
the use of metaphorical language at 48a2 in contrast to the myth employed at the 
beginning of the Timaeus is in keeping with both the considerably smaller 
metaphysical stature of & U & Y K ~  in comparison to U O ~ S  and the importance of the 
opening of the work over secondary considerations. 
Taylor” in his commentary, along with Bury and Lee, translates G V ~ % & G E O ~  as 
‘combination’. Thus, he  comments as follows: 
A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (henceforth abbreviated PO, p. 303. 22 
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This is not what the text states, but rather: 
&k &V&YlCTlG TE KCXi VOG OuoZ&OEO~ 
If Taylor is merely clarifying the syntactical structure by his re-arrangement of this 
short Greek passage I am curious as to why, for whereas he presents the syntax of 
this passage as being fairly obvious and likewise its meaning, he offers no reason for 
the need to clarify the syntax or support for his reading. I would like to offer some 
observations with respect to this. First, ‘ k ~ ’  with ‘ O U W ~ ~ O E W G ~  is never cited by 
LSL as meaning ‘from a combination’, but rather is quoted once with the meaning 
of ‘a standing together, close conflict, battle’, modifying p&xq (Hdn. 4.15.3). Plato 
is also cited as using ‘OUOT~~GEOG’ with this same meaning, but not with &K and 
again, closely joined to p&xq by K C X ~  (Lg. 833a). Moreover, C J ~ C C ~ O ~ G  from the 
root O V U ~ O T ~ ~ ~ ,  meaning a ‘bringing together’, is not mentioned at all as occurring 
in the Timaeus, whereas ~ ~ O T ~ O I <  from the root C J V V I & W X ~ ~ I  meaning a 
‘combination’, although cited, is never cited with respect to Ti. 48a2, but rather, only 
to other passages relating to the ongoing explication of the cosmology (i.e. 32c6, 
36d8, 75b3). Z ~ G T ~ O L G  is also understood in the sense of ‘formation’ at 89b5, but 
other than these few instances, neither O~OTCXOLG nor ‘GWT&OEOG’ are again 
cited from the Timaeus. It should be noted, moreover, that LSL does not cite 
OVOT~~OEOG at Ti. 48a2 as meaning ‘combination’, even though it would have 
presented a clear example from a key passage, if in fact that were its meaning. 
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It is also possible that OUOT&O&O< is in fact an adverb and not, as Taylor 
suggests, a noun in the genitive case.23 There are two points in favour of this 
reading. First, its form is in keeping with that of an adverb i.e. ending in -EO< and 
second, so is its placement, i.e. placed directly before the verb. I would further argue 
that the dynamic sense of the interaction between & U & Y K ~  and U O ~ S ,  whether of 
‘combining’ or of ‘battling’, is more precisely caught by adverbial modification than 
by the more static nominal. 
With respect to a nominal reading, however, prepositions such as &K do not 
strictly govern cases, but rather, serve to bring out more clearly or emphasise the 
meaning of the cases with which they stand. Thus, should the text at 48al-2 actually 
read &K ~ z > o z & O & ~ G ,  which it does not, with O Z > ~ % & O & ~ G  remaining a genitive 
noun, this argues just as favourably for the idea of ‘separation’ or ‘combating’ (i.e. 
the genitive of separation) as it does for ‘combining’, whereby the genitive of origin, 
relation or causal means are argued to be in play, a1 of which are indicated by the 
genitive case. 
I queried above the reason for Taylor wishing to clarify the syntax of this passage, 
while being satisfied, as it were, with merely asserting the meaning of the passage 
after alteration of its syntax. Reasons were clearly lacking. In response I argued that 
this passage should indeed be commented upon, but without alteration. Rather, it 
needs to be looked at first and foremost as Plato wrote it. I would like to further 
suggest that the key to Taylor’s lack of argumentation is evidenced in his very next 
comment with regard to 48a3. Here he quotes Hume and the “growing discovery of 
23 There is no evidence presented in the LSL for this reading. 
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rational connexion, as science Although Taylor is explicating the 
reason why ~06s is successful in ‘persuading’ &U&YKT~ in “the majority of cases,” 
his method is to refer back to the ~ a i  jo ning & U & Y K ~  to ~06s at 48a1, where he 
states “at first we began by seeing only ‘conjunction’,’’ quoting as he puts it “Hume’s 
famous antithesis.” We cannot read or assume to understand Plato according to 
Hume’s eighteenth-century understanding of science. It is Hume, however, whom 
Taylor is quoting in support of his understanding of these passages and not Plato. As 
such, Taylor’s presentation of Hume’s scientific acumen, while interesting, does not 
offer tenable support to his alteration and consequent reading of this passage. 
Thus, what is presented in Taylor’s commentary as a simple and at first glance, 
harmless switch of syntax, supposedly to clarify the syntactical structure of the 
passage, is questionable upon closer scrutiny. It becomes indicative of further 
distortion which will follcw throughout Taylor’s commentary in his reading of 
& U & Y K ~  and ~06s. In understanding OUOT&O&W~ as ‘combination’, an abstract, 
non-active noun, the causal powers & U & Y K ~  and ~06s  henceforth become 
secondary or mere explanatory features of the cosmology, with references to either as 
key players mitigated to various degrees of allegory. EWJT&OEO~, on the other 
hand, by losing any active sense it might have had fiom its original verbal root 
presents a devitalised and ultimately positivist depiction of the origin of the Cosmos, 
which, while a fitting testimony to the appreciation of the advances of scientific 
method from Hume’s day on, is oddly out of place for Plato, and is a depiction, I 
would argue, Plato neither intended nor described. 
24 Taylor, PT, p. 303. 
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In like manner and with the same consequence, C ~ r n f o r d ~ ~  translates 
OUO.C&O&O< as ‘combination’, feeling neither the need to open up this passage for 
discussion, nor like Taylor, to clarify its syntax. However, the consequence of this 
choice, becomes, as it did for Taylor, a crucial move away from a deeper 
understanding of & u & Y K ~ ,  an understanding which would take into consideration 
any literary clues that were in place, not just the larger scientific picture, and one 
which would also take into consideration any possible original use by Plato of the 
Greek language in describing what for him was the likely origin of the Cosmos, 
wherein fresh use of the language would at times not only have been naturally 
forthcoming, but also necessary. 
1.3.6 The meaning of Y~V&OI.< 
The meaning of y h & o t <  at Ti. 48a1, I suggest, is singular, found within t ?e 
context of a unique opening metaphor re-introducing the beginning of the Cosmos. I 
would argue, however, that in these first few lines its meaning is closer to that of 
‘origin’ than ‘generation’.26 What is at issue here is the positing of a pre-generative 
viewpoint prior to the generation of the universe as distinct from a reference to the 
universe during its physical generation, thus supporting Plato’s stated view that the 
Cosmos had a beginning and rejecting interpretations arguing otherwise. I offer the 
following reasons. First, ‘generation’, in the sense of the production or manner, the 
‘how’ in which the Cosmos came into being, is yet to be discussed and will not be 
discussed until after the invocation to the protective deity at 48d4. Second, although, 
25 Cornford, PC, pp. 160-177. 
26 See Ti. 28b. 
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like &U&YIC~\ and CJZ>CJZ&CJEW<, Y&VEOL< will also shift in meaning once it is 
outside its opening metaphor, i.e. from ‘origin’ to ‘generation’, it does so specifically 
to accommodate a change of focus, namely, from an opening reference to the 
primary event, i.e. the ‘battling together’ of ~06s and & U & Y K ~  which creates the 
force driving the ~&UECJL<,  to a description of how the individual items of the 
universe were actually made and in what order they were made, which focus will 
occupy Timaeus to the end of his speech. Third, nowhere in the Timaeus is an actual 
theory of mechanical motion ever made explicit, but if one were to assume such a 
theory as its basis, it could then be argued that at 48al ‘generation’ is a more apt 
translation for Y&UEOL<, rejecting ‘origin’ as being more diffuse in meaning and 
therefore open to unnecessary metaphysical speculation. This I would argue, for all 
of the above reasons, is wrong. Choosing an ontological and event-based reading of 
47e3-48a5 requires neither a reductive nor figurative understanding of this passage, 
but rather, a metaphorical one, where the big metaphysical questions are envisioned 
but not asked. They are put aside to address the physical ones, the metaphysical 
questions having been thought too difficult to answer or the listener not able to 
~nderstand.~’ Granted, therefore, that in the opening metaphor, a metaphysical basis 
and not merely a physical one is being assumed, should the more difficult 
metaphysical questions be articulated, then religious answers cannot be overlooked 
and in fact, may be required, which is the position Plato argues passionately for in 
Laws X. 
See Ti. 28c and 48c. 27 
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A description of the manner in which this mixture brought about the Cosmos is 
what follows next. Plato, however, gives little detail at this juncture except to 
highlight that “Mind was the ruler of Might,” impelling the greatest good for most of 
the things generated. Nonetheless, from this short description we do get a glimpse of 
the respective powers of both U O ~ <  and of & u & Y K ~ .  Mind, which always brings 
about the greatest good, seems to have achieved this for most things generated, but 
not for all, leaving us with the clear implication that Might, not being rendered 
totally powerless, was able to bring about a lesser good for certain, but far fewer 
things. In other words, the greatest good was not achieved consistently or 
completely for all things generated in the Cosmos due to residual power remaining 
with and supposedly having been used by & U & Y K ~  or Might during the generative 
process. Plato does not give further details or clarification of what he means here. 
This apparent lack of detail, however, is understandable if Timaeus’ speech is 
understood primarily as that of an observer. Thus, it was observed that “Mind was 
the ruler of Might” and upon further consideration a theory followed. In other 
words, Timaeus did not base his understanding on a priori ideas and then posit a 
world according to these ideas, but quite the opposite. He observed the world and 
from this, extrapolated a theory of its origin. There is no evidence here of either 
Plato’s theory of forms28 or a theory of mechanical motion. Rather, Plato, through 
Timaeus’ opening remarks, notes that the Cosmos appears for the most part to be 
perfectly good, i.e. “the greatest good” having been achieved for most things 
’‘Although a clear reference is made to the Forms beginning at T i . 2 8 ~ 5 ,  no such reference is made in 
the later passage beginning at 47e3. 
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generated, but not completely so, crediting to Mind what is wholly good and to 
Might what is not. 
1.3.7 NOGG and &VdyKq 
For Plato the workings of ~ 0 6 5  and &V&YKT~ capture the very essence of 
generation, both the act (their ‘striving together’) and the result (the Universe), and 
yet, of themselves, they are neither. He has already declared that to discover the 
Maker and Father of this universe, the agent, is “a hard task indeed,” deeming it 
impossible to tell all men about Him.29 Therefore, it is not surprising that Plato does 
not spell out fully what ~065 and & U & Y K ~  are. He cannot, for, like the Maker of 
the universe, they remain behind the scenes with only their effect being felt and 
hence, articulated. For this reason to ask who or what they are remain largely 
unanswerable and perhaps inappropriate questions, since their being is prior to all 
gemration. Plato addresses this problem by either leaving them alone within a 
context with very little explanation or by using metaphor or simile and to some 
degree, anthropomorphic language, when describing and using them in his 
cosmology. However, in so doing he is not reducing their metaphysical status to 
mere symbolism or to some abstraction about the Cosmos, for nowhere in the 
Timaeus does he intimate this and in Laws X he argues against such views.30 Rather, 
with the assistance of myth and metaphor-the language of the unknown-and likely 
storytelling, Plato enlarges the context of his cosmology to include what existed 
before the generation of the Cosmos. He does this, moreover, in such a way so as to 
Ti. 28c3-5. 




also allow a certain precision of description (i.e. both U O ~ <  and & U & Y I C ~  have 
qualities akin to the physical world later described and as causal forces are 
understood by Plato to be the source of its generation), as well as passion, especially 
in Laws X, for what ultimately remained unseen and unknown to ordinary man. 
1.3.7.1 A discussion of ~ 0 6 s  
I have chosen to translate U O ~ <  as ‘Mind’ in order to incorporate from the text 
what I believe is the best reading. Taylor also understands U O ~ <  as ‘Mind’, offering 
several points in support of this, some of which are historical (see Appendix I of this 
thesis).31 ‘Mind’ generally does not refer to just reason, the will, the subconscious, 
the conscious, the soul, intelligence, identity, thought or personality alone, but it can 
and often does refer to any or all of these aspects of mental or spiritual phenomena, 
depending on what ideas are being demonstrated or what act is being carried out. At 
Ti. 47e4 Plato specifically states that the ideas presented up to this point by Timaeus 
demonstrate the workings of V O ~ <  or as I have translated it, ‘Mind’. However, the 
demonstration of such workings tell us little about U O ~ <  itself other than that there is 
rationality involved. To be able to figuratively race alongside & U & Y I C ~ ,  to battle 
with it and ultimately impel it to bring about the greatest good for most things 
generated does not imply rationality or intelligence alone, but is, I suggest, much 
more akin to action which requires the totality of mind. In this regard, I follow 
Taylor’s understanding, in which he has translated U O ~ <  within the Timaeus as 
‘Mind’ up to and including this passage at 47e3-48d7. Occasionally Taylor restricts 
8 
31 See Taylor, PT, pp. 74, 82, 117, 123, 153, 175, 182-83, 247, 292-93 as set out in the Appendix at 
the end of this thesis. 
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his understanding to a certain aspect of mind, e.g. ‘thought’ (at Ti.29b6), but not to 
the degree that he is willing to incorporate, even intermittently, a substantially 
different understanding and hence, translation. 
Plato’s use of ~06s in describing the generation of the Universe is one of the 
more difficult complexities of the Timaeus. A telling question to help unravel this, 
however, is to ask why Plato refers not only to ‘the God’32 in the generation of the 
world, but also to a ‘Demiurge’, in addition to ‘nous’. Moreover, if one were to 
concede that the ‘God’ mentioned at Ti. 30a2 is in fact the Demiurge who generated 
the Universe, what is Plato’s purpose in introducing ‘nous’ as well? Pointedly, what 
is ‘nous’? With regard to the first question, I find no evidence within the Timaeus in 
support of the argument that the Demiurge referred to at 68e2 or 69c3 is anything 
other than ‘the God’ referred to at 30a2. These references are used interchangeably 
and synonymously, the Demiurge referring to the God’s activity in generating the 
world much in the same way that a man may be referred to as a father in relation to 
his children and an engineer in relation to his work or even a gardener in relation to a 
hobby, but nonetheless remaining one and the same man. Elsewhere in this thesis33 I 
have argued that the Demiurge does not represent the whole of what the God is- 
Plato denies that it is possible to truly know the Father of the Universe (he is “past 
finding out,’’ Ti. 28c3-5)--but rather, bears witness to and names a specific activity 
of the God, namely, his role as a craftsman in the generation the world. The fluidity 
with which Plato uses these and other names for God bears witness to this. Even 
I follow the practice of A. S. Mason (Reason and Necessity in Plato’s Timaeus, D. Phil. thesis, 
Braesnose College, Oxford, 1990, p. 1, fn. 2) and others in generally keeping the article when 
referring to the primary deity, so as to avoid potential confusion with the Christian concept of ‘God’. 
33 For example, see 53.3.3.1 and 54.3.7 of Part I and $4.3.6 of Part I1 of this thesis. 
32 
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later, in Laws X, when Plato’s understanding concerning the God has developed still 
further, his intermingling of names for this primary god, that of ‘King’ (Lg. 904a6) or 
the ‘supremely good Soul’ (Lg. 897c7), remains the same. In each case Plato is 
highlighting an aspect of the God’s activity in relation to the generated world. 
With the regard to the second question or Plato’s reason for introducing ‘nous’ as 
an adjunct to ‘the God’ as a causal source in generating the world, the answer proves 
more complex. However, if one also remembers that Plato does not allow the creator 
God to generate the world ex nihil0 or ‘out of nothing’,34 rather it was generated out 
of chaotic and mostly unorganised material (and never out of purposely organised 
material) and additionally, incorporates the assistance of ideal Forms in order for the 
Demiurge to construct of the world, then it comes to no surprise that Plato should 
isolate the reasoning function of this god in the form of ‘ n ~ u s ’ . ~ ’  What all of this 
suggests is that as the causal scheme is disclosed in order to accord with human 
understanding, so Plato increases the primary god’s attributes (e.g. ‘Mind’) and the 
tools (e.g. chaotic material and the Forms) he uses. I argue elsewhere concerning the 
primal powers that the Demiurge is all ‘nous’ or rationality to the degree that Ananke 
is not. However, I do not argue that ‘nous’ for Plato is onZy rationality and in this 
regard I differ substantially from C ~ r n f o r d . ~ ~  Part of this disagreement lies in 
Cornford’s rejection of the idea that the myth which Plato has constructed refers to 
The idea that ‘nothing comes from nothing’ is a negative statement of the principle of sufficient 
reason. 
35 Gregory Vlastos captures the richness of the Demiurge’s character when he states that “the high god 
of the Timaeus is not so much a governor as a philosopher, a mathematician, an engineer, and, above 
all, an artist. That he is Reason personified is taken for granted; Plato alludes to this from time to 
time, but feels no need to say so formally. He does not call his deity “Nous” or “Logos,” but 
“Demiourgos” - literally, “Craftsman” (Plato ’s Universe, p. 26). 
34 
See Cornford, PC, pp. 33-37. 36 
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anything ontologically real in the metaphysical realm, allowing it only to refer to 
aspects of the physical world. However, as my thesis later argues, Plato’s 
burgeoning metaphysical retinue in the opening scenes of his cosmology is for the 
sake of understanding the divine, however imperfect our knowledge, in its role in the 
world’s generation. To understand the divine at all we must bring it into human 
terms and that is exactly what Plato has done, but to say that that is all that the divine 
is goes much too far. Mind or ‘nous for Plato represents the best of man 
disembodied, his ‘mind’, but now free to act in its every capacity. In this form it 
becomes the highest vision Plato can approximate in intimating the active power of 
the God and with regard to the final question, of what ‘nous’ is, provides his closest 
answer to the divine identity. 
Cornford’s understanding of V O ~ S  is articulated as early as page 27 of his 
commentary where he is discussing 27c-29d of the Timaeus. Thus, he writes: 
He [PlatoI3’ was certain that the visible world exhibited the working of a 
divine intelligence aiming at what is good, and he held it to be of the 
utmost importance for the conduct of human life that this should be 
believed. The truth is best conveyed by the image of the divine maker, 
pictured as distinct (like the human craftsman) from its model, his 
materials, and his work. But he here warns us not to imagine that in 
using this image, he has declared the true nature of the cause. It is to be 
taken, not literally, but as a poetical figure. The whole subsequent 
account of the world is cast in a mould which this figure dictates. What 
is really an analysis of the elements of rational order in the visible 
universe and of those other elements on which order is imposed, is 
presented in mythical form as the story of a creation in time. . . . He does 
not mean that any actual state ever came into existence by these stages.38 
Cornford’s exegesis of the Timaeus at this point is strongly interpretative and does 
not, I suggest, provide an accurate analysis of the text as it stands. First, he fails to 
37 Square brackets are my own. 
Cornford, PC, p. 27. 38 
42 
give sufficient grounds for why Plato, who by Cornford’s own admission believed 
that the world exhibited the working of a divine intelligence aiming at what is good, 
should suddenly drop the ‘divine’ and now only be concerned with the ‘intelligence’, 
i.e. “what is really an analysis of the elements of rational order in the visible 
universe” or why Plato would devote most of the Timaeus to describing a state that 
never came into existence. Second, arguing fi-om the Republic, depicted here as an 
analysis of the ideal State cast into the form of a history, Cornford suggests that Plato 
used a “similar device” in the Timaeus. Thus, he argues that whereas in the RepubZic 
Plato did not mean that any actual state ever came into existence by these stages, by 
analogy Plato does not tell us in the Timaeus what the sustaining cause is and could 
not tell us “without stepping outside the framework of the very myth he is 
c~nstruct ing.”~~ However, Plato does attempt to tell us something about the ultimate 
cause of the world in his account, which argues against the idea that he is 
constructing a myth in the strong sense that Cornford suggests. The only analogy 
which Cornford can accurately make here with the RepubZic would be that in the 
Timaeus no actual state ever came into existence by the stages Plato describes. This, 
however, is only partially true in that Plato’s description of how the universe came 
into being could only ever be, by his own admission, a ‘likely’ account and not an 
exact one, with the so-called “stages” necessarily being imagined and therefore, 
while inexact nonetheless representing a real process of generation involving real 
stages. What is true is that the actual state, in this case the universe, did indeed come 
into existence. Moreover, as stated above Plato does speak of a cause whereby it 
Cornford, PC, p. 27. 39 
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came into existence, namely, the ‘Demiurge’ and gives some detail about this cause, 
even if he has to claim difficulty in doing this.4o Third, in arguing that Plato could 
not tell us what the sustaining cause is, not only has Cornford conflated two issues, 
namely that of a cause and that of a sustaining cause,41 he also begs the question, for 
in presupposing in his analysis that Plato is constructing a myth, he must forgo the 
possibility that Plato can state the cause. Finally, although Comford’s query is 
directed specifically at a ‘sustaining’ cause and what this cause might be, these 
considerations follow upon presuming that this cause is the one in question. He 
does not consider the possibility of a non-sustaining primary cause.42 Plato’s 
description, however, would indicate other than a sustaining cause, setting out as he 
does the generated universe as being entirely self-sufficient and self-~ustaining.~~ 
Moreover, the fact that the Demiurge could choose to dissolve anything which it has 
generated (although according to Plato would nct destroy something which was good 
and in possessing a will which has “a stronger and more sovereign bond than those to 
which you [at this point addressing the heavenly Gods] were bound” would prevent it 
See Ti. 28c, 29a, 29d-30c, 31b, 32b and further examples throughout the Timaeus, where, as Bury 
has noted (Ti. p. 7), various references to “God” (in the singular), “the Divine” Power, as well as “the 
Gods” taking an active part in operations marked for rational purpose, are made. Bury writes: “The 
Role of the World-Artificer, the ‘Demiurge’, is similar to that of the Anaxagorean ‘Nous’ (Reason). 
He is not a Creator, in the strict sense; that is to say, he does not make things ex nihilo but only 
imposes order and system on pre-existing Chaos. Nor does he continue to act directly, in propria 
persona, throughout the process of world-building, but, at a certain stage, hands over his task to the 
created star-gods [ibid.] .” 
Cornford, PC, p. 26. Here Cornford states: “It follows that the ‘cause’ of this becoming must be a 
perpetually sustaining cause,” but offers no argument for this assertion. 
Unfortunately, Cornford has fallen into the same trap, I suggest, as that which he accuses the 
Christian apologists (e.g. see PC, p. 35), namely, of confusing a particular Christian doctrine with 
Plato’s understanding of God. To wit, God understood as a ‘sustaining’ creator or cause is prevalent 
in many Christian theological circles, but is notably absent (as Cornford points out) in the Timaeus. 
This is not to say, however, that Plato’s primary cause could not sustain if it so wished. 





from happening by another will),44 does not mean that the Universe requires ‘the 
God’ or primary cause to sustain it. 
1.3.8 The ‘likely’ tale/myth 
In trying to match the Timaeus with Cornford’s analogy of the Republic, what 
could be stated as being comparable would be the stages of the construction of the 
Cosmos, not the actual final state. However, Plato speaks early on of a “likely” tale 
(29d), not of an unlikely tale, and although this point has been widely debated, and 
still is, it is not a closed issue, tending to form two camps. There are those who 
understand myth or ‘likely tale’ as Taylor sees it: 
He [Plato]45 wishes to make it clear from the outset that the whole of his 
cosmology makes no claim to be regarded as ‘exact science’. Properly 
speaking it is not ‘science’ but ‘myth’, not in the sense that it is baseless 
fiction, but in the sense that it is the nearest approximation which can 
‘provisionally? be made to exact 
Taylor argues for this view from Plato’s own theory of forms. Whereas in pure 
mathematics “you get absolute finality and exactitude, just because there is no 
change or movement or life in the objects you are studying, e.g. integers, triangles, 
ellipses, and the like,” time not needing to be taken into account in studying them 
because there is no movement or change, equally so, “Cosmology and biology, and 
‘pure’ physics itself’ or in Timaeus’ own words ‘that which is becoming only and 
. . .can never in his [Timaeus’] or Plato’s opinion be rigorously ’47 ‘6  never is existent, 
7 ,948 ‘exact , because such things are incessantly undergoing change and variation, 
~~~~~~~ 
44 See Ti. 41a7-b6. 
45 Square brackets my own. 
Taylor, PT, p. 59. 
Ti. 28a. 





requiring perpetual revising and improving on the results, making ‘passage’ the 
7 49 fundamental fact about ‘Nature . 
There are also those, however, who, like Cornford, understand ‘myth’ from the 
perspective of being poetic or symbolic, and thus representational of something else, 
which in this case, at least for Cornford, becomes “an analysis of the elements of 
rational order in the visible universe,” with ‘Reason’ becoming the preferred choice 
of meaning for U O ~ < . ’ ’  Although the capital ‘R’ does appear to give some voice to 
the ‘divine’ of “divine intelligence,” in effect, the opposite happens. Due to a 
complete rejection by Cornford of all religious import and hence, of any relevance it 
might have in a commentary on and translation of the Timaeus, in his analysis of 
~06s what ultimately results from such a modus operandi is a divinisation of human 
reason, rather than a position such as Taylor’s where divine intelligence remains as 
an object of human understandin and not an attribute of it. With regard to U O ~ G ,  
however, Cornford’s position, being at once both revisionist, in that he redirects 
Plato’s imagery to coincide with his own highly interpretative exegesis (“divine 
Reason ) and reductionist, in claiming that the text does not really mean was it says 
Q 
9 9  5 1  
(“It must be said of the Demiurge that, as a mythical symbol,. . .he is not really a 
creator god, distinct from the universe he is represented as making,”)s2 cannot be 
what Plato had in mind when he stated: 53 
Ibid., p. 60. 
See Ti. 47e; Cornford, PC, p. 160; Bury, p. 109. 
Cornford, PC, p. 4 1. 







He was good, and in which good no envy whatsoever concerning 
anything is possible. Being therefore free from this he wished all 
things to be as much as possible like himself. Accepting this principle, 
then, from men of wisdom as being above all one of supreme 
authority, it can be accepted as absolutely true. 
In this passage the &y&< is clearly prior to and separate from the n & ~ ~ a .  
Cornford’s understanding and translation of V O ~ <  as ‘Reason’, therefore, is entirely 
derived from his interpretation of the Timaeus as purely mythical in nature and of his 
explication of the Demiurge specifically as a mythic symbol, to which he feels no 
need to add further arguments. 
1.3.9 One cause versus more than one 
Archer-Hind, like Comford, translates & V & Y K ~  as ‘necessity’ and v O ~ <  as 
‘reason’ (but with a small ‘r’), providing similar, but in some ways fuller reasons for 
his translation and possibly the basis for Cornford’s understanding written 50 years 
later. Because of this fuller explication it is worthwhile to discuss Archer-Hind’s 
argument in hl l .  According to him it is completely senseless to speak of the notion 
of & v & Y K ~  as an independent force external to ~065 and for this reason &V&yKq 
will be considered here along with his discussion on V O ~ < . %  
His argument is as follows: The one cardinal doctrine of Platonism is that the only 
K W $ ~ O <  is ~ u x f i . ~ ~  From this he concludes that: 
Bury, Ti. 29e4, has a reversed word order: yevkoeat kpouhfieq. 
Archer-Hind, The Timaeus of Plato (hereafter abbreviated as A-H, TP), p. 166 E 
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ss Ibid. This passage has 6k instead of 6h. 
56 
57 A-H, TP, p. 162. 
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Plato does not mean that there is a blind force existing in nature, acting at 
random and producing hap-hazard effects. Such a conception is totally 
foreign to his system, in which the one cause, the one K L V ~ ~ E O ~ ,  
is 1 4 r w x i j . ~ ~  
I do not dispute that for Plato ~qfl is the only cause of motion. This is assumed to 
be the case throughout the Timaeus and is clearly articulated in Laws X. What is 
disputed, however, is how narrowly Archer-Hind has taken this doctrine and what he 
concludes from it, namely, that there is only one cause. Plato does not specify at any 
point in the Timaeus that there is only “one cause,” asserting, rather, that everything 
that becomes or changes must do so owing to some cause.j9 The closest he comes to 
this idea of one cause is when he acknowledges that the Demiurge or father of the 
7 60 Universe is a superior cause or ‘the best of causes . Moreover, in his telling of the 
ordering of the Cosmos, after the World-Soul has been fashioned, followed by the 
generation of the material body of the world and heavens of the Universe by this God 
or Best of Causes, Plato articulates two more causes, namely, Ananke (Necessity)61 
and the Accessory Cause(s),62 specifically noting the latter as subordinate. A reason 
for positing these two additional sources of causation beyond providing a hller 
description of the physical story is suggested at Ti. 28a6-b 1. Here Plato proposes the 
idea that whenever the maker of anything keeps his mind’s eye on the eternally 
unchanging and uses it for the pattern after which he realises the form and capacities63 
of his product, then the result must be good. He can only hold the Demiurge 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ti. 28a4-5. 
Ti. 29a5-6: o 6 ’  &.ptozo~ T ~ U  akiov. 
Ti. 48a6-7: “this particular (kind of) wandering cause (TO T ~ S  d a u o p k q ~  &‘t& a’tziac;).” 
62 Ti. 46c7-46d7: “Accordingly, these are all assistant causes (n;&vza kmtu  T ~ U  owatTicov).” 
63 The function of such an object would follow upon its form and capacities, and like these and for the 




responsible for results which are completely good, since the Demiurge himself is 
described as being wholly good. Consequently, Plato must look to other causes to 
account for all aspects of the Cosmos both before and after its ordering which are not 
completely good, which come to be or which change. For this he turns to Ananke, 
both before and after the world has been generated, and also to the World-Soul and 
the accessory causes after it has been generated.64 
1.3.10 The accessory cause or o~ahtta 
With regard to the latter, Plato clarifies what he means by the accessory causes? 
Although he refers to these as causes, he makes it clear that it is not because they are 
what he would consider to be true causes. True causes for Plato within the generated 
Cosmos must possess WUXQ or soul capable of self-motion, conceding only that the 
accessory causes are sometimes mistaken as possessing such a power. Rather, he 
calls all causes accessory or secondary which do not move of their own accord, but 
when moved by a true cause or t p ~ Q ,  themselves become objects of movement by 
being moved and thereby become capable of moving other objects upon coming into 
contact with them. Thus, they assist the original cause in bringing about a particular 
end either by being moved or by acting as intermediaries moving others to bring 
The fact that Cornford takes the Demiurge to be a completely mythic character or non-being in the 
normal sense of the word will be discussed later. His view is that both the Demiurge and chaos are 
symbols for “real elements in the world as it exists” (PC, p. 37). I will argue that although there is 
myth in the Timaeus it is given at the beginning o f  the dialogue in the form of the Atlantis myth (Ti. 
20d7-25d6.) This is a second-hand account related by Critias as passed on to him through his 
relatives by Solon, the famous ancient poet. Plato’s account of the Cosmos, on the other hand, is 
through the voice of Timaeus, a scientist and is not a second-hand account, but is his own 
understanding with no indication that it is be taken as myth. On the contrary, it is explicitly stated that 
this account is to be understood as a likely account, although it does contain metaphor and due to the 
nature of metaphysics, cannot be exact. 
64 
Ti. 46e1-3. See $2.3, Part I, of this thesis for a ‘Commentary and Notes’ on Ti. 46c7-46e6. 65 
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about such an end through their auxiliary motion? It is explaining the origin of 
such ends in his description of the Cosmos that requires Plato to bring in this notion 
of the accessory cause. 
1.3.1 1 Discussion of ‘cause’ or d t h  
Plato is articulate in his understanding and explanation in the Timaeus of what 
constitutes a ‘cause’ or ‘a’t~ia’ and no more so than when he clarifies why an 
accessory cause or C J U U ~ ~ T ~ C X  cannot be a primary cause or a‘tzia. He leaves no 
room for equivocation. In Plato’s metaphysical scheme, the term ‘dt~ia’  or ‘cause’ 
is used exclusively for the work which his key metaphysical players, the Demiurge, 
Ananke and the World Soul, must carry out in order for the physical world to be or 
have the existence it does!’ Accordingly, these a‘t~iat account for its subsequent 
stability, change, perfection and lack thereof.68 
In reviewing the actual use of a’t~ia or ‘cause’ as this word is found in the 
Timaeus, the following can be a~ce r t a ined .~~  First, it or a close derivative appears in 
the text at least 39 times and presents as having three distinct, but clearly defined, 
uses. Its first appearance is at Ti. 18e3 and is best translated as ‘was due to’. In 
instances such as these, there are no references to either the Demiurge or Ananke 
(Necessity), and the idea of metaphysical or physical causation is entirely lacking. 
In Plato’s account, the end brought about by an accessory cause is always good, pointing to the need 
to clarify exactly how Ananke can be a cause in any efficient sense, if at all. 
Causality for the modern thinker often denotes efficient causality and less often material or formal 
causality, whereas in religious circles causal interest often gets referred to final and first causes, but in 
all cases the reference and importance of ‘cause’ remains grounded in the ‘stuff of the world. A shift 
to Plato’s thinking would see the relative importance of the latter diminish and a rejection of all but 
metaphysical causes as true causes. See Ti. 46d7-e6. 
Outside of metaphysical discussions, a less rigorous and broader meaning for ‘cause’ is 
occasionally sought, e.g. Ti. 18e3. 





What remains is an allusion to deductive reasoning (i.e. Premise 1: X has been 
allotted a spouse with the same intelligence as himself. Premise 2: There has been 
no pre-arranged specially designed drawing up of lots for spouses. Conclusion: 
therefore, this has happen entirely-‘was due to’-by chance, rightly or wrongly 
deduced, and in this initial case, wrongly, as we are told that the allotments have 
been ‘fixed’, so that like partners end up with like in each case. The next two 
instances, at 22cl and 22e4, suitably follow with the same translation, referring to 
aspects of history, and form the preamble to the Timaeus proper and thus occur 
before Plato sets about to describe the generation of the Cosmos. 
From Ti. 28a4 down to 48a7, however, instances of dt~ia refer almost 
exclusively to ontological causation’’ or to the ‘coming into being’ of the Cosmos 
and to the metaphysical causes bringing about such an event. Plato clearly states that 
such a depiction is his express purpose for this extended passage regardless of the 
difficulties which this engenders or more precisely, because of those difficulties, of 
sometimes missing its mark. An exception appears at 29d7, where the meaning of 
d t ~ i a ~  is clearly the abstract noun ‘reason’, i.e. “let us therefore state the reason,’’ 
but which cannot be confused with the Demiurge as ‘cause’, since in this instance a 
separate word is used to describe the Demiurge, namely, O OUU~OT&<. Similar 
passages where the abstract noun ‘reason’ ( d t z h ~ )  or ‘reasons’ (dtTia<) is again 
found, but while still on the subject of the generation of the Cosmos, are at Ti. 33a6 
and 38d7 respectively. At 42e3 dt~ia is best translated as ‘(from this) origin’, but 
again, there is little room for mistaking its meaning here. Whereas Bury translates 
’O In the sense of ‘primary’ causation, without which it would have no being. 
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this passage literally “from this ca~se,’’’~ plausibly referring to the Demiurge who 
did in fact (we are told) generate the stars, the passage which immediately follows 
and subsequently dismisses a discussion of the origin of the other gods as too great a 
task (40d6-7)’ would argue for a similar meaning, i.e. that of ‘origin’. Ti. 44c7, on 
the other hand, refers to ‘causes’ generally, whether physical or metaphysical, 
whereas the passages at 46c7, d l ,  e6 and 47a2 all refer to accessory causes. 
Finally, from the instance of dt~ht at Ti. 57c8 down to its last instance at 88a7, 
Plato, for the most part, is using d t ~ h  or ‘cause’ in the sense of ‘process’, meaning 
the physical reasons for an event occurring or alternatively, as ‘cause’ generally, 
which might include the idea of process. Once again, the exceptions are clearly 
defined. Two distinct places are at 68e4 and 68e6, and at 76d6 and 76d7. At 68e4 
Plato is making a distinction between a true cause and a subservient cause, and at 
68e6 he is referring explicitly to metaphysical causes, the & U ~ ’ Y K U ’ ~ U  and the 
~ E ~ O V ,  the ‘necessary’ and the ‘divine’. Similarly, at 76d6 he is referring to the 
G I I U ~ ~ T ~ O I G  or accessory causes, explicitly not to first causes, and at 76d7, by using 
the superlative, to the greatest of causes, or as best understood here, to ‘divine 
Purpose’. Further, at 67e4 the meaning of C X ‘ I ‘ C ~ G  from its context, as at 22e4, is 
best understood as ‘reasons’, whereas at 69a7, ~ L T ~ U  refers to various kinds of 
‘causes’, and thus, to ‘causes’ generally. Thus, in this final section, except where 
noted, Plato is dealing exclusively with physical processes, e.g. the growth of hair, 
the causes of respiration, etc. and the use of d t ~ h  is consequently borrowed and 
adapted with this specific purpose in mind. There is no equivocation. The material 
Bury, p 3 5 .  71 
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surrounding the in situ use of dt~ia as occasioned in all three sections of the 
Timaeus, the historical preamble, the metaphysical description of the origins of the 
Cosmos, and finally, its physical description, in each case clearly defines its 
perimeters with respect to the various meanings, which in turn, emerge distinctive 
and well-defined. 
This thesis is concerned with Plato’s understanding of ‘cause’ as a metaphysical 
entity and specifically, as ‘Cause’ in its primal sense.72 Understood in this way, the 
idea of Cause is one of prime mover and therefore is entirely an a priori 
consideration and not an a posteriori one following upon judgements from sense 
data. Thus, Plato does not begin with an outcome and then work backwards to an 
explanation until at one point a logically economic universe has emerged.73 Rather, 
he begins, quite literally, with an uncompromising commitment to a core belief in a 
God who is perfectly good,74 but not alone,75 and to philosophical premises which 
support this belief, particularly those involving his theory of knowledge which 
incorporate his theory of forms or ideas.76 To ask whether or not the “unfelicity” or 
non-perfection of an outcome should be explained in terms of some cause, e.g. 
72 The use of capitals is avoided except where a distinction is required or being made. In this case 
‘Cause’ with initial uppercase ‘C’ refers specifically to a primary cause. 
73 My position is opposite to that of Vlastos (although the universe remains the same in both 
accounts), who, in describing Plato’s method and purpose in writing his cosmology states that “if you 
cannot expunge the supernatural, you can rationalize it, turning it paradoxically into the very source of 
the natural order, restricting its operation to a single primordial creative act which insures that the 
physical world would be not chaos but cosmos forever after. Plato accomplished this by vesting all 
supernatural power in a Creator who was informed by intelligence and was moved to create our world 
by his love of beauty and by his pure, unenvying, goodness” (PU, p. 97), thereby granting to Plato a 
“perversely original way” of giving rational men a pious faith to live by for two millennia. My 
suggestion is that Plato found a higher power to be the source of that rationality and not that he made 
it the source to serve some pragmatic end, i.e. the conscious expunging of the supernatural by 
rationalising it to ensure that a rational explanation of the cosmos is furthered. 
74 Ti. 29d7-30a7. 
75 See Ti. 27cl-d4. 
76 See Ti, 27d5-29d3. 
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Ananke (Necessity), is a non sequitur in the case of the Timaeus, as it is no more 
valid a question for its writer than asking whether the felicity of an outcome should 
be explained in such terms, for he does neither. Plato does not begin his enquiry 
with the world and then posit by way of explanation, causes; rather, he begins with 
what he considers to be the primal causes of the Universe, the Demiurge and 
Ananke, and then draws his understanding of the world from this. Thus, his template 
for understanding the Cosmos proceeds first from these Primal Causes and other 
proposed metaphysical features, and then to the world itself and not the other way 
round. These in turn are based on Plato’s core religious beliefs, as well as his 
metaphysical and philosophical assumptions, and not on empirical considerations. 
Although the generated Cosmos does figure in Plato’s decision to posit the 
various metaphysical components of his cosmology, they are never limited to it and 
for the most part supersede the dictates of scientific, but never rational, explanation 
and necessarily so - Being preceded Becoming. Rationality for Plato involved 
‘nous’, the contemplation of Being and the belief in its inherent intelligibility. The 
explanations provided in his inquiry move constantly forward and never backwards, 
although restated anew several times. Moreover, the world of Being and that of 
Becoming are not, I suggest, dependent worlds. Although the fact of their separate 
existences is deductively realised or understood (a maker of something must have a 
model in mind), the existence itself of Being and of Becoming do not require that 
they have a relationship. These worlds simply exist and their contents are 
discoverable. A wrong idea of one will not necessarily obtain the other world 
wrong. Once the heavens have been generated and ‘Becoming’ or the Universe is 
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operative, ‘Becoming’, like ‘Being’, is also explained in its own terms or those of 
‘becoming’ and secondary causes. Equally, the Primal Causes, like the world of 
Being, lie outside the generated world or that of ‘Becoming’ and arguably also lie 
outside of ‘Being’ as it is de~cribed.~’ 
Thus, the felicity or unfelicity of the outcome (the outcome being the Cosmos 
itself) is not explained by Plato in the positing of Primal Causes which are either 
good (the Demiurge) or evil (Ananke)--explanations for the workings of the 
Universe remain within it and are discoverable therein-rather, the outcome of 
Plato’s inquiry begins with the Primal Causes themselves and moves forward 
through the world of Being to include Becoming or the Cosmos. The metaphysical 
movements of the Demiurge and Ananke in bringing about order or disorder 
respectively are in turn given as the reason for the existence of the Cosmos. It is 
unlikely that Plato envisioned that the details of the physical world should be 
examined in the light of these metaphysical assumptions (e.g. the Primal Causes), as 
they did not extend for the most part7* to such detail.79 As such, the accountability 
of the metaphysical grounds he sets out is very restricted. In Plato’s own words, “the 
world the Demiurge constructed was a single, complete whole, designed to supply its 
own nourishment from its own decay and to comprise and cause all of its own 
77 I later argue, however, that the concept of ‘Being’ is closely associated in Plato’s understanding 
with the causal operations of ‘Nous’ (‘Nous’ existing as the causal aspect of the Demiurge or God) 
and that these two metaphysical players are intimately connected. 
See the discussion immediately following on the World Soul. 
79 The fact that Plato’s philosophical system of Forms has been held up to the scrutiny of the greatest 
minds and has been judged and found wanting fi-om its very outset, rejected as untenable at worst and 
unnecessary at best from the time of his most gifted pupil, Aristotle, to the present day, as regards the 
empirical world and its details, bears witness to this. 
78 
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processes, its Framer having thought it better to be self-sufficient than dependent on 
anything else": 
Thus, the very basis on which the Universe was organised, namely, a principle of 
self-sufficiency in which it would comprise and cause all of its own processes, 
precludes attempts to connect causal factors" in the world with those existing 
outside of it or before its generation. Indeed, such attempts appear foolish. 
Whatever took place between the Demiurge and Ananke to bring about the 
generation of the world happened before" this averred independence of the world 
from everything which preceded it. 
1.3.12 The denial of the four elements as causes 
Furthermore, Plato patently denies that any of the four elements, fire, water, air or 
He describes them, rather, as the four earth are causal factors in themselves. 
constituents of the Universe.82 These bodies form the whole by their proportion, at 
which point the Cosmos came into existence, and are only causal by way of their 
being assistant or auxiliary to a true cause.83 In Laws X he repeats this assertion: 
Except for the noetic movement in the world produced by the World Soul, having been formed 
precisely for this purpose (being a true d~zia possessed of ymxfi or 'soul'), all other causes in the 
world are accessory only. 
At the very least ontological priority is implied here, the heavens having not yet been made. 






Fire and water, earth and air - so they say - all owe their being to 
nature and chance, none of them to art; they, in turn, are the agents, 
and the absolutely soulless agents, in the production of the bodies of 
the next rank, the earth, sun, 
While Plato is vehemently arguing against the concluding portion of the above 
assertion, namely, that the earth, sun and moon are simply in the next rank, and are 
thus equally soulless, in no way does he depart from his original premise contained 
in the first part and as previously set out in the Timaeus, namely, that fire, water, 
earth and air are absolutely soulless agents. His argument which clarifies this begins 
a little further on in Laws X, at 891c7-d4 where he questions the validity of the 
reasoning of those who would make soul derivative of the soulless agents, fire, water 
earth and air. Soul, he will claim, is elder-born than all bodies and the prime source 
of all their changes and transfo~mations.~’ He then moves on to show that soul is 
more primitive than fire or air, or the like, and that its defining factor is its capacity 
to cause its own movement, as well as the movement of others, which is shown, 
Plato argues, in the movement of the sun, the moon and the stars.86 This in turn is 
what ranks them (the souls that drive the heavenly bodies, and to the extent that they 
do, the heavenly bodies themselves) as gods, whose self-motion is clearly superior to 
Taylor, Laws X, p. 279. 
Lg. 892a2-bl . 
84 
86 For Plato, the identity of the soul(s) whose self-movement drives the movement of the heavenly 
bodies is so closely linked to the identity of those celestial bodies themselves that he asserts, taking 
the sun as an example, it is this soul (not this body) which provides us all with light and that “every 
single one of us is bound to regard it as a god” (Lg. 899a7-10). 
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the motion of any of the elements which motion is always caused from without by 
another agent. From this he will argue: 
1. Motion, however it arises, which is induced by something else and which never 
confers self-motion on anything else is secondary, being change in a truly 
soulless body.87 
2. Thus, soul is prior to body, governing the real order of things, and body being 
subject to governance.88 
3. Moreover, the  characteristic^^^ of soul, i.e. “mood and habits of mind, wishes, 
calculations, and true judgements, purposes, and memories, will also be prior to 
physical lengths, breadths, and depths, in virtue of the priority of soul itself to 
body.”” 
4. Plato sums up his argument by stating that given the soul has been shown to be 
the cause of all the contraries, then we are bound to assert it as the universal 
cause. 91 
5. Indwelling soul, then, controls all things universally that move anywhere and 
thus, heaven including individual celestial bodies.93 
6. It is shortly after this juncture that Plato explains the manner in which he 
considers the sun or moon or stars to be a god or gods, namely, by being moved 
by soul, either by being driven from within or from without, or “in what way 
~ o e v e r ? ~ ~  He comes to this conclusion from the conjecture that the source of 
their self-movement is invisible, comparing this with the self-movement of a 
man whose soul is also invisible and can only be discerned by an act of pure 
understanding? 
7. After this Plato is able to exclaim: “Will any man who shares this belief bear to 
hear it said that all things are not ‘full of gods . ,37996 
Lg. 896b4-8. 





Taylor has translated this as “characters;” see his translation, PT, p. 288. 
Lg. 896~9-d3. 
9 ’  Lg. 896d5-8. 
92 Lg. 896dlO-e2. 
93 Lg. 898d3-7. 
94 Lg. 898e8-899alO. 
Lg. 898d9-e3. 95 
96 Lg.,  899b8- 10. 
5 8  
Thus, Plato asserts, not only in the Timaeus, but again in Laws X, supported now to 
some extent by argument, that the elements are entirely soulless, having no capacity 
of self-movement, and consequently, moving back to the argument of the Timaeus, 
are not true causal factors. 
Plato has pre-empted the possibility of the Demiurge and Ananke9’ playing a 
fbrther causal role in the physical universe, once it has been generated, by the 
priority of their ontology.98 However, the one metaphysical causal factor,99 unlike 
the Demiurge and Ananke, which does imbue the world with its ongoing presence in 
material matters is the World Soul, which was constructed by the Demiurge for the 
sake of the world to provide it with its several movements.”’ Although the World 
Soul is eternal, unlike the Demiurge and Ananke, its immortality, by way of its being 
constructed (which is not the case with either the Demiurge or Ananke), extends also 
but only a partepost into infinity, being described here as existing ‘for all time’. 
Although ‘Necessity’ is a common translation for the causal force & u & Y K ~ ,  where possible I use 
the transliteration ‘ Ananke’ to avoid a misunderstanding which can arise from this reading. However, 
I do use ‘Necessity’ where this particular reading is being discussed. 
The negative impact of Ananke as a causal factor in the soul of man after his generation will be 
taken up by Plato in the Laws X. See the discussion in Part I1 of this thesis, where the counterpart of 
Ananke within the generated world is now understood by Plato as the ‘Non-beneficent Soul’. 
The World-Soul, having been created by the Demiurge for the precise purpose of generating noetic 
motion in and for the world, is not too far removed from the modem concept of a ‘factor’, since 
although the World-Soul is described here as being ‘the best creation of the best of intelligent and 
eternal things’ (Ti. 37al-2), endowed as it is with reason and harmony from an unending and divine 
source (Ti. 36e4-5), apart from its participation in the specific pragmatic end for which it was made, 
all of which, its being, its participation and the end, are necessarily good having been engineered by 
the Demiurge who is wholly good, the World-Soul is not judged of itself to be either good or bad 
apart from its role in the world for which it was fashioned. This is patently not the case for Plato with 
regard to either the Demiurge or Ananke, neither of which is similarly generated. 
Plato makes it abundantly clear in the Timaeus that the World Soul was generated by the Demiurge 
and is not to be identified with this primary causal power and as Lutoslawski correctly states: “This 
demiurge is outside the world, and different from the world’s soul, imparting to the world “its shape 
and present nature,” from The Origin and Growth of PZato s Logic (London: Longmans, Green, and 






1.3.13 From timely indissolubility to eternity: 
An argument from Ananke 
Prior to the section on the World Soul, Plato also makes an important move 
regarding the infinity of the body of the world or Cosmos. It is deemed infinite, not, 
as in the case of the Demiurge and Ananke, because it is ungenerated, since clearly it 
has been generated, but rather, because of the providence of God, whose strength 
and sovereignty prevailed and continues to prevail over that of Ananke. This is an 
important claim that Plato makes and is part of a larger deductive argument 
involving Ananke and its apparent insurgent presence as a metaphysical force. He 
states in the Timaeus, at 32c2-4, that the body of the Universe is indissoluble by 
anything except its compounder, but not without explaining a little further on at 
4 1 a7-b6 that its compounder, the Demiurge, described earlier as being perfectly 
good,” because of this goodness, would not do such a thing in any event. Similar 
indissolubility is also attributed to the heavenly bodies at 38b6-c3. Thus, the 
Universe, theoretically at least, becomes eternal from the point of its generation, with 
Plato explicitly making the move from it being indissoluble to being eternal at 40b4- 
6 when discussing the fixed stars.Io2 
Two initial observations can be made with regard to these passages and the 
making of the Universe, its Soul and the Living Creatures within it. First, at no point 
is Ananke given any role in either the making of the body of the organised world, i.e. 
the generated Universe, in part or in whole or its Soul, materially or mechanically, 
Ti. 29e1-2. 
In this passage Plato uses the word a’t6ta from a i 6 t 0 ~  (&E\), meaning ‘everlasting’, for &L&&LOG 
(LSL). The non-temporal eternity of the primary causes is prior to any ‘everlastingness’ attributable to 
the physical Universe, which latter necessarily remains contingently everlasting due to its dependent 




e.g. from the perspective of process. Materially, the world was formed by the 
Demiurge only, who achieved this by introducing measurable relations, internal and 
external, to the elementary particles of what was otherwise a chaotic, albeit visible, 
world. lo3 Although Plato describes the elementary particles of the pre-cosmic chaos 
as sometimes being in a certain order, this was only by chance. The order produced 
by the Demiurge was never random, but was achieved in and through the use of the 
Demiurge’s power of ‘nous’. According to Plato’s cosmology, however, there is 
also a power behind all disorder and randomness, which metaphysical power he 
names ‘Ananke’. Consequently, Ananke would also be the cause, inadvertently, of 
any random order. 
Implicit to Plato’s theory is the assumption that these elementary particles were 
comprised minimally of the two basic triangles later ordered by the Demiurge, * O4 
since it is these that are then described as having been ordered (by the Demiurge) 
into more complex shapes and which surfaces upon further ordering became the 
basic elements, fire, earth, water and air, of the ordered Universe. Prior to their 
further ordering by the Demiurge, according to this thesis, Ananke would have held 
these basic triangles in their non-ordered state, being a metaphysical power without 
reason and thus, having no capacity to order them.lo5 These basic triangles, 
Ti. 69b2-c3. 
Ti. 53c4-d4. 
This is vastly different from Teloh’s understanding of ‘ananke’ (understood by him as ‘necessity’). 
According to his interpretation ‘necessity’ is closely linked with the receptacle or ‘nurse of 
becoming’, which receptacle had two diverse but not inconsistent functions (DPM, pp. 2 14-2 15): He 
writes, first, that it was ‘space’ which received all generated things, and second, it moulded the stuff in 
it and in fact “is that out of which becoming is formed.” It is precisely this moulding stuff “made up 
of rudimentary physical powers (52e), with these powers operating according to what we would now 
call physical laws” and “organized according to the mechanistic principles of the 
physiologoi.. . [which] constitute the domain of necessity.” This complex and somewhat ingenious 





therefore, would not only form the basis of the consequent ordering of the Universe 
described by Plato, but would also form the basis of its non-ordered state or 
particular level of it at which Plato begins his cosmology. I would concur with 
Cornford that: 
There is really no warrant for attributing to Plato this atomistic picture of 
irregular particles moving at random in a void.’06 Atoms were 
completely determined particles of solid substance, separated by intervals 
of nothingness, which gave them room to move about. Plato’s Space is 
not a void which remains completely distinct from particles moving in it; 
it is a Recipient which affords a basis for images reflected in it, as in a 
mirror-a comparison that could not be applied to atoms and a void.’” 
I would propose that Plato deduced these basic particles to be triangles due to the 
fact that accordingly to him only triangles were capable of being formed into the 
surfaces of which solids were composed, and whereas they could be so formed, they 
need not be and thus could remain in a disordered (non-ordered) state. Plato does 
not address the issue of the possibility of a greater degree of disorder achievable for 
these random particles, i.e. whether the triangles or particles themselves were 
ordered into their basic shape from something else even more basic.lo8 His main 
concern with the Timaeus was the ordering of the Cosmos and such order could be 
achieved by the ordering of these two kinds of, previously random, triangles. He 
regresses no further than is necessary. Thus, while I would agree with Cornford that 
“rudimentary physical powers” remains perplexing and in need of further explanation. Plato’s 
account does not provide this explanation or make this connection between space and ‘ananke’, or 
does he suggest it. 
See my discussion of ‘void’ within the comparison between Democritus and Plato at $2.3.5.2, Part 
I. 
lo7 Cornford, PC, p. 200. 
See Ti. 48b6-c2. In this passage Plato is stating that the four elements, fire, water, earth and air are 
far from being the basic (not even comparable to syllables in an alphabet) building blocks of the 
Universe, with the further implication that the basic triangles themselves might have a greater story, 
which Plato will not even attempt to tell. As this passage continues (48c244), Timaeus asserts that to 
tell a story of the basic principles would in fact be too difficult to explain in the context of the 




Plato stops short at the positing of triangles “without pursuing the analysis of the 
I do not agree that “Plato indicates 7 7  109 triangles themselves into simpler principles, 
that there is something arbitrary in starting from this assumption” or that “Plato’s 
reason for stopping short at triangles was perhaps the need to keep his exposition 
Rather, Plato states that “the principles which are still 7 7 1  10 within reasonable bounds. 
7 9 1  11 higher than these are known only to God and to the man who is dear to God. 
When further explanation would take too long or diverge too far off topic, Plato 
acknowledges this.’12 He does not do so here. Cornford’s identity of ‘the man who 
is dear to God’ or as he translates this phrase, “men favoured by heaven”, with the 
philosophic mathematicians whose analysis would stretch “back to the ultimate 
7 9 1  13 premisses of the science, if a proper analysis was fully borne out, is not a position 
suggested here or supported by Plato. Ultimately, Laws X will attest to Plato’s 
rejection of any hypothesis omitting the deity as first principle (‘grand and primary’) 
or built on the notion that the works of nature themselves can offer up to the 
scientists their own ultimate premises, mathematical or otherwise, upon inquiry. 
Cornford’s footnoted conclusion to his discussion of this passage (Ti. 53c-d) that 
“the Timaeus is a myth of the physical world, and therefore has no need to go further 
must methodically omit all record of Plato’s repeated 7 7 1  14 back than the surface, 
affirmations of the god or Demiurge as first principle and alone privy to ultimate 
See Cornford, PC, p. 2 12. 
Ibid., p. 213. 
Ti. 53d6-7. 
Cornford, PC, p. 213. 
Ibid., h. 4. 
109 
110 
‘ I 2  See the footnote 109 with reference to Ti. 48b6-c2. 
114 
63 
origins, to affirm this. As such, Cornford’s conclusion remains highly interpretative 
and substantially removed from what Plato originally sets forth. l 5  
The World Soul in the Timaeus was likewise formed by the Demiurge, before the 
body of the world, to be its dominating and controlling (source of movement) 
power.’ l 6  According to Plato’s ‘likely’ account, it was compounded of various 
mixtures of Existence, Sameness and Difference as its constituent parts, and was 
then divided up and bound together in proportion. The Demiurge ultimately put the 
World Soul together and arranged it to encompass the completed Universe and act as 
its source of movement.”’ This precludes Ananke from ever being the cause of any 
Similar to Cornford in his approach to the Timaeus purely as myth, R. D. Mohr reads the creation 
story of the Timaeus as though “not intended to be read literally” (see The Platonic Cosmology, p. 1). 
Accordingly, he suggests “ ‘all the furniture’ of Platonism-gods, souls, Ideas, matter, space, 
properties, natural and artificial kinds-are seen related each to all within a single frame,” namely, 
“the major branches of his speculative thought-epistemology, metaphysics, theology, physics, and to 
an extent logic and ethics,” and in so doing “casts light on all of Platonism [ibid.].” What neither 
Cornford nor Mohr acknowledge, however, is that this approach to the Timaeus is dependent on 
extensive interpretation of not just a few, but of every piece of “furniture” within that story or myth. 
This is to ignore Plato’s repeated claim that what he is telling is a likely story, not an unlikely story, 
which an understanding of this work as pure ‘myth’ or a fanciful tale essentially assumes. It may be 
argued, however, that if the causal players or other metaphysical features within Plato’s cosmology 
are not viewed as essential features of a myth, e.g. are not interpreted as ‘reason’, ‘motion’ or 
‘disorder’ in the world as it exists now (Cornford) or as in the case of Plato’s primary ordering cause 
that it is not viewed as a “necessary existent whose essence is rationality.. .to serve as a crafting agent 
who constantly works to bring that which falls away from a paradigmatic Form into accord with it” 
(Mohr, The Platonic Cosmologv, p. 183), thereby introducing “standards and measures into the 
phenomenal realm” (p. 3), then the Timaeus as it stands is too fantastic to be meaningful or ‘likely’. 
Such an assumption, I suggest, needs to be challenged in light of certain of the features of Plato’s 
cosmology having become completely dismantled (e.g. ‘Ananke’) or made completely subservient to 
the understanding of an already existent world (with or without a pre-existing ‘chaos’) in the process 
of carrying out such an interpretation. Nothing of the myth is left requiring it in the first place. 
Should, on the other hand, the Timaeus be approached as a likely cosmological account, which 
contains mythic features only (but is not itself a myth) while explaining the supra-physical or 
metaphysical features of the cosmos before and after its generation, and in so doing is found to be 
sufficiently cogent so as to satis@ Plato’s reasons for writing it (i.e. provides a meaningful 
explanation of the generation of the cosmos according to his perspective and understanding, and 
which understanding is not fanciful in terms of that explanation), then this, I suggest, is the preferred 
reading since it is closer to Plato’s own account. In contrast to a ‘literal’ account, this reading of the 
Timaeus is best described as a ‘literate’ account, where the understanding of each passage requires to 
be assessed and re-assessed according to the ongoing dynamics of Plato’s thought, and never in spite 






of the Cosmos’s several motions within time, since all movement in the Universe, 
except that caused by mankind (having its own source of movement by way of its 
less pure soul generated by the Demiurge and assisted by the young gods),’ l 8  was 
caused by the World Soul. Thus, what movement was not directly caused by the 
World Soul or human souls was indirectly caused by them.’” Such secondary 
movement was the result of ongoing processes realised by auxiliary causes carrying 
through the original momentum initiated by its causal source (the World Soul or 
human soul), but which auxiliary causes, in any event, were never direct causes of 
movement themselves. Thus, Ananke, by virtue of its ontology-a primal cause and 
thus ungenerated, but never the source of ordered movement-is excluded from 
being the source of either movement or process within the ordered world. 
Second, and decisive for understanding the extent of the metaphysical stature 
given to Ananke and the implications which follow thereon, is the role Ananke plays 
in Plato’s structuring of his argument for timely indissolubility. Embedded here 
within Plato’s theology is a deductive argument for the eternity of the generated 
Universe. This not only allows, but requires Plato to make a move from dissolubility 
to indissolubility of the Universe within time, and ultimately to immortality. This 
move, however, is subtle, presented by Plato as a dismissive remark made against 
Ananke and remains almost hidden within the exception which Timaeus grants to the 
Universe’s ‘Compounder’, the Demiurge. 
Ti. 41d4-42e4. 
Plato is never clear in the Timaeus on exactly how ‘soul’ is the cause of movement, only that it is 
the cause of movement. His depiction of the generation of the soul as strips permeating the Universe 
is clearly metaphoric, since according to Plato we cannot see the soul. Part I1 of this thesis, dealing 
with Laws A’, will attempt to explicate the relationship between the soul and movement. 
I19 
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With regard to the first observation, some clarification concerning ‘time’ and the 
generation of the Cosmos is required. Although the meaning of Plato’s famous 
passage12’ describing time as a “moving image of eternity” is profoundly compact 
and cames with it the impact of poetry, it is not poetry. Plato has already carefully 
explained in prior passages leading up to this one exactly what his understanding of 
movement is, both causal and non-causal, how ‘image’ figures in the process of 
generated being and what the relationship of eternity to the generated Cosmos is. 
Germane to our discussion of Ananke, however, is Plato’s averment here that he 
copy, i.e. the Cosmos, “has been and is and will be throughout the whole of time. 7 121 
For Plato ‘the whole of time’ is something quite different from the parallel notion of 
‘eternity’. Time only comes into being with the generation of the heavens, whereas 
eternity carries the notion of having always existed, thus existing before the heavens 
came into being, during their depiction of time and forever after should they be 
dissolved.122 Moreover, time has movement, a beginning and an end, whereas 
eternity has none, remaining forever at one with i t ~ e 1 f . l ~ ~  It is upon the equivocation 
of this passage concerning ‘the whole of time’, however, or similar passages, that 
Ananke (when understood in this way, referred to as ‘Necessity’) is argued to be a 
mere physical factor. Thus, Necessity (Ananke) becomes associated with 
mechanical motion, a moving metaphor, so-to-speak, in a physical world, which, 
according to this interpretation, has always existed (i.e. ‘throughout the whole of 
Ti. 37d5. 
1 2 ’  Ti. 38c 1-3: zo pEv y&p 6fi napdc6~typa n&vza a’t6va koztv bv, o 6 ’ a6 6t& zkhouq 
zou &n;avza xpbvov y~yovcbq ZE ~ d t  Qv ~ d t  koop~voq. 
Ti. 38b6-c3. 




time’) and whereby the notion of eternity is dropped altogether. Against such a 
position is the fact that much of what Plato states, except where he is describing 
physical phenomena, has either to be abandoned, ignored or passed off as metaphor 
in order to achieve this. A severe abatement of this sort would have to be a last 
resort upon finding no rational basis or coherence in the metaphysical ideas Plato 
presents in the Timaeus. This thesis argues against taking such a view. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the face-value facility with which 
Plato’s scheme is presented and is so easily understood approximates too closely to 
storytelling to be anything but. As earlier suggested, however, and as Plato 
repeatedly reminds his readers, the ‘storytelling’ quality of the Timaeus reflects the 
“likelihood” of his account whereby he is attempting to describe certain 
metaphysical realities. This requirement of metaphor or ‘likeliness’ is due to both 
the priority124 and perfection of these a priori entities, existing as they do before the 
outside of all generated Universe and, except for the ‘Nurse of Becoming , 
change. A description of this sort, therefore, cannot be exact. It is patently absurd to 
ascribe to Plato the need to invent a Demiurge and Ananke in order to describe the 
ordering process of mental and physical phenomena within the Universe, as he has 
proven himself quite capable of discussing each of these, independently from his 
separate discussions on the two metaphysical causes, 126 making such a need 
7 125 
That is, before the generated heavens and thus, before time. 
The ‘Nurse of Becoming’ is a difficult concept when considering the congruence of Plato’s cosmic 
scheme and is rife with potential problems in that it appears to exist prior to the generated cosmos and 
yet is subject to change. This and associated difficulties are discussed in a later section. 
See, for example, his discussion in the Timaeus of the ordering of regular solids and of their 
assignation to the four elements at 53~4-56c7 (Ananke is only referred to at the very end by way of 
reminder of its seemingly cross-purposed metaphysical impact on generation, being one of both 
willingness to work with the Demiurge, and yet at the same time, because of this and its disordering 





redundant and completely pointless. Moreover, the ‘whole of time’ described by 
Plato is clearly not inclusive of the eternity wherein his key metaphysical causal 
players, the Demiurge and Ananke, had earlier striven to bring about the Cosmos. 
This would require a logical impossibility, namely, for the Cosmos to have existence 
before being generated. Not only does the generation of the Cosmos account for the 
beginning of its existence, but the periodic motion of the heavenly bodies within the 
Cosmos is what gives us our sense of time. Furthermore, Plato makes a point of not 
only declaring at the very outset of the Timaeus that the Cosmos came into being,12’ 
but also of arguing that this must be the case. He reasons that since all things which 
are perceptible by the senses-of which the world in its totality is comprised-are 
objects of sensation and opinion, and therefore change, they must have a cause. If 
such objects have a cause, then they must have come into being. 
Nonetheless, it is also equally true, and unequivocally so, that prior to the 
generation of the Universe there was for Plato another kind of metaphysical reality, 
one which was neither causal nor caused, but rather, existed eternally as pure 
‘being’, after which all things were patterned.12* Moreover, in addition to these 
‘ideas’ or ‘forms’, there was also for Plato a pre-generation physical reality 
consisting of basic, randomly moving triangles. This chaos, moreover, was 
contained within ‘space’. If something exists, it must exist somewhere or not exist at 
all.’29 Finally, while remaining mostly unorganised in form and random in 
diseases of the soul or mind beginning at 86b 1 or again, immediately following that, his discussion of 
the balance of the mind and body beginning at 87cl. 
12’ Ti. 28b7-c2. 
Ti. 5 le6-52a4. 
Ti. 52b3-5. 
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movement, this chaos, due to chance movements, was not entirely disorganised, but 
also consisted in triangles which had become randomly organised into what Plato 
calls ‘becoming’ and which ‘becoming’, when taken over by the Demiurge, would 
eventually comprise the whole of the Uni~erse.’~’ It is this three-fold claim of the 
pre-existence of Being, Space and Becoming, in addition to the above-noted 
equivocation regarding time and eternity, which together lead, I would argue, to a 
general misinterpretation of Plato’s cosmology in support of a non-metaphysical 
position with regard to Ananke and the Demiurge, and a positivist, atheistic position 
overall for the Timaeus. A careful examination of the text, however, shows such a 
position to be untenable. At this juncture it is only necessary to point out that Plato 
saw the positing of ‘being’, ‘space’ and incipient ‘becoming’ prior to the generation 
of the Cosmos as prerequisite to its generation. Thus, their existence was not simply 
commensurate with the Cosmos, never having existed apart from it and now 
portrayed anachronistically as mythic detail. Rather, prior and eternal, their 
existence was logically required before generation could take place. According to 
Plato, the Cosmos had to have a pattern or idea after which all things are fashioned 
(‘being’), there had to be a place in which it could have existence (‘space’) or be 
nothing at all and it had to be made out of something (‘becoming’). Finally, and 
importantly for Plato, there were powerful primal forces behind both the generated 
Cosmos and the non-generated Chaos, which he distinguishes respectively as the 
Demiurge and Ananke. Thus, when Plato now marks out in his scheme that the 
generated Cosmos will exist ‘for all time’, as will the celestial Gods or heavenly 
130 Ti. 52d2-4. 
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bodies, it has a decidedly peculiar ring to it, since earlier in the Timaeus he has not 
referred to time at all, our perception of it having only just come into being with the 
generation of the heavenly bodies. Prior to this section on time, Plato simply makes 
reference to the ‘eternal’ without seeking to qualify it, since there was no thought 
when referring to what is eternal of such an eternal object ever having a beginning or 
an end. As noted above, the Demiurge, Ananke, the forms (or being), space (the 
‘nurse’ 1 3 ’  or receptacle of becoming) and incipient becoming (becoming at its 
earliest stage) are all described by Plato as being eternal and therefore, as having 
existence before the world was generated. 132 
With regard to the second point made above concerning Plato’s subsequent 
argument for timely indissolubility as a hidden rebuff against the eternal and chaotic 
powers of Ananke, this argument takes the following form: 
1. Order is the source of all goodness. 
2. The Demiurge is the ordering Cause. 
3. The Demiurge is altogether good based on the fact that it is the ordering Cause 
and on this fact alone. 
4. The Demiurge generated or ‘ordered’ the Cosmos. 
5. Disorder is the source of all evil. 
6. Ananke (a transliteration of the Greek word & v & Y K ~ )  or ‘Anarchy’ is the 
disordering Cause. 133 
1 3 ’  Ti. 52d4-5 (zQv 6‘r 6fi y r u k o r . ~ ~  ztefivqv). Plato’s reference to the place of becoming or 
‘space’ as the ‘nurse’ of becoming is congruent with his previous metaphor of birth at Ti.50c7-d4 (for 
a discussion see Cornford, p. 187), where the receptacle i s  referred to as the ‘mother’, the model or 
forms as ‘the father’ and incipient being as the ‘offspring’. 
132 Ti. 52d2-4. 
Although derived differently, & v & y ~ q  (see my proposed etymology at 6 1.3.2, Part I, of this thesis) 
understood as a primary cause shares the idea of disorder with the English word ‘anarchy’ (from the 
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7. Ananke is altogether not good or, conversely, is ‘bad’, based on the fact that it is 
the disordering Cause and on this fact alone. 
8. Ananke did not prevent the Cosmos from being ordered or generated, or more 
precisely, could not, and therefore is given a role in its generation based on this 
fact and on this fact alone. 
9. Ananke or more properly its effect, chaos, remains in the generated world due to 
the fact that it was not completely subdued or organised by the Demiurge. 
10. The Demiurge is eternal. 
1 1. Whatever the Demiurge generates directly is indissoluble except by himself, i.e. 
the Universe as a whole (which includes the Heavens) (Ti. 32c2-4, 41a7-8), the 
World Soul (Ti. 36e4-5) and the human soul (41c6-d1), based on this fact and on 
this fact alone. 
12. Whatever the Demiurge does not generate directly’34 (and while excluding the 
immortal part of the human soul, does include the human body, the mortal parts 
Greek an-‘without’ + arkhos ‘chief, ruler’) and is, I suggest, a good translation, although not problem 
free (see fn. 431). In translations of the Timaeus, however, h d y ~ q  is most often translated as 
‘necessity’, but which word I argue becomes its meaning (or a derived meaning) only in the latter 
third of this work. What transpires is that a change in meaning takes place throughout the course of 
the Timaeus. For the most part, therefore, I have left ‘Ananke’ in its transliterated, untranslated form, 
except for the above and for translating it as ‘Might’ when first introduced to coincide with Plato’s 
contrast of Ananke with Nous or ‘Mind’ in the early development of the Cosmos. I argue that for the 
first two thirds of the Timaeus Ananke is understood by Plato as a disordering primary cause. 
Accordingly, for this part of the Timaeus, ‘Anarchy’ provides a better translation and is closer in 
meaning to 6Cucky~q than ‘Necessity’, thereby depicting not only its force, but also its wholly 
negative or disordering impact. The apparent lapse on the part of Ananke or collusion suggested by 
Plato between the Demiurge and Ananke which allowed the Demiurge to order the Cosmos (see Ti. 
48a2-5) need only follow from the observation that the Universe was in fact ordered and for the most 
part remained so. Following this line of reasoning, and keeping the opposing natures of these two 
powers intact, the Demiurge would then be seem as the more powerful ‘Will’, with Ananke having 
had to either concede or submit to allow this ordering. Mythically, this asymmetry is easy to portray 
as momentary agreement or collusion between these primal powers. Plato does appear to make the 
above subsequent claim regarding the respective opposing ‘wills’ of the Demiurge and Ananke at Ti. 
41a8-b6. For a discussion of the concept of ‘will’ in ancient Greece see Albrecht Dihle, The Theory of 
Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1982)’ chaps. I1 and 111. 
How the natural objects of the world, e.g. a maple tree, a gold nugget, etc., apart from the three 
kinds of living creatures (those inhabiting water, air and land) fit into Plato’s scheme re dissolubility is 
obscure, not having been discussed. They appear to evolve, rather than to have been generated, out of 
the ‘Nurse of Becoming’. This difficulty will be dealt with later. It would seem, however, that these 
objects, including the elements out of which they are formed, in not requiring or exhibiting any sort of 
self-movement or presence of soul, would not have been generated either by the Demiurge or by one 
of his divine delegates, nor could they have been given that they are soulless. The presence of the 
World Soul, moreover, does not seem to affect these individual objects, which objects for Plato 
remain subject to secondary causes for their movement. They remain linked to generation, however, 
due to the fact that they are ordered, thereby exhibiting the presence of ‘nous’. These objects, 
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of the human soul built onto the divine part [Ti. 69c3-d6], as well as the weaving 
of these together [Ti. 41d1-4]), i.e. the three kinds of living creatures, are not 
eternal or conversely, are dissoluble or mortal (Ti. 4 1 c2-6), based on this fact and 
on this fact alone. 
13. Thus, anything generated or bonded together, including the Gods (the Heavenly 
Bodies), is not entirely immortal or indissoluble (Ti. 41b2-3), and thus is 
dissoluble either by the Demiurge (prem. 11) or due to their mortal nature 
(prem. 12). 
14. Only a wicked Will would do this (Ti.41a8-b6), i.e. dissolve anything which is 
good and all generated things, in as much as they are ordered, are good. 
15. The Demiurge is entirely responsible for the ordering of the Cosmos and is 
altogether good, and therefore it could never be the Demiurge’s will to dissolve 
the Cosmos or any part of it. 
16. Ananke is also eternal. 
17. Because Ananke is the disordering Cause and is altogether not good or 
conversely, is ‘bad’ (premises 6 and 7 above), it could only be the will of 
Ananke that would bring about the dissolution of the Cosmos or any part of it. 
18. However, such dissolution is impossible, since the will of the Demiurge is a 
stronger and more sovereign will than that of Ananke (Ti. 4 1 b4-6). 
19. Thus, as a consequence of the eternal presence of the disordering power of 
Ananke or ‘Anarchy’ in the generated Cosmos (prem. 9) and that only it would 
dissolve something which was good (prem. 17), but combined with the fact that 
the Demiurge is the stronger and more sovereign eternal will in the Cosmos 
(prem. 18) and therefore would prevent this fiom ever happening, the Demiurge 
must now declare all things previously generated (the three kinds of mortal 
creatures as yet remaining uncreated [Ti. 41b7]), beginning with the Heavenly 
Bodies because of their central role in the ordering of ‘time’, as no longer being 
dissoluble, since this would be impossible, given the above premises. Plato 
asserts this, moreover, in order to also affirm the certainty of his premises which 
are all a priori or follow therefrom and could be disputed. The reason, 
therefore, that the generated Cosmos is now declared to be indissoluble 
throughout all time is due to the fact that given the Demiurge and Ananke are 
both eternal, but with Ananke being the disordering cause, whilst the Demiurge 
is the sole ordering one and thus, is all good (and given the ordering of the 
Cosmos, the more powerful cause), the latter must now assert its superiority 
therefore, are properly described by Plato as having been taken over by the Demiurge from “all that 
was visible [Ti. 3Oa2-61,” rather than as having been generated. 
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over Ananke for the fuZZ Zength of their existence which is forever. What 
otherwise would follow is that what has been ordered could be dissolved. The 
indissolubility of the ordered Cosmos, however, is now a sign of the Demiurge’s 
continued superiority over Ananke in time, just as the ordered Cosmos was a 
mark of its initial superiority outside of time. Plato does not argue that because 
there is no evil Will, generated things are indissoluble, but rather, because of the 
goodness, power and sovereignty of the Demiurge over such an evil Will is this 
the case, with the Demiurge himself declaring that the things he has thus far 
generated will never be dissolved or taste death (41b3-4), with the result that 
they now become eternal a parte post. 
The importance of this argument is that Plato was logically required to make it 
and precisely because of the metaphysical, and not physical, existence of Ananke. If 
Ananke did not actually exist as one of two primary metaphysical causes, the 
Demiurge being the other, then Plato could have left the generated Cosmos (as a 
whole) as potentially dissoluble throughout time, since it would have had no 
opposing force to ever bring about its dissolution, reflecting in this manner its 
likeness to the Eternal Living Being. Further on in this thesis (@3.3.2), the difference 
between natural disorder and unnatural disorder in the Timaeus is discussed. Plato 
clearly accounts for natural disorder or the natural processes of decay and resurgence 
which occur in the Cosmos. These are considered good and part of the ordering 
process. This type of decay, therefore, involving natural death, is not what he is 
rejecting here. Rather, what Plato is opposing by his declaration that the Cosmos is 
indissoluble in time, is that the Cosmos as a whole is indissoluble. Without Ananke, 
the Demiurge would have been the only metaphysical being existing and would not 
have required such a declaration, since it would have been against its nature to 
dissolve anything which was good, which the Cosmos, in its entirety, was. It is 
precisely because of the eternal presence of Ananke and its will to return the Cosmos 
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to chaos that the Demiurge is required to assert its own superiority and thus claim 
indissolubility for the generated Cosmos throughout the whole of time. 
Moreover, the above declaration of indissolubility would similarly not have been 
required if Ananke were merely mechanical motion in the world, since as a part of 
the Cosmos,'35 it would then be subject to the same conditions as the Cosmos and 
would not be viewed as a threat to its continued existence. The possibility that 
Ananke is some sort of brute disorganising force existing within the generated world 
(not without) must also be rejected. It would then have to be accounted for in its 
entirety as such a force, which Plato does not do. To the contrary, he goes to great 
lengths to disavow this by depicting Ananke's nature solely in metaphysical terns, 
whilst depicting the body of the world in physical terms and as being perfect and 
subject neither to age nor disease.'36 Although Plato suggests in the Timaeus that 
there are vestiges of disorder remaining in the Cosmos,137 these would remain only 
as traces of the original chaos, since it was never completely subdued and 
accordingly, point only to the works of Ananke and not to Ananke itself. Plato's 
depiction, moreover, of the fixed stars as being divine and immortal,'38 is consistent 
only with ultimately equating their immortality with the concept of the 
indissolubility of the Cosmos throughout all time. The fixed stars are divine because 
they were made by the Demiurge. They are immortal because they are divine and 
being immortal, they are eternal. However, they are eternal only a parte post 
because, like all things generated, they, too, had a beginning. Thus, if they are to 
Ti. 33a6-bl. 
136 Ti. 33a6-bl. 
137 See Ti. 48a2-5; 53b5-7; 69b2-5. 
138 Ti. 4Ob4-6. 
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remain immortal, it must be the case that they can never be dissolved throughout all 
of time. They are immortal. Therefore the Cosmos in which they exist is 
indissoluble throughout all of time.'39 Finally, it is not sufficient to argue that the 
Demiurge designed the Body of the World, the Heavenly Bodies and the World Soul 
to be immortal in order to imitate the Perfect Living Being,'40 the Form after which 
they are modelled. If this were the case, their immortality would point directly to that 
Form. However, the Perfect Living Being is not the only truly eternal object (i.e. is 
eternal both a parte ante and a parte post), but so are Being, Space (the 'Nurse' of 
Becoming) and Be~oming, '~ '  as well as the primary causes, Ananke and the 
Demiurge. 
1.3.14 The World Soul 
Following upon the birth of time, Plato proceeds to place the World Soul securely 
142 within the Universe as the source of its several motions: 
The fact that the fixed stars by introducing measure form part of the mechanism which creates the 
notion of 'time' and are themselves immortal is another argument for the indissolubility of the 
Universe throughout all of time, since as long as the stars exist (and they are eternal), so, too, will both 
the time which they create and the Universe which houses them. 
See Ti. 37d3-4. "But inasmuch as the nature of the Living Creature was eternal, it was impossible 
to bestow this attribute in its entirety on what was generated" (Bury, p. 75; Lee, p. 51). From this 
passage it is clear that it was not thought possible to make the Universe eternal simply by copying its 
Form. This further argues, therefore, for the position that Plato had another agenda, a metaphysical 
one (stated above) for attaching eternality to the Universe beyond the cosmological position, which 
was limited to simply bestowing a "moving image" of it. 






And in the centre He put Soul, extending it throughout the whole of it and 
further wrapped its body round about with Soul on the 0 ~ t s i d e . l ~ ~  And so 
he established a single universe, a Circle revolving in a circle, solitary, but 
because of its excellence, able to keep its own company and requiring no 
other besides, sufficient to be its own acquaintance and friend. On account 
of all of this, that which He brought into being was a blessed God.’44 
Besides depicting here the placement and relation of the World Soul to the 
Cosmos, Plato makes a distinction between the eternal God, i.e. the Demiurge, and 
the Cosmos which has just been brought into existence, calling the latter a blessed 
god because of its singular wholeness, circularity of motion, overall excellence and 
self-sufficiency, stressing that it is for all of these reasons that it, as a whole, is a 
blessed god. Prior to this, at Ti. 30b6, he notes that the Cosmos has come into 
existence in very truth as a living creature endowed with soul and intelligence due to 
the providence of God. Again, a little further on at Ti. 30dl-31a1, he states that it 
was God’s purpose to use as his model the highest and most completely perfect of 
intelligible things, “and so he created a single visible living being, containing within 
79 145 itself all living beings of the same natural order. What is important to consider in 
each of these passages is that it is the whole which has become a God, having been 
imparted with overall perfection, e.g. it is round, contains the sum total of the four 
elements out of which everything is made, is self-sufficient, revolves in a uniform 
circular motion on the same spot’46 and, related to the latter and perhaps most 
importantly, is contained by and contains, and thus is completely diffused by the 
Also, therefore, the Demiurge enclosed it with Soul. 
When translating this passage, I have adapted the same use of capitals as suggested by Bury in his 
Lee, p.43. 
This motion was deemed to be the motion most properly belonging to intelligence and reason. See 
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presence of W U X ~ ~  in the form of the World Soul (as well as human ‘souls’), wherein 
dwells its intelligence, the measure by which Plato judges something to be superior 
(which in this case is the highest and the best there is of created thingd4’) and 
through which it shares in the divine.148 
7 149 he Although Plato ascribes divinity to the Cosmos, declaring it a ’blessed god , 
does not assign divinity similarly to each human being as a whole, i.e. he does not 
say Man or Men are blessed gods, even though man also partakes in soul and 
intelligence. One reason for this is that human beings are given over to be the 
handiwork of the celestial gods precisely so that they remain mortal, lSo thereby 
helping to complete the Universe according to the forms that Reason (nous) 
perceives exist in the eternal Living Being, which is its model (Ti. 39e6-9). Thus, 
the Demiurge declines to make man himself15’ precisely so that man as a whole is 
not divine, but remains, except for his soul (and only part of that), mortal (Ti. 41c2) 
in keeping with the model envisioned. A second reason why it can be argued that for 
Plato man cannot be a god, is that while man as an individual partakes of soul, his 
soul is not pure, described as being only to the second and third decree pure (Tz. 
41d4-7). However, a god for Plato necessarily includes the notion of perfection (Ti. 
34a8-b9) and not just that it partakes of soul. Thus, man remains a mortal being 
forming a part of the Cosmos, and whilst the latter is wholly divine and wholly good 
given the factors noted above, only the intelligent part of man is (having been made 
See Ti. 30bl-3. 
Ti. 92c4-9. 
See Ti. 34a8-b9. 
See the Demiurge’s speech at Ti. 41a7-d3. 
I have used the masculine pronoun here in keeping with Plato’s metaphor in depicting the 







by the Demiurge) and to the degree that his soul, in which nous or intelligence 
dwells, remains ordered, is it g 0 0 d . l ~ ~  
Soul, as a “divine source of unending and rational life for all time” originally 
belonged properly to the Cosmos as a whole (Ti. 36d8-e5), extended by way of the 
World Soul. In a passage which soon follows, Plato depicts the mixing of the human 
soul as being made by the Demiurge from leftovers of what he had previously used 
for making the World-Soul, but only this time, less pure (Tz. 41d4-7) and which is 
subsequently divided up into individual souls. He has already explained when 
describing the original mixing of the World-Soul that his narrative was bound to 
reflect man’s, and thus his own, contingent and accidental state (Ti. 34c2-4), and 
equally so, when describing the mixing of the human soul. What becomes evident 
from this narrative is that mankind as a whole is not a god, unlike the Cosmos, 
which, because it was made by the Demiurge in its entirety, and not just because of 
the presence of the World-Soul, is, as a whole, declared to be a blessed god. 
Pointedly, Plato’s physical Cosmos resembles as nearZy as possibZe a model world, a 
Form wherein there is no imperfection and thus no need or requirement to explain 
any aberrations in terms of Ananke. This is not the case, however, with regard to the 
generated Universe or copy itself, which was modelled after this perfect Form.153 
Here there would be a need to explain imperfection, since everything in the Cosmos 
which was not generated or ordered directly by the Demiurge lacked perfection. 
Thus, whereas the Cosmos as a whole was called divine or a god due to its 
~ ~~ 
See Ti. 43e8-44a5; also see Ti. 42b2-d2. 152 
‘53 Ti. 3 1 a2-b3. 
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provenance and perfection, its parts were not, specifically man or any of the three 
kinds of living creatures, winged, water or land. Indeed, some of the content of the 
Universe was generated after the Cosmos was made, namely, the three kinds of 
living creatures. Moreover, other content appears to have evolved aZongside 
generation, e.g. natural objects made up of the elements. 
1.3.15 Soul or yqfi 
With regard specifically to soul or vuxfi, although Plato does not explicitly 
associate any particular d t ~ i a  in the Timaeus with vuxfi, not having yet established 
this connection, he does state that intelligence is impossible without soul.’ 54 
Moreover, he will describe two souls in Laws y5’ which represent a remarkable 
similarity with, and I will later argue, are an unmistakable development of the figures 
*54  Ti. 30b3. With regard to soul in the Timaeus, Plato is primarily concerned with the generation of 
the World-Soul (Ti. 34bl Off) .  
155 There is no evidence to suggest that Laws X preceded the Timaeus. On the contrary, the accepted 
view, given the evidence, is that the Laws is “the latest of all Plato’s writings” (see A.E. Taylor, The 
Laws of Plato, p.lxiii ff), with the possible, although arguable, exception of the short dialogue 
Epinomis, meant as an appendix or supplement to the major work. Supporting this view is the fact 
that Book IV (71 1 a-b) of the Laws contains historical details indicating that it must have been written 
after 360 B.C. when Plato returned from Syracuse for the last time. Moreover, it was traditionally 
maintained from later antiquity that the received text was never finally revised, being passed into 
circulation by his scholars after his death (ibid. p. xiii). As Cornford has written, “The Timaeus 
belongs to the latest group of Plato’s works: Sophist and Statesman, Timueus and Critias, Philebus, 
Laws”, with The Laws being “the only dialogue that is certainly later than the Timaeus and Critias” 
(see Cornford, PC, p. 1). This thesis assumes the late dating of these works. Cornford hypothesises 
that Plato, being too old (close to 80) and having too much material to finish properly his proposed 
trilogy of Timaeus, Critius and Hermocrates, leaves unfinished the Critias in mid-sentence and begins 
anew with “The Laws,” a subject much closer to his heart, whereupon he “continues the story [ibid. p. 
7-81.’’ For a different dating of both the Timueus and Laws see G. L. E. Owen, “The Place of the 
Timaeus in Plato’s Dialogues” in Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, R. E. Alien, ed., pp. 313-338. In 
this work Owen argues that both of these works belong to Plato’s middle dialogues. Cherniss, 
however, in an article from the same volume, “The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato’s Later 
Dialogues” (pp. 339-378) concludes upon examination of the case presented by Owen that this view 
is mistaken in that evidence is lacking to prove the points which Owen wishes to make and with 
respect to the Timaeus, its philosophical doctrine, no matter what its true chronology, is not at 
variance with or in any essential point modified by those dialogues considered to be late, e.g. the 
Sophist, the Politicus and the Philibus. 
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of the Demiurge and Ananke from the Tirnae~s.’~~ If, as Archer-Hind has done, by 
interpreting the second and third causes, namely, Ananke (Necessity)’” and the 
accessory causes, ’ 5 8  as not having genuine metaphysical status, understanding their 
respective roles as representing physical aspects of nature, i.e. mechanical motion or 
subjects of that motion, and they are thereby eliminated altogether as causes, then, but 
only then, are there grounds for claiming that there is only “one cause” in the sense of 
a genuine metaphysical cause.159 However, I would argue that Archer-Hind has not 
Mason’s conclusion regarding the Demiurge in his dissertation Reason and Necessiy in PZato s 
Timaeus (pp. 66-67) that the Craftsman in the Timaeus “represents” the reason responsible for this 
ultimate ordering [of the Cosmos] is wrong in as much as the craftsman does not, I suggest, represent 
anything, but is in fact the name given by Plato (within a necessarily mythic setting) to the primary 
ordering cause in his cosmology, of which ‘reason’ or ‘nous’ is a divine attribute, but which latter is 
not and is never spoken of by Plato as being such, the only divine attribute. Mason’s further 
assumption, moreover, that the Demiurge is a ‘soul’ (“though himself a soul”) is given no support in 
the Timaeus, nor is his admission of the formal Aristotelian principle of separating an object (e.g. 
‘soul’) into its genus (the Demiurge) and its subclasses (the ‘World Soul’ and ’ human souls’). In the 
Timaeus the idea of ‘soul’ is strictly limited to the ‘World Soul’ and to ‘human souls’, both of which 
are described as generated. Although Laws X offers a more developed understanding of ‘soul’, so that 
included in this notion is now the idea of all non-physical causal powers from the primary causes 
down to the psychic powers of man, as I argue later (see Part 11, 52.3.2.1.6) this is not a substantial 
change in Plato’s understanding from the Timaeus, but is primarily a change of aspect. 
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Archer-Hind, Cornford and Taylor all refer to Ananke as ‘Necessity’. 
See Ti. 46d4. Only with regard to the accessory causes, but not Ananke (Necessity), does Plato 
state that they are not true causes, although he affirms that they are mistaken for such. He describes 
the accessory causes as being completely incapable of reason or intelligence, arguing that of 
themselves they are without soul since soul is invisible, yet they (fire, water, earth and air) are all 
visible bodies. What Plato is arguing against here is the notion of some sort of innate rationality or 
‘nature’ belonging to material things themselves apart from the ordering presence of ‘soul’ and the 
divine. ‘Soul’ for Plato is not simply order, but rather, order is the result of the action of ‘soul’. 
Borrowing Aristotelian terms for distinguishing amongst the different kinds of causes, a 
description of the Demiurge as being either the material cause or the formal cause of the Cosmos 
would not appear to be arguable, since the material of the Universe is merely organised by the 
Demiurge, and the Forms or Ideas for Plato are themselves eternal, forming the pattern after which the 
form or essence of a generated object is determined, a function which does not involve the Demiurge 
in any demonstrable way. Although it can be maintained that the Demiurge is an efficient cause, it is 
clearly not sufficient as a cause on its own, requiring Ananke as a participant, albeit, an arguably 
‘hostile’ player. Further, one could also view the Demiurge as the final cause, if the purpose of the 
Demiurge in generating the Cosmos is as Plato states, namely, in being good, he wanted to create a 
Cosmos which would reflect this goodness. Finally, marking the Demiurge as the first cause is a 
tendentious move, favouring a notion of creation from nothing, rather than what Plato depicts, that is, 
generation of the Cosmos by the Demiurge from the pre-existing ‘stuff already present in the 
unformed Universe and thereafter being organised upon the pattern of the eternal Ideas or Forms, 
which like the Demiurge are outside of it. Therefore, this last choice would have to be carefully 
qualified to include these co-factors in the consequent generation. The idea that the Demiurge is the 
Supreme Cause, akzo dcyaeov, as affirmed in the Republic, is, I would argue, a better rendering for 





successfully done this, since he must ignore the causal scheme Plato has set up in his 
cosmology to explain the genesis of the Cosmos, a genesis, moreover, which is 
explicitly given a backward-looking teleology, a fourth or final cause which Plato 
announces as its first, namely, that God was good and he wished everything as far as 
possible to be like himself. Archer-Hind’s analysis suggests an interpretation of 
the Timaeus which is highly revisionist, resulting in a strongly reductionist view. He 
writes : 
Consistently with all his previous teaching Plato here [Ti. 29ell makes 
the ab~b  &yaebv the source and cause of all existence; this in the 
allegory is symbolized by a benevolent creator bringing order out of a 
preexisting chaos. Of course Plato’s words are not to be interpreted with 
crude literalness. The cause of the existence of visible nature is the 
supreme law by virtue of which the one absolute intelligence 
differentiates itself into the plurality of material objects: that is the reason 
why the world of matter exists at all: then, since intelligence must needs 
work on a fixed plan and with the best end in view, the universe thus 
evolved was made as perfect as anything material can be?’ 
In designating the Demiurge as a symbol in an “allegory” Archer-Hind removes 
from Plato’s account the key player in the metaphysical explanation given in the 
Timaeus for the Cosmos, a player, moreover, who at no time is explained away as a 
mere symbol in an allegory by Plato, himself. By doing this, the denouement Archer- 
Hind leaves behind as Plato’s cosmological explanation is essentially a mechanistic 
account of the world. With the supernaturalism suggested by a real Demiurge 
removed, what is left is material in motion, governed by laws which exist in nature 
precluding another causal factor, i.e. Ananke, as well as the ideas of final end and superiority. 
Moreover, the supernality of the Demiurge while assumed, is left essentially unchallenged by Plato, 
although not by Archer-Hinds or Cornford. However, this quality of supreme excellence is ably 
captured in the title ‘Supreme Cause’. 
See Ti. 29d7fE “Let us state then the reason (a’tziav) for generation and for this Universe which 
the Framer constructed. He was good, and in which good no envy whatsoever concerning anything is 
possible. Being therefore free from this he wished all things to be as much as possible like himself.” 
160 
A-H, TP, p. 9 1, comment re line 12. 161 
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amongst the plurality of the material objects. However, the mechanism for which 
Archer-Hind argues is more along Kantian lines where causality itself is a law of 
nature giving rise necessarily in time to an occurrence. Hence, he refers to “supreme 
law” and “one absolute intelligence,” with intelligence requiring a fixed plan and 
evolution, rather than arguing for the Cartesian sense of mechanism where physical 
phenomena is explicable purely by mechanical laws. Cornford will ultimately agree 
with Archer-Hind, adopting, however, the starker Cartesian sense of mechanism 
where the Cosmos is governed entirely by mechanical laws, but not without 
obscuring his account by first divinising Reason. 162 
1.3.16 Plato’s teleology 
Whereas it is possible to see Plato’s backward-looking teleology as not a teleology 
at all, but rather, as grounds for a mechanistic view with the future being explained in 
terms of the past and the past seen only as story-telling involving myth and 
metaphor,’63 such an interpretation, I suggest, is an unnatural and biased reading of 
Plato’s cosmology, who stresses from the beginning of the Timaeus that it is a ZikeZy 
account limited necessarily by language when discussing such a topic. If Plato was 
dealing only with the physical world and was not genuinely trying to communicate 
his belief in the role that the metaphysical or divine had to play in its genesis, then he 
~ ~ 
162 “[Tlhere is no doubt he [the god] stands for divine Reason for ends that are good [Cornford, PC, 
p.381,” and further, “We may ask how this divine Reason in the world is related to that divine Reason 
symbolised by the Demiurge [ibid, p. 391.” Although Cornford does not answer this question, and 
consequently holds back fiom equating what he calls ‘divine Reason’ symbolised by the Demiurge 
with divine Reason in the world, choosing rather, to confine his attention to the world and the ‘reason’ 
it contains, nevertheless, by denying the Demiurge metaphysical reality, he simply transfers the 
problem to what he now calls ‘divine Reason’, but once again chooses to ignore this, concentrating his 
attention on ‘reason’ with a small ‘r’. A metaphysical distinction, nonetheless, has been made and the 
problem remains as to the nature of this reality. 
163 See Cornford, PC, p. 27 and pp. 3 1-32. 
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could easily have done so and would not have needed to invent such a story, a story, 
moreover, which, if taken only to depict the physical world, is extremely obscure. 
Laws X bears out his utter rejection of anyone positing a purely materialistic or 
mechanistic view of the world irrespective of how this would be communicated.’64 It 
can hardly be argued that he would find this more acceptable if it were reformulated 
as myth. Further, he makes no attempt in Laws X to present his position as a 
rehtation of an earlier position, e.g. of a supposed mechanistic or materialistic view 
from the Timaeus. This strongly suggests that Plato’s understanding of the 
metaphysical and the divine in Laws X, although developed and re-focused, remains 
substantially unchanged from the Timaeus and that neither the Demiurge nor Ananke 
are purely descriptive of the world as we know it. 
It could also be argued, however, that Plato’s teleology, relying heavily on 
religious assumptions articulated within his metaphysical description, rather than 
merely providing a picturesque vehicle for a mechanistic account of natural 
causality, was, in fact, arrived at purely out of Plato’s ignorance, that is, in lieu of a 
more scientific approach and understanding of the world. This type of ignorance, so 
the argument goes, would lead naturally to mistaken identifications, as in the case of 
natural objects being seen as gods. Although Plato no doubt rejected many of the 
earlier anthropomorphisms and deifications, preferring to offer his acknowledgement 
of them without giving his assent to their validity,’65 he could nonetheless be seen as 
See Lg. 886d2 and 8 8 7 ~ 5  ff. 
See The Apology (Collected Dialogues, ed. by Hamilton & Cairnes), 27c4-dl . Although this is 
purported to be Socrates’ defence written down by Plato, it is likely that Plato was influenced by the 
views of his mentor and that this dialogue captures some of his own views as well. Just as Socrates 
had a very strong belief in and attachment to a singular ‘God’ (over others), so did Plato (the 
‘Demiurge’). See also Ap. 26d3-4 (“he says that the sun is a stone and the moon a mass of earth”). 
165 
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falling into other traps. Thus, in Plato’s case, it could be argued, various natural 
processes would be understood by him as Demiurgic causal activity, when in fact 
they were not. Thus, a certain amount of hypothesising or speculation would take 
place but wrongly, as in earlier times when a bang of thunder might have been 
mistakenly understood as the angry voice of one of the gods. Although Plato rejects 
outright natural objects as being gods, his error could occur, for example, or so the 
argument goes, when what is really only natural ordering or causation is mistakenly 
seen by him as the work of a cosmic Mind or Demiurge, and so forth. I would 
counter, however, that Plato’s theological basis in the Timaeus is ipso facto not a 
case of ignorance followed by mistaken identifications. It cannot be argued that the 
Demiurge is the mistaken personification for the principle of causation if Plato’s 
claim is in fact inclusive of the claim his opposition is taking, namely, that the 
Demiurge, along with Ananke, are the two primary causes, and thus, the very 
principles of causation themselves, the former described as the ‘best of causes’ and 
the latter, ‘operating without reason, producing effects casual and random. ’ Thus, 
the claim which Plato is purportedly denying is in fact accepted by him. The 
Demiurge and Ananke are both primary causes for Plato, and are articulated as such 
in the Timaeus, nothing more and nothing less. The main opposition to Plato’s 
understanding, I would suggest, lies in his proposed ontology for these causes, which 
Although Socrates appears to deflect this position as not being his own, Plato willing adheres more 
closely to it, but with qualification. See Ti. 38e3-39e2. In this passage Plato describes the sun, the 
moon and the planets as being made by the Demiurge, each with a physical body, bound by ties of 
‘soul’. For Plato’s understanding of how soul moves the heavenly bodies see Lg. 898e8-899a4 and 
899b3-10. What is certain is that for Plato the elements making up the physical bodies were not 
themselves gods (see Ti. 46c7-d7). Although Plato appears to be disputing the atomists in this 
passage, the essential position, which he is rejecting is the belief that any of these elements have 
power of their own, either natural or divine. 
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is rejected on two fronts, namely, first, for the position that they are both eternal and 
had existence before the generation of the Cosmos and second, that there is an 
axiology or moral assignation attached to these causes, that of perfect goodness to 
the Demiurge and its opposite, evil, to Ananke. 
The first aspect of Plato’s ontology which is rejected is that the Demiurge and 
Ananke exist as primary powers or forces of causation apart from all considerations 
of time and space connected with the generated Cosmos. Thus, they do not exist 
simply as principles to be discerned amongst ordered objects, but exist as powers 
separate from those principles found to be operative within the Cosmos. The second 
aspect of Plato’s ontology, equally important to him as the first, but which is also 
rejected by those claiming an error of “anthropomorphism” is Plato’s assessment of 
perfect goodness given to the Cosmos and hence, the Demiurge, and contrarily, his 
assessment of evil given to Ananke as the ultimate source of disorder prior to and 
remaining in the Cosmos and the human soul. As stated above, however, the 
Demiurge and Ananke are not merely principles of causation in an already generated 
Cosmos, but are the powers to which these principles can be traced for their origin. 
This is not merely a religious assumption on Plato’s part, for although his beliefs 
may have given him some impetus for making the inquiry, he nonetheless arrives at 
his conclusions and hence, understanding, logically and deductively. 
Plato’s reasoning can be outlined as follows, beginning with his understanding of 
the ontology of the primary causal powers. First, what is ultimately the cause of 
something cannot be in any way a part of it, otherwise it would not be its cause. 
Second, everything within the Cosmos has a cause and third, nothing can be or is the 
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cause of itself. Thus, Plato argues that none of the physical causes166 within the 
Cosmos can be ultimate causes, but merely participate as accessory causes, since 
they timeously govern (other events) and are themselves governed and as such, 
cannot be true or ultimate causes.16’ The remaining source of true, although, not 
ultimate, causation in the world after its generation Plato allots to ‘soul’, which soul, 
while designed solely for this purpose by the Demiurge, exists prior to the generation 
of the Cosmos.16’ As with the primary causes in the Timaeus, ‘souls’, too, in laws X, 
are designated morally as being capable of good or its opposite, evil!” Just as with 
the primary causes, however, Plato’s understanding of ‘soul’ is not a case of 
mistaken identity for some sort of natural phenomenon, as there is nothing 
equivalent to ‘soul’ for which it might have been substituted at the natural level. 
‘Soul’ in effect is sui generis and a preternatural kind, just as the primary causes are, 
existing always at a metaphysical level and never as a natural kind subject to 
physics. Although ‘soul’ permeates the Cosmos through and through, the mark it 
leaves is rationality or intelligent ends within the Universe, not to be confused with 
the physical motion which is so impacted and directed. Plato does not claim to 
understand how ‘soul’ achieves this, only that it does and was designed to do so.*’’ 
According to Plato’s ontology, what is apprehensible by intelligence or reasoning, 
does not change, and hence, exists necessarily apart from the world of change and 
Subject to time, these would be events occurring after the generation of the Heavens. 
167 Ti. 46c7-e6. 
See Part I1 of this thesis, where at $2.3.5 it is argued that ‘soul’ is more properly understood as 
begotten by the Demiurge, rather than generated, the depiction of its generation forming part of the 
storytelling aspect of Plato’s cosmology. 
169 See Lg. 896e4-897d1. 
understanding of the ‘soul’ in the Timaeus. 
166 
See Lg. 898e8-899b10. Also see Part 11, 52.3.2.1.1 to 2.3.2.1.5 of this thesis on Plato’s 170 
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what is perceptible by the senses.”’ The vehicle of this rational (or irrational) art, 
however, can and does co-exist with the world by the fact of the rationality and 
hence, order (or disorder) discernibly present within the Cosmos and is understood 
by Plato as ‘soul’, whilst the source of rationality remains for him the Forms and the 
means of their discernment, the human mind. 
Secondly, with regard to Plato’s moral understanding, ‘order’ (being the opposite 
of ‘disorder’) in no way participates in ‘disorder’. Moreover, ‘order’, being life- 
generating and supportive of the life which is generated (i.e. the generated Cosmos is 
‘ordered’ and by this order has and remains in existence) is judged by Plato to be 
completely good with respect to the Cosmos. Hence, the ‘goodness’ which is known 
of and identifiable with the Demiurge lies in the fact of the Demiurge being both 
source Thus, to the extent that the Cosmos is 
ordered, it is perfectly (completely) good and therefore its cause is also deemed to be 
completely good. Conversely for Plato, to the extent that the Cosmos remains or 
returns to disorder, this disorder is completely bad or evil, and so, too, is its cause. 
172 and cause of this ‘ordering’. 
1.3.17 A theological basis 
The theological basis, therefore, which Plato gives to his Cosmology, is not a case 
of mistaken identity, since Plato’s Universe is neither speculative, nor hypothetical, 
nor, as I have argued earlier, is it metaphorical, any of which would have to hold for 
a non-metaphysical interpretation of the Demiurge and Ananke to be tenable. 
See Ti. 27cl-29d3. 
In Part 11, $2.3.2.1.4 I articulate the relationship of the Forms to the Demiurge as their source. 
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Moreover, Plato’s acknowledgement of the various nature gods173 and gods within 
the Pantheon were those commonly accepted by Athenian society. Nonetheless, 
these were open to investigation by Plato,’74 although reverently, and some, at the 
very least, to re~isi0n.l~’ Thus, whereas Plato’s belief in or at least 
acknowledgement of such gods is subject to the above criticism of ignorance and/or 
mistaken identity, the status of some of the gods was subject long before to his own 
criticism and for the same sort of reasons, which would have resulted in the revision, 
or perhaps demotion, of at least some of them as gods.176 
However, the same is not true for either the Demiurge or Ananke, the reason 
appearing to lie in their ontology. Whereas the nature gods play no role in the 
Timaeus at all, the Demiurge and Ananke are the central metaphysical figures in 
Plato’s cosmology. Moreover, and important to both sides of the argument-i.e. the 
claim of only metaphorical and symbolic importance for these figures versus a claim 
for their genuine metaphysical reality-the acknowledgement of the Demiurge and 
Ananke arise for the first and only time in the Timaeus. There is no earlier precedent 
set or is there a later one, strongly suggesting that the existence of the Demiurge and 
Ananke are both specific to and necessary for the generation of the Cosmos. Thus, 
Plato is not trying to adapt old cosmogonical figures to a new cosmology. Leaving 
173 See Ti. 40d6-4 1 a2. See also 48d4-e 1. It is uncertain which, if any, of the popular ‘gods’, although 
acknowledged, Plato actually believed in. Plato states clearly in the Timaeus that fire, water, earth and 
air are all visible bodies, governed by soul (Ti. 46d5-d7), which idea again appears in Laws X, where 
the governance of heaven and earth and their whole circuit is described as being conducted by soul 
174 See Lg. 888a1-2. Also see Plato’s Apology 18cl-3, where he portrays Socrates as inquiring into 
such matters. 
(Laws X, 897b7-~2). 
See Lg. 886 b 10-e2. 
See Socrates’ Defence in Plato’s Apology at 26~1-9; also 27c4-dl, where Plato, through Socrates, 
suggests that his belief in the Gods was related to his belief in supernatural activity, which, no doubt, 




the old cosmogonies aside, he begins anew. The question which must be asked, 
however, is whether Plato deductively arrived at what he considered must be the 
case regarding the world and its beginnings, given the Cosmos as he then saw it and 
believed it to be, or whether, he began with a certain set of core beliefs and ran a 
version of the world past it, developing a cosmology in its wake. 
An argument for positing that Plato began with at least some unshakeable 
assumptions rests on that fact that not everything comes together in his cosmology. 
In other words, not all aspects of his cosmology make sense when an attempt is 
made to bring its separate strands together into a coherent whole, and concerning 
which whole, in spite of obvious problems, Plato does not attempt to rectify or to 
adjust in order to make it work better. These assumptions are primarily religious 
and/or metaphysical in nature. Some of the more important ones are (1) the 
equivocation between Nous and the Demiurge: In spite of acknowledging Nous as 
playing a powerful role in the generation of the universe, the Demiurge is still 
figured separately as the primary cause; (2) Ananke is described as being persuaded 
by the Demiurge in generating the Cosmos, and yet it is also suggested that it is 
Ananke’s evil will which would move the Cosmos to disarray should the Demiurge 
not constantly be on guard; (3) Being, Space (the receptacle and functionally, the 
‘Nurse’ of Becoming and change) and the elements of Becoming are all described as 
existing before the Cosmos was generated and yet, whereas Space and the primary 
elements are entirely used up in its g e n e r a t i ~ n , ’ ~ ~  nothing is said further of what 
becomes of or wherein exist the Forms; (4) the ‘Nurse of Becoming’ is described as 
’” There is no space or elements, which, after the generation of the Cosmos, do not form a part of it. 
having a puzzling sort of intelligibility’ 78 and a self-movement, quite distinct from 
the Demiurge, Ananke, Nous or and (5) similarly, whereas the elements 
comprising the ‘Becoming’, which is taking place in this receptacle, are described as 
being able to gather enough momentum of their own accord (and also in conjunction 
with the movement of the receptacle) to form the basic building blocks of the 
Universe and also possess traces of their own nature (indicating certain organisation 
or evidence of intelligence,18* apart from and prior to any movement or intelligence 
originating from the primary metaphysical sources), these same elements are also 
described as being marked into shapes by God by means of forms and numbers.’” 
These few instances are representative of some of the inconsistencies or 
difficulties found within Plato’s cosmology. In response to the above, I suggest that 
these examples are less problematic than they would otherwise be, if their presence 
in the Timaeus can be seen as contingent upon Plato’s belief in the quite separate 
metaphysical existence of both the Demiurge and Ananke, rather than a poor attempt 
by Plato at hypothesis or speculation in describing a coherent set of physical 
principles with which to describe the Cosmos. To this end I offer the following 
possible explanations: (1) The Demiurge as a figure could have been removed if all 
he represents is Reason18* or Intelligence in the Universe, as Nous is already 
adequately described to play this role. The notion of ‘Maker’, on the other hand, is 
not necessarily contained within the notion of ‘Nous’, being an entirely separate 
See Ti. 51a4-b2. 
179 Ti. 532-5.  
Ti. 53b2: ixvq pkv k ~ o f l a  b~&v h ~ a ,  [...I. 
Ti. 53b4-5. 




is to be identified with the Reason in the World Soul.” 
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issue, although indeed requiring supreme intelligence as Plato has noted. The 
bottom line for Plato is that the Cosmos had a beginning and what has a beginning 
must have a cause, and this cause or maker he names variously the Demiurge, the 
Maker and the Father. The metaphysical assumption Plato makes here, therefore, 
is that the world has a beginning and this beginning has a cause, and in this case, it is 
a powerful, eternal, good and intelligent cause, which exists outside the world it 
generates. While requiring supreme intelligence to carry out its task, moreover, this 
is too narrow an understanding for Plato’s Cosmic Maker, the Demiurge, to be 
equated with this aspect alone. (2) A plausible explanation for why Plato describes 
Ananke as having been both persuaded to a good end by the Demiurge, but also at 
the same time forever ready to usurp that end has already been explicated above, 
namely, ‘persuasion’ is metaphorical language for the fact that the order initiated by 
the Demiurge did in fact prevail and not the disorder as originally maintained by and 
now consequently re-sought by Ananke.ls4 It should be noted, however, that while 
Ti. 28c2-3. It is noteworthy that Plato writes notqzfiv KCX‘L nazkpa in this passage, further 
qualifying the notion of maker with that of father or originator, suggesting a stronger claim than 
merely that of a builder. 
For G. R. Morrow, “to say that the cosmos comes about by persuasion means that it results from 
the working of the powers inherent in the materials of which it consists, each of them bringing into 
being the effects natural to itself, and none of them being under any constraint by a power outside 
nature” (“Necessity and Persuasion in Plato’s Tirnaeus” in Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, R. E. 
Allen, ed, p. 431). Plato does not state that the cosmos came about through the workings of the 
powers inherent in the materials of which it consists. To the contrary, this is precisely what Plato rails 
against in Laws X, namely, the view that there are any powers whatsoever belonging to the materials 
which comprise the universe and is why, in both the Timaeus and in Laws X, he goes into such great 
detail explaining the differences between the secondary and primary causes. If, as Morrow suggests, 
Plato consciously borrowed the language of Democritus in choosing the term ‘ananke’ (p. 424), which 
seems reasonable enough, Plato’s intention in so doing could hardly have been to emulate Democritus 
at one level by excluding all “cosmic” purpose from the physical world (one step up from Democritus 
who excluded all purpose), while correcting him at another by including purpose at a purely physical 
level-the whole of the Timaeus bespeaks of ‘ends’ at a cosmic level brought about by a Demiurge 
outwith the universe it generated, thwarted to some extent by another cosmic power, Ananke. This is 
effectively, however, what Morrow’s position defends in seeking to delimit Plato’s understanding of 
the natural order to “causal sequence” (p. 423). Plato’s cosmology is effectively rewritten by Morrow 




metaphorical language is being used here, it is only used to depict what for Plato was 
impossible to show in any other way, in this case being descriptive of non-physical 
powers prior to the world being fully ordered, rather than what has been suggested 
by commentators, namely, colourful language for describing physical powers 
inherent in the world following its generation. The latter is not in keeping with 
Plato’s ability to describe fully the most mundane physical matters of the world and 
the causes associated with them. The metaphysical assumption Plato is making here 
is that preceding the state of order there was disorder, which disorder had a cause 
and which disordering cause is variously named by Plato as the ‘wandering’ or 
‘errant cause’ and ‘Ananke’. (3) Whereas Being, Space and Becoming are all 
described by Plato, along with the Demiurge and Ananke, as each existing before the 
Cosmos was generated,’” with especially the notions of ‘Being’ and ‘the Nurse of 
Becoming’ (akin to the modem notion of ‘space’) quite easily interpreted as 
primitive attempts by Plato at empirical speculation re cosmic origins, this simply 
cannot be the case, as it must ignore Plato’s given rationale for their articulation, 
which must be considered in the first instance. 
1.3.18 Building a reasonable Cosmos 
What is more likely is that Plato has in mind an argument from which he proceeds 
to build both the Universe and the metaphysics supporting it.’’‘ It is an argument, 
of a “likely” tale made unnecessary. A more or less exact account would have sufficed. This 
physicalist view, however, is precisely what Plato flatly and repeatedly denies and with everything at 
his disposal, be it myth, argument or rhetoric. A more likely reason for Plato borrowing the term 
‘ananke’ from Democritus, should this indeed have been the case, when naming the disorganising 
causal power within his cosmology, would be to attach to it the complete lack of ‘nous’ already 




moreover, which proceeds in stages, requiring more players or metaphysical support 
as it progresses in order to be fully comprehensible and thereby arrive successfully, 
by Plato's standards, at its conclusion, each player becoming a premise in an 
argument where the conclusion is the Universe. So completely foreign to positivist 
thought is the idea that one can actually know anything prior to or about the universe 
by proceeding in this fashion, that there is the immediate move to relegate such 
writings to metaphorical language for physical or mental phenomena, but for Plato 
the physical reality of the generated Cosmos is a secondary reality, reflected not only 
in the ordering of the Timaeus itself, where it is presented last, but also explicitly 
described as such by Plato himself. ''' Moreover, after establishing his first premise, 
namely, that there is a primary cause, which for the sake of argument Plato names 
the Demiurge, it is upon consideration of his second premise, namely, that there is a 
perfect pattern or system of forms"' upon which the world (and its contents) has 
been fashioned, that his argument begins to move forward, with everything which 
follows becoming consequent upon this idea. The logic which moves Plato to make 
the assertion that there is an intelligible and unchanging model upon which the 
Cosmos is patterned is that the objects of opinion and irrational sensation, in other 
words, everything which comes to be and ceases to be, cannot possibly be the 
original model for themselves, since the result would not have been good, being an 
unstable and unreliable pattern, whereas for Plato, the generated world as it stands 
now is completely good. The inference, therefore, which is being made is that the 
18' Ti. 27d5-29d3. 
Also called 'ideas'. 188 
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Cosmos which would have resulted had the Demiurge used the present world as his 
original model, albeit a world observed as being wholly good by Plato, would have 
been a universe which not only came to be and ceased to be, but one which was now 
fbll of error and imperfection, the implication being that a natural regression would 
occur. Thus, the logic of Plato’s argument so far, takes the following form: 












The World changes; 
Everything which changes must have a cause; 
Therefore, there is a cause named Maker, Father and Demiurge. 
A maker must have a pattern; 
A perfect pattern used by a perfect maker yelds a perfect creation; 
The world is perfect; 
The World must have been made upon a perfect pattern, which 
perfect pattern he collectively calls ‘Being’, or the ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’, 
suggesting that each object has an individual form after which it has 
been fashioned. 
There must be a place in which such objects are then put or located; 
This place Plato names ‘the Nurse of Becoming’, akin to the modem 
notion of ‘space’. 
All things located in space are perceived by the senses; 
Things perceived by the senses constantly change and have no 
stability ; 
All things located in Space (or the ‘nurse of becoming’) Plato calls 
‘Becoming’, further suggesting that to be truly accurate, due to the 
instability of such objects, it would be better to call them only by their 
qualities and not as ‘this’ or ‘that’ particular object. 
What is noteworthy is that Being, Space and Becoming, while described as existing 
before the Cosmos was generated and each logically required by Plato’s argument 
A = Assumption. 189 
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(see above), are not metaphorically or anthropomorphically drawn in any way 
whatsoever and in this respect emerge quite distinct from the prior respective 
presentations given for both the Demiurge and Ananke, the other two metaphysical 
objects described by Plato as having existence before the Cosmos was generated. 
This suggests that strictly speaking, a para-physical or supra-physical relationship to 
the world for these remaining three objects is perhaps a better interpretation than a 
metaphysical one,”’ which latter description I am arguing is properly attributable to 
the Demiurge and Ananke.”’ Strengthening this claim is that whereas Being, Space 
and Becoming are requisite components of the Cosmos in Plato’s scheme for its 
generation, the Demiurge and Ananke are not components of it at all, but are causes 
which exist quite separate from the object which they have just generated and which 
have no ongoing physical role in it afterwards. 
It is tempting to interpret ‘Space’ and ‘Becoming’ as descriptive of the early physical cosmos and 
hence, having simply aphysical relationship, albeit a more basic one, to the world which was later 
generated. However, this is to deny Plato the distinctions he specifically sets out, as he will deny all 
self-movement and intelligence, apart from soul contained therein, to the generated Cosmos, yet he 
clearly grants to both Space and Becoming a decree of self-movement and intelligibility, however 
nominal. I would like to suggest, therefore, that Becoming, as it existed per se before the generation 
of the Cosmos and prior to the Demiurge organising it into shapes by means of forms and numbers, 
like Space, was entirely used up in the process of generation. Whereupon what remained is the 
Universe and its objects, which objects Plato then devotes the remainder of the Timaeus to describe, 
and to describe, not as qualities, but as concrete objects. 
I am using the term ‘metaphysical’, not in the modern sense of the most basic building block(s) of 
the universe, which together with the less basic, form a kind of continuum of understanding and 
content for the universe as a whole, but rather, to denote that entity or those entities which becomes 
apparent and distinguishable in the Timaeus, namely, of being(s) which is entirely separate from the 
physical world and in no way forms a continuum. The suggestion of the term ‘para-physical, or 
‘supra-physical, for describing the ontology of Space and Becoming (at least, but perhaps at most, in 
its early stages) are to take into account both their physical nature and their respective descriptions 
given to them by Plato as possessing a degree of self-movement and intelligibility. The Forms, 





Returning again to the assumptions behind Plato’s understanding of the 
generation of the Cosmos, the Forms are particularly problematic, for although they 
are logically required by him, their actual ontology is extremely difficult and which 
difficulty, moreover, Plato does not concern himself with in the Timaeus. However, 
owing to the importance of the Forms in Plato’s overall metaphysics, they will be 
discussed later. With regard to the ‘the Nurse of Becoming’ as laying claim “in a 
most puzzling way” to a certain amount of intelligibility in the process of 
becoming,’92 this appears at one level to be a fairly straightforward natural account 
of just how objects eventually come to form into objects out of their primary 
elements. It is arguable, moreover, that there is an underlying assumption here at 
least of initial stages of evolution. Further, while Plato’s description of the ‘Nurse of 
Becoming’ is cautious when ascribing some intelligibility to this apparently innate, 
but necessary object in his metaphysical scheme, the caution is not unreasonable, 
given the high regard which Plato has already granted ‘intelligibility’, combined 
with its previous assignation as a singular attribute of Demiurgic a~t ivi ty . ’”~ This 
particular passage, therefore, is one in which a theory of natural law, whether of the 
rationalist or positivist sort, might be thought to apply to Plato’s writings. However, 
I would argue that this is extremely unlikely given the complete lack of any 
The Nurse of Becoming or Space 
Ti.51al-b2. See also Ti. 52a8-b2. 
For C. Ritter (The Essence of Plato’s Philosophy, p. 209) ‘space’ becomes the cause of the 
irrational or what constitutes ‘necessity’ in Plato. Thus, he writes “It [the Timaeus] is in search of a 
general principle of explanation for these inconsistencies [which arise in the structure of the world of 
concrete objects] and it finds it in the resistance of matter to the purpose and the efforts of this 
formative rational power. Space appears as the essence of matter. Thus space becomes the cause of 




development on Plato’s part of this idea beyond a mere suggestion of evolution and 
Plato’s reticence in separating ‘intelligibility’ from its divine source and his 
condemnation of those who What is more likely to be the case, is that Plato, 
in granting prior existence to an object, in this instance ‘the Nurse of Becoming’ or 
Space, he naturally assumes the object to carry some degree of divinity, and thus, 
intelligibility. This, moreover, is entirely in keeping with his belief in other gods and 
the apparent intelligence he grants to both Ananke19’ and the and 
supremely so to the intelligence he grants to the Demiurge. This in turn argues, not 
for a natural law theory, but rather, for a supernatural or divine law theory in which 
the Cosmos itself is a god (having been fashioned out of all things divine), which 
proposal is entirely in keeping both with the above-noted logic and pointedly, to 
Plato’s claim that this was in fact The evolution or emergence of the object 
which takes place, therefore, is entirely a consequence of divine ordering, not natural 
ordering, since behind all ordering is intelligence and behind all intelligence is a 
divine being or god. 
The fact that Plato has the Demiurge further ordering the elements into various 
geometrical configurations, while suggesting at the same time that ‘becoming’ 
emerged or evolved naturally out of Space due to certain motions and inclinations 
involving these elements-Space, along with the process occurring within it, 
described by Plato as the ‘Nurse of Becoming’-is, once again, in keeping with 
See Lg. 889b 1 -890a9. 
I will later attribute only ‘will’ to Ananke, but not intelligence as we know it and will argue that the 








Plato's inherent logic and style in the Timaeus, namely, of restructuring an 
explanation as he requires greater detail to complete his description of the 
Cosmos.'98 First, it should be noted that whereas the Demiurge gives greater 
organisation to the elements of which Becoming is comprised, via geometrical 
designs, these elements are described by Plato as already obtaining, to some decree, 
their own natures and their own movement, and hence, as I have argued above, a 
share in divinity. Second, therefore, and consequent to this first point, Plato cannot 
be described as being either a strict physicalist or creationist, since in the former you 
remove the Demiurge and in the latter, you remove the pre-existence, self-movement 
and intelligibility given by Plato to both Space and Becoming in their early stages 
before the generation of the Cosmos. 
1.3.20 Ananke and the natural world 
Returning now to my criticism of the commentators, when Archer-Hind suggests 
that Plato did not have in mind the idea of a blind force existing in nature, referring 
here to & u & Y K ~ ,  this is certainly true, but not, I would argue as Archer-Hind 
concludes, namely, because there is no such cause, but rather, because this force, as 
represented by & u & Y K ~ ,  is neither blind (or if blind, one might ask in what sense) nor 
is it a force existing in nature. Rather, according to the Timaeus, this cause exists, 
along with the figure of the Demiurge, as well as Being, Space and Becoming, before 
the generation of the Cosmos. As such, Ananke exists before nature and the advent 
of any laws within nature. As I have argued earlier,'99 the text suggests through its 
19' Ti. 48e2-4. 
See my discussion of Ti. 48al in Part I, Ch. 1 of this thesis, beginning at $1.3.1. 199 
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imagery that it is the force created by the clash between the Demiurge and Ananke 
which brings the Cosmos into existence and not the causes themselves which do this. 
I would like to suggest, moreover, that there is an unspoken equivocation by both 
Archer-Hind and Cornford on the meaning of ‘intelligibility,’ as well as the words 
‘reason’ and ‘law’ when they are referred to as being in nature. These terms are not 
defined or properly clarified, and at times are substituted one for the other with little 
or no explanation. Is the meaning which is to be derived or assumed when these 
terms are used a reference to natural law theory-i.e. a rationality inherent in both the 
perceiver and the perceived-surely a proposal which Plato would abhor given his 
insistence on the instability of matter pre-empting any kind of true knowledge? Or 
rather, is the reference which is really being made by these terms to the causal laws 
themselves in the natural order, but again, a position which both the Timaeus (see 
Ti.46d4-7) and Laws X (Lg. 891b8-d4) deny, and the latter vehemently so? Whereas 
Archer-Hind chooses to understand the Demiurge as intelligence in the Cosmos with 
a capital ‘I’ and Cornford as reason with a capital ‘R’, neither explain what they 
actually mean by these epithets. Although such titles suggest that these figures 
represent intelligibility or reason inherent in nature, with their high regard represented 
by capitals, it seems intuitively out of place that causal laws in nature would warrant 
this capitalisation (moreover, Cornford explicitly refrains from identifying “divine 
Reason” in the world with divine Reason “symbolised by the Demiurge”).200 Yet it 
seems equally implausible for either Archer-Hind or Cornford to understand these in 
terms of natural law theory where intelligibility is itself a genuine and sufficient 
Cornford, PC, p. 39. 
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cause, and thus, is not accounted for in the causal laws of sensible realities, where 
such realities themselves have their own genuine causality. If, however, what is 
meant by Archer-Hind and Cornford is that ‘Intelligibility’ and ‘Reason’ are 
somehow separate from the sensible realities and equally separate from the causal 
links between these realities, then what we are left with is a theory of mind as equally 
difficult to understand as Plato’s account, but minus the possibility of a metaphysics 
in which to interpret it, since this much they have both denied. However, I would 
suggest that in fact what we are left with by this equivocation is an understanding of 
‘Intelligence’ or ‘Reason’ which is as metaphysical as the supposed mythic material 
which each have respectively rejected, unaccounted for by Plato’s physics and simply 
left without a context. 
In Laws X Plato acknowledges at least two vuph and in the passage where he 
makes this claim he makes clear reference to a negative, or as I have translated it, the 
‘Non-beneficent Soul’ (what is contrary to the ‘Beneficent Soul’). He never mentions 
a third or ‘accessory’ ~ I I X ~ ,  thereby paralleling the three causes of the Timaeus. 
This omission would provide some support for Archer-Hind’s claim that there is only 
one cause, namely, the inference that the accessory cause(s) as described in the 
Timaeus is not a true cause, representing as it does features of the natural order after it 
has been created and Plato clearly states as much.201 With this much I would agree, 
but not with his larger claim that there is only one cause equated with the one soul. 
There are, in Plato’s words “not fewer than two, one Beneficent, the other capable of 
See Ti. 46e7-e6. 20 1 
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9,202 contrary effect and thus, no less than two causes. If one wants to speak of the 
force created between the two causes, i.e. the “clash” spoken of earlier, as the 
efficient cause of the Cosmos, then one can speak of one cause, but only in this 
manner. 
Moreover, if Plato’s principal concern in introducing the figures of the Demiurge 
and Ananke in the Timaeus was to show the provenance of the physical force which 
generated the Cosmos, the specific purpose of the dialogue being to show the origin 
of the cosmic system down to the origin of man, then there would be no need to speak 
of them further in the dialogue once this universe has been generated since their role 
for his present purposes would have ended and there would be very little he could say 
either empirically or on rational grounds about these two causes. In fact, this is 
exactly what he does: they are removed fi-om the scene. Thus, the stated purpose of 
the dialogue203 is sufficient to account for their subsequent disappearance from it. 
However, although no longer the focus of the remaining dialogue, the ontology of the 
Demiurge and Ananke can neither be done away with, nor revoked, since their being, 
whatever that may entail, is now thoroughly entrenched and irrefutably so in Plato’s 
account, it having been established early on that it was upon their ‘striving’ that the 
physical Cosmos was created. Thus, whatever the Demiurge and Ananke may or may 
not be, each has being before the Cosmos was generated and hence, are not physical 
Lg. 896e4. Taylor’s concern in his footnote to this passage in his commentary on the Laws (p. 289, 
footnote 1) is based on another consideration, namely, that modern interpreters have used this passage 
in Laws X to claim that there are two souls of the world [italics my own] or two World-Souls. I 
would agree with Taylor in this regard as there is nothing to indicate that either of the souls described 
here are ‘of the world’ in the sense of being a feature of the world, rather they are given here as the 
universal causes of what is good or evil in the world, Lg. 896d5. 
203 Ti. 27a2 ff. 
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or mental in the sense of being a descriptive part of the physical universe, both being 
prior. To argue from the Timaeus that Ananke is physical force, whereas the 
Demiurge is Reason or Intelligence is myth-making beyond what Plato’s account can 
support.2o4 What remains, however, is a possible metaphysical account of these pre- 
physical entities which the Timaeus does not go into, but which will surface in Plato’s 
discussion of “at least two souls” in Laws X and which this thesis will detail in Part 11. 
.205 Continuing with his explanation of & V & Y I C ~  at Ti. 46e Archer-Hind writes. 
What does he mean by this. [sic] It is idle to treat the physical forces of 
nature as causes, since in themselves they have no intelligence or 
purpose. They are indeed designed and set in motion by Intelligence for 
the best ends; but the conditions of their action may be such that 
sometimes their immediate results are not good, and they have no power 
in themselves to avoid such results; they must operate inevitably 
according to the law of their natures. 
There are at least four issues here, which must be addressed. First, the Timaeus itself 
argues specifically against the position that Ananke is a physical force of nature in 
the sense of ‘in nature’. This view is also supported strenuously by the Plato in 
Laws X. Second, one must ask what Archer-Hind means by “the conditions of their 
action may be such that sometimes their immediate results are not good.” Third, 
Archer-Hind, unlike Cornford, equivocates on the meaning of ~06s and while 
If he means 206 translating ~06s as ‘reason’, explains it in terms of ‘intelligence . 
Intelligence, as he refers to it with a capital ‘I,, then he has failed to provide a 
metaphysical or ontological basis for this supposedly increased status while 
*04 Taylor’s understanding of myth is better suited to Plato’s account than Cornford’s, which latter 
demands a complete reinterpretation of the text. See Taylor, PT, p. 59; also see Cornford, pp 174- 
176. 
*Os A-H, TP, p. 162. 
*06 Ibid. p. 167. 
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diminishing that of & u & Y K ~ .  And finally, Archer-Hind’s understanding of V O < ~  to 
mean ‘Intelligence’, while translating it as ‘reason’, is further complicated by his 
description of vo6q shortly thereafter as a power which “matter qua matter” 
possesses or ‘has’. To wit, in discussing U O ~ <  at Ti. 47e-48a, he states:2M 
For this reason we must not suppose that there is in matter as such any 
resisting power which thwarts the efforts of ~06s: this is an absolute 
misconception. Matter qua matter, being soul-less, is entirely without 
any sort of power of its own: whatever power it has is of yuxfi. 
Taking these issues one at a time, we will look at the first, namely, the claim that 
& U & Y K ~  is a physical force in nature, which forces do not have intelligence or 
purpose, and therefore, as such, cannot be a cause. The problem with this argument 
is that Plato explicitly asserts the conclusion which Archer-Hind denies. At Ti. 
48a6-7 (TO r~fi< ~ h a v ~ p h ? l <  &?GO< CX’IT~CX<) Plato, in referring to & u & ~ I c ~ ,  
states that it is a cause, albeit, an errant or indeterminate cause. Moreover, as a 
cause, it is not described in this passage as being without reason or intelligence, 
rather, it is described as being “persuaded” by intelligence (Ti. 48a5), which obscure 
passage is indicative at the very least of some sort of relation of &VdCy~q with 
respect to the reason or intelligence in order for it to be persuaded (i.e. subdued) at 
all, which I argue is the possession of a ‘will’ and the ultimate overpowering of its 
will by the stronger will of the Demiurge. None of the accessory causes are 
described as being so “persuaded,” since, having no power of their own, they lack 
both the need and means to be persuaded, putting & v ~ C ~ I C ~  in a class of its own as a 
cause. In other words, Ananke, while retaining the character of a force, i s ,  I suggest, 
A-H, TP, p. 166. 207 
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not a blind one, since & U & ~ K Q  along with UOV;, in being depicted as able to bring 
about the best end for the most part of things which come into existence (which I 
argue was by the submission of Ananke’s ‘will’),2o8 are at the same time attributed 
by implication, at least to some degree, of having similar qualities as that of 
‘intentionality’ and ‘will’, neither of which can exist without mind or soul, wherein 
reason and intelligence lie.209 Plato, on the other hand, does speak of blind forces, 
i.e “those that operate without reason and produce effects, which are casual and 
random,” but the reference here is not to &v&yK?l---this is a misreading of the 
text- but rather, to the accessory causes, and in this case specifically to the visible 
bodies fire, water, earth and air, which he has adamantly just declared “are 
completely incapable of reason or intelligence. 7,210 
Nonetheless, & u & ~ I c ~  learly remains a problem for Plato who is unwilling to 
ascribe to it \ c r ~ ~ f i  and hence, his aforesaid seemingly obscure reference to 
At the same time, however, he is equally unwilling ‘persuasion by intelligence. 
to let v065 be the sole cause of the Cosmos and hence, its partnership with & v & ~ K T ~ .  
This again points to the suggestion that & v & ~ K T ) ,  as the source of brute force in the 
universe, nonetheless shares at least some of the characteristics of the divine in its 
own right. Conversely, it can be asked whether v065 is the source of intelligent 
force, i.e. that which moves by persuasion. Plato, however, is consistent in his 
description of y ~ f i ,  or of that which has v ~ ~ f i ,  as being the only source of 
7 2 1  1 
~ ~~~ 
208 Ti. 48a3. 
*09 The idea of a ‘disordering causal force’ being closely associated with the movement of ‘soul’ is a 
problem which Plato will deal with more specifically in Laws X. 
* I o  Ti. 46c7-e6. For a translation see Lee, pp. 64-65. 
2 1 1  This reference is not obscure if Ananke (Necessity) is understood as one of the primary causes. 
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motion. Still, what is actually meant by this needs clarifying. Are the ideas of force 
3212 and motion separate. Moreover, is it one thing to be the force or to be the motion 
(if indeed these are separate ideas) and quite another to be the source of that force or 
motion? Thus, 
specifically, if & U & Y K ~  is the cause, or one of the causes, of physical force, is it or 
can it be the force itself? How does this relate to motion if V U X ~  is the only source 
of motion? Importantly, where do the accessory causes fit into Plato’s scheme and 
how? With respect to the latter question, the only ‘so-called’ causes, which Plato 
describes as being specifically without intelligence, and therefore not genuine causes 
at all, are the accessory causes. It is in relation to these accessory causes, moreover, 
whose description begins at Ti.46~7, where we get a clear description of what for 
Plato constitutes a genuine cause. See the next chapter for an in-depth discussion of 
the accessory causes and explication of this passage. 
These questions need to be asked and if possible, sorted out. 
Finally, reverting back to our discussion of & V & Y K ~  as a force, at no place in the 
Timaeus is & V & Y K ~  ever described as being a force within nature. Rather, it is 
specifically rendered as a force, along with U O ~ S ,  which preceded the generation of 
the physical Cosmos. To interpret the Timaeus to accord with one’s own 
understanding is one thing, which both Comford and Archer-Hind have clearly done, 
reflecting a fairly modem, scientific and non-religious account and bias, but to claim 
that this is what Plato meant or held to be true is quite another matter and has to be 
212 Cornford makes no such distinction, agreeing with Grote when referring to Necessity (Ananke): 
“It is Force, Movement or Change, with the negative attribute of not being regular,” Cornford, PC, p. 
172. The capitals, however, are noteworthy, but which Cornford neither explains nor dismisses. 
However, by being highlighted in this manner these words attain the status of a proper name and 
require an explanation. 
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rejected. To be sure, the Timaeus’s prime concern is about the generated world, but 
implicit in this inquiry is how it came to be - the generation itself - which, although 
difficult to depict, Plato sets about to show. In fact, it is so difficult, that Plato has to 
explain that it is only a likely account and not an exact one. There is little, if 
anything, in the text to support an understanding which omits this inherent difficulty. 
On the contrary, there is much to support a metaphysical account of Ananke. 
Modem metaphysics often restricts itself to talking about facts of the world, with the 
language of metaphysics having been appropriated to this end. Plato, however, did 
not work within these restrictions or within any other metaphysical scheme, but 
established his own, based upon and imbued with a deep religious sense and an 
explicit belief in the divine and the gods. Plato’s metaphysics speaks to a Universe 
not yet ordered and to a world not yet generated, and therefore, pre-empts in its 
consideration all facts concerning the world and thus, necessarily, cannot be about 
the world. Nor is Plato’s metaphysics simply a continuation of what has been 
handed down to him, having rejected the causal claims of the atomists on the one 
hand and what he considered to be false cosmogonies on the other. Plato’s 
metaphysics, particularly when dealing with the ontology of the Demiurge and 
Ananke, as well as the generation of the world which is dependant on these, must be 
viewed on its own terms and then be rejected or accepted, but not transformed, 
which I argue both Archer-Hind and Cornford have done, into what is more 
metaphysically a~ceptable.~ l3 This is history of philosophy misappropriated. 
Luc Brisson, like Cornford, understands ‘necessity’ as existing wholly at the corporal level. It is a 
term, he explains, employed by Plato to capture that which resisted or was acted upon by the action of 
reason in the world and was never an autonomous reality. Understood in this way it is a relative term 
comprised of three ‘stages’, where only the last one, the assistant or secondary cause, is real or as 
213 
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1.3.21 Plato’s metaphysics 
The problem, however, which one soon faces in explicating Plato’s metaphysics 
on its own terms is that it is not entirely rational. There is, as earlier discussed, a 
belief system underpinning it.214 Is this, therefore, where philosophy must leave off 
and accept this base or belief system as Plato’s a priori beginning or does one try 
and give a rational account of the belief system itself, or failing this, is the belief 
system simply removed, either retold as myth (Cornford) or eradicated (Archer- 
Brisson puts it, represented for Plato ‘pure necessity’. The first and second stages are imaginary early 
depictions of ‘necessity’ in a world drawn as generated for the sake of understanding, representing 
both the imaginary resultant incidences of movement created at the level of corporal nature by a world 
soul and later, the semi-tamed movement which formed traces of the four elements taking shape in 
‘space’, “la cause adjuvante [additive].” These first two stages, he argues, were introduced by Plato 
to gain a better understanding of the relationship between ‘necessity’ and ‘reason’. The third stage, 
the only “real” one according to Brisson’s understanding, takes place in the fully formed world and is 
where ‘necessity’ can no longer be clearly separated from reason, behaving as a secondary cause in a 
chain of reactions under the guidance of reason, or in Plato’s imaginary terms, under the action of 
“l’iime du monde, dominee par le cercle du rncme” upon the mass of corporeal elements. See Luc 
Brisson, Le Mime et I’Autre duns la Structure Ontologique du Time‘e de Platon (Paris: Editions 
Klincksieck, 1974), pp. 524-525. This is also Lutoslawski’s understanding of “blind Necessity” (The 
Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic, p. 485). The essential difference between ‘necessity’ and 
‘reason’ at this final stage appears to lie in the absence of reason and design from physical causation 
when considered alone and apart from the aims of reason. The problem with Brisson’s understanding 
of ‘reason’ and ‘necessity’ in the Timaeus, as with Cornford’s (and as regards ‘necessity’ only, also 
Lutoslawski’s), is that he offers no explanation for the presence of these causes in the world, other 
than that they are. His explanation becomes a description of these causes as they would already be 
understood by the modem mind. I would challenge, however, that Plato attempted, at the very least, 
to offer insight into the provenance of these causes, both as to their ontology and their metaphysics, 
and with respect to the world, their power and their influence, and to mitigate this attempt is to offer 
less than Plato intended. 
Similar to Brisson, Mason’s understanding of ‘necessity’ within Plato’s overall theory is that it 
“refers to the nature/powers of material things, and that when Reason ‘persuades’ necessity this means 
that it takes control of, and exploits, the nature of material things. When governed by reason these 
things can be a factor in producing orderly effects” (A. S. Mason, e-mail transmission, 22 November 
2002, University of Edinburgh, where he is currently teaching). With respect to the meaning of 
‘necessity’ itself, Mason has enlarged his position from that of his original doctoral thesis (Reason 
and Necessity in Plato s Tzmaeus, 1990). Thus, he agrees now not only with the causal interpretation 
of Morrow, i.e. ‘necessity‘ is called what it is because “one event follows necessarily upon another,” 
but additionally with the factual interpretation of Crombie, i.e. ‘necessity’ is called what it is because 
“it is a ‘given’ or ‘brute fact’, an inevitable feature of the world which reason could not eliminate.” 
The main problem with Mason’s understanding of ‘necessity’ is that any position which understands 
material things to contain powers of their own is directly opposed by Plato in the Timaeus and 
vehemently so in Laws X (see Tz. 46c7-e6 and Lg. 889bl-el) and in fact, this is the very position 
which Plato opposes. 
See 81.3.17 of Part I of this thesis, where beginning at “the question which must be asked,” I 
specifically address the issue of Plato’s core beliefs and religious assumptions. 
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Hind) more or less unceremoniously, in order to better accommodate modem 
beliefs? As I have argued above, none of these approaches do justice to Plato’s 
account of the Cosmos in the Timaeus. Plato begins with a core set of assumptions 
which are either religious, metaphysical or arguably, supra-physical, in nature, and 
thus, are specifically not physical. Plato’s assumptions in turn proceed to become 
premises in a wholly rational account or argument designed to explain the Universe, 
which rationality is entirely dependent upon key metaphysical players around which 
these assumptions are built, namely, the Demiurge, Ananke (Necessity), the Forms 
(Being), the Copies (Becoming) and their receptacle or Space (the Nurse of 
B e ~ o m i n g ) . ~ ’ ~  
For Plato the physical world has no rationality of its own. Its rational movement 
or the design towards ends found within the Cosmos relies solely on a generated 
World Soul. Thus, it is this additional divine source of rational life, that of the 
World Soul, which is seen by Plato as the basis of the generated world’s ordered 
and not physical or mechanical force. To speak, therefore, of religious 
or metaphysical assumptions pre-empting a fully rational account becomes 
nonsensical, since the key metaphysical players themselves in these assumptions are 
the sole participants in ‘nous’, that is, in ‘rationality’ or some aspect of it, i.e. either 
‘rationality’ or ‘will’, or both. For example, whereas Ananke has a ‘will to 
One could arguably include ‘the gods’ or heavenly bodies, but these are generated and like the 
World Soul and ‘soul’ generally form part of the generated Cosmos, which is not the source of its own 
rationality. 
216 Ti. 36d8-37~5. 
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disorder’, the Demiurge has a ‘will to order’, participating not only in the ‘willing’ 
aspect of nous, but also in its rational component. The World Soul, on the other 
hand, participates solely in the rational component of nous, itself subject to the will 
of the Demiurge. Although there is nothing particularly rational in positing a 
‘Demiurge’ or any other of the metaphysical players, it is not unreasonable to do this 
and in so doing Plato is able to account for the various factors in the Cosmos. He 
strongly asserts that the Universe was generated, but due to the immensity of his task 
in describing such generation, storytelling or the drawing up of ‘a likely account’ 
was found necessary. 
To speak, therefore, of Plato’s cosmology as preventing a fi l ly rational account or 
preceding such an account, or in seeking to find rationality within Plato’s belief 
system or again, to re-interpret Plato’s story as a mythic account of entirely physical 
phenomena or yet again, to remove it as unessential, must all be summarily 
reje~ted.~’’ To the contrary, Plato’s pre-cosmic assumptions are where his 
philosophy begins and from whence the generated Cosmos proceeds. 
Gregory Vlastos correctly argues that the Timaeus is unique among Plato’s myths and that it is a 
mistake to put it on a level with those contained in the Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic X, the Phaedrus, 
and the Politicus. He writes: “The Timaeus uses none of the devices by which all of these disavow 
the scientific seriousness of major features of their account. . . . The sober, systematic, prosaic tone of 
his discourse [meaning that of Timaeus, the Astronomer, who in Socrates’ estimation has reached the 
highest summit of all philosophy (Ti. 20a)] contrasts sharply with Critias’ earlier reminiscences. This 
all but irrelevant introduction sets the fanciful myth over against the scientific myth. . . . A mythos is 
a tale. Not all tales are fictions.” See G. Vlastos, “The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus” in Studies 
in Plato’s Metaphysics, R. E. Allen, ed., pp. 380-382. I would go further than Vlastos, however, and 
state that for Plato those tales which are not fictions include for him not only a telling of the physical 




2 TI. 46C7 - 4636 
2.1 Original Greek 
OGU 
2.2 Translation 
Accordingly, these are all assistant causes which serve God who uses them in 
carrying out, as far as it is possible, the idea of the best. But the majority believe 
them not to be assistant causes, but rather, to be causes of all things, producing218 by 
cooling and heating, and solidifying and dissolving and all such processes. Yet none 
are even capable of having either an opinion or a thought. For, of existing things, 
that alone which has acquired Mind, one must claim to be soul-but this is invisible, 
whereas fire and water, earth and air all come into being as visible bodies-and 
therefore, the lover of thought and knowledge has to follow closely as primary the 
causes219 of a rational nature;20 whereas for those which are moved by others or on 
the other hand, which in turn move others, as secondary. We also then must treat 
I.e. 'producing effects'. LSL refers to another passage in the Timaeus, namely, 29a (cited as "28e 
al." in the LSL), where the meaning of &n&.pydopat is translated as 'to cause' or 'produce'. See also 
Bury's translation of the above. 
* I 9  These primary causes Plato is about to separate into two kinds. 
218 
In other words, the invisible ones are to be understood as primary and the visible, as secondary. 220 
110 
these accordingly and discuss both kinds of causes,221 separating those which, with 
Mind, are makers of the beautiful and good, from those which, being devoid of 
thought, bring about random disorder each time they produce. 
2.3 Commentary and Notes 
2.3.1 
The etymology of T ~ U  G W ~ L T ~ W U  at Ti. 46c7 when taken at face value is clear, 
A discussion of G W ~ ~ T ~ O U  or the ‘accessory cause’ 
G’UU + d t z h u .  However, to clarify its meaning, Plato presents an argument for 
why akta is prefaced by GW. Only Mind is capable of thought and opinion, 
which latter are requisite in bringing about a best end, and hence, is properly called a 
‘cause’. The only generated object which contains Mind, however, is soul and soul 
is invisible. The o ~ a h a ,  on the other hand, take into account physical 
phenomena often mistakenly assumed to be causes themselves. Plato’s argument is 
that like the soul, the accessory causes are part of the ordered universe, but unlike 
soul, they are visible, e.g. fire, water, earth and air, along with their respective 
processes (cooling, heating, solidifying and dissolving, etc.). Thus, by the very fact 
that they are visible, the opposite cannot also be true, namely, that the accessory 
causes are identifiable with invisible soul containing Mind. If, therefore, they are to 
be called causes at all, it must be by virtue of the fact that they are composite, in 
other words, are in some way222 joined with invisible soul containing Mind, which 
alone is able of bringing about an end. Thus, following Plato’s line of thought, there 
must be something with which these a’t~ta are joined-hence, the compound 
221 Plato is referring here to the primary causes, which he immediately divides up into two kinds, as he 
does not recognise the accessory causes (those without soul) as being true causes, let alone 
constituting a ‘kind’, but rather, they are understood as affects or effects, always working in tandem 
with God who produces the beautiful and the good (see Ti. 46c7-9 above); see also my discussion 
which follows. 
The ‘how’ Plato chooses to leave within the context of myth-telling, and hence, unknown or at 
least not fully unexplained. See Ti. 34b10-37~5. 
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0Z)Vai'T;ta-and which is also both invisible and capable of thought. In other 
words, the a"tzta or cause must be joined with soul (containing Mind) in order for 
the things subject to these accessory causes can be shaped in the "best possible way" 
as a consequence of this contact. This rules out grounds for understanding 
G V U ~ ~ ' T ; L O U  simply as a 'causal factor', which omits or at least, buries, Plato's strong 
denial of active powers of agency for any of the accessory causes. I would propose, 
therefore, that ~WCC~ 'T ;LOU as a compound entity is best understood in either of the 
two following ways, first, as a cause, but only by virtue of being joined to invisible 
soul when it is so acting, and as a consequence described by Plato as a secondary 
cause, or alternately, not as a cause at all, but when joined with or moved by a true or 
primary cause ( O ' U V - ~ ~ Z L O U )  is able to assist in bringing about a desired end. This 
passage supports both readings, which in turn converge to argue that only soul is 
capable of being a true cause within the generated world. 
This argument aside, what requires to be established is exactly what Plato wants 
to include under the heading of the C J Z ) U ~ ~ ' T ; L ~ .  In the passage preceding the one 
under discussion, at Ti.45b2-46c6, he has just discussed eyesight and how it works, 
but he does not wish to claim that either the eyes or eyesight are accessory causes. 
Rather, he goes on to explain that the 'accessory cause' gives the eye its power or 
eyesight. O ~ U  E&U'T;CX ~ T L U  &U 
C J V U ~ L Z ~ O ~ U ,  clarifying shortly thereafter that the accessory causes are not causes of 
a rational nature, but are ones which operate through bodies whose motion is derived 
from others or is passed on to others. Consequently, the accessory cause described in 
this passage can be understood in one of three ways, first, as including both the body 
Beginning at Ti. 46c7 he writes T~G'T; '  
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which acts or is acted upon and the processes which help to carry out the act, or 
alternatively, simply the body itself, excluding anything external to it, or contrarily, 
not the body at all, seen only as part of the modus operandi for the cause so acting, 
but rather, the process or processes themselves which as a whole carry out the act. 
While a more abstract notion, I would suggest that the latter meaning approximates 
most closely the claim being made here. At Tz. 46e6-7 Plato refers to the auxiliary 
causes as contributing to the power or ability which the eyes possess: 
Earlier at 45b2 when Plato begins to describe how sight takes place in the eyes, the 
eyes are depicted as the organs through which the many processes come together in 
the eyes to produce sight. In so describing the eyes and eyesight, it soon becomes 
apparent that what Plato has in mind as comprising the accessory cause is not, for 
instance, the eyes themselves or any object made up of the basic elements of fire, 
water, earth and air, which latter merely serve to qualify or make up the bodies 
through which the various accessory causes must act,223 but rather, under the 
umbrella of ‘accessory cause’ reference is being made here to the many interrelated 
processes or movements which must take place in order for visible objects to have 
their particular power or 6 6 ~ a p t ~  (46e7), i.e. the eyes, their sight, the ears, their 
hearing, etc. The distinction which I am making, of process separate from the body, 
although not specifically drawn out by Plato, is almost certainly being made given 
his insistence that the elements themselves are bereft of all causal powers. The text 
Ti. 46d6-7. 223 
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remains clear in this regard, presenting nothing problematic or in opposition to this 
claim. By the process of elimination, moreover, one can also arrive at this 
conclusion, as there is nothing left, given Plato’s account, for an accessory cause to 
be. Thus, ‘cause’, whether of a primary (e.g. generation of the Universe) or 
secondary (e.g. cooling) nature, is always in relation to movement. Finally, I would 
propose that Plato’s main purpose in explaining the accessory cause in this passage is 
to clarify its intermediary, i.e. secondary and not primary, nature. What is also made 
clear from this passage, and most importantly for this thesis, is that Ananke is not an 
accessory cause, nor can it possibly be one. 
2.3.2 Ananke and the accessory cause 
This last point is a crucial one, but requires some clarification, as it can easily 
become obscured both in the English translation and in the Greek, obfuscated not 
only by the brevity of the passage in question and by what precedes and follows, but 
also by the difficulty of the passage itself. At Ti. 46e2 Plato writes: 
First, with respect to ~ a . ? > ~ a ,  this word may simply form part of a variation of 
the single adverbial expression ‘in this way’ (refemng back to the actions of a ‘lover 
of thought and knowledge’ [46d7-8]), K ~ T &  ~ a . ? > ~ a ,  usually written in the singular, 
i.e. K ~ T &  Z O U T ~ .  However, should this not be the case and Plato has chosen the 
plural for a specific reason and with a specific referent in mind, then the meaning of 
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this sentence becomes equivocal, both with regard to its principal referent and to its 
content, and thus becomes problematic. If, on the other hand, the adverbial 
expression stands, we are still left with a problem of meaning with regard to the 
passage, which immediately follows. Both Bury and Taylor treat KC& TCX~TCX as
the adverbial expression ‘in this way’. Cornford similarly translates this passage as 
“on this principle.” Archer-Hind, on the other hand, translates T C X ~ T ~  as a 
demonstrative singular pronoun ‘this then,” introducing what follows by a colon, 
with Jowett following likewise.224 In the prose which then follows, moreover, Plato 
does not help matters by leaving within the text a certain duplicity. When 
introducing Ti. 46c7, he begins with To%T’ , which referent, while clearly the 
O ’ U V ~ ~ T L C X ,  is nonetheless left somewhat ambiguous. It can be understood as either 
referring back to the several processes just expounded upon in the prior passage 
describing how sight takes place in the eye or alternatively, to the accessory causes 
soon to be listed. These latter are specified within a more general discussion which 
follows of such causes, i.e. “cooling and heating, solidifying and solving, and 
producing all such effects,” and wherein Plato defines very precisely what he means 
by these secondary or assistant causes, comparing them with the primary causes. It 
is also possible, however, that Plato meant the reference to apply both ways, the first 
being specific and exemplar of what is then generally discussed. As the above- 
mentioned translations by the various authors of this text bear out, there is no need 
to link the T C C ~ X  which next follows at line Ti. 46e3 with what has just preceded 
Bury, Ti. p. 107; Lee, Ti. p. 64; Taylor, PT, pp. 293-294; Cornford, PC, p. 157; A-H, TP, p. 163; 224 
Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato (hereafter abbreviated DP), p. 733. 
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it; moreover, it would be awkward to do so, as both the accessory or secondary 
causes and the primary causes, each in the plural, have now already both been 
discussed in the preceding passage at Ti. 46c7-e2. What I believe is important to 
consider, therefore, is that if this is the case, namely, that the za6>za at Ti. 46e3 
introduces a new section or idea, then the two causes referred to in the line which 
now follows (Ti. 46e3), described here as ‘the two kinds of causes’ are precisely that 
and do not refer back in any way to the accessory causes, which for Plato were not 
true causes. I would further argue, moreover, that this is not just a possibility, but is 
in fact what Plato intended, where at Ti. 47e he will soon introduce these causes as 
~06s and & V & Y K ~  and attempt to explain their role in the generation of the world. 
Thus, the inherent sectioning of the text by Plato also supports this reading. 
The reasons for concluding that neither of the two causes now mentioned refers 
back to the accessory causes are as follows. Firstly, the accessory causes are never 
described as FEZ& V O ~ ,  whereas the first mentioned cause at Ti. 46e4 is. This is 
only descriptive of ‘soul’: Z6V y&p bV.r;OV 4 V O b  pbUq K 6 i i o k L  n;pOOfiK&L, 
~ E K T & O U  V U X ~ ~ V .  Moreover, Plato specifically states that the accessory causes are 
incapabZe of possessing reason and thought for any purpose. This is strongly stated 
and unequivocally so: 
hbyov 6& ob6kva ob&& voGv &I< Ob6&V Guvazdc EXELV koziv. 
Secondly, and what I believe to be the strongest argument in rejecting either 
cause at Ti. 46e3 as refemng to the accessory causes, is that the accessory causes 
produce nothing of themselves, yet Plato refers at Ti. 46e4-6 to causes which 
116 
produce, and in the second instance, to causes which also produce, but randomly 
and without order, but nonetheless produce. The verb used in this second instance is 
from the root & & ~ ~ d t < o p t  and can mean both to bring to completion and to 
destroy, and while a fitting verb for a disordering primal cause, is not appropriate 
for a secondary or assistant cause, which, being moved or in turn, moving others, 
would be quite incapable by itself of either bringing something to completion or 
destroying it, except by proximity to that event. The assistant225 causes are always 
located, if we take Plato’s description as evidence for their manner of existence, as 
part of the process of something produced, and which latter are explicitly declared 
not to be random, e.g. eyesight, hearing, speech, music, all of which are cited as 
examples of those things which are produced with the help of the accessory causes. 
Moreover, and importantly, these are esteemed to be extremely good, ‘sight’ 
described as having been invented and given by God, 8Ebv Q p i ~  & V E U ~ E ~  
6wpfpaoeai ZE byl~v (47b6), to bring about the greatest benefit for man, 
$ ~ ~ O O O $ O ~ ,  and with high regard also granted to the other accessory or assistant 
causes and for similar reasons. Thus, when at Ti. 46e3 Plato refers to the bat 
povcdk’kat $ P O V ~ ~ E O S  as being devoid of thought and tending to random 
disorder each time they produce, he cannot be referring to the auxiliary causes, 
which of themselves produce nothing. Moreover, although he has affirmed that the 
auxiliary causes are incapable of any plan or intelligence for any purpose (Ti. 46d4) 
and as not possessing V U X ~ ,  they are nonetheless always, by their very provenance, 
attached to and contribute to the power of objects of generation (Ti. 46e6). By 
The terms ‘assistant’, ‘auxiliary’ and ‘secondary’ cause all refer to the accessory cause. 225 
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definition, therefore, they are always and remain ‘assistant’ causes, helping to bring 
about the innumerable ends of which the Cosmos is comprised. Descriptive 
references regarding the accessory causes in Laws X, moreover, invariably stress 
their proper function and thus, their secondary but necessary roles in bringing about 
various good ends. This argues strongly against the passage at Ti. 46e3 as in any 
way referring to these causes, leaving Ananke, understood as a primary disordering 
cause, as the sole possible referent. 
A further point worth considering is that to be described as being “destitute of 
reason” (from ~ O V ~ O  = to forsake or leave alone) is not the same thing as being 
described as incapabZe of reason ( O ~ ~ E V  ~ v v ~ T & ) .  These are separate issues. The 
former is a much weaker notion and can simply imply a derogatory judgement 
towards the object in question without actually intending to qualify it in a more 
literal way or to its full extent.226 In support of this reading is the fact that in Laws X 
Plato will treat the Non-beneficent Soul, the counterpart to Ananke in that work, 
similarly. 227 It should be noted, moreover, that the idea of being ‘destitute of reason’, 
rather than being ‘incapable’ of it, is in keeping with passages elsewhere in the 
Timaeus where Plato appears to attribute to Ananke the possession of a ‘will’, i.e. the 
ability to be persuaded by Mind (implying an independent ‘will’), as well as having a 
weaker will than that of the Demiurge (in order to be persuaded).228 When Plato 
I argue in this thesis that Ananke is an independent force for disorder, possessed of a ‘will, and 
hence, participates in none of the organisational powers of Nous as understood to be associated with 
the Demiurge. I do not argue, however, for either the Demiurge or Ananke that the possession of 
‘nous’ (meaning specifically the noetic powers of ‘reason’ which bring about order) or an abuse or 
lack of it, comprises the total identity of either of these powers, but rather, only that part to which 
man’s intellect is privy. 
227 See England, Law X, 904a6R Taylor, pp. 297-299. See Part I1 of this thesis for an analysis of the 
relevant passages of Laws X and their impact on and relation to &V&YKT~. 
228 See Ti. 47e3ff and 41a7-b6. 
226 
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later develops and makes explicit an argument in Laws X in support of the idea of a 
negative power, arguing that while all actions have soul in them and contain much 
virtue, likewise, some actions contain much vice, and since soul is the cause of good 
and evil, there must be at least two this closely parallels Plato’s earlier 
distinction made above in the Timaeus of two kinds of primary causes, those which 
are causes of things fair and good and those which are causes of things which are not. 
This rules out categorically, I suggest, any direct identification whatsoever of these 
causes with the accessory causes, which latter, according to Plato, have absolutely no 
power independent of other causal power(s), thus, cause nothing of themselves, 
always are associated with and contribute to bringing about an end (which end 
implies ‘nous’, organisation and hence, ‘goodness’) and contrary to any notion 
connected remotely to that of disorder or ‘evil’, can include amongst their numbers 
“the greatest benefit for mankind.” 
2.3.3 Ananke and “persuasion” 
Furthermore, Plato’s odd ascription to Ananke, namely, after having already been 
set out as a cause completely contrary to good order and reason, of then being 
capable of something which is normally thought of as requiring reasonableness, i.e. 
“persuasion,” does not present as a singular instance in the Timaeus. At Ti. 51a7 
Plato describes the Receptacle of Becoming: 
See Laws X, 896d5-897d1, Taylor, pp. 288-290; also see 904a6@,Taylor, p.297. 229 
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It is spoken of as participating in, “in a most puzzling way,” ‘intelligibility’ and also 
as being a concept which is ‘hard to grasp’. Here there is no pejorative sense or 
hesitation, but nonetheless there is an admission of great difficulty in understanding 
it, but beyond this admission, Plato states nothing more. Thus, exactly how Ananke 
can be persuaded and how the Receptacle of Becoming is possessed of intelligibility 
are left unaddressed. These are left unattended, I would argue, not because a 
metaphor has been thought more apt to describe a physical aspect of the ordered 
universe-Plato proves himself fully prepared to describe in great detail all such 
aspects and does not need a metaphor for this-or, as in the case for the Receptacle 
of Becoming, because Plato lacks a proper understanding of how the senses or 
perception works-the Receptacle or Nurse of Becoming (Space), according to 
Plato, is apprehended without the ~enses~~’-but rather, he refrains from giving any 
further explanation, having followed the same pattern established earlier at a 
similarly difficult place231 and refraining for essentially the same reason, namely, 
because of the great difficulty involved in describing these metaphysical realities. 
Ananke, as a disordering primal power, existed for Plato before the physical world 
was generated and so too, the Receptacle of Becoming, its existence explained as 
logically required for the world of things to have been generated and thus, as eternal 
and indestructible as Ananke, and as difficult to explain. 
There is a further passage in the Timaeus where once again Plato indicates a 
semblance of order and hence, reasonableness, amidst the disordered and unreasoned 





forces and pre-existing stuff of the universe before generation began, albeit, only 
vestiges of reasonableness. This appears in his description of the primitive chaos, 
where beginning at Ti. 52d2 Plato explains how the elements or ‘qualities’ of fire, 
water, earth and air, bear some traces of their proper nature, “ I x v ~  @I) E x o v . ~ ; ~  
ab%& &.r;.r;a;” even before God has marked them out in shapes by means of 
forms and numbers, while at the same time being & h b y ~ <  ~ d t  & p & . r ; p ~ q 5 . ~ ~ ~  The 
significance of this passage, I suggest, lies in Plato’s repeated willingness, although 
drawn somewhat obscurely, in allowing, to at least some degree, order, intelligibility 
and Mind to be present in the universe as it stood prior to its formal ordering by God 
(the Demiurge) and hence, the deployment of fully rational causes. It is here, 
moreover, where the God is again described as constructing as far as he could 
everything to be as fair and as good as possible.234 
2.3.4 
2.3.4.1 Discussion of phrase 
The phrase .r;b ... ~ V U C X T O U  or ‘as far as he could 
TO ... 6u~a%Ov / ‘as far as he could’ 
,235 or ones with similar meaning 
or intention are scattered throughout the Timaeus. Significantly, this passage at Ti. 
53b5-7 is an echo of the one found at Ti. 46c7-dl, both of which appear to curtail or 
in some way define the power of the Demiurge, possibly in some way by the 
opposing powers of Ananke or its effect ascribed thereto. However, another reading 
of either passage could take the reference which is being made there as that of the 
232 Ti. 53b2. 
Ti. 53a8. 
234 Ti. 53b5. 
In the analysis which follows, for the sake of comparison I will translate this passage ‘as far as 




logical limitation of a copy to its Form,236 rather than being suggestive of any 
abatement of the Demiurgic powers. A further reading, moreover, is possible, 
namely, the continued expression of the original desire by the wholly good Demiurge 
to share his goodness asfuZZ’ as possible (i.e. to itsfuZZ extent) with the Cosmos he 
was shaping, the idea here being that of the expanse of his goodness to include 
objects of generation and not to any lack (imperfection) on the part of the generator 
or the object he generates. In other words, the Demiurge’s goodness is meted out to 
match and enable the continuing expanse of the Universe as it is being moulded. 
Minimally, Plato’s understanding of God’s goodness is his desire and ability to 
achieve form out of chaos. Thus, this reading pre-empts the idea of the Universe and 
the Demiurge being one and the same thing or a pantheistic reading, while at the 
same time imbuing it (the Universe) with the perfection of its creator. The God who 
generates is greater than any generated work. In other words, it is the Demiurge who 
shares his goodness, thereby generating and enabling the object. Although there is a 
notion of limitation here, it is not due to a lack of excellence, but rather, the idea 
suggested is that to create or generate something is to form or delimit it, thereby 
giving it boundaries, which in turn enables it to be this or that particular object and 
secondary to this, to be generated is to be subject to (be less powerful than) the 
generator. Therefore, the limitation which is understood by this reading is one of 
boundaries or the limitation of an object (in this case the Universe being formed by 
the Demiurge) by its form in order for it to become a particular object, and as such 
does not refer to any sort of lack or deficiency. In contrast to the other two readings, 
See the quotation from Plato’s argument at Ti. 52c 5-dl which follows. 236 
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this understanding of limitation includes the idea of perfection as an outcome of the 
limiting action, without which, it (the Cosmos) would not be and thus, not to any 
notion of imperfection. The Cosmos as a finite object is perfect with respect to itself, 
while being limited with respect to the chaos out of which it is formed and the 
powers with which it has been bestowed (i.e. it did not generate itself, nor can it 
destroy itself, both of which minimally separate the Universe from the Demiurge). 
This sense of limitation, therefore, is not negative and is not due to any imperfection 
on the part of either the Universe itself (in the sense of lacking in goodness with 
respect to itself or lacking in form with respect to its Form) or its maker, but rather is 
a positive result of the Generator’s generosity in having wanted to share his goodness 
and perfection, as Plato explains at the beginning of the dialogue. Thus, a reading of 
the phrase “as far as he could” need not have any intended reference to either the 
Forms (a copy understood as being less perfect than its Form) or Ananke (the 
Demiurge did the best job he could given his materials) and thus, to lack of any sort, 
formal or otherwise. Accordingly, both the Demiurge and the Universe are perfect, 
the Generated no less than the Generator.237 
There are problems with isolating any one of these views, however, when seeking 
an understanding of these passages and they will be reviewed shortly. What each of 
these readings ultimately suggests is that this phrase (or similar ones), in whatever 
way it is read, contributes to and is indicative of what overall for Plato is a realist 
perspective in his account of the generation of the world in the Timaeus and is also 
237 This reading is congruent with Plato’s closing words of the Tirnaetrs (Ti. 92c4-9) where it is stated: 
“We can now claim that our account of the Universe is complete. . . . It has thus become a visible god, 
supreme in greatness and excellence, beauty and perfection, a single, uniquely created heaven [Lee, p. 
1 241 .” 
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indicative of his main concern, that is, to give a ‘likely’ account of how the world 
began in relation to how it now stands. It is, therefore, not, I would argue, a directly 
metaphysical or speculative comment about the nature of God, although there are 
metaphysical ramifications, nor is its primary purpose to acknowledge the opposing 
influence of Ananke or disorder during the ordering of the Cosmos, although again, 
there are metaphysical consequences concerning Ananke. The question of whether 
reference is being made to the relationship, perhaps made askance, of a copy to its 
Form is also possible, but cannot be answered fully until the question of the reality of 
the Forms is addressed, which will follow in a further chapter of this thesis.238 The 
context of the passage suggests, however, that the principal focus of this comment is 
directed at describing the state of the world as it then stood or indeed, when 
observing the world, as Plato saw it, since beyond his initial assessment of the 
Demiurge as being wholly good,239 and this largely, if not entirely dependent upon 
the fact that the world which he is about to describe in detail has already been judged 
by him from the beginning of the narrative, and repeatedly so to its very end, to be 
the fairest of all things generated,240 he has already dismissed the possibility of ever 
truly knowing or being able to fully explain the nature of God.241 Plato’s reasons for 
coming to both of these conclusions, however, namely, that there is a Demiurge and 
secondly, the great difficulty in discussing the Demiurge ’s nature referred to above, 
are at once rationally and empirically based, derived in part from his empirical 
See Part 11, Chapter 2, 52.3.2.1.4. 
Ti. 29e1-2. 





and 92c4-9 (the last paragraph of the narrative). 
24 1 
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observations and in part from his metaphysical and theological assumptions 
concerning these observations and the arguments derived therefrom. Thus, while 
such assumptions and arguments do provide a philosophical framework and physical 
reference for his supervening, although barely discussed, metaphysics,242 they do not 
account for the remaining disorder either in the world or in the generated soul, both 
of which are noted in the Timaeus. Plato is mindful of this disorder, but he must look 
elsewhere for an explanation. At no time, however, does he seem concerned with the 
apparent contradiction of his perfect god-the generated Cosmos, thoroughly infused 
with its perfect soul-in containing such disorder. My second comment, therefore, 
that to show the opposing influence of Ananke or disorder during the ordering of the 
Cosmos is not the intention behind Plato’s comment here and thus, is not the focus of 
his attention in delimiting the Demiurge’s power, needs now to be addressed. 
There are several passages in the Timaeus containing references to either disorder, 
to a lack of perfection or to disequilibrium in the generated Cosmos. These 
references, moreover, depending upon where they appear in the dialogue, refer to one 
of three perspectives, either, first, to impending imperfection (or disorder) which will 
be left in the Cosmos due to extant powers or prior factors or second, to untoward 
conditions involving its generation and which will necessarily remain as an effect in 
it afterwards or alternatively, third, to imperfection in the form of disequilibrium or 
disorder found extant in the Cosmos following its ordering. This third kind of 
disorder is not understood by Plato as necessarily following upon the other two 
242 Ti. 34blO-c4. This passage is exemplar in showing Plato’s awareness of the metaphysical scuttling 
required to bring what is contingent and accidental (his topic at hand) to the surface and in focus. 
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kinds. Rather, its depiction forms part of the descriptive involving the process of 
ordering, either with respect to the Cosmos in the way in which (showing how) the 
elements moved from disarray to order within the Nurse of Becoming243 and also 
later (in the Cosmic process) in how they disassemble and reassemble in the constant 
process of becoming244 or alternatively, with respect to the Soul as it acclimatises to 
its bodily state245 or is excessive with regard to its body.246 Thus, this kind of 
disorder is always a result of process and is always moving towards perfection or 
vice versa. Moreover, not only are there three kinds of disorder distinguishable 
within the Timaeus, these passages fall roughly into three categories with regard to 
their meaning (or can be made to do so, i.e. upon rewording or rephrasing): First, in 
the sense of the superlative, e.g. as far aspossibze meaning ‘the very best’; second, 
as far as possible used in reference to imitation of the Forms; and third, as far as 
possible, referring specifically to the limiting influence of imperfection in the form of 
disorder or disequilibrium. Finally, these references are made either directly or 
obliquely, and while some are quite broad or general in their scope and are included 
for the sake of completeness with regard to all references made, others are very 
central to the discussion and provide crucial insight for the conclusions which follow. 
2.3.4.2 List of relevant passages in the Timaeus. 
These can be listed as follows: 
29e2-3 Being therefore free from this [envy] he wished all things to be as 
much as possible [ pdth~o~a] like himself; 
243 See Ti. 52d2-53b6. 
244 See Ti. 49a7-d4. 
245 See Ti, 42e5-44d2. 
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God, therefore, wishing . . . as far  as possible nothing imperfect; 
resembles as nearly as possible [above all things: Z O ~ Z ~  ~;&uzou]; 
that it might be, so far  as possible [pdthto~a], a Living Creature, 
perfect and whole; 
he rejoiced and planned to make it still more like its pattern; and as 
this pattern is an eternal Living Being, he set out to make the universe 
resemble it in this way too, as far as waspossible; 
and it was made after the pattern of eternal nature, to the end that it 
might be as like thereto as possible; 
so that this world should in its imitation of the eternal nature resemble 
as closely as possible [hs O ~ O I ~ Z ~ Z O U ]  the perfect intelligible 
Living Creature; 
bright and beautiful to look at as possible [using superlative of the 
adjectives]; 
that each might be as perfect as possible [p&hto~a] 
since you have been created, you are not entirely immortal and 
indissoluble, etc.; 
and guide the mortal creatures to the best of theirpowers, except in so 
far as it should be a cause of evil to itself; 
they made wrong judgements of sameness or difference, and lapsed 
into falsehood and folZy . . .And because of this the soul.. .is as much 
without reason today as it was in the beginning; 
god uses in shaping things in the best way possible (the passage from 
which this discussion partly arose and whose meaning will be 
discussed separately); 
Intelligence controlled necessity by persuading it for the most part to 
bring about the best result; 
We must thus assume as a principle in all we say that God brought 
them to a state of the greatest possible perfection, in which they were 
not before (also one of the originating passages for this discussion and 
will be discussed separately); 
and brought them in every way to the most exact perfection [6t’ 
&~ptP&iag ]  permitted by the willing consent ofhanke;  
The cause of disequilibrium is inequality, whose origin we have 
already described; 
to the degree and extent that they were capable [bn;q ~ V U ~ Z ~ U ]  of 
proportion and measurement; 
For our makers remembered that their father had ordered them to 
make mortal creatures as perfect as possible [ h ~  &~I.OZOU &IS 
66~apt~ I  (see also a separate discussion of this passage); 
The body is composed of four elements - earth, fire, air and water; 
and disorders and diseases are caused by an unnatural excess or 






another, by any part of the body taking in an unsuitable variety either 
of fire or another element (for there are several varieties of them), and 
by similar disturbances; 
and no longer maintain the natural orderly sequence, etc (reference is 
being made here to the onset of disease and its description); 
no one wishes to be bad, but a bad man is bad because of someflaw in 
his physical make-up and failure in his education, neither of which he 
likes or chooses; 
For health and sickness, virtue and vice, the proportion or 
disproportion between soul and body is far the most important factor; 
but if he imitates what we have called the nurse and foster-mother of 
the universe.. .by such motions he can reduce to order and system the 
qualities and constituents that wander through the body according to 
their affinities, in the same way that we have described in speaking of 
the universe; and so he will not leave foe ranged by foe to produce 
conflict and disease in the body, but friend by friend to produce 
health. 
With reference to the first division, that of perspective, either before, during or 
after the generation of the Cosmos, the passages can be divided as follows: 
Before the generation of the Cosmos: Ti. 29e2-3, 30a2-3, 30~5-7,  32dl-33a1, 39d8- 
e2,40a3-4,40b3-4; 
During the generation - of the Cosmos: Ti. 37c6-d2, 38b7-c1, 41b2-6, 42e2-4, 43e8- 
44bl,46c7-d1,48a2-3, 53b5-7, 56c5-7,69b2-5; and finally, 
After the generation of the Cosmos: Ti. S a l ,  71d5-7, 82a1-7, 83a2, 86d7-e3, 87dl- 
3, 88d6-89al. 
2.3.4.3 Division by perspective 
These passages fall fairly evenly into the above three perspectives, possibly 
arguing for a conscious ordering on Plato’s part of the three perspectives. More 
important to our argument here, however, is the next triadic division proposed, 
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namely, that of division according to meaning, which can be outlined and constituted 
as follows: 
(1) First, in the sense of the superlative ‘as-far as possible’ 
With regard to the superlative, the passage in question may or may not have any 
reference to disorder or to a lack of perfection, depending on its context. The 
passages which fall quite clearly within this category are as follows: Ti. 29e2-3, 
30a2-3,32dl-33al, 40b3-4, 82a1-7,83a2, 86d7-e3, 87dl-3 and 88d6-89al. Passages 
46c7-dl and 53b5-7 can also be included in this category in respect to one of their 
composite meanings. See my discussion in the fourth division entitled Composite 
Meanings. 
(2) Second, in the sense of imitating - its model or Form ‘as far aspossible’ 
There is a natural limitation to how far an object can be like its model or like any 
other object, for which Plato provides an argument at Ti. 52c 5-dl. Here he writes: 
whereas to the aid of the really existent there comes the accurately true 
argument, that so long as one thing is one thing, and another something 
different, neither of the two will ever come to exist in the other so that the 
same thing becomes simultaneously both one and two. 
(Bury, Ti., p.125) 
This argument affirms the position that two differently identified objects cannot be 
one and the same thing, made logically impossible by the fact of their difference(s). 
Responding further to this idea, Plato immediately reaffirms that Being, Space and 
Becoming were existing, three distinct things, before the Heavens came into 
existence. He does not describe either Space or Becoming as being in any way 
inferior to Being in this passage, as it is their separateness which he wishes to express 
here and not their relative value. Thus, in the passages which fall within the scope of 
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this division, where imitation of an object to its model is being described, i.e. of 
‘becoming’ to ‘being’, emphasis is being given, I would suggest, not to imperfection 
or disorder inherent in one object as compared to the other, but rather, to the logical 
relationship which exists between the Form and copy in being distinguished 
separately, the Form in this case being prior and eternal and incapable of change, 
while the copy, being in time, subject to the finitude of change. This argument 
suggests that the copy is understood by Plato as being inferior only when compared to 
its Form and not in respect to itself, since it is only a copy as a result of its different 
ontology and not from a flaw in its ontology. Thus, although the Forms are 
understood by Plato as being perfect with respect to themselves, this argument also 
allows the copy the same perfection in respect of itself, since the argument is 
essentially an ontological one. The meaning, therefore, which ‘as far as possible’ 
suggests in this category is perfection of the object in question to the fullness of its 
capacity as a distinct object and separate identity apart from its Form and not to any 
inherent lack when compared to its Form. That this reference, moreover, need not be 
understood as referring to a lack of perfection of the copy in relation to itself is drawn 
out by Plato’s reflection on the copies themselves at Ti. 5Oc4-6: 
But the forms which enter into and go out of her [the Nurse of Becoming] 
are the likenesses of eternal realities modeled after their patterns in a 
wonderful and mysterious manner.247 
There is nothing “wonderful” about copies, which are essentially flawed. This 
understanding of the phrase ‘as far as possible’, moreover, provides a basis for the 
Jowett, DP, p. 737.  247 
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closing words of the Timaeus when the Cosmos is described as “supreme in greatness 
and excellence, beauty and perfection, a single, uniquely created heaven. ,7248 
As regards to Plato’s overall valuing of their respective ontologies (their value 
with respect to the whole which includes both Form and copy), Plato no doubt 
considered the Forms to be superior objects, being without change, to any copy made 
of them. However, my suggestion in setting up this division, is not to oppose this, but 
to acknowledge the subtle comparison which is being made when passages are so 
qualified, which is not to the perfection of a copy as it measures up to its Form, but 
rather, to the perfection of any object in respect to itself, in other words, as it is 
realised to its fullest extent or ‘as far as possible’. The essential difference in this 
division, therefore, when compared to the others is one of emphasis, the emphasis 
lying with the perfection of an object distinguishable from its Form and not with its 
lack of perfection in comparison with that Form. 
The listed passages which fall within this category are: Ti. 30~5-7, 37c6-d2, 38b7- 
c l ,  39d8-e2, 40a3-4. Passages 46c7-dl and 53b5-7 can also be included in this 
category (see the fourth division entitled Composite Meanings). Plato has already 
offered at Ti. 51e6-52d4 a prior argument for why the Forms, in addition to the 
objective world, must exist in the first place, which in summary can be outlined as 
follows: First, because what comes into being and thus is changeable, must have a 
cause. Second, if the world is beautiful (and it is the fairest of all generated things) 
and the maker good (he is the best of causes), then he had to have his eye on a pattern 
248 Ti. 92c7-9; Lee, p. 124. See also Jowett, DP, p. 780. 
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which is eternal and unchanging, apprehended by reasoning and understanding alone. 
And third, it therefore follows that the world is a likeness of something else. 
(3) Third, in the sense of imperfection, disorder or disequilibrium ‘as far as 
possible’ 
In this third main category we are arguing that either a direct or indirect reference 
is being made to a distinct lack of perfection and thus, to some degree of disorder or 
disequilibrium in the subject. Thus, reference is not being made specifically to either 
a copy to its Form or to the possibilities of perfection. The passages listed, which 
fall within this division are: Ti. 41b2-6,42e2-4,43e8-44bl, 48a2-3, 56~5-7, 58al and 
69b2-5. Both passages 46c7-dl and 53b5-7 can again be included here, with their 
inclusion explained under the heading, Composite meanings. 
(4) Composite meanings: 
Ti. 46c7dl and 53b5-7 (Div. 1 ,2  & 3) and 71d5-7 (Div. 1 & 3) 
Out of a combination of the above three main categories, there arises also a fourth 
or hybrid grouping. It is within this fourth and final category, a composite of all of 
the above-noted meanings, where I propose that the passages initially queried, Ti. 
46c7-dl and 53b5-7, fall. As regards 53b5-7 and 71d5-7, while their contexts do 
suggest meanings which are composite, there is no direct reference to the Forms in 
the first instance and none at all in the second, thereby excluding 71d5-7 from 
division 2 of the suggested categories altogether. Thus, with regard to each of these 
three passages, there is present within all of them not only a reminder of the 
superlative goodness of the Demiurge and his desire to share it with his handiwork, 
but, also, a suggestion of curtailment in some way of this goodness or perfection and 
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therefore, acknowledgement of disorder in some form. Whereas the presence of the 
first meaning is externally evident, although somewhat differently expressed each 
time, the third division of meaning, that of disorder, is not. Consequently, at Ti. 
46c7-d17 it is the presence of other causes, i.e. of the accessory causes and of 
Ananke, in bringing about the Demiurge’s desired perfection of the Cosmos, which 
makes absolute perfection impossible. The accessory causes involve movement, 
which in turn implies change, disavowing the possibility of absolute perfection, 
wherein there is, by definition, no change. Moreover, the effect of the presence of 
Ananke as a causal power of disorder is observed by Plato as never having been fully 
expunged. Ananke will soon be described as having been ‘persuaded’, but only for 
‘the most part’ by the Demiurge when ordering the Universe. 
With regard to the second two passages, Ti. 53b5-7 and 71d5-7, the unarticulated 
but, as I argue here, assumed existence of disorder remaining in the Demiurge’s 
handiwork requires clarification. At Ti. 53b5-7 Plato has just described the primitive 
chaos “all without proportion and measure,” after which he will then describe how 
God began ‘reducing’ this disorder to order, giving the elements, fire, water, earth 
and air, a definite pattern of shape and number. It is at this juncture that he reminds 
the reader that as a principle it must be assumed that they were brought into the 
greatest possible perfection by the Demiurge. The reader has just been told, 
however, at Ti. 52d2-5, the opening of this section on the primitive chaos, that before 
the generation of the world there existed three distinct realities, Being, Space and 
Becoming. Thus, although these two passages are not continuous, there has 
nevertheless been discreetly placed in the reader’s mind a reference to the Forms or 
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‘being’, albeit, somewhat removed, and this is why I have included the meaning of 
division 2 as being also applicable to Ti. 53b5-7. 
Specific mention is made in this passage of the fact that the elements of the 
Universe were not in this state earlier, i.e. an ordered state, not before God, the 
Demiurge, had touched them, the implication being that if there is imperfection 
remaining, any whatsoever, it is precisely because order has been brought out of 
prior disorder and no greater perfection is possible than what the Demiurge can give. 
As in Ti. 46c7-dl, the prior existence of disorder and change pre-empts the 
possibility of absolute perfection. The disorder referred to in the third passage, Ti. 
71d5-7, is more specific, forming part of a larger discussion wherein Plato discusses 
man’s lower or mortal parts of the soul (the emotions in the heart region and the 
appetites in the belly) and the various physical organs involved. The reader is left 
with an image of the gods doing the Demiurge’s bidding by aiming for perfection 
when making man and who “did their best even with this base part of us.” Reference 
here, of course, is being made to the liver and to the role it was assumed to have in 
divination. Again, the text is clear in articulating and intimating the idea that not 
only the Demiurge, but also the gods, were working with imperfection and disorder, 
which would logically follow when considering a Cosmos in which the prior chaos, 
although subdued and shaped by the Demiurge, was not altogether eliminated. 
A further word can be said concerning Ti. 71d5-7. This passage, like the other 
two composite ones, is similar in formulation: hq &~IGTOU 61s 6 6 ~ a p 1 ~  XOIE~U, 
the main difference being that whereas earlier it was the Demiurge who is shown as 
bringing about an end which is as good as possible, here the memory of the 
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Demiurge enjoining the previously-generated heavenly gods, to bring about such an 
end when making mortal creatures,249 is brought to the reader’s attention. What is of 
interest is that it is the Demiurge’s power or activity ( ~ L ~ O ~ ~ E U O I  ZQU kpQ~ 
6 6 ~ a p . u  n;&pt ZQU bp&%&pa~ y & ~ & o t ~ )  in making the gods themselves, which 
these created gods in turn are to take as their model, and not the Forms, when making 
mortal creatures. To take the Forms as their model would be logically impossible if 
the Forms are a vision privy only to the Demiurge precisely because of his 
perfection. Plato has been very explicit in stating that the heavenly gods are bonded 
together, albeit, directly by the Demiurge, and thus being themselves generated (6i dl 
~ a ‘ t  &n;&in;&p y&y&Vqoe&) are not entirely immortal and indissoluble, and 
therefore, not being perfect, are capable neither of envisioning the Forms nor in turn, 
of emulating them directly in their activity. This entire formulation, I would argue, is 
a logical move on Plato’s part and involves very little, if anything, which is mythical. 
The Forms, it can be concluded, are the vision logically required, according to Plato, 
of a perfect being, i.e. that of the Demiurge. The gods, I suggest, are required to take 
the Demiurge’s power or activity as their model and not his vision of the Forms, 
incapable of such a vision. They will thus encounter all the vicissitudes which 
Ananke has previously impacted on the Demiurge’s work. Consequently, at Ti. 
71d7-el, when reference is made to the gods rectifying that ‘vile part of us’ (zb 
$&Lou Qpb),  this is not in any way a mythic presentation, but rather, is a logical 
consequence of Plato’s ontology. 
See also Ti. 41c2-6. 249 
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Finally, on returning again to Ti. 46c7-d 1, this passage alone of the three passages 
listed above refers explicitly to ‘the idea of the best’, ZQV TO.?, ~ C P ~ O T O V  K ~ T &  zb 
~ V U ~ T ~ U  ’ L ~ C X V ,  and thus presents a direct reference by Plato to the Forms or the 
ideal state of perfection or being.25o However, as mentioned above, immediately 
prior, this same passage also speaks in terms of the Demiurge’s desire to make the 
Cosmos the very best, i.e. the superlative, albeit in terms of the Forms or the idea of 
the best, against which there is also a hint of curtailment preventing absolute 
perfection. It is in terms of this curtailment, moreover, expressed as disorder and 
change remaining within the Cosmos, from which I am arguing that Ti. 46c7-d 
speaks in terms of the superlative and not the ideal form of it, the latter expressing, 
rather, a standard, since the ideal world, given any remaining disorder or change, 
would be impossible. What is ultimately at issue here, however, is not the meaning 
of the phrase ‘as far as possible’ (or similar formulations), be it a reference to a 
superlative aim, the Forms or curtailment of the ideal, all of which possibly apply, or 
alternatively, to allusions of these sentiments, however expressed, but rather, it is the 
purpose behind Plato’s remark. I would propose that his chief aim in using the 
phrase ‘as far as it is possible’ (or its equivalent) was to show the limiting effect 
which disorder and change had on the ideal world envisioned by the Demiurge, 
which because of his perfection could only be ideal and nothing less, although 
clearly, disorder or change as the limiting effect was not always the focus of 
individual passages. Plato’s express purpose, however, was not one of emphasis of 
the ideal world, any more than it was a denial of a metaphysical position or 
See also Ti. 30~5-7 ,37~6-d2 ,38c l ,  38c6-d2,39d8-e2 and 40a4. 250 
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affirmation of the physical, but was primarily one of emphasis of the real world, 
which for him included not only disorder and change and with that, the physical, but 
also a Demiurge2” and the changeless ideal and with that, the timeless and seamless 
metaphysical. The modern notion fkom the History of Science of the 
‘disenchantment of the world’, a point in time where myth, imagination and spirit 
were cut off from what is now called ‘scientific reality’ would, for Plato, have only 
told half the story. 
2.3.4.4 The classical commentators 
None of the classical commentators, Cornford, Taylor or Archer-Hind, pick up on 
or comment upon this re-occurring theme of ‘as far as possible’, as it nonetheless 
appears and re-appears throughout the Timaeus. Thus, they have little or nothing to 
say in this regard, whether it concerns the less obvious passages noted above or the 
more important ones at Ti. 46c7d1, 53b5-7 and 71d5-7, either collectively or 
individually. This omission, however, is noteworthy and I would argue is primarily 
due to the allocation to ‘myth’ of substantial parts of the Timaeus, which in fact are 
not myth and secondly, to a much too early impacting and facile handling of Plato’s 
early admission by Timaeus that his story is a likely tale, inserting an ‘only’ where 
there is none. 
For Cornford, as discussed earlier, even the Demiurge is a mythic figure, 
following his purely positivist line of interpretation upon which his Commentary on 
the Timaeus is based. Thus, it is not surprising that there is silence with regard to 
any of the above-noted possibilities regarding the nature of the Demiurge, Ananke 
One among at least two, but possibly many. 25 1 
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and the Forms, since for Cornford these are not metaphysical realities, but are aspects 
of the physical or mental realm, redrawn as myth or abstractions because of their 
complexity. All references to likeness are thus interpreted as objects within the 
world as they compare to the ideal in the mind as objects of rational thought: 
We have seen that, although the creator god, as such, is a mythical figure, 
the relation of likeness to model none the less subsists between the visible 
world and the intelligible. ... However we may interpret the divine 
Reason symbolised by the Demiurge, this model [the generic form of the 
Living Creature]’” is one among the objects of its thought. It is the ideal, 
whose perfection the visible universe, as a living being, is to reproduce in 
its own structure, so far as is permitted by the conditions of temporal 
existence in space. 
(PC, pp. 40-41) 
In response to the section at Ti. 32c-33b7 Cornford comments upon certain 
‘powers’ ( ~ U U & ~ E I G )  in the sense of qualities or properties of bodies considered as 
having the ‘power to act and be acted upon’ (66vaptq  TO^ ~ O L E ~ U  d t  ndox~tv),  
which discussion is not problematic (PC, pp. 53 and 199). However, it is not 
66~aptq or the well-known use of the prepositional phrase K ~ T &  66~aptq which 
carries the weight of ‘as much as possible’ here, but rather, p&ho~a ,  the 
superlative of p & k  or ‘exceedingly’, reflecting the slightly different meanings, as 
discussed above, behind the same English translation. However, Cornford refrains 
from commenting on p&hto~a, just as he does not comment earlier at Ti. 30a2 
when 66~ctptq is used with K ~ T &  or later at Ti. 37d2 when it is used with &‘IS, 
veering away from considering 66~aptq other than as he explains it above as an 
elementary force, even when its meaning has clearly changed when combined with 
such prepositions as K ~ T & .  at Ti. 30a2, 38cl and 42e2 or &‘I< at 37d2 and 71d5-7, or 
The square brackets and their content are my own. 252 
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again later with ~ a ~ d c  at Ti. 46c7, but this time combined with its adjectival forrn, 
K ~ T &  TO ~ u u c ~ T ~ u . ~ ~ ~  Ti. 53b5-7 is an example of TO 6 ~ v a z 6 ~  being used in 
combination with the superlatives, ~ d c h h t ~ a  &ptoTa, to indicate the greatest 
possibZe perfection. Ti. 7 1 d5-7 follows similarly, combining the superlative h< 
& ~ O T O U  with one of the prepositional phrases, &L< 6bap1.v. Comford is silent 
regarding these passages. 
Taylor comments on Ti. 56~5-7, stating that “there is a suggestion that the 
‘compliancy’ of & U & Y K ~  is not absolute”, and further: 
‘When &LJ&YK~ submits’, you get minute and exact conformity to a 
recognizable law -this is the point of the 6t’ &~ptp&iaq-  but when 
& U & Y K ~  is not sufficiently compliant, you get only the imperfect 
approximation of this ideal. 
(Taylor, PT, p 382) 
By his comment, Taylor acknowledges a division 3 meaning for this passage, but he 
does not discuss any of the other passages listed in their relationship to the above- 
discussed theme of ‘as fa r  as possible’ or the various meanings that would attach. 
Archer-Hind, on the other hand, would place Ti. 30a2-3, it would appear, in 
division 3, whereas I have placed it in division 1. At this section, he is commenting 
specifically on KCXT& 6 6 ~ a p t ~  where he concentrates on the notion of the 
inevitable presence of ‘evil’. However, Archer-Hind remains a sceptic as to what 
this might be and places it firmly within the realm of matter: 
To make the material universe absolutely perfect would be impossible, 
since evil, whatever that might be, is more or less inherent in the very 
nature of matter and can never be abolished. 
(A-H, TP, p. 92) 
Moreover, his reason for focussing upon ‘evil’ is unclear. 
From the deponent verb 86vayat, ‘to be able, capable, strong enough to do’. 253 
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2.3.4.5 
Up to this part of the Timaeus, which is still very much at its beginning, Plato has 
not yet introduced ‘Ananke’ and the word which is here translated by ‘evil’ is 
$ha6p0~, a form of @6ho5. However, its meaning much more closely 
approximates that of ‘careless’, ‘common’ (in the sense of ‘vulgar’) or ‘poor’. Thus, 
there is no reason to think that ‘evil’ understood as some sort of, as yet, nameless 
negative force or effect forms the background thought of the text here. Although 
Plato does mention that the cosmos was in discordant and disorderly motion when 
the Demiurge decided to order it, what is being focussed upon and discussed here is 
the God’s goodness and complete lack of imperfection, and his desire to share that 
goodness as far as is possible in all that he orders. Thus, rather than contrasting that 
goodness with anything other (i.e. evil) than itself (i.e. goodness and an 
approximation to that goodness), what Plato appears to be doing is present a known 
(from men of understanding) principle according to which ‘becoming’ and the 
Cosmos came into being, the @ ~ L C J <  &V zt< & p x Q ~ .  The spirit engendered here 
is one of generosity on the part of the Demiurge. If Archer-Hind were correct in his 
understanding of an assumed contrast of ‘evil’ with the goodness of the Demiurge, 
then the discordant and disorderly motion would have to be an example of that which 
is careless, common or vulgar (the proper meaning of the word Archer-Hind has 
translated as ‘evil’), which is meaningless both in this context and in relation to what 
Plato later states about the pre-existing chaos. Archer-Hind does not comment on 
any of the other passages. 
& U ~ ~ L U  and the notion of ‘evil’ 
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2.3.5 The accessory causes 
With regard once again to the accessory causes, however, Archer-Hind makes an 
interesting observation, which to some degree is at odds with his understanding 
above, where ‘evil’ in the Timaeus is understood by him to be the mitigating force or 
forces “inherent in the very nature of matter” (similar to what he describes as 
Democritus’s understanding of a “blind unconscious force” [see below]) preventing 
the Demiurge from bringing about perfect goodness, but which position Archer-Hind 
now claims Plato set specifically out to argue against. He correctly notes with regard 
to the z b  G U U ~ ~ T ~ U  at Ti. 46c7 that Plato is guarding against being supposed to 
mean that the physical principles he has just laid down are the real causes, and are 
really the means through which the true cause works “viz., ~06s operating h t  TO 
,9254 Bkhztozov. 
His next observation is worth quoting in full. He suggests comparing the above 
with Phaedo 99b, and then states: 
The whole of this latter part of the chapter contains a polemic partly 
against Anaxagorus, partly against Demokritos. Anaxagorus did indeed 
postulate V O ~ <  as his prime force, but he used it simply as a mechanical 
agent, without attributing to it a conscious effort to produce the best 
result. Demokritos conceives a blind unconscious force, &u&ylcq, to be 
the motive power of the universe. Thus whereas the opposition between 
Demokritos and Plato is fundamental and essential, Plato’s controversy 
with Anaxagorus is due rather to inconsequence or incompleteness on the 
part of the latter. 
(A-H, TP, p. 161, fn. 9) 
It can be assumed that the comparison Archer-Hind is making here is with that 
section of the Timaeus which follows Ti. 46c7, dealing with ~06s and & u & Y K ~ ,  and 
Superlative of &xyaObq, ‘best’. 254 
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not the Phaedo from 99c onwards, although the attention he draws towards Plato’s 
disappointment and disagreement with Anaxagoras in this part of the Phaedo is apt. 
That the Timaeus contains an understanding of ‘Nous’ contrary to that advanced by 
Anaxagoras, or at least greatly developed and extended, is not disputed. Further, I 
would agree with Archer-Hind that this was due primarily to the incompleteness of 
the idea of ‘Nous’ as it had been developed by Anaxagoras. However, a few words 
should be said in this regard. 
2.3.5.1 Anaxagoras 
First, it is questionable whether Anaxagoras, in fact, can be cited to be a 
‘physicalist’ or ‘physicist’ in any strict sense, regardless of Plato’s disappointment in 
him for not appearing to recognise the powers of ‘Nous’ beyond the strictly physical 
sense or that of mechanical agent or the power, such metaphysical powers for Plato 
being the ability of Nous to bring about the greatest good and to be the cause of 
everything. Although, as the ancient historian Diogenes Laertius describes him, 
Anaxagoras indeed felt he had been born “for the study of the sun and the moon and 
heavens,” he differs from other physical philosophers in a decisive way, namely, he 
believed definitively that ‘Mind’ was not only the first principle of movement, but 
also of order: “All things were together. Then Mind came and arranged them.’’ He 
became renown for this belief, in fact, so much so, that he was nicknamed ‘Mind’, 
appearing in the Silli of such writers as Timon. Secondly, this was not a material 
mind, rather, Anaxagoras argued specifically for a non-material, non-physical Mind 
(from the first book of his Physics): ‘‘Mind is infinite and self-controlling and it has 
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been mixed with no thing, but is alone itselfby itsev” He argues that if anything had 
been mixed with it, “in everything there is a present share of everything,’’ this 
mixing would have prevented Mind from the absolute control it has (a view similar 
to that of Xenophanes), thus: “For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and it 
possesses all knowledge about everything, and has the greatest strength. And mind 
controls all things, both great and small, which possess  SOU^." (B12) However, 
Anaxagoras’s Mind is not entirely transcendent and this perhaps is where he falls out 
with Plato: “In everything there is a present share of everything except mind - and in 
some things mind is too present.’’ (B1 1) Thus, although he could have been, and 
indeed was, accused of atheism or impiety, having regarded the heavenly bodies as 
objects of scientific inquiry rather than in the traditional, religious sense as gods, 
Anaxagoras was certainly not a physicalist in the way it has been suggested Plato 
understood him to be from the Phaedo. Plato specifically states in the Phaedo at 
98b7-c 1 that Socrates’ disappointment (assuming that he shares this view) in 
Anaxagoras lay primarily in Nous or Mind being assigned no causality for  the order 
of the world, leaving such order to the elements (e.g. air, aether and water) or to what 
Plato has now designated at Ti. 46c7 as the accessory causes and with it, omitting 
However, any ability by Nous to discover “how it was best for that thing to be. 
Plato’s assessment of Anaxagoras’s position would appear to be somewhat biased in 
light of the latter’s own writings where Mind is acknowledged to control all things 
that contain soul and who traditionally has been credited with being the first to 
introduce the teleological principal into the explanation of the natural world, with 
”255 
255 See Plato, Phaedo, 97c-99c. 
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only Xenophanes possibly pre-empting Anaxagoras’s right to this claim. As noted 
above, Socrates’s primary disappointment in Anaxagoras was directed at his 
omission in acknowledging Mind as the cause of everything, which latter 
philosophical consideration, however, occupied neither Anaxagoras’s main interest 
nor pursuit (nor perhaps ability, as Plato’s dialogue implies), having already 
acknowledged his own scientific turn of mind, which would lead naturally, as it did, 
to discerning causation at the physical level, rather than at the metaphysical. While 
both Xenophanes and Anaxagoras serve as predecessors to Plato’s more developed 
understanding of Mind, it is much too strong a claim to say that their views were 
counter to it. 
2.3.5.2 
However, although the same cannot be said concerning Democritus (and 
L e u ~ i p p u s ) , ~ ~ ~  at least not in any straightforward sense, care must be taken not to 
succumb to the broad generalisation made here by Archer-Hind regarding an obvious 
“fundament and essential” opposition between Democritus and Plato.257 There are 
enough points of similarity between these two philosophers to counter or at least, 
temper, any statements of this sort. Although Plato’s religious and metaphysical bias 
strongly rejected strictly physicalist views, this is not to say that he did not absorb 
certain of these ideas into his own cosmology, while at the same time, adapting them 
to his own metaphysical scheme. Further, although many commentators on 
Democritus and Plato - a comparison 
I have adapted the traditional position of presenting the atomist philosophy through the writings of 
Democritus, but who in fact was a student of Leucippus, the actual father of the atomic theory, but 
about whom we know very little. 
I have chosen the more modem English transliteration, ‘Democritus’, rather than that of Archer- 




Democritus or Plato tend to favour this starkly contrasted understanding of 
Democritus and Plato, he is never actually mentioned by Plato, let alone in this light. 
Moreover, many of their views on the physical world are remarkably similar.258 
Significantly, the lives of these two men closely overlap, with the younger Plato 
being born some thirty-two years later and dying only about twelve years after the 
atomist. Democritus, therefore, would have been a mature man and philosopher by 
the time Plato was born and his philosophy would have been widely known and his 
writings largely disseminated throughout the Greek philosophical community by the 
time Plato began his career as a philosopher. Thus, his ideas would have been 
thoroughly known to Plato, either directly or indirectly. The ideas which Plato 
appears to have appropriated into his own cosmology from Democritus’ atomic 
theory and consequently used in the Timaeus are not insignificant.259 
First, it cannot be denied that Plato has adopted very painstakingly a version of 
the atomist260 view as forming the building blocks of his physical universe. There 
are too many similarities. The ideas of these two philosophers may differ, perhaps, 
as to the particulars in working out their individual theories, but the overall view 
J. J. Cleary (“Plato’s Teleological Atomism” in Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias, eds. T. Calvo and 
L. Brisson, p. 242) notes that both Empedocles (Fr.360KR) and Democritus (DK68A40) are credited 
with positing the vortex to explain the separation of like elements into different regions; Anaxagoras 
(DK12) also seemed to accept the same mechanism for separating things out. Cleary suggests, 
moreover, that the receptacle is Plato’s alternative to the Atomists’ void, “as a plenum in which 
change and movement can happen without the introduction of absolute non-being” (ibid.). 
There are other similarities which have been noted in antiquity, e.g. regarding ‘knowledge’: “You 
cannot say that every impression is true, because of the reversal - as Democritus and Plato showed in 
their reply to Protagorus,” (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians VI1 389-390) in EGP, 
Barnes, pp. 256-57; also with regard to Moral Philosophy: “Democritus and Plato both place 
happiness in the soul” (Stobaeus’ Anthology, I1 vii 31) in EGP, Barnes, p. 265. There are also many 
other areas of Democritus’ philosophy reflected or shared in the writings of Plato. 
All the following references in this section are from Early Greek Philosophy by Jonathan Barnes, 





which emerges is not discontiguous in respect to the other and can be outlined as 
E G P ~ ~  Democritus Ti. Plato 
p. 247 “Democritus thinks that the nature 53c4-8”’ 
of eternal things consists in small 
substances, 
“In the first place, it is clear to everyone that fire, 
earth, water and air are bodies, and all bodies are 
solids. All solids again are bounded by surfaces, 
and all rectilinear surfaces are composed of 
triangles.” 
infinite in quantity, From the Timaeus it is dificult to discern precisely 
what Plato’s view is on this. However, there are 
indicators throughout this work favouring a view 
similar to Democritus in this regard, namely, 
infinitude in quantity. First, although Plato 
discerns only one Cosmos or Universe, he gives a 
rational account for this and not a physical 
argument, following which he does not appear to 
delimit the extent of this Universe (see Ti. 30c2- 
31b3). In other words, he does not posit one 
Cosmos264 because there were only so many 
triangles to be used up by the Demiurge, but rather, 
one Cosmos is superior ontologically to a multitude 
of worlds, given that a wholly perfect Demiurge 
constructed the Cosmos and unity is argued to be 
superior over multiplicity (“nothing can be good 
which is modelled on something incomplete.. .and 
so he created a single visible living being”). 
Secondly, ‘becoming’ (comprising the whole of the 
physical universe and concerning which, the 
triangles form the basic building blocks or 
particles) mirrors ‘being’ (the Forms), which 
Forms are never limited in number by Plato. Thus, 
although the Cosmos appears to be finite with 
regard to the kinds of objects of ‘becoming’ it 
contains (e.g. four living creatures) and even the 
number of a particular kind (e.g. mortal beings 
limited by the number of souls created or the effect 
of their evolution or transmigration), the basic 
particles themselves need not be limited and are in 
fact potentially unlimited outwith any particular 
object of being. Thirdly, Plato does not work 
through the ramifications or status of the original 
chaos from which the triangles in his theory /. . . 
This particular passage is Simplicius’s quote of Aristotle, contained in his Commentary on the 
None of the references with regard to Democritus’s atomic theory are original fragments by him, 
See Lee, p 73; Bury, p.127. 
I use ‘Cosmos’ and ‘world’ here as substitutes for Universe, as to speak of ‘one universe’ appears 
redundant, and hence, slightly confusing, and yet the possibility of multiple universes or worlds was a 
concern which even Plato himself raises. He, of course, denies this possibility. 
26 1 
Heavens 294.30-295.22. 






(p. 247) (infinite in quantity,) 
Ti. Plato 
originally came together, nor does he attempt to do 
so. His account suggests, however, that the 
original chaos, which itself contained some natural 
ordering not initiated by the Demiurge, remained 
even after the ordering of the Cosmos, with the 
result that it is not done away in its entirety, nor are 
its limits spelt out or known. Exactly how this 
original chaos ultimately relates to the ordered 
Universe is not discussed. There is nothing in the 
Timaeus to suggest that this original chaos, out of 
which the Universe emerged and was shaped, now 
forms a part of the Universe or that the chaos was 
all used up (only the four elements were), although 
vestiges of it remain in the Cosmos, and 
understood in this way, constitutes an anachronism. 
To the contrary, Plato’s account as it stands 
suggests that the ordered Universe forms a part of 
the original chaos, separated by order and design. 
There is also a clear indication in the Timaeus (see 
Ti. 34a8-b9) that this perfectly round “blessed 
God” (Universe) “with the extremes equidistant in 
all directions from the centre’’, has a discernible 
outer edge (Ti. 4Oa2-7) and “a smooth and 
unbroken surface” (Ti. 33b4-c), which outer edge 
would logically meet up with the original chaos. 
Again, precisely how is not worked out in the 
Timaeus. The fourth and strongest argument in 
favour of a position favouring infinitude in 
quantity, however, is where Plato refers to the 
triangles as being infinite in variety (see Ti. 57d3- 
6), whereby he stresses that such variety must be 
taken into consideration when considering probable 
reasoning concerning Nature. ‘Potentiality’ does 
not enter as a factor here. An infinite variety 
would infer infinite quantity, but again, how this is 
to be worked out is left undiscussed. 
and for them he posits a place, “third, space which is eternal and indestructible, 
distinct from them and infinite in which provides a position for everything that 
extent. comes to be.’’ 
He calls place by the names ‘void’, For Plato there is no ‘void’, but it is clear from the 
‘nothing’ and ‘infinite’ reference to ‘void’ in Democritus that he is 
describing the space (‘void’ for Democritus, 
‘space’ for Plato), where ‘being’ (‘becoming’ for 
Plato) would reside. Thus, when Plato states that 
there is no void, he is not stating that there is no 
place for ‘becoming’ (‘being’ for Democritus) to 
reside, but rather, there is no space without 
‘becoming’ being contained therein and he explains 
why (Ti. 58a4-7). This is not at odds with what we 
are being told about Democritus’s theory, where 
‘void’ is simply the place for ‘being’ (Plato’s 
‘becoming’) to reside. For both philosophers I... 
52a8-b2’65 
265 Lee, p 7 1 ; Bury, p. 123. 
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EGP Democritus 
(p. 247) (He calls place by the names 
‘void’, ‘nothing’ and ‘infinite’) 
and each of the substances he calls 
‘thing’, ‘solid’ and ‘being’. 
Ti. Plato 
this would appear to be a logical requirement, for 
which Plato offers the argument that “an 
image.. . needs to come into existence in something 
else if it is to claim some degree of reality, or else 
be nothing at all” and “so long as two things are 
different, neither will come to be in the other and 
so become at once both one and two” (Ti. 52c3- 
dl) .  Thus, based on this reasoning, Plato posits a 
separate entity called ‘space’, which entity 
Democritus had named ‘void’. 
It is in regard to the facing passage noting 
Democritus’s naming of substances wherein lies 
Plato’s main and significant divergence away from 
Democritus’s physical theory and from those of all 
previous philosophers. This dissent resulted in 
Plato’s introduction of his theory of Forms. 
Philosophically, such naming is at odds with 
Plato’s understanding of the cyclical process that 
all substances constantly undergo, since it implies a 
stability, which Plato denies at the physical level. 
This idea of ‘instability’ with regard to the physical 
Cosmos (i.e. the elements out of which it was 
comprised) was of such prime important to Plato 
that it gave rise to a strong dictum by him against 
such naming, wherein he sets about to specifically 
address the related issues. First, Plato prefers to 
call such substances ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’ 
because of their constant physical transformation 
from one element into another and whose 
movement must have a cause, reserving ‘being’ for 
the postulated non-physical patterns after which 
each object of ‘becoming’ is shaped and the 
Demiurge (or those the Demiurge directs) as their 
ultimate or efficient cause (Ti. 27d5-29d3).266 
Secondly, and for the same reason, Plato finds such 
objects so lacking in permanence and solidity that 
he suggests that it would be more accurate to refer 
to them as “having a quality”, rather than thinking 
of them as solid objects or “being a thing” at all 
(Ti. 49b2-e7).267 He obviously, however, does not 
suggest that this is at the same time practical, 
referring himself to individual solid objects 
throughout the remainder of the Timaeus and not to 
their ‘qualities’ when discussing them, e.g. the 
various parts of the human body. Thirdly, Plato 
suggests that we should not call something, not 
even when seeing them as qualities, ‘this thing’ or 
‘that thing’, as this suggests a permanent reality 
and stability which substances and qualities just do 
not have. He suggests, rather, that when the /. . . 
See Lee, pp. 4 2 4 3 ;  Bury, pp. 49-53. 





(p. 247) (and each of the substances he calls 
‘thing’, ‘solid’ and ‘being’.) 
Ti. Plato 
demonstrative expressions ‘this thing’ or ‘that 
thing’ are used, they should only be used to denote 
that in which the process takes place and “in which 
these qualities appear for a time and vanish” (Ti. 
49e7-50a4).268 
The essence of Plato’s argument is that due to the 
fact that all objects are subject to constant change, 
no permanent designation would ever be truly 
accurate over time. 
I would argue, however, that the overall effect of 
the above considerations remains at a theoretical 
level and in practical terms and for the remainder 
of his description in the Timaeus of the physical 
Cosmos, with the exception of his treatment on the 
soul and its role in causation, which again is dealt 
with at a highly theoretical level, Plato’s view 
remains closely contiguous with that of the Atomist 
posit ion. 
He thinks that the substances are so 
small that they escape our senses, 
5 6 b 7 - ~ 3 ’ ~ ~  “We must, of course, think of the individual units 
of all four bodies as being far too small to be 
visible and only becoming visible when massed 
together in large numbers.’’ 
Plato goes into great detail explaining how the 
differently shaped triangles bring about differences 
in shape and magnitude of the pure primary bodies 
or when amassed, the four elements. 
and that they possess all sorts of 
forms and all sorts of shapes and 
differences in magnitude. 
53c8- 
57d617’ 
From them, as from elements, he 
was able to generate and compound 
visible and perceptible bodies. 
As quoted above, for Plato all visible and 
perceptible bodies are composed of the four 
elements, which ultimately derive from specific 
triangles, and hrther differences, from variations in 
these triangles. 
The atoms struggle and are carried “When earth meets fire it will be dissolved by its 
about in the void because of their sharpness, and, whether dissolution takes place in 
dissimilarities and the other fire itself or in a mass of air or water, will drift 
differences mentioned, and as they about until its parts meet, fit together and become 
are carried about they collide and earth again, for they can never be transformed into 
are bound together in a binding another figure.” 
which makes them touch and be 
contiguous with one another but 
which does not genuinely produce 
any other single nature whatever 
from them; 
for it is utterly silly to think that “so long as two things are different, neither will 
two or more things could ever come to be in the other and so become at once both 
become one. one and two.” 
56d1-627’ 
52~3-d l  
268 See Lee, p. 68; Bury, pp. 1 15-1 17. 
269 See Lee, p. 79; Bury, p. 137. 
270 See Lee, pp. 73-8 1 ; Bury, pp. 125-14 1. 
*” See Lee, pp. 79-80; Bury, p. 137-139. 
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EGP Democritus Ti. 
p. 247 He explains how the substances 56a6-b3’72 
remain together in terms of the 
ways in which the bodies entangle 
with and grasp hold of one another; 
for some of them are uneven, some 
hooked, some concave, some 
convex, and others have 
innumerable other differences. 
So he thinks that they hold on to 
one another and remain together up 
to the time when some stronger 
force reaches them from their 
environment and shakes them and 
scatters them apart. 
contrary, dissolution, not only in 
connection with animals but also in 
connection with plants and worlds 
- and in general with all 
perceptible bodies. 
(Aristotle, fragment 208).274 
a whirl of every kind of forms was 
separated off from the whole (B 
167) but does not say how and by 
what cause, seems to generate it 
spontaneously and by chance.275 
57a5-6273 
PP- He speaks of generation and of its 56~8-57c6 
247- 
248 
p. 248 Democritus too, when he says that 52e5- 
53a7’77 
p. 249 For in the one case the whirling of 
the sieve separately arranges lentils 
with lentils, barley with 
barley ... and in the other case, by 
the motion of the waves, oval 
pebbles are forced into the same 
place as oval pebbles.. . , as though 
the similarity in things contained 
some sort of force for collecting 
things together. [B 1641 That is 
Democritus’ view.’76 
Plato 
In Plato’s theory, the different figures are 
compounded of the various triangles, with some 
configurations more stable than others: “So to sum 
up, the figure which has the fewest faces must in 
the nature of things be the most mobile, as well as 
the sharpest and most penetrating, and finally, 
being composed of the smallest number of similar 
parts, the lightest. Our second figure will be second 
in all these respects, our third will be third. 
“but the process of dissolution continues so long as 
transformation produces a weaker mass to offer 
resistance to a stronger one.” 
Plato goes into considerable detail describing the 
physical process of generation and dissolution of 
the elements and their component particles, which, 
except for the soul, comprise the whole of the 
generated Universe. 
“And its [that of primitive chaos or the ‘nurse’ of 
becoming] contents were in constant process of 
movement and separation, rather like the contents 
of a winnowing basket or similar implement for 
cleaning corn, in which the solid and heavy stuff is 
sifted out and settles on one side, the light and 
insubstantial on another: so the four basic 
constituents were shaken by the receptacle, which 
acted as a kind of shaking implement, and those 
most like each other pushed together most closely, 
with the result that they came to occupy different 
regions of space even before they were arranged 
into an ordered universe.” 
See Lee, p.79; Bury; p 137. 
See Lee, p. 80; Bury, p. 139. 
272 
273 
274 End of Simplicius’s quote of Aristotle (contained in his Commentary on On the Heavens 294.30- 
295.22). 
Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 327.23-26. 
Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians VI1 1 16- 1 18. 
275 
276 
277 See Lee, p. 72; Bury, p.125. 
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Secondly, although the main difference between Democritus and Plato would 
appear to lie in the area of causation, it is mainly because Plato has developed a 
theory of causation, namely, that of the soul with regard to physical motion within 
the Cosmos and the Demiurge and Ananke with regard to primary causation, which 
Democritus failed to With regard to causation, therefore, as with so much of 
Democritus’s physical theory where he provided ‘likely’ detail, Plato has now filled 
in the gaps,279 providing what he regarded as a ‘likely’ theory of causation. ‘Likely’, 
I would argue, because its precedent had already been set by Anaxagoras and 
Democritus. Having adapted for his framework ‘Mind’ from Anaxagoras, where “it 
possesses all knowledge about everything, and has the greatest strength ... and 
controls all things, both great and small, which possess soul” as the primary cause 
for good, which is synonymous with order and ordering, Plato now adds the “blind 
unconscious force, &V&YK~ , ”  from Democritus as the primary cause for evil, which 
is synonymous with disorder and disordering, and which becomes for Plato the 
motive power of the universe before its ordering by the Demiurge, and for all 
disorder thereafter. In neither case, however, does Plato account for mechanical 
motion in the generated Cosmos by either Nous (the Demiurge) or Ananke 
(Necessity), reserving the accessory causes (not true causes) for all but initial 
movements, which latter causal role he reserves specifically for the generated ‘soul’, 
“As for motion (whence and how existing things acquire it), they too, like the others, negligently 
omitted to inquire into it.” (Aristotle, Metaphysics 985b4-20) in EGP, Barnes, p. 248. 
279 “Democritus too, when he says that a whirl of every kind of forms was separated off from the 
whole [B 1671 but does not say how and by what cause, seems to generate it spontaneously and by 
chance.” (Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 327.23-26) in EGP, Barnes, p.248. 
278 
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but which I will argue later280 is a modal source of movement and not a physical 
28 1 one. 
7 282 Taylor s Commentary on the accessory causes or, as I have translated them, the 
assistant causes, as they pertain to the Timaeus, is insightful. Of note, are his 
references, first, to the passage from the Phaedo (95b-99d),283 which Archer-Hind 
also cites (but who leaves the passage ~nexplicated’~~) and second, to the early 
occurrences of the words O W ~ ~ L O < ,  p&.r;ai.r;~o< and ~ ‘ ~ z I o <  in the extant 
literature. 
2.3 S.3 The Phuedo 9%-99d 
With reference to the first, Taylor points out that what is at stake here is the 
principle of agency and not merely the “formulation of mathematical laws of 
Thus, Socrates’ bones, muscles and sinews are interconnexion between events. 
in no sense the real cause of his now being seated in the prison waiting to be 
executed, but rather his notion of what is best for his soul is, i.e. to face Athenian 
justice. Hence, when the purposive behaviour of an agent, e.g. Socrates, aiming at a 
real or supposed ‘good’, is distinguished from those things ‘without which a cause 
,7285 
See Part 11, Chapter 2, $2.3.2.1.3 (‘A modal account’) of this thesis. 
There is little doubt that Plato was influenced in varying degrees by the ideas of a great many 
thinkers. Of note, is the suggestion by Philo of Alexandria concerning the early influence of the poet, 
Hesiod: 
280 
But some persons think that the father of the Platonic theory was the poet Hesiod, as they 
conceive that the world is spoken of by him as created and indestructible; as created, when he 
says, - “First did Chaos rule 
Then the broad-chested earth was brought to light, 
Foundation firm and lasting for whatever 
Exists among mankind;” (Hesiod, Theogon, 1 16) 
and as indestructible, because he has given no hint of its dissolution or destruction. See 
Philo, The Works of Philo, Tram. C D Yonge, Henrickson, Massachusetts, 1993, pp. 708-9. 
282 Taylor, PT, pp. 290-294. 
283 Ibid, p. 291. 
2 84 
285 
A-H, TP, p. 161, fn. 9. 
Taylor, PT, p. 291. 
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would not be a cause’, the latter become distinguished as accessory causes. Thus, 
with regard to ‘disorder’ per se, either as a cause or an effect, specifically in its not 
requiring to attend to any other action or effect for its potential or real existence, it 
remains logically distinct from the notion of accessory cause. 
2.3.5.4 Early occurrences of the words G ’ u u ~ ~ L O ~ ,  p&%ak~Oq and 
ahoq 
With regard to the early occurrences of the words G V U ~ ~ Z I O ~ ,  p&.r;ai%to< and 
~ L Z I O < ,  Taylor notes their juristic origin, where the important distinction being 
drawn is that between the ‘principal’ agent and the ‘accessories’ or intermediate 
agents in acts which have legal or moral consequences and hence, is not between the 
primary and consequent actions which follow thereon. In Aeschylus Agam. 11 16 
Casandra calls Clytaemestra O V U ~ I Z ~ ~  $ 6 ~ 0 ~  ‘accessory’ to the murder of her 
husband, the ‘principal’ being Aegisthus, as he afterwards boasts. In like manner, 
~“LZIOU is that which is entitled to the legal credit or discredit attaching to an act, in 
other words, that to which an act can be ‘blamed’.2s6 Thus, the earliest uses of these 
words distinguish agency involving purposive behaviour, but distinguish neither the 
ordering of the acts themselves which ensue therefrom, nor the acts outwith such 
purposive behaviour. 
The idea of Ananke or & U & Y K ~  as representing brute physical force in the 
cosmos is not raised by Taylor and neither is any mention made of & u & Y K ~  in 
connection with the accessory causes. The closest Taylor comes to explaining 
Ananke in terms of mechanical motion is at Ti. 46e1-2 in reference to the 
286 Taylor, PT, p 291. Also see footnote on same page. 
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prepositional phrase E( &u&YK~ ,  where he argues that the text is simply making a 
contrast between those things which can’t move or restrain themselves, so that they 
are & U & Y K ~  = ‘without being able to help themselves’, which he then translates 
as ‘mechanically’ and those things which, in possessing a soul or W U X ~ ~ ,  are self- 
m o ~ i n g . ~ ”  I would argue, however, that behind Taylor’s explanation, which would 
appear correct in itself, is the further suggestion hinted at by his reference to V O ~ S ,  
that the underlying contrast being made here is between ~06s and its display of 
intelligent purpose and &u&YK~ ,  not displaying such purpose and thus, with both 
causes appearing on an even, but opposing playing field and as primary.288 I would 
argue, therefore, that the contrast being made here in using ke & U & V Y ~  is not 
between a true causal power, i.e. W U X ~  or W U X ~  possessing ~06s and a secondary 
or non-causal power, i.e. mechanical motion, but rather, between a motion displaying 
intelligent purpose and a motion which of itself does not. As Taylor has noted: 
The thought is a combination of the doctrine of the Phaedo that the 
‘good’ is the real explanation of everything with the doctrine, first 
introduced in the Phaedrus, of the soul as the one and only ‘self-moving’ 
thing.289 
It is only later, however, in Laws X where Plato will develop his theory of soul to 
explicitly include a non-beneficent causal power or soul. I would argue, therefore, 
that at this juncture care must be taken not to make the above comparison either more 
all-encompassing or more discrete than that suggested, as a broader or more specific 
appeal is not supported by the text. Thus, the point of comparison or similarity 
which Plato makes, i.e. a lack of intelligent purpose, between the individual 
“This is all that dCu&ylcq means here,” Taylor, PT, p. 293. 
See my earlier discussion regarding Ti. 46d7-e2. 





secondary causes or mechanical motion(s) of generated objects and the disordering 
cause or & u & Y K ~ ,  is where all such comparisons and similarities between these 
causes begin and end. 
2.3.5.5 The mechanism of vision 
In commenting on the accessory causes, Comford begins from the passage in the 
Timaeus on the mechanism of vision at Ti.45b-46a7 where he states: 
He [Plato] begins with the bodily mechanism of vision, for the sake of 
leading up to the contrast between these ‘secondary causes’ and the true 
reason or purpose, which is that man may learn number by seeing the 
heavenly bodies and so pass on through the sciences of number to all 
philosophy.29o 
Although Plato does give a clear statement as to why he thinks man was given the 
mechanism of vision by the Demiurge, he does not make the above statement 
regarding ‘philosophy’ in this passage, but in a subsequent passage beginning at Ti. 
47a. Comford has had to pass over important metaphysical detail given by Plato at 
Ti. 46c7-e6 to arrive at the conclusion that Plato did this ‘‘for the sake of’ leading up 
to a “true reason or purpose,” with the result that the emphasis which is placed on the 
above-quoted contrast, and the contrast itself, are both contrived, but not by Plato. 
There are two problems. First, the object of the purported “true reason” or 
purpose Cornford is suggesting here is unclear. For Plato to have included a 
discussion of the secondary causes for the sake of discussing vision, so as to further 
explain the origin of man’s philosophic ability, is unlikely given that Plato’s 
discussion of vision is exceedingly detailed and lengthy when taking into account the 
length of the Timaeus overall. This alone belies any move to claim that such a 
Cornford, PC, p. 152. 
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discussion was included ‘for the sake of  some other purpose, which purpose, 
moreover, is barely touched upon before it drops from the discussion completely. To 
the contrary, Plato’s inclusion of the secondary causes is a reasonable furtherance of 
his plan stated at the outset of the Timaeus, namely, to expound upon the origin of 
the cosmic system down to the story of man.291 For Comford to have telescoped this 
general plan in an instance is quite rash and renders as discontiguous Plato’s actual 
discussion which follows upon this section on the mechanics of vision, namely, the 
relative importance of the secondary causes in relation to the primary or true 
causes.292 This brings into focus a second and ultimately more serious problem 
created by Cornford’s analysis, namely, of removing Plato’s metaphysics from the 
discussion at hand. Not only are the objects of the comparison wrong - clearly it is 
the primary and secondary causes which are being discussed at this juncture in the 
Timaeus and for their own sake - the shift which Comford suggests here, namely, 
towards a general emphasis on man’s ability to do philosophy, is out of keeping with, 
and indeed, contrary to, Plato’s stated purpose for writing the Timaeus, not only 
stated at its beginning as noted above, but also repeated in more specific terms later 
on: 
And if, for relaxation, one gives up discussing eternal things, it is 
reasonable and sensible to occupy one’s leisure in a way that brings 
pleasure and no regrets, by considering likely accounts of the world of 
change. So let us now indulge ourselves and proceed with an account of 
the probabilities next in order.293 
(Ti. 59c5-d3) 
29’ Ti. 27a2-6. 
Ti. 4 6 ~ 7 4 .  




Thus, Cornford, by connecting and conflating the content of two separate 
passages, Ti. 45a6-46c6 above with 46e8-47b5,294 and importantly, by omitting 
Plato’s metaphysics wherein Plato does make an explicit contrast, moves the latter’s 
attention away from the world of change (which is undoubtedly affirmed by him to 
be the object of his inquiry) to that of eternal Realities, wherein lie the objects, 
properly speaking, of philosophy. The contrast, however, which follows in the 
passage subsequent to Ti. 45a6-46c6, namely, 46c7-46e6, is not, as suggested by 
Cornford, between the means and the end, i.e. between the mechanism of vision and 
its purpose, but rather, as argued above, between the secondary or assistant causes 
and the Primary  cause(^).^^^ In other words, the contrast which Plato draws is 
between the secondary or assistant causes (those that operate through bodies) and the 
Primary Cause(s) or those of a rational nature. What is at issue here is not what Plato 
held to be more important, for there is no doubt as to the importance he placed on the 
purpose of vision or any other aspect of physical world, his complaint of 
A n a x a g 0 1 - a ~ ~ ~ ~  in the Phaedo confirming his desire to properly understanding the 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Plato eschews the contrast suggested by Cornford when he writes: “As far as the eyes are 
concerned, we have said enough about the accessory causes” (Ti. 46e6-7). 
For a full discussion of these Causes, see 8 1.2.3, Part I of this thesis. In other words, the contrast 
which Plato draws is between the Secondary or Assistant Causes (those that operate through bodies) 
and the Primary Causes or those of a rational nature. 
See 82.3.5.1, Part I on Anaxagoras. Plato’s basic complaint in the Phaedo (97c-99c) is that 
Anaxagoras fails to recognise the power of Nous beyond the strictly physical or that of mechanical 
agent. It is important to Plato that the basis of order in the natural world be properly understood as 
resulting from the metaphysical power of Nous, which is as an ordering that takes place first at the 
level of Mind. All physical power and its ordering, in the form of mechanical agents and processes, 
are not directly attributable to Nous, but, rather, are a consequence of this metaphysical or noetic 
ordering and hence, is secondary to it. Importantly, without this metaphysical ordering, there would 
be no physical order, but as to their sphere of existence, they are completely separate. Thus, 
Anaxagoras’s analysis is incomplete according to Plato rather than wrong, the essential separation of 
the metaphysical world from the physical having not been articulated. Thus, Plato’s focus remains at 
all times the proper understanding of the world and its processes, however complex their origin, but 





physical world and its many processes. Rather, what is central to this discussion and 
to every discussion in this work, is Plato’s reason for writing the Timaeus, which is 
to offer a description and understanding of the physical world-the objects, 
apparatus and phenomena which enable such purpose, and equally, the metaphysics 
behind the world, so as to gain an understanding of the source of its generation and 
support, and ultimately, the context of such purpose. It is significant that Plato’s 
inclusion of his “disquisition on optics,’’ under Cornford’s analysis, seems to 
Cornford to be intrusive, which intrusiveness he softens by making reference to the 
RepubZic and Plato’s interest in analogies between the bodily eye and the eye of the 
soul, and between the sunlight and the truth, when in fact, I suggest, it is Cornford’s 
analysis itself which is the cause of any apparent intrusi~eness.~~’ 
The above-noted conflation, however, and the errors which ensue from it, soon 
lead, by the shear weight of the omission of Plato’s full metaphysical infrastructure, 
to a more serious problem and hence, error, by Cornford, namely, that of his 
mistaking the assistance causes referred to above (the various and sundry bodily 
mechanisms) and as discussed at Ti. 46c7-46e6 in the Timaeus, with the works of 
Necessity (Ananke) at Ti. 5 2 d - 5 3 ~ . ~ ~ ~  Moreover, it is on the basis of this and similar 
errors, whereby Cornford is able to dismiss all notions of either a transcendent or 
immanent metaphysics for Plato, explaining away possible references to such 
meaning in terms of myth and metaphor,299 and thereafter relating what would have 
297 Cornford, PC, p. 156. 
See ibid., pp 157 and 209. 
Such references, both explicit and inferred, to myth, poetry and metaphor appear throughout 
298 
299 
Cornford’s Commentary, e.g. see PC, pp. ix, 29-31,40, 74, 173, 175-176,209 and 361. 
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been previously understood as metaphysical matters (e.g. the ‘Demiurge’, ‘Ananke’, 
the ‘soul’) almost exclusively, if not entirely, to the physical realm. 
First, Cornford does note briefly the distinction drawn by Plato between the 
secondary and primary causes, referring to them as “subsidiary causes’’ and “rational 
purpose,” respectively.300 However, he only admits to this distinction at Ti. 4 7 c k 2 ,  
while completely ignoring any prior reference within the passage at Ti. 46c7-46e6, 
and does not elaborate further, introducing this subsequent reference only as a link to 
the second part of the Timaeus where a discussion on Necessity subsequently 
follows. By omitting any discussion of the Primary Causes referred to earlier, i.e. 
T&S T ~ S  ~ ~ @ P O V O S  @~)GEWS ~ I T ~ C X S  n;phTa~ at Ti. 46d8 and Z& T ~ v  CX‘LT I~V 
y k q  at Ti. 46e3, where, notably, such causes are referred to in the plural, and by 
further minimising their importance by grouping them together and categorically 
describing them as “rational purpose” in the later reference at Ti. 47c4-e2, while 
offering no explanation for either their earlier dismissal within his discussion or the 
transformation of these Causes into ‘rational purpose’, Cornford fails to properly 
exegete the Primary Causes in these passages as they stand and as they are referred to 
by Plato. The consequence of this is that Cornford’s analysis in relationship to these 
Primary Causes, and what follows from this analysis, especially in what he says 
following upon his discussion of the secondary causes and ‘rational purpose’ 
regarding Necessity, while believable (if one does 
Cornford’s move) from the perspective of the terms 
and interesting, is not what Plato wrote, nor follows 
Cornford, PC, p. 159. 300 
not notice or simply accepts 
which Cornford does choose, 
from it, and is clearly wrong 
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when considering the Primary Causes as they are addressed in the text,30’ and is not 
arguable from it. 
As mentioned above, the more serious problem for Cornford is when he 
ultimately identifies the assistant causes explained at Ti. 46c7-46e6 in the Timaeus 
with the works of Ananke described at Ti. 52d-53q302 blurring by apposition 
(substituting one for the other without adequate explanation) any logical connection 
or need for such a connection. He achieves this end in a slow and methodical way, 
moving inevitably but erroneously to the above conclusion. Thus, following the 
translation of Plato’s discussion of Ananke at Ti. 47e-48e, Cornford repeats Plato’s 
suggestion that a study of the irrational factors is now in order and follows 
similarly.303 However, without explanation, Cornford’s next move is to declare that 
these “irrational factors” (i.e. the ‘works of necessity’) are “at once connected with 
Against this move, however, besides ‘the nature of fire and air, water and earth . 9 7,304 
not offering a rational basis for it, is Plato’s explanation in the above passage that 
what he is concerned with here is the true origin of such elements as opposed to an 
overall silence regarding their generation, wherein they are usually posited as first 
principles, but which he openly scorns as being an unacceptable assumption to even 
Thus, those of little intelligence - “elements (as it were, letters) of the universe. 9,305 
See my discussion beginning at Part I, 52.3 of this thesis. 
See Cornford, PC, pp. 157 and 209. 
Ibid., see pp. 161 and 199. 
Ti. 48b8: O T O L X E ~  was the regular Greek term for letters of the alphabet. Plato borrows this term 
in order to make a point. By using O T O L X E ’ ~  to describe the physical elements, he opposes the 
current uninvestigated understanding, chiding that it would not appear as a reasonable representation 
even to one of little intelligence, since for Plato such elements are neither first principles, nor are they 
of so little importance as to be described after the manner of mere syllables. By playing into the 
richness of the language here, Plato turns possible ambiguity to his full advantage. While he next 
specifically eschews any attempt in this investigation to get at the true nature of first causes, due both 
30 1 
302 




in introducing the Primary Causes, of which Ananke is one and NOGG or Mind, the 
other, the very last thing Plato is proposing is to connect these causes with ‘the 
nature’ of any of the elements, and to the contrary, his purpose was to oppose, 
strongly, such a view. 
2.3.5.6 
Thus, Cornford’s error lies in his ultimately identifying the assistant causes with 
Necessity (Ananke) and further, after abandoning the notion of ‘Necessity’ as a 
proper cause, identifying the assistant causes with the ‘works’ of Necessity. The root 
of Cornford’s error, I would argue, however, lies in his over-emphasis on the modem 
adjectival understanding of an English translation of & u & Y K ~ ,  namely, ‘necessary’, 
but which usage, in ancient Greek and specifically, in the Timaeus, is always 
rendered by the addition of the preposition of separation, Et, i.e. kc &u&YK~<.  As 
argued earlier in this thesis, Plato explicitly uses the substantive & V & Y K ~  in the 
Timaeus to depict the second of two primary causes, which causes, according to his 
theory, brought about the Cosmos. In doing so, Plato has borrowed a much earlier 
understanding of this compound word, which at that time would have had the 
meaning of ‘force’ or ‘might’. Moreover, this idea of at least two primary causes is 
repeatedly and consistently maintained throughout the text. Cornford, on the other 
hand, has ultimately only considered a much later development of this word in his 
commentary on the Timaeus and thus, eventually arrives at a misidentification of the 
The accessory causes and Ananke 
to the difficulties involved and his current manner of proceeding, it becomes quite apparent as his 
treatise unfolds that a more in depth understanding of the elements was within its scope. Thus, Plato 
very clearly and from the outset, separates first principals or causes from the elements or their natures. 
See also Taylor’s explanation in PT, pp. 306-308. 
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various movements of the elements with what he thinks Plato understood as 
7 306 ‘necessity . 
2.3.5.7 An Empedoclean approach - ‘necessity’ as chance. 
At first Comford does refer to ‘Necessity’ as a cause, but as he pursues his 
analysis and fails to gamer a satisfying explanation from Plato, it becomes clear that 
Comford wants to abandon this understanding in favour of a more tangible or 
specifically scientific interpretation. Thus, initially he examines Necessity and 
concludes that it is “the very antithesis of natural law,” finding accord and support in 
Grote’s view: 
‘This word (necessity)’ he wrote [Grote], ‘is now usually understood as 
denoting what is fixed, permanent, unalterable, knowable beforehand. In 
the Platonic Timaeus it means the very reverse: the indeterminate, the 
inconstant, the anomalous, that which can be neither understood nor 
predicted. It is Force, Movement, or Change, with the negative attribute 
of not being regular, or intelligible, or determined by any knowable 
antecedent or condition-vis consili expers’ (Plato, iii, ch. 36).307 
Just prior Comford has introduced Aristotle’s discussion of the Empedoclean 
understanding of ‘necessity’ with its meaning of random chance, contrasting this 
with the idea of final causation in nature. Cornford does this in order to support his 
view that Plato’s understanding of the term ‘necessity’ is of a lower kind of ordering 
in the form of the accessory causes or mechanical motion,308 which, in turn, is a 
This is not to say that Cornford did not choose this identification, perhaps knowing of the earlier 
Cornford, PC, pp. 17 1-1 72. 
Ibid., p. 172: “Here the lower type of causation, transmitting motion or change from one body to 
another, is, in the same breath, declared to proceed ‘of necessity’ and ‘at random and without order.” 
As I have argued with regard to Ti. 46e, Cornford, by conflating the playing field in this passage, 
requires an equally conflated explanation of two of its key players, namely, Ananke and the necessary 
causes, which results in a rather absurd hybrid or “man-faced ox-progeny” in the form of random, but 
necessary order. 
306 




further development of this idea of random chance 309 or in other words, of order, but 
bereft of the higher ordering of soul. Aristotle, Cornford argues, clearly understood 
‘necessity’ to mean random events, citing his quote of the Empedoclean theory of 
causation (which both Aristotle and Plato opposed), where the opponent argues that 
natural phenomena, e.g. “rain falling,” need not have an end or purpose, i.e. ‘so that 
corn may grow’, but may fall &c & U & Y K ~ G ,  “without purpose.’’ However, by 
introducing this argument, Cornford once again moves the discussion in a non- 
Platonic direction, focussing not on the substantive & u & Y K ~ ,  which for Plato was a 
primal disordering cause, but on the prepositional phrase kc & U & Y K ~ G ,  which 
phrase, when Plato does use it, is undoubtedly used in its everyday sense of 
‘necessarily’. Aristotle’s analysis here of hypothetical necessity stays clear of first 
causes, wherefore Plato had initially introduced the two primal causes, Nous and 
Ananke (Necessity). Equally, Plato’s introduction of & U & Y K ~  as a primary cause 
does not extend to his discussion of natural phenomena or ends within the Cosmos, 
which discussion occurs later on in his cosmology. With regard to these ends, 
moreover, Plato clearly acknowledges that they exist, both in the form of an 
overarching end (from which Ananke by definition is e~cluded) ,~” i.e. the good as 
exhibited in and extended by the Demiurge in the generation all things within an 
ordered universe3’ ’ and also in the ends which are manifest in every generated object 
in the form of purposive design.312 Plato’s fairly extensive use of the phrase &E 
~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
Arist. Phys. I1 8. 198b17. See Cornford, PC, pp. 165-166. 
Ti. 3 1 a8-b3. 
There are many instances of purposive design in the Timaeus. The ordering of the heavens is 
perhaps the best known, which by their ordering (i.e. of the heavenly bodies), ‘time’, generated as a 
consequence, becomes ‘a moving image of eternity’ (Ti. 37d5-7). Another equally important 
3 09 
310 Ti. 29e1-3. 
3 1 1  
3 12 
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&u&YK~< in the latter half of the Timaeus, however, when he is discussing the 
physical phenomena within the already generated Cosmos, is never used with the 
meaning of random chance, but always and invariably so, with the meaning of 
exigency, i.e. that something necessarily follows. Thus, Cornford’s introduction of 
Empedocles’s understanding of the phrase kt & u & Y K ~ <  has no direct bearing 
whatsoever with respect to clarification of the Platonic text, although this most 
certainly was his intention. Plato does not use the prepositional phrase kt & u & Y K ~ <  
when referring to the primary causal force of disorder or randomness, rather he uses 
the term & U & Y K ~  and when he does use the phrase kt & u & Y K ~ < ,  he uses it entirely 
in the modem sense of ‘necessity’, meaning ‘necessarily so’, and never with the 
meaning of random chance or disorder. 
Furthering this line of thought, Cornford’s next move is to introduce from Laws X 
Plato’s opposition to the early cosmogonies where it is thought that “Fire and water, 
earth and air ... all exist by nature and change, not by design,’’ in other words, exist 
Cornford’s purpose in 
introducing the passage is to highlight the existence of this earlier view, where 
‘necessity’ is not only connected with chance and change, but now also with nature. 
Although Plato does oppose the atheistic materialism of the early cosmologists in 
“by chance, of necessity’’ ( K ~ T &  Z ~ X ~ U  kt & u & Y K ~ < ) .  7 9 3  13 
example, showing a refinement of and interdependence between ends, is that of eyesight, where, at Ti. 
46e6-47~4, Plato describes our sight of the heavens as leading mankind to the derivation of numbers 
and from there, causing him to delve into the nature of the Universe and ultimately, to discover 
philosophy, the “greatest gift of the gods.” This same passage also shows a hierarchy between ends, 
where Plato eschews a discussion of lesser such ‘gifts’ as being for those not interested in philosophy, 
claiming philosophy to be the greatest good of eyesight: h k y o  6fi z06t0 oppdtzov pky~ozov 
kyaebv- zdcna 
o6upbpEvoG ciiv epqvoi pdtzqv. 
ijoa acj lzzo zi div ~pVoipEv, C U ’ ~  b pfi $ t h b o o ~ ~  zu+hoedtG 
Cornford, PC, p. 167, referring to Lg. 888e-890b. 313 
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Laws X, this is arguably a later work where his concern is not with the particulars of 
the cosmology itself, but with the implications which such views would have upon 
belief in the gods.314 The same objection would hold here, however, as it did for the 
Empedoclean distinction noted above, namely, that the prepositional phrase kc 
&u&YK I~~ ,  which occurs frequently in the Greek language and hence, in both Laws X 
and the Timaeus, is distinct from the substantive & U & Y K ~  as it is used in the 
Timaeus. Nevertheless, a point which Cornford repeatedly tries to convey, namely, 
the connection of ‘necessity’ with spontaneity, coincidence and chance as opposed to 
‘purpose’ and its further identification with chance as opposed to ‘design’ in Laws X, 
is correct, but only insofar as there is no degree of ordering present when these 
descriptive terms are used as synonyms for ‘necessity’. Ananke, as has been argued, 
is the exact opposite of Nous as a causal power, being degenerative and thus, 
disordering as distinct from generative or ordering. 
How Cornford consequently errs is twofold. First, in his understanding of 
from the Anstotelian passage noted above, although Cornford ‘chance 
distinguishes this idea from any kind of intentional ordering (or disordering), he does 
not distinguish it from the ideas of ‘ordering’ and ‘disordering’ themselves-it can 
,315 
be either, as long as it is unintentional. However, inasmuch as he fails to do this, his 
analogy misses the mark. All ordering is understood in the Timaeus as brought about 
by the desire or ‘will of the Demiurge (although the carrying out of this activity is ,316 
Laws X becomes relevant to this thesis, but not with regard to the prepositional phrase 
&V&YKYS, rather, with regard to references in Laws X to at least two souls, one beneficent and the 
other not. 
3 1 5  Cornford appears to group the ideas of ‘chance’, ‘spontaneity’ and ‘coincidence’ together, so as to 
mean the opposite of any kind of intention, rather than a lack of order or disorder per se. 
3 14 
See Part 11, 52.3.6.1 of this thesis concerning ‘will’. 316 
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allocated in part to the gods) and therefore, whenever order is present, so, too, is 
intention. All disorder (except re-generative disorder), on the other hand, is the work 
of Ananke (Necessity). Thus, most,3 l 7  if not all instances of spontaneity, coincidence 
and chance, which also involve ordering within the generated Cosmos, would 
categorically lie outside of Plato’s understanding of ‘necessity’ (ananke) no matter 
how they came 
The second way in which Cornford errs is by relegating all consequent 
‘disordering’ to mere chance phenomena within the Cosmos, whereby he then 
disregards Ananke as an independent causal force at the time of its generation. In 
rendering Ananke (‘necessity’) non-existent as an independent causal force, 
Cornford then identifies ‘necessity’ with the accessory causes. This move, however, 
as we shall soon see, is contrary to the text and does not hold up well upon scrutiny. 
When Plato does refer to disorder as remaining in the Cosmos after its generation 
this is acknowledged as being due to the fact that the Demiurge was not entirely able 
to appropriate (overtake) Ananke as a causal force during its generation. 
Consequently, whatever remains in the Cosmos which is degenerative or unordered 
marks the residual active presence of Ananke, having never been fully subdued. This 
317  At Tz. 69b6 Plato refers to things standing in no measurable relations “except by chance” ( h o v  
pfi ~ 6 x 9 )  prior to the organisation of the Cosmos by the Demiurge. However, all order, intentional 
or not, is closely associated by Plato with ‘nous’, being ultimately the source of all order (the result of 
which generates and sustains the Universe), whether wrought by chance or brought about through the 
noetic movements of the Demiurge and the gods, just as all disorder (re-generative disorder excluded) 
is formed by disassociation from nous, again, whether, wrought by chance or brought about through 
the disordering power of Ananke. See Ti. 29d7-c 1. Thus, although the reference to ‘chance’ above 
involves a pre-cosmic instance of ordering and accordingly, stands side by side with Ananke’s 
disordered Universe, this instance of order exists in spite of Ananke and not because of it. The notion 
of chance, therefore, refers exclusively to the absence of intention and not to the absence of nous. 
As I have argued separately in this thesis, the physical causes, the forces and processes within the 
Cosmos, lie outside the realm of the primal causes, whose movements are entirely noetic or anoetic, 
depending on which primal cause. 
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is not to say, however, that this marks Ananke’s on@ existence. The picture of 
Plato’s cosmology which Cornford presents is considerably less robust than that 
which the text presents, since as a causal force Ananke is at best explained only in 
terms of its residual effects, whereas Plato is most explicit in presenting both Nous 
and Ananke in the first instance as primal causal forces. At worst, Ananke is 
ultimately identified and espoused by Cornford as falling within the concept of the 
‘accessory cause’, which is simply wrong. 
2.3.5.8 Ananke understood as ‘phenomena’ 
Cornford moves ahead to this final position in stages, first, by abandoning the idea 
of Ananke as a primal causal force, second, by consequently concentrating 
exclusively on the usage of the prepositional phrase kc &u&YKT~<, third, by next 
appealing to an understanding of & U & Y K ~  in terms of this usage, whereby Ananke is 
explained initially in terms of spontaneity and change, being both irregular and 
~nintell igible,~’~ and finally, fourth, by interpreting Ananke or ‘necessity’ in terms of 
phenomena exhibiting or bringing about change within the generated Cosmos. 
Having already discussed the first two stages, I would like to address this third 
stage. While the text in the Timaeus presents Ananke as a primal mover or force, a 
cause operating without order, i.e. without ‘nous’ or intelligence, Cornford (in 
quoting Grote) alters the figure of Ananke substantially, changing it from an active 
agent outwith the Universe to a passive, abstract noun within it, whereby Ananke 
instantly becomes the collective term for the impotent observed facts of irregularity 
and confusion within the generated world, i.e. “the indeterminate, the inconstant, the 
Cornford, PC, p. 172. 319 
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This leaves, ,9320 anomalous, that which can be neither understood nor predicted. 
however, the possibility that Ananke could still operate intelligently (only without 
our understanding) and reasonably (i.e. accordingly to some scientific, but unknown 
law), and since not understood by us, not predictable. This possibility, I suggest, 
posed a problem for Cornford. Having already denied Ananke any sort of 
metaphysical status as a primary cause by not allowing it to have pre-existence as a 
force outwith the generated Cosmos, likely being too ‘religious’ or Christian in 
connotation for C ~ r n f o r d ~ ~  * and in further allocating all intelligence and 
understanding to Nous (or Reason in the universe personified) he consequently 
abandons this idea of Ananke as an abstract subject. What he consequently does is to 
then appropriate and further Grote’s understanding of ‘necessity’ even more, where 
the subject is now switched and it is man who does not understand ananke or is able 
to predict its actions. For Cornford this allows ‘ananke’ to become an object of 
inquiry, and veers far enough away from the notion of a mysterious, forceful subject, 
320 Cornford, PC, p. 172. 
Ibid., see pp. v, ix, 35-37 and 163-164. Cornford, from the very first page of the ‘Preface’ to his 
commentary, sets out that it is his intention to discuss “each problem of interpretation,” which arises 
in his (or any) translation of the Timaeus. One such problem, however, which becomes a mainstay of 
Cornford’s criticism, is what he describes as the “risk of falsifying the sense, especially by misleading 
reminiscences of the English Bible.” What Cornford fails to discern, however, is that to remove such 
reminiscences simply because they are reminiscences is to risk equally falsifying the passages at hand. 
Thus, in his eagerness to cut out all similarities between Plato and Christian thought, he subsequently 
fails to allow room for any similarity and in so doing, distorts the text according to a new bias, a 
markedly non-Christian one. Thus, at page ix of the ‘Preface’ one finds Cornford decrying the 
postulated conclusion (of a hypothesised Christian no doubt) that “Plato (or Timaeus ?) is at heart a 
monotheist and not far from being a Christian.” This translates into an exaggerated response by 
Cornford as he writes his commentary, so that wherever potential similarities arise in the text he must 
cut them out with razor-sharp efficiency and insert an equally ‘pagan’ or alternatively, preferred 
modem scientific reading of the passage to hand. On balance, this is not good historiography, merely 
pointing to Cornford’s impatience with Christianity specifically and to religious interpretation 
generally, although as I have pointed out, he will concede to a pagan reading, as long as there are no 
similarities to Christianity. This unfortunately is a weakness in Cornford’s methodology in his 
commentary on the Timaeus and must be kept in mind if the reader is to distance oneself from this 
unabashedly studied bias. 
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an irrational position with which Cornford has already expressed discomfort and 
rejected as Christian conjuring, to become broachable within the comfortable context 
of natural phenomena. However, in doing this, Cornford winds up almost where he 
begins, i.e. with ‘necessity’ still possessing possible intelligence and remaining a 
force capable of acting independently, thus leaving in its wake this unintended and 
undesirable consequence, which, at very bottom, is a position which Cornford would 
clearly deny, since ‘necessity’ for him is both irrational and powerless, and better 
explained by natural science, a position which he also sees Plato as sharing. The 
solution to this apparent conundrum, however, finds closure in Cornford’s fourth and 
final move, which is to have ‘necessity’ redrawn as the ‘works’ of necessity, where 
the meaning of ‘necessity’ has now become an abstraction exacted from an analysis 
of the prepositional phrase kc & U & Y I C ~ <  (not from the substantive & U & Y I C ~  as used 
in the Timaeus) and then to identify these ‘works’ with the o ~ a h a ,  which Plato 
has argued are only accessory and not true causes. Thus, the metaphysical has 
become the physical and ‘necessity’ has become the equivalent of mechanical 
motion.322 
By introducing hstotle’s analysis of the Empedoclean understanding of &E 
& u & Y K ~ < ,  the idea of necessity for Cornford becomes irreversibly and intrinsically 
linked with the abstract notions of spontaneity, coincidence and chance, not the 
singular metaphysical or primal causal force first introduced in the Timaeus and 
contrasted with Nous at Ti. 47e5. Thus, following on from the line of thought 
introduced by Aristotle, Cornford describes “ ‘a necessary’ result” as that which 
Cornford, PC., p. 54; also see p. 164. 322 
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comes about by causes that cannot act otherwise than they do and are not directed by 
purpose.323 In quoting Socrates at PhZb. 28d, Cornford cites Socrates, who asks: 
“Which are we to say, Protarchus-that everything, this ‘whole’ as we call it, is at 
the disposal of a force that works without plan, at random, and just as it may chance, 
or on the contrary . . . that it is an ordered system, guided by some admirable reason 
or intelligence?” At this point ‘necessity’ for Cornford is still linked to the idea of a 
causal force, but only just, for in quoting a similar passage immediately after from 
the Sophist, a second alternative to “admirable reason or intelligence,” i.e. divine 
craftsmanship, is then offered in place of the above-quoted “force that works without 
a plan,” namely, a spontaneous cause within Nature (“@~oL<”) that generates things 
without intelligence (Sph.. 265c).324 It is this latter alternative, “a spontaneous power 
of generation” from the Sophist,325 supported by the passage from Aristotle (Ph. B, 
viii, 198b) and not the “force that works without plan,” which Cornford will hereon 
in begin to identify as ‘necessity’ and contrast with design. Thus, by a literary slight- 
of-hand, Cornford has placed two alternative notions side by side, and through the 
literary device of apposition,326 chooses the second. Thus, offering no reason for this 
choice, he simply appends it as the appropriate meaning for an altogether different 
Cornford, PC., p. 166. 323 
324 Ibid., p. 167. 
325 Ibid. 
‘Apposition’ is a literary device whereby a thing or person is more fully identified by a phrase, 
usually a noun phrase, being placed alongside it. The object so qualified is capable of being replaced 
by or identified with the descriptive with no further explanation expected or required, (e.g. “that man, 
the coward”), as the truth is generally assumed. This is a powerful, although easily abused device, 
better suited to poetry or drama than philosophy. Well-known examples are found in the Psalms and 
the Song of Solomon of the English Bible, but are also found in it elsewhere, e.g. “He raises up the 
poor from the dust; he lifts the needy from the ash heap” (I Sam. 2.8). The poetical breadth and 
inherent richness of such passages are not permitted by the philosopher, who is expected to mine each 
nugget and exact a pure meaning or alternatively, to substantiate the meaning of any second phrase so 
appropriated by careful analysis. 
326 
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work, namely, the Timaeus. Moreover, after adopting the meaning of ‘necessity’ for 
the Timaeus from the Sophist, Cornford then refines this borrowed meaning by 
opposing a “vaguely personified ‘Nature , ascribed in the Sophist and the Physics 
to this ‘spontaneous power of generation’. In this way, not satisfied with simply 
abandoning the meaning of Ananke from the Timaeus and appropriating a meaning 
from elsewhere, Cornford must duly edit this meaning as well, excising again all 
metaphysical content. However, there is little philosophical basis or argument, and 
none given, for choosing this second alternative as an understanding of Ananke in 
the Timaeus. 
7 7,327 
Forming part of the progressive movement of his suggested ‘fourth stage’, 
Cornford next identifies the above-noted ‘spontaneous power of generation’ with 
“their several powers (active properties, ~uv&~&os ) . ”  Quoting Plato’s summary of 
the atheistic materialism which is being opposed in Laws X (888e-89Ob)’ the 
inanimate elements, fire, water, earth and air, are described as moving “by the 
It is with these powers moving by chance that chance of their several powers. 
Cornford now attempts to identify ‘necessity’. There are, however, two problems 
with this. Firstly, as pointed out earlier and as again substantiated by his explanation 
of the phrase ‘by chance, of necessity’ Z ~ X T V  kc & u & Y K ~ s ) ~ ~ ~  in the above 
passage, Cornford’s understanding is based on an analysis of the common 
prepositional phrase kc & V & Y K ~ S  and not the substantive &V&YKT, both of which 
are found in the Timaeus and are clearly distinguishable. Secondly, Cornford makes 
9,328 
327 Cornford, PC, p. 167. 
329 Ibid. 
The italics are Cornford’s. 328 
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no attempt at clarifyng what is meant later on in this passage by a further phrase 
describing these elements and the actions of their several powers moving by chance, 
“fit together with some sort of affinity-hot with cold.. .and in other mixtures which 
arise,”330 but simply glosses over it. Plato, however, was disturbed with this as an 
explanation, as he would certainly be now with Cornford’s acceptance of it in like 
terms. The third problem, however, which stems from errors in both method and 
logic, leads quickly to a fatally flawed conclusion and culminates in Cornford’s 
fourth and final move. 
First, by Cornford taking up the ideas associated with atheistic materialism from 
Laws X, clearly rejected by Plato, where the ~ V V & ~ E I <  or ‘active powers’ within the 
four elements bring about ‘by chance’ the existence of the heavens, the sun, moon, 
stars and earth,331 and then applying this whole interpretation, that is in its broadest 
sense involving motions and not simply borrowing the idea of ‘chance’, to Plato’s 
understanding of Necessity in the T i r n a e ~ s , ~ ~ ~  Cornford errs seriously in method if 
what is hoped for is an accurate vision and honest interpretation of how Plato 
understood ‘Ananke’ in the Timaeus. Plato rejected this move outright by rejecting 
the whole atheistic materialist agenda-‘soul’ is more than just some innate earthly 
power in Laws X. Whereas Ananke, as has been previously argued in this thesis, is 
understood by Plato as a negative metaphysical force in the Timaeus, this idea is no 
330 Cornford, PC, p. 169. 
Cornford attempts to give credibility to this position earlier when he introduces Aristotle’s 
summary of the Empedoclean objection to Plato’s position. Although a slightly different argument 
concerning ends (the Humean-like causal idea of no ends as distinct from the idea of natural ends put 
forward here), it nonetheless supports the latter by also rejecting the metaphysical idea of ‘the good’ 
as an end and thus appears as a natural progression of thought, representing the earlier stage, moving 
from the pre-scientific to the scientific, and always with any metaphysical implication carefully rooted 
out. 
332 Ibid., pp. 167-1 68. 
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longer relevant in Laws X and is consequently replaced by the notion of a non- 
benevolent s~ul(s)~~~-making it blatantly false, although respectable as a 
contemporary explanation, for the materialistic position engineered by Cornford to 
represent the metaphysical position persistently held by Plato regarding negative 
causal powers and causality generally. Whatever Plato may have thought in Laws X 
concerning kc &U&YK?~G (he does not introduce the substantive &v&YK?~ outside of 
the Timaeus and he does not discuss this prepositional phrase), if the discussion is to 
have any bearing on the Timaeus, it must be subject in the first instance to what Plato 
thought about & U & Y K ~  in the Timaeus, and not be made simply to replace it. This 
amounts to bad scholarship, not just poor method. 
At this juncture, in drawing together the final pieces of his above-noted 
interpretation of ‘necessity’, Cornford drops all references to Plato and concentrates 
solely on the “atheistic materialism” (which Plato has clearly rejected), taking 
Cornford through to the end of his discussion on ‘Reason and Necessity’, moving all 
the while in concentrically smaller circles and ending with what can best be 
described as an approximation of a cross between the pantheism of Aristotle and an 
early animism, where nature is ‘alive’ and Reason is ‘deified’.334 It is worth quoting 
Cornford in full as he begins his closing argument concerning Necessity: 
In this passage of the Laws, as in the Physics, we find necessity linked 
with chance, while law ( u O ~ O ~ )  and order are connected with design. 
Chance and necessity, moreover, are associated with ‘Nature’, which is 
credited by the materialist with some spontaneous power of generation. 
This idea has survived from the earliest cosmologies, which had 
conceived the primary element or ‘nature of things’ as living. In 
See Part I1 of this thesis on Laws X. 
Cornford, PC, pp. 168-177. Only at the very end does Cornford again refer to Plato, introducing 
333 
334 
yet another character in his place to provide interpretation, Thucydides. 
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consequence, the first physical philosophers had felt no difficulty about 
an original cause of motion. The divine and immortal substance of the 
world moved and gave birth to individual things, because it was alive. It 
was only later that this substance came to be reduced to the level of the 
bodily, which needs some external force to move it about. At this stage 
separate moving powers emerged : the Mind of Anaxagoras, the Love 
and Strife of Empedocles. These forces, however, remained part of 
Nature; they were not what we should call immaterial, but were extended 
in space. They retained that power of self-motion which had originally 
resided in the primary substance; but their motion was not directed by 
purpose towards any ideal of perfection in an ordered world. Even 
Anaxagoras’ Mind, in spite of its name, had not been represented as 
working with conscious design for any good end, but only as giving the 
first impulse of mechanical motion to the revolution, or cosmic eddy, in 
which the world takes shape. 
In the last of these physical systems, the atomism of Leucippus and 
Democritus, the cause of motion seems to have entirely disappeared.335 
There are several points from this passage which require addressing. First, a 
material “substance” as it is articulated above is foreign to Plato’s thought in the 
Timaeus. In this work Plato was primarily concerned with investigating the being of 
things from the standpoint of their intelligibility and for him there was no other focus 
meriting investigation. He traces this intelligibility, first, from the object to the 
ultimate maker of things, the Demiurge, then to goodness, to Nous, to intelligibility 
itself, and finally to the individual Forms, the abiding universal and only constant of 
all things, thereby tracing intelligibility from what is fleeting to what is ideal. With 
regard to the latter, contrary to what Cornford states above about ‘substance’, these 
Forms do not extend into space, such placement being reserved exclusively for the 
copies of the Forms, understood by Plato as the ever-changing and transient objects 
of becoming. Further, the copies themselves, although composed of the same 
elements noted by Cornford, are nonetheless 
basic triangles and have little in common with 1 
constructed from an arrangement of 
the above idea of ‘substance’. Again, 
Cornford, PC, pp. 167-168. 335 
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contrary to the above, Plato does not talk of these triangles as ever being ‘alive’ on 
their own account or self-moving. Rather, they were brought into proportion by the 
Demiurge by means of forms and numbers,336 with their movement maintained by a 
certain disequilibrium existing between them and also by the forces extant in the 
Cosmos.337 Prior to this, the movement of the simple triangles and elemental 
‘qualities’ were maintained by the general disequilibrium existing within the 
unordered universe. These triangles, therefore, were never immortal or divine, but 
were generated into more refined shapes and thus, had a beginning (as did the 
Cosmos), kept in motion by the interplay of their various constructions, assisted by 
the physical conditions in which they found themselves and the powers to which they 
were subject. 
Secondly, nor would Comford, when speaking of “primary substance” as it “came 
to be reduced to the level of the bodily,” be correct if he had in mind the idea of an 
underlying substance qualified by accidental properties, akin to hstotle’s idea of 
336 Ti. 53a7-b5. 
Ti. 57d7-58al. For Plato, motion can never take place in conditions of uniformity, motion and 
equilibrium always being disassociated. According to his theory of motion outlined in the Timaeus 
the Nurse of Becoming, before the generation of the Cosmos by the Demiurge, although characterised 
by the qualities of the various elements, had no homogeneity or balance of the forces within it, this 
disequilibrium taking the form of constant movement and separation of its contents. Plato’s 
understanding of movement in the Cosmos after its generation by the Demiurge builds on to this same 
idea, but with various dissimilar groupings of order or homogeneity, in the form of the various 
elements, now added. Thus, the groupings of triangles forming the four elements, being dissimilar 
and assisted by the constant shaking of the Cosmos, change places with one another (except for earth), 
changing also in shape and size. The element with the fewest faces (fire) is the most mobile, the 
lightest, the sharpest and the most penetrating, while that with the most faces (earth) can only wait to 
regroup with its own kind upon dissolution, being incapable of penetration or exchange with the other 
elements. When enough similar elemental shapes meet up, the separate elements are then carried by 
the various motions to their respective regions in the Cosmos (according to their size and weight). 
This separation is never permanent, however, due to their constant interaction with the other elemental 
shapes at their perimeter (hemmed in by the sphere of the heavens within which they form a 
continuum, there being no void) and the overall shaking motion of the Cosmos. The consequence is 
that there is a continuous, unending source of motion throughout the extent and breadth of the 
Cosmos, which takes place. 
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the individual, i.e. an individual ‘this’ consisting in the unity of its matter and form, 
since this idea is also foreign to Plato’s account. Plato explicitly denies stability to 
objects of becoming when he writes: 
Whenever we see anything in process of change, for example fire, we 
should speak of it not as being a thing but as having a quality; water, 
again we should speak of not as a thing but as having a quality. And in 
general we should never speak as if any of the things we suppose we can 
indicate by pointing and using the expressions ‘this thing’ or ‘that thing’ 
have any permanent reality: for they have no stability and elude the 
designation ‘ this’ or ‘that’ or any other that expresses permanence. ... 
We should only use the expression ‘this thing’ or ‘that thing’ when 
speaking of that in which this process [of change] takes place and in 
which these qualities appear for a time and then vanish; we should never 
apply them to any quality, to hot or cold, for example, or any other 
contraries, or to any derivation of them.338 
Thus, clearly, Cornford did not consider the resultant problems in suggesting the idea 
of “divine and immortal substance” to Plato, particularly as this conflicts with his 
explicit denial of material substance ever being “alive,” but also with regard to his 
denial above of the existence of “individual things,” having granted this existence 
only to the Nurse of Becoming, the voidless ‘space’ in which the process of 
becoming takes place. 
Thirdly, the very problem which Plato had with respect to Anaxagoras’s 
understanding of Mind was that this ‘separate moving power’ remained in Nature. 
Thus, this aspect was precisely what Plato did not wish to embrace and yet this is 
what Cornford appears to want to recoup in his For Plato, the two 
primary moving powers or causes exist outside of the generated Cosmos, being 
logically prior. Cornford, however, as he continues with his historical scheme, picks 
up on a relatively new notion of separate moving powers, which are extended in 
Ti. 49d3-50a4; see Lee, p.68. 




space and are self-moving, and reminds the reader of their original locus, that is, of 
their residing in primary substance, which is ultimately a view he infers to share with 
h s t o t l e  and on which his understanding of ‘necessity’ in the Timaeus ultimately 
comes to rest.340 
Finally, Cornford expresses the complaint (PC, p. 168) that in the last of the 
physical systems, culminating with Leucippus and Democritus, the cause of motion 
seems to have entirely disappeared. Plato also complains (Laws X, 888e-890b), but 
again, we find Cornford siding with Aristotle, not with Plato, and consequently 
appropriating Aristotle’s solution and understanding, not Plato’s. As already 
outlined and argued in this thesis, Plato shared many ideas with the atomists, but, like 
Aristotle,341 was dissatisfied with the idea of motion being left without a cause. This 
is where Plato radically departs from Aristotle’s position (and ultimately, from 
Comford’s), however. Aristotle was dissatisfied with the notion that the only 
principle left governing the motions of these particles or atoms by the Atomists was 
the unanalysed axiom of the tendency of like coming together with like, and in this 
case, of atoms coming together in the vortices. As a bare, unexplained fact it was not 
acceptable as an explanation. Cornford, carrying on from Aristotle, states that this 
principle is still found “as an ultimate unexplained assumption, at work in the chaos 
This, however, is a gross over-simplification of Plato’s position, of the Timaeus. 
for although Plato does give voice to the position of like coming together with 
,3342 
340 How exactly separate moving powers can be extended in space is problematic, but is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
Aristotle, Physics, B, 4, 196a, 25. 




like,343 as does modem science344 (but with its own explanations), he goes into 
considerable detail providing a possible explanation for this occurrence.345 
,346 2.3.5.9 Ananke, ‘chance movement restrained 
It is precisely at this point in Cornford’s historical survey that he slips into the 
position of explaining ‘necessity’ (Ananke) as though it were chance movement 
which has been retrained or in Platonic terns, as an ‘accessory cause’: 
From another point of view the result may be called necessary, in the 
sense that every motion takes place ‘under constraint’ (h’ &U&YIC~Q of 
some previous motion : an atom receives a shock and blindly passes on. 
But the ancients had not discovered the laws of motion : to say that a 
movement happens ‘by constraint’ is not to say that it conforms to any 
law. Necessity, in fact, did not carry with it the associations of law and 
order, at any rate in the earlier phases of a t ~ m i s m . ~ ~ ’  
This final move, however, when considering the accessory causes as Plato presents 
them, apart from all earlier suggested errors in method by Cornford in relation to 
Ananke (‘Necessity’/‘necessity’), presents in itself an extravagant error of logic.348 
Still, ignoring the underlying logic of his argument concerning the identity of 
Ananke with the accessory causes and wishing to strengthen his position further, 
Cornford introduces yet another player, Thucydides, who “believed in Fortune, 
defined as ‘a non-natural agency which breaks in, as it were, fkom outside and diverts 
Ti. 53a4-6. 
It is interesting to note that Cornford appears to associate a ‘scientific’ conception of the world 
343 
344 
with that of a “strictly mechanical” one. See Cornford, PC, p. 170. 
345 Ti. 55d6-58~4. 
346 In Cornford’s explanation of the Empedoclean idea of ‘necessity’, necessity becomes associated 
with ‘spontaneity’, ‘coincidence’ and ‘chance’, closely linked in meaning and all three opposed to 
purpose. See Cornford, PC, p. 166. 
347 Ibid., p. 169. 
See 52.3.5.1 1, Part I. 348 
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the current of events, without itself being a part of the series or an effect determined 
,9349 by an antecedent member of it [sic]. 
2.3.5.9.1 Thucydides 
Comparing this fifth-century historian with Plato, Comford finds a certain 
analogy between the two. “Thucydides sees the field of human action divided 
between human foresight and chance; Plato sees the world of physical events divided 
between divine purpose and chance associated with necessity. Although there are 
some grounds for comparison, the idea of ‘chance’ as presented by Comford and as 
then developed and associated with the idea of ‘necessity’ understood from the 
perspective of the common prepositional phrase kc & u & Y K ~ ~ ,  albeit in its larger 
historical framework, is a separate consideration from the idea of ‘Ananke’ as 
introduced in the Timaeus. In this work, Ananke, as a substantive, is presented in the 
first place as the second of two Primary Causes, existing as a force of disorder 
outside of the generated Cosmos and therefore, outside the realm of either ‘the field 
of human action’ or ‘the world of physical events’, existing secondarily, however, as 
residual disorder or arguably, the Non-beneficent Soul, in both realms.351 As regards 
function, ‘Ananke’ for Plato was the antithesis of NO US,^^^ the ordering cause, with 
the meaning of ‘chance’ only adding a possible krther descriptive to this notion as 
7,350 
Cornford, PC, p. 170. 
Ibid., p. 171. 
349 
350 
3 5 1  See the relevant sections of this thesis regarding the ways in which Ananke permeates the 
generated world, either as a remnant of disorder remaining in the generated Cosmos or arguably, in its 
re-emergence into the world as the ‘Non-beneficent soul’ (for this, see Part I1 on Laws x). 
Ananke, as the antithesis of the ordering power of Nous, is, I suggest, a much larger concept than 
simply “the very antithesis of Natural Law” (Cornford, PC, p. 171), being the second of two causal 
forces which existed before the cosmos or natural world was even generated, wherein Natural Law 
was later seen to be at work. 
352 
179 
long as it did not involve intentional order, but only chance order, and was not its 
sole meaning. 
2.3.5.10 
Cornford now drops his discussion of ‘necessity’ as associated with ‘chance’, and 
moves again to Plato’s description of the secondary causes. As argued previously, 
however, Cornford conflates what Plato states in the Timaeus concerning the 
mechanical processes of eyesight (Plato having completed that discussion) with 
subsequent passages which immediately follow regarding both true causes and 
accessory causes. Thus, whereas Plato now clearly distinguishes between two kinds 
of causes, those that are causative in a primary metaphysical sense and those which 
have no power of their own, but only participate in a process, Cornford now 
mistakenly identifies the ‘two’ of the “both kinds of cause as representing firstly, 
the Demiurge, standing for ‘Nous’ or Reason and secondly, the accessory causes, 
leaving out the notion of ‘Necessity’ altogether. As a consequence, however, and 
one which complicates matters still further, because Cornford does take seriously the 
discussion by Plato involving ‘Ananke’, he develops an explanation (discussed at 
length above) whereby ‘necessity’ is now to be understood as representing in a 
general sense the ‘accessory causes’. 
Ananke identified with the accessory causes 
”353 
Because of this confusion, Cornford’s remaining discussion becomes quite 
inflated and to some extent even ‘mysterious’, where he must end his explanation by 
trying to answer a large cortege of questions his conclusion now raises. 354 In 
See Cornford’s translation, PC, p. 157. 353 
354 Ibid., p. 173. 
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summing up this conclusion, Cornford, as before, now turns to Aristotle355 and 
distinguishes two kinds of necessity, ( 1) the necessity which Aristotle calls 
‘hypothetical necessity’ or the indispensable means to an end, e.g. food in relation to 
life (although it is not necessary that we should live) in contrast to ‘absolute 
necessity’, and (2) the necessity residing in the properties themselves and governing 
their action (a quite different notion of necessity from the notion of ‘chance’ which 
Cornford has argued for above). However, rather suddenly and hence, oddly, 
Cornford attempts to explain this second notion of necessity in terms of Plato’s 
7 356 ‘wandering cause , stating that although fire acts by constraint of its nature, e.g. it 
has the characteristic power of burning heat, “the fire is indifferent to my purpose 
and has none of its own.” He then qualifies this necessity and further states that one 
can direct it to a “foreseen and purposed end” (e.g. to a griddle or chimney).357 He 
then ties this second type of extended necessity (extended as it relates to the 
wandering cause, e.g. necessity as ‘fire’, when subdued by the persuasion of Reason, 
becomes extended, e.g. a ‘hot griddle’) directly to Plato by referring to the Phaedo 
and Socrates’s reference to ‘that without which the cause would not be a cause’. 
Cornford then makes the further claim that Socrates’s regret in the Phaedo that this 
distinction of causes should be applied to the explanation of the world as a whole, 
but which he himself was unable to attempt, is now taken up by Plato in the Timaeus. 
In making this final claim, Cornford ties the hypothetical necessity of the Phaedo, 
with its explanation by hs to t l e ,  to his explication of the prepositional phrase kc 
Aristotle, Metuph. A 5 (“where the various meanings of ‘necessity’ are distinguished,” Cornford, 
Cornford, PC, p. 174. 
3 j j  
PC, p. 174). 
356 
357 This example is my own, not Cornford’s. 
181 
&u&YK?~< from the Timaeus (and other sources), depending for its overall 
consistency on numerous errors of method along the way. He then sums up his 
conclusion, stating: 
And here in fact we find him [Plato] speaking of the Demiurge as making 
use of the lower kind of causes as auxiliaries (ouuaiza~) or subordinate 
instruments in his work of producing the best results possible (e.g. at 
46c) .358 
Thus, although ingenious, in some respects, in the sheer effort which has been taken 
to arrive at this conclusion, the truism that it takes just as much genius to be wrong as 
right, if that type of intelligence is at the helm, holds for this extended argument, 
where Necessity in the Timaeus is identified by Cornford with the accessory causes. 
Too many errors in method have occurred and the underlying logic has been ignored. 
2.3.5.11 A fatally flawed conclusion 
There remains, therefore, one more aspect to be discussed in Cornford’s 
argument, concerning what I have already labelled as his ‘fatally flawed conclusion’ 
and that is his error in logic resulting in an unsound argument. While it can be 
argued that Cornford’s premises may indeed be false, e.g. his method badly flawed, it 
can still be claimed that his conclusion is still nonetheless true, based on other 
assumptions or perhaps on a broadly-based inductive argument. However, 
Cornford’s conclusion, equating ‘necessity’ with the secondary causes, when 
compared to the actual claims Plato made in the Timaeus regarding Ananke and the 
accessory causes (outlined above), has absolutely no basis in fact and therefore is 
false, creating an unsound argument which must be wholly rejected. 
358 Cornford, PC, p. 175. 
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In order to put forth this position, however, a number of key facts must first be 
assumed. One, it must be admitted that Plato did in fact have something to say 
concerning the substantive & U & Y K ~  (‘ Ananke’), either directly or indirectly, beyond 
its appearance and use within the common prepositional phrase &k &U&YKTS; two, 
that what he had to say concerning Ananke was of a metaphysical nature and not a 
physical nature; three, that his discussion of the accessory causes had nothing to do 
with the first two, namely, the substantive ‘Ananke’ or metaphysics generally; 
further, four, that Plato admitted to there being true causes and adjoins ‘Nous’ 
(identified with the Demiurge) and ‘Ananke’ as being the only true causes in the 
generation of the Cosmos, both infinite and capable of directing movement within 
the cosmos, and finally, five, and conversely, that the accessory causes are decried by 
Plato as being in any way whatsoever true causes in themselves. Rather, they are 
assistant to the true generative causes, having no power of their own and existing 
finitely in time after the generation of the Cosmos. Admitting to any one of these 
facts, and I hold they all are true, makes it impossible to logically maintain 
Cornford’s final position, namely, that ‘necessity’ and the accessory causes are one 
and the same thing. Admitting to all of these facts, however, as my argument does, 
presents not only a valid argument concerning Ananke, but also, I would like to 
suggest, a sound one. It is, moreover, an argument in which Plato’s claims are 
considered in the first instance and their textual integrity in the second, whilst 
historical interpretation and scientific re-interpretation are granted input only 
latterly,359 given that the initial two first-order considerations provide the requisite 
359 In other words, to later place the argument within its historical setting as an argument. 
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congruity and clarity in themselves to put forth a sound argument and robust 
position . 
With regard to the first two premises, namely, that Plato did speak to the subject 
of the substantive ‘Ananke’, distinctly and separately from its use within the 
common prepositional phrase kc & u & Y K ~ <  and that a distinctly metaphysical nature 
was accorded it, have already been argued for extensively and consequently averred 
within this thesis in Chapter 1 of this Part, beginning at 51.3.1, which chapter 
formally addresses that part of the Timaeus pertaining to Ti. 47e3 to 47d6. That 
Plato did speak to the general fact of Ananke, however, is not disputed by Cornford, 
at least in its mythic form, and is reflected in how Cornford sets up his commentary, 
heading his chapter on this subject as ‘Reason and What is disputed 
are the terms in which he wishes to interpret ‘necessity’, giving heavy weight for 
interpretation to several non-textual sources, including later arguments by Aristotle, 
philosophical insight from the fifth-century historical writings of Thucydides, as well 
as earlier arguments by Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Leucippus and Democritus, but 
settling for the most part on an extraordinary identity with the above-noted 
prepositional phrase, whilst ignoring the details of the text itself, where, paired with 
Nous, one is most apt to find the proper identity and meaning of & V & Y I C ~ . ~ ~  
With regard to premise three, namely, that Plato’s discussion of the accessory 
causes had nothing to do with the substantive ‘Ananke’ or anything of a 
metaphysical nature, this at first glance would appear to be exactly what Cornford is 
Cornford, PC, pp 159-176. 




maintaining. However, Cornford only achieves this by denying, either by omission 
or directly, all substantive and pre-cosmic existence to ‘necessity’ which would point 
to a metaphysical interpretation, of further interpreting ‘necessity’ in terms of the 
prepositional phrase &E &v&YIc?~< and then, but only then, by equating the accessory 
causes with all actions which happen ‘of necessity’. Thus, by solely interpreting 
‘necessity’ in descriptive terms as a modifier and by stressing the link which this 
modifier has, i.e. the necessary links of process, to movement and change, with 
further momentum given to an historical understanding of chance in relation to 
change, Cornford effectively not only removes both Ananke and the metaphysical 
from his discussion of the accessory causes, but also effectively removes these from 
the discussion altogether. On the contrary, however, the position which Plato 
articulates in the text and which I argue is to be taken at face value, is a position 
whereby Plato claims unequivocally that the Cosmos had a beginning, had a Maker, 
was generated and was subject to two primal causes in its generation, one being 
‘Nous’, the orderly and ultimately more powerful cause referred to as the ‘Demiurge’ 
and the other, ‘Ananke’, the disorderly and given the Cosmos, less powerful cause, 
referred to as the ‘Errant’ or ‘Wandering Cause’. Although Plato does not have all 
the scientific answers to his cosmology in place, indeed, there are huge anomalies 
which Plato simply does not address, to dismiss his explanation as myth and its key 
players as elements within an already generated cosmos, i.e. Reason and necessity as 
they exist within the cosmos, is a far more fantastical stance from a scholarly point of 
view, given that this is, at best, a modem version of the very view which Plato 
adamantly denies to be the case, not only in the Timaeus, but also in the Laws. 
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Although one may be uncomfortable with the metaphysics which Plato’s cosmology 
embraces and the dualism it appears to advocate, to remove this discomfort by 
simply denying the metaphysics, as Cornford has done, creates not only new 
problems, but the making of a completely false and unsound argument to replace 
them. 
The fourth premise which I argue must be assumed, namely, that Plato admits that 
there are trues causes and adjoins Nous and Ananke as being the only such causes in 
the generation of the Cosmos, being both infinite and capable of directing movement 
themselves, is taken up by Cornford as mythic objects requiring causal re- 
interpretation and which are then quickly subsumed by him under a theory he posits 
of nature being ‘alive’ and of innate powers being extant within it.362 However, what 
rings true for the first three premises also rings true with the generative causes. They 
cannot simply be dismissed or subsumed under another guise without leaving that 
part of Plato’s cosmology largely unexplained or blatantly wrongly explained. In 
positing the idea of innate powers within nature and of it being alive, Cornford more 
closely approximates that active aspect of nature or the Cosmos after its generation 
which Plato gives to the World but which latter Plato clearly states as 
generated and antecedent to the primal generative causes. When Cornford further 
introduces the idea of the accessory causes as requiring ‘of necessity’ to act in a 
certain way, he moves what was originally presented by Plato as a primal disordering 
cause-Plato having even giving it a name, ‘Ananke’ (as he did the ordering cause, 
362 See Cornford, PC, pp. 167-1 75.  
See Ti. 37c6-dl . 363 
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Nous, naming it the ‘Demiurge’)--still one step lower, regarding it simply as a 
functioning of the mechanical aspect of the Universe. To wit, this re-interpretation 
by Cornford of the primal causal powers, namely, of Nous viewed as akin to the 
activity of the World in other words, its rationality and of Necessity regarded 
as a function of process, leaves them nonetheless essentially unexplained, for this in 
no way touches upon their attendant ontology as primal causative powers when first 
introduced by Plato as ‘Nous’ and ‘Ananke’ and as having existence before the 
Cosmos and thus, being prior also to the World Soul, nor does it address the fact that 
the accessory causes as argued for by Plato are considered to be separate horn these 
primal power,365 nor does it explain the attendant metaphysics of the latter in relation 
to the former, nor why Plato felt it necessary to introduce the idea of a World Soul, 
and a generated one at that, if both the world and its attendant rationality have always 
been in existence-he could easily have stated as much, but chose to state and rather 
eloquently, the opposite. Yet all of the above Cornford has either assumed, has 
argued for or has alluded to in order to arrive at his conclusion. 
The fifth and final fact which must be assumed, namely, that the accessory causes 
are to be rejected as being in any way whatsoever true causes in themselves, but 
rather, are assistant to the true generative causes, having no power of their own and 
existing finitely in time after the generation of the Cosmos, can now be addressed 
and is the key premise which I argue determines Cornford’s position as false. 






that the accessory causes are not true causes. What is being questioned, rather, is the 
identity by Cornford within this passage of the ‘two primal causes as really being 
only one primal cause, wherein the second primary cause is consequently subsumed 
(and explicated at length by Cornford) under the auspices of secondary or assistant 
causes, and thus is named as secondary, rather than as second. As I have argued 
earlier in this thesis, the text here gives rise to some confusion if not looked at 
carefully in terms of the content both preceding and following it due to the summary 
nature of the surrounding passages, but is both consistent with the Timaeus as a 
whole (having already introduced not one but two primary causes) and is 
understandable in situ when viewed in these terms. In conclusion, therefore, 
Ananke, in being presented as one of two primary causal powers in the generation of 
the Universe, directing pre-Cosmic chaotic movement and like the Demiurge, being 
infinite, cannot at the same time be touted as a secondary or assistant cause having 
no power of its own and being part of the finite Universe. This, I suggest, presents a 
contradiction within Cornford’s conclusion regarding Necessity (Ananke), namely, 
that ‘necessity’ is a lower kind of cause or OVUCXLT~CX which assists the Demiurge in 
“producing the best results possible. 
’366 
7,367 
366 See Ti. 46e2-6. 
See Cornford, PC, p. 175- 176. Here, again, in Cornford alluding to both the ovuatzia (accessory 
causes) and the (so-called) ‘persuasion’ of Necessity by the Demiurge to produce the best results 




3 TI. 29D7 - 30Cl 
3.1 Original Greek 
3.2 Translation 
Let us state, then, the reason why he who brought about generation and this 
universe, constructed them. He was good, and in that which is good no envy 
whatsoever concerning anything comes to be. Being therefore free from this, 
he wished all things to be as much as possible like himself. Accepting this 
principle, then, from men of wisdom as being above all one of supreme 
authority, it can be accepted as absolutely true. For God had desired 
everything to be good, and nothing imperfect, as far as it was possible. Thus, 
Written Qv ztua in Bury, Ti., p. 54. 368 
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then, having taken in all that was visible, which was not at rest, but moving 
about without harmony or order, he brought it into order out of disorder, 
believing that to be altogether better than this latter. But it neither was nor is 
right for Him who is best to do other than that which is most fair. Therefore, 
taking into account such was naturally visible, he found, taking each as a 
whole, that nothing without intelligence to ever be a more beautiful work than 
that having intelligence and furthermore, that it is impossible for intelligence to 
come to be in something without a soul. Consequently, because of this 
reflection, by placing intelligence in soul and soul in body, he was helping to 
construct the universe so that his completed work might be by nature both the 
finest and the best. Thus, then, according to what, upon reflection, is likely, 
one must affirm the cosmos to have come into being in very truth a living 
creature endowed with both soul and intelligence due to the providence of God. 
3.3 Commentary and Notes 
3.3.1 ‘As far as possible’ = ‘the very best’ 
There are three relevant issues in the above passage with respect to this thesis (as 
shown in bold print), two of which have already been dealt with. The first issue 
deals with the idea of ‘as much as’ or ‘as far as possible’ and second, with the idea of 
something being ‘likely’. The third issue, and not yet discussed, is the idea of 
something being ‘naturally visible’. 
The first idea, that of ‘as much as possible’, as mentioned, has been discussed at 
length earlier.369 However, there are further reflections, which can be made. What 
must be kept in mind with regard to this expression and to other passages containing 
the same or similar phraseology is that, depending on the passage, they takes on 
various shades, configurations and aspects of meaning and do not always refer to 
lack or limitation. With respect to this particular passage, I have previously argued 
that reference here is made not to limitation, but rather, to the idea of the superlative, 
i.e. as far as possible, meaning ‘the very best’. In fact, soon thereafter in the same 
passage, Plato has the astronomer further affirm that it is in fact impossible for the 
See 52.3.4 of Part I. 369 
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God or Demiurge to achieve anything but the very highest. There are subsequent 
passages, moreover, which suggest that ‘the very best’ is what the Demiurge did in 
fact achieve.370 Plato will later argue that because of certain factors which logically 
adhere to the concept of generation and empirically to the generated object itself, e.g. 
of movement and change (which latter includes the idea that what is bonded together 
can be potentially dis~olved),~” in addition to the presence of a residual power lying 
latent in the Universe ready to reduce the Cosmos’s order back into primordial 
disorder, its powers appearing immanent, relative to these, the work of the Demiurge 
is also challenged. However, Plato never comes out and states in the Timaeus that 
the work of the Demiurge was curtailed. In fact, his conclusion at Ti. 92c4-9 affirms 
. 3  72 the opposite. 
Here at last let us say that our discourse concerning the universe has 
come to its end. For having received in full its complement of living 
creatures, mortal and immortal, this world has thus become a visible 
living creature embracing all that are visible and an image of the 
intelligible, a perceptible god, supreme in greatness and excellence, in 
beauty and perfection, this Heaven single in its kind and one. 
It could be argued that this conclusion is mere hyperbole on Plato’s part and that any 
imperfections and limitations in the Universe have been forgotten (or forgiven) by 
the writer. However, such a conclusion is virtually groundless and, literally, very 
shaky. If the Universe, as noted above, is “a perceptible god, supreme in greatness 
E.g. see Ti. 30b4-6, 34a8-b9, 4Oa2-7 and 46c7-dl. Note that in this passage reference is made to 
shaping things “in the best way possible,” a stronger notion than simply “as far as possible,” Ti. 53b5- 
7 and 68e1-4. See also Plato’s conclusion at Ti. 92c4-9. The idea continually suggests itself that 
given what the Demiurge set out to do, the best was achieved and in fact, nothing less was possible. 
This is contrary to Cornford’s suggestion at PC, p 159, where he states that “the work of the most 
ungrudging benevolence cannot be perfect; it can only be ‘as good as possible’.” 
3 70 
See Ti. 41a8-b2. 
Cornford, PC, p 359; see also Lee, Ti., p. 124 and Bury, Ti., p. 253. Plato’s description of the 
world from the very start of the dialogue at Ti. 29a5-6 as “the fairest of all things” argues for a 





and excellence,” then admitting to any imperfection whatsoever would be a 
contradiction in terms of this description. It is only before its generation or after its 
generation that Plato will allow imperfection or disorder to exist in the Universe, not 
during it when only the Demiurge’s hand is at work and Ananke is left with no active 
role. It must be stated, however, that this does not therefore lead to the opposite 
conclusion, namely that Ananke as a primal cause does not exist, standing in 
metaphor-like fashion, as Cornford holds, for some mode of physical change in an 
already existing cosmos. Indeed, as stated above, there is disorder both before373 and 
after374 the Universe has been ordered. Rather, Ananke is the disordering375 or 
second of two primal causes, while the first primal cause, the Demiurge, is given the 
sole role of being the primal ordering cause.376 This ordering power, therefore, 
persisted successfully in bringing order out of chaos, with the result that the Cosmos 
became nascent and according to which order, by the very fact of its existence, chaos 
clearly gave way. It is with this idea in mind, I would suggest, namely, of the 
Demiurge being a stronger power than Ananke, that Ananke is described by Plato as 
having been “persuaded,” fitting well with a ‘likely tale’ where human analogies 
abound, but more than this, nothing, I suggest, is meant.377 Taking the idea of 
373 See Ti. 3Oa2-6, 53a7-8 and 69b2-8. 
(to the end of the Timaeus), where Plato deals with diseases of the body and soul or mind. 
375 See Ti. 41a8-b6. 
376 See my earlier argument re Ananke being ‘persuaded’ at 62.3.3. 
377 See Ti. 47e5-48a5. If this is a human analogy describing the Demiurge’s greater power over that o f  
Ananke, the question can be raised why Plato used a word meaning ‘persuaded’ and not, for instance, 
‘destroyed’ or ‘overwhelmed’. However, I would suggest that two ideas converge to make 
‘persuaded’ the better choice. The first is that Plato’s concept of the Demiurge is entirely positive and 
this power, being wholly good, is not a destroyer and hence, would not destroy. The second idea is 
that Ananke is not merely mythical or representative according to Plato, but is an equally real, but 
weaker (having no power for order) metaphysical power, which co-exists, and hence is co-eternal, 
with the Demiurge. The idea of ‘persuasion’ brings out clearly Plato’s understanding of Ananke 
being a weaker power, while at the same time, and an idea which will persist strongly in Laws X 
See the earlier section in this thesis regarding ‘as far as possible’ (52.3.4); see also Ti. 81e6-92c3 3 74 
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‘persuasion’ literally creates such a gross anthropomorphism, involving as it does the 
two key metaphysical players in Plato’s dialogue, that every consequent step 
thereafter in this work also becomes subject to the whims of supposed myth-making 
(under the umbrage of a ‘likely-tale’ but with the unfortunate meaning of a ‘fairy 
tale’). Thus, if the natural logic present in this passage, which lies fairly near the 
surface, of one metaphysical power being stronger than the other prior to the 
generation of the Cosmos and thus prevailing, is glossed over, then so, too, is the 
consequent metaphysics. What ultimately results is that these powers then become 
this or that aspect of myth-making representative of primal physica2 powers in an 
already existent world, since the metaphysics enabling generation would have been 
sufficiently eroded to allow this, but, as I have suggested, erroneously. 
According to Plato’s cosmology, moreover, neither the Demiurge nor Ananke 
have relevant roles to play after the generation of the Cosmos. In fact, thereafter, 
when Plato begins to describe the objects of the generated Universe, both of these 
primary powers quite literally disappear from the dialogue. This, I would argue, is 
significant and for two reasons. First, it elevates their ontology as true causal 
powers, nothing more and nothing less. The Demiurge is not merely the deification 
of reason with a capital ‘R’, nor is Ananke the personification of change or motion. 
Second, and perhaps the more important reason in terms of this dialogue, by the 
Demiurge and Ananke having exited from the stage as powers, all remaining powers 
(albeit via the idea of a Non-benevolent Soul), retaining the idea that Ananke is very much a real, if 
not latent, power outwith and to some degree within, the generated Universe. Viewed in this light, 
therefore, the term ‘overwhelm’, like ‘destroyed,’ undermines too greatly the actual power of Ananke 
for potential disorder, to which disorder Laws X later attests and of which Plato was fully aware even 
in the Timaeus. 
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and their effects in the Cosmos can now be identified, i.e soul containing ‘nous’, 
order, the secondary or subsidiary causes, movement, change, disorder and disease, 
according to their own design and taxonomy. In other words, these latter can be now 
named and explained as part of the natural order, having already been either 
generated or effected after the generation of the Cosmos, allowing physics rather 
than metaphysics to come to the fore. Thus, with no further reference now required 
to be made to causal powers of the ‘eternal Reality’ sort, the discussion is finally 
freed up so that Plato might indulge in the relaxing pursuit of what he describes as 
“likely accounts of the world of change. 7,378 
3.3.2 
I would further argue that subsequent references in the Timaeus to disorder or 
instances of disorder within the Cosmos are one of two kinds, namely, either natural 
disorder or unnatural. Instances of natural disorder can be understood as 
regenerative, representing the decay and rebuilding activities which occur naturally 
within the Cosmos as it maintains itself, supported by the fact that the Cosmos has 
already been described by Plato as “designed to supply its own nourishment from its 
This is not contradicted by a own decay and to comprise and cause all processes. 
slightly earlier reference in this same passage to the Universe being ageless and free 
from disease (i.e. decay) as this refers to an earlier stage of generation where the 
Cosmos is described as a Living Creature, and although a ‘single complete whole’ 
consisting of parts that are wholes, it is not yet complete in terms of what it will 
Two kinds of disorder - natural and unnatural 
,7379 
378 Ti. 59c5-d3. 
Ti. 33c7-dl; see Lee, Ti. p. 45; see also Bury, Ti. p. 63 and Cornford, PC, p. 55. 3 79 
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contain as a completed Universe, since it is still to be inhabited by the composite 
bodies.380 The regenerative processes noted above involve these subsequent 
composite bodies, whereas the Living Creature, at least initially, appears to refer only 
to the larger structure which would later house and support these bodies without 
itself decaying (hence, its description as a ‘single complete whole’). 
The other remaining references to disorder in the Timaeus concern unnatural 
disorder, in other words, to disorder in the world that does not help maintain its 
equilibrium. Plato suggests that this kind of disorder should and can be avoided (e.g. 
by education or temperance), but avoidance is a difficult task, involving as it does the 
unbridled human ‘will’. The idea of ‘freedom of will’, e.g. to choose to be unruly or 
to be disciplined, is not explicitly argued by Plato, but is nonetheless, at least to some 
degree, thought possible for the soul and is consequently assumed by him throughout 
the text.381 He does this by his several references to unbalanced appetite, unfettered 
motions of the soul, ignorance and stupidity, any or all of which, according to Plato, 
bring about such disorder and are to be avoided, the idea of avoidance involving 
choice, choice in turn involving the idea of freedom and the agent of this fi-eedom 
understood as the human will (within the Finally, therefore, although he 
cannot argue that the Demiurge’s ordering is at all disordered (this would be a 
contradiction), Plato must nevertheless account for the disorder or imperfection he 
observes in the finished Cosmos and this he does in a two-fold fashion: First, by 
380 Ti. 33b2-4. 
Although Plato explicitly states that we acquire our faults owing to two causes outside our wills 
(i.e. a bad physical make-up and failure to be educated properly), he enjoins the reader to “try with all 
our might ... to avoid evil and grasp its contrary” (see Ti. 87a7-b9). He does not go into a fuller 
explanation concerning this in the Timaeus stating, “That, however, is another story.” 
381 
See Ti. 8 1 e6-92c3 (end), where Plato deals with diseases of the body, mind and soul. 382 
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including certain kinds of disorder as part of the balancing process and as necessary 
in achieving a good end383 and second, by never claiming that the Demiurge 
completely subdued Ananke, but rather, did so only to the degree that the Cosmos is 
and remains ordered, in which absence all remaining instances of disorder or as I 
have collectively named them, ‘unnatural disorder’, fall.384 
3.3.3 
The second issue in this passage which I would like to raise and which has not 
been addressed previously concerns the idea of the Demiurge having taken in ‘all that 
‘All that was visible’ / was ‘naturally visible’ 
This type of disorder is understood by Plato as part of the ordering process taking place in the 
world and thus, part of the good end achieved. 
It is contrary, I suggest, to Plato’s understanding of the complete goodness of the Cosmos to grant 
Ananke any sort of ‘role’ in supplying unwanted disorder to it. According to Plato, the world as 
generated is wholly good, wherefore the Demiurge is assigned as the cause of this goodness and thus, 
as cause, is itself wholly good. Any unwanted disorder in the Cosmos is simply a fact, ungenerated by 
the Demiurge, which Plato must nonetheless account for and for which he must also, according to his 
metaphysics, assign a cause, which he does in the form of the disordering cause, Ananke. In the 
Timaeus, however, he does not fully account for disordering powers lying within the Cosmos, 
acknowledging only the disordering cause, Ananke, in its relation to the initial ordering of the Cosmos 
and with as little note as possible. As a consequence, disorder within the Cosmos is left largely 
unexplained and within its mythical context, i.e. as that residual part of the Cosmos wherein Ananke 
was not fully “persuaded” by the Demiurge to allow the Cosmos to be ordered (see Ti. 47e5-48a5). In 
Laws A’, however, through the further development of the notion of ‘soul’, Plato is able to incorporate 
into his metaphysics the idea of unwanted disorder or ‘evil’ as an active power in the world, but not 
until then. For Plato, the Demiurge or Ananke to be regarded as active powers within the generated 
World in the Timaeus was not possible, since according to his metaphysics he does not regard either 
of these forces to be souls or to be self-generated, generated or a part of that which is generated in any 
way whatsoever. They are metaphysical powers lying entirely outwith the generated Cosmos, whose 
effects appear within the Cosmos as ordered or disordered aspects of it and which effects are a result 
of their respectively fair or foul play prior to and at the time of the act of generation. According to 
Plato’s metaphysics, moreover, the World Soul was generated to maintain the order which the 
Demiurge wrought at the outset of the Cosmos, while any residual disorder simply remained from 
before the Cosmos was generated. How this disorder is maintained within the Cosmos is not 
addressed in the Timaeus, except to say that it remains in spite of generation having taken place. Plato 
only once refers to the maintenance of order or disorder by the primal causal powers but this is with 
respect to the whole of the Cosmos and not just a part of it, when he states that the ‘will’ of the 
Demiurge was greater than those powers which had control before its generation and is why he (the 
Demiurge) would never destroy it (see Ti. 4 1 a3-4 1 b6). Consequently, while there is reference here to 
the Demiurge and to the maintenance of order, it is only with respect to the initiation of order from 
outwith the Universe as it is being generated or as it might be dissolved. Similarly, Ananke is to be 
understood as the source of whatever disorder remained in the Universe at its outset. In either case, 
the initiation of order or furtherance of disorder in the Cosmos has no need to be understood as the 
result of these powers remaining active within the generated Cosmos, the latter coming to be, as it 
were, after the fact of their having acted. For metaphysical activity of this sort Plato develops the 




was visible’, and further, his taking into account of what was ‘naturally visible’. It is 
interesting that Plato should make this distinction between the visible Cosmos or 
further still, the naturally visible Cosmos and that which is not visible or naturally so. 
In some respects, this language is clearly metaphorical or, more properly speaking, 
anthropomorphic, as the Demiurge is depicted looking over what he is about to 
change or arrange, and yet eyes, with their function of vision, will only have 
existence later, as a part of that generation. The perspective of the Demiurge, 
moreover, is unabashedly anachronistic (he seems to already have a grasp of the 
difference between things that are rational over things that are not, even before the 
generation of the Cosmos takes place), just as a person might think of what is not yet 
there when imagining something. The above, however, as regards both its 
anthropomorphic and anachronistic style, has nothing to do, I suggest, with the 
Demiurge therefore being a character from what might be interpreted as a ‘mythic’ 
portrayal of the early Cosmos and its generation.38s 
3.3.3.1 
Plato has not yet fully described the Demiurge at this stage, but what will emerge 
is a god who is wholly good and wholly perfect. The Demiurge, moreover, is a 
tremendously powerful god, and whereas we are told the degree to which he used his 
powers, we are not told whether this use represented the full extent of his powers. 
The Demiurge and the visible Cosmos 
I strongly disagree with Cornford, who, in rejecting the metaphysics in Plato’s cosmology, 
proposes that the Demiurge and chaos are merely symbols, further suggesting that there was never a 
moment of creation before which the chaos existed, and whereupon he concludes “and this part of the 
mythical imagery is not to be taken at its face value” (PC, p. 37). This extensive reinterpretation of 
Plato’s cosmology as myth opposes at every turn what Plato actually wrote and by this literary 
dismissal simply ignores the logic and complexity behind this cosmology. In Cornford’s attempt to 
extricate Plato from the grip of the theologian, he casts him into the mould of the modem man of 
science, both of which, when simply imposed and then taken to the extreme, are in error. 
385 
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This argues against the position that he is not omnipotent. We do not know. It 
seems plausible, however, that a god who is portrayed as being completely good and 
wholly perfect, would have powers to match, whether he chooses to use these powers 
or not. Further, with time only coming into existence with the generation of the 
heavenly bodies, the Demiurge is logically left to stand outside of time and all 
considerations relative thereto. The Demiurge, moreover, by definition ‘the best’ (Ti. 
3Oa7), is a god having the highest degree of ‘nous’, wherein his faculty of 
intellection has as its object the full complement of Forms.386 To describe the 
Demiurge, therefore, as ‘having taken in all that was visible’ need not imply that it 
was visible to him, since he clearly stands outside of time and has no eyes, but only 
that what the Demiurge set out to order would be visible to someone who had eyes if 
that person were there. The Demiurge, however, being privy to all the Forms and 
subject neither to time nor to what he has generated, nor seemingly, to the 
ungenerated universe, could quite plausibly envision this without eyes. Plato does 
not ask his readers to take him literally-on the contrary, he reminds them how 
difficult it is to write about such subjects and why any considerations regarding these 
can only be approximate-but he does demand from his readers that they 
acknowledge the truth behind his writing and its images and goes into great detail to 
ensure that if one image does not quite capture what he is trying to explain, another 
will or will aid in that understanding. This happens time and time again in the course 
of the Timaeus, ultimately building up images-the Demiurge, Ananke (Necessity), 
The Forms relative to this thesis are dealt with at 53.3.4 of Part I, as well as at 52.3.2.1.4 of Part I1 386 
on Laws X. 
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the eternal Living Being, the Nurse of Becoming, the Forms-as a kind of meta- 
language in the supra-cosmic scheme of things for the eternally existent, inside and 
outside of time, within and outwith the generated Universe, where they, as core 
features of generation, are and remain faceless except for these images. 
3.3.4 
Another consideration I would like to put forward is the possibility that behind the 
decision of the Demiurge to order ‘all that was visible’ is the suggestion by Plato of a 
non-visible substratum. Although Plato says very little about such a substratum, 
addressing for the most part only the visible world, he nonetheless does mention 
particles too small to be seen at Ti. 56b7-c3 (discussed earlier at $2.3.5.2). These, he 
explains, only become visible once enough of them have joined together, like with 
like, so as to become visible, as one of the four elements. At this micro-cosmic level, 
therefore, there is, according to Plato, a physical world composed of triangles already 
ordered into their particular elemental shape, but which cannot be seen. 
Non-visible/invisible substrata and Plato’s theory of triangles 
Early on in the Timaeus Plato’s astronomer states, “anything that has come to be 
must be corporeal, visible and tangible, but nothing can be visible without fire, nor 
tangible without solidity, and nothing can be solid without earth. ’9387 A little further 
on he explains that “fire, earth, water and air are bodies, and all bodies are solids. 9,388 
Continuing, he states, “all solids again are bounded by surfaces, and all rectangular 
surfaces are composed of triangles.” However, if so, what can be said of these 
triangles, themselves? It is unlikely that Plato would be comfortable with the idea 
Ti. 31b4-6. 




that the triangles which make up the basic elemental particles have acquired their 
triangular shape through either chance or Ananke, since his notion of chaos (and 
chance, but to a lesser degree) is irregularity which is incapable of achieving ends of 
a rational nature or only rarely, as in the case of chance, but always without 
consistency.389 When he first mentions the triangles in the Timaeus, it is not in 
respect of their provenance. Rather, his interest at this point is with a later stage of 
the development of the Cosmos, when these triangles have come together sufficiently 
to form specific elemental types, i.e. earth, water, air and fire. According to Plato’s 
description of these primitive triangles, they are completely regular and form the 
basis of what eventually becomes the fully generated, and being generated, rational 
and hence, meaningful (with respect to ends) Universe. Accordingly, these triangles 
most likely represent an early stage of the organisation of the Universe, with Plato’s 
cosmology beginning in turn somewhat later, when some of these triangles have 
come together, by chance and then design by the Demiurge, to form the elements. 
Plato’s depiction of the process of generation, therefore, is an evolutionary one, 
involving forces that exists side by side, the Demiurge being a force for order and 
Ananke, for disorder, as the Cosmos is being formed. As metaphysical forces, 
moreover, the Demiurge and Ananke always exist and act outside of time. 
Accordingly, I would suggest that the initiation and the maintenance of whatever 
order or disorder is wrought by these forces would be one and the same thing, the 
extension of time being an effect of such causal power. The only exception to this 
principle would be when one power overrides the work of the other, as in the case of 
Ti. 69b5-8. 389 
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the Demiurge “persuading” Ananke in the Timaeus during the generation of the 
Cosmos or similarly, in Law X, where when redrawn as non-generated Souls, these 
causal powers interact with the world bringing about good or evil within it, 
displacing one with the other in a world of change.390 
There is, moreover, I suggest, an invisible aspect also, relative to two different 
sources, with regard to Plato’s understanding of the Universe. The first source, not 
being physical this time, in other words, not being due to the elemental particles 
being too small to be seen, is purely noetic and has to do with the role which the 
Forms have to play in the organisation of the triangles into elemental particles (at 
least as far as Plato draws his cosmology). When the Demiurge sets about to order 
the Cosmos, the elements out of which the Universe is constructed already contain a 
certain degree of order.391 I have argued that at least in part this is due to the fact that 
Plato’s cosmology does not appear to commence at the very beginning of time, but 
starts later in the process when the Demiurge has already begun his ordering. It is 
also possible, therefore, that outside of time, that is prior to generation proper, Plato 
would be fully aware of the potentiality which the Forms, present to the Demiurge as 
objects of his own subjective reflection, would have for all present and fhture 
ordering and thus hints, when referring to “all that was visible,” to what is invisible 
or the Form behind the object, and not just to the non-visible Cosmos (i.e. what is too 
small to be seen) in contrast to the visible. I would suggest, therefore, that when 
Plato refers to “all that was visible”, he may in part be contrasting this with the 
390 Lg. 896e4-6. 
See Ti. 52d2-53c3 and also Ti. 69b2-c3. 39 1 
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invisible substratum or Forms, which he postulates are responsible for the formal 
organisation of all objects within the Universe, while when he next cites “all that was 
naturaZZy visible,” he is at this point referring to the microcosmic world or to the 
physical particles themselves, some perhaps already elements, but as yet too small 
and too dissipated for us to see, but which will eventually comprise the full visible 
Cosmos. 
The second source of invisibility, I would suggest, comes in the form of the 
primal triangles themselves, which only when amassed together become one of the 
four visible elements and then particular objects within the Cosmos. We learn in the 
Timaeus that at the beginning of the ordering of the Cosmos there existed triangles, 
ordered but non-visible particles, not yet capable of amassing together into particular 
elements until they were more complexly ordered into this or that kind of sided 
triangular shape. The question remains, however, whether or not they were in fact 
invisible as well as, or rather, prior to, being non-visible, since they existed at this 
stage on only one plane, incapable in this way of full perception ever until further 
shaping (with other triangles forming sides) takes place. I would suggest that the 
answer to this question is yes. These ordered triangles existed at first ‘invisibly’ 
(they could never be consistently visible without further dimensional contours added) 
and eventually ‘non-visibly’ (even with further dimensions, until amassed like with 
like, being too small, they would remain non-visible), making up the suggested 
ordered substratum of the apparently pre- or semi-ordered state of the Cosmos before 
its full generation, depicting, moreover, the evolutionary nature of Plato’s Cosmos. 
How this substratum first came to be ordered and the degree and extent of its further 
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ordering, if indeed this state was achieved over time as a part of initial generation or 
had always been ordered from the outset of generation, is not discussed or even 
suggested as being known by Plato. It is curious, however, that the Demiurge can 
‘pluck’ so efficiently from the disorder of Ananke a whole Universe without recourse 
to a stabilising medium. Although one could reason that the Forms inhabit these 
invisiblehon-visible spheres (substrata), they could never account for the stability of 
the objects of the Universe, only for their form, being themselves pure non-physical 
objects of ‘nous’, nor could the Forms account for the mysterious392 provenance of 
the triangles, which nonetheless are numbered and ordered by the D e m i ~ r g e . ~ ~ ~  
Plato never states that order and visibility are one and the same, and in fact, the 
opposite is proposed when in his description of the original chaos, the disorder which 
is found is described as comprising “all that was visible.” It is worth considering, 
therefore, that these primal triangles, out of which Plato later gives the elements their 
full visible form and stability upon the Demiurge’s further engineering, naturally 
inhabit this invisible and later non-visible, but logically suggested ~ u b - s t r a t u m . ~ ~ ~  
The degree to which this substratum is ordered or unordered, moreover, would be the 
degree to which the Demiurge or Ananke, respectively, actively participate in it. The 
upshot of the above considerations is that they reveal Plato to be a realist of profound 
See Ti. 53d4-7. 
Plato explains at Ti. 52d2-53c3 that before the God touched them, the basic constituents, fire, 
water, earth and air, were all without proportion or measure (although they bore some traces of their 
proper nature), but the Demiurge reduced them to order by giving them a definite pattern of shape and 
number, which he did via the triangles (their substructure), whereby different sized triangles were put 
together in specific ways. See Ti. 56a6-c7. The details of how this was carried out is not discussed, 




See Ti. 56b7-c3; see also 43a1-3. 3 94 
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depth and breadth, whose realism includes both supra- and non-physical notions, as 
well as a physical Universe of both micro-cosmic and macro-cosmic proportions. 
3.3.5 A ‘likely’ account 
The third matter, a theme which constantly recurs throughout the Timaeus, and 
shows up initially in this early passage, is the idea of the account being ‘likely’. This 
idea of ‘likelihood’ is a twin, but not identical, idea with that of ‘possibility’. This 
latter idea has been discussed elsewhere and most extensively within the discussion 
of ‘as far as he could’ or ‘as far as possible’ (TO ... ~ v u ~ T ~ u ) .  However, in this 
passage ‘likeliness’ is at issue, not ‘possibility’. The difference lies not just in 
meaning, in that the Greek word which Plato uses in this early passage is TOU 
E ‘ L K ~ Z ~ ,  a participle with the nominal meaning of ‘what is likely’ or ‘probable’, 
deriving Erom the verb E O L K ~ ,  a perfect with a present sense, which in turn is from 
the verb E ~ K W ,  ‘to be like’, rather, the notion of careful deliberation or the choosing 
of what is likely or probable amongst possibilities, is also introduced. In other 
words, what Plato is describing is an account of the Cosmos, which according to 
reason hbyo~) is likely or probable. Thus, the context itself at the very 
outset of Plato’s cosmology adds the stricture of reasonableness to the idea of what is 
‘likely’, with no hint of myth or fancy or suggestion that the “Timaeus is a poem. 7,395 
Later, at Ti. 48d1-4, Plato will again refer to his original intention as outlined in 
this initial passage, making it clear that what he is trying to undertake is as likely an 
account as possible of both particular things and the totality of things and 
commencing Erom an even earlier origin. Thus, he writes: 
Cornford, PC, p. 3 1. 395 
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While preserving the meaning of the likely account which was laid down 
from the beginning396 concerning all things individually and as a whole, I 
will undertake nothing of less likelihood, rather more, recounting an even 
earlier beginning. 
As in the passage at Ti. 30b6-c 1 , in this later passage at 48d2-4 Plato again uses the 
participle E ) ~ K ~ z o c :  
Moreover, at Ti. 29c4-d3, prefacing 30b6-c1, while Timaeus and Socrates are still 
discussing what Timaeus is about to expound upon, Plato, through Timaeus’s 
dialogue, makes it very clear what he means to impart by his use of the term E ) I K ~ T ~ ,  
namely, that he will not be able to give accounts that are “always in all respects self- 
consistent and perfectly exact.” This is a disclaimer, not an announcement that the 
language of myth or poetry is about to be used. He further explains that any lack of 
self-consistency or exactness in his treatment of the Gods (the heavens) or the 
generation of the Universe is due to their being such huge topics, concerning many 
matters, and not that these matters cannot be discussed or must be encrypted. Thus, 
not yet having embarked on his exposition at this stage, by this disclaimer he allows 
for a certain dynamism and approximation in the account as it unfolds. The necessity 
for this is soon made evident as Plato repeatedly begins his account anew, layered by 
the introduction of new key-players within his cosmology. In this way Plato is able 
to build a degree of sophistication into his presentation that would otherwise appear 
Whereas at Ti. 48dI of this passage TO 6E KWC’ dcpxdq carries the meaning of ‘from the 
beginning’, this clearly refers to Plato’s account, i.e. from the beginning of Timaeus’s cosmology, and 




convoluted and ‘mythic’ by the sheer crowdedness of the stage. To the contrary, it is 
precisely these poetic accounts and overcrowded cosmogonies, which he wishes to 
correct.397 
There is a sense in which, if Plato’s cosmology were to be misunderstood as 
attempting to describe the actual physical beginning of the Cosmos, that it could, 
with reason, be called poetry and not a true cosmology, containing as it does a fairly 
high degree of mythic language, too much to be called anything but a cosmogony. 
However, that this would be offensive to Plato is extremely likely, given both his low 
opinion of poets and his distaste for cosmogonies, as well as the fact that 
he states very clearly in the Timaeus that what he is about to do is give a ‘likely’ (not 
‘unlikely’) account of the generation of the Cosmos, repeating this mantra of 
‘likeliness’ numerous times throughout his cosmology. Thus, in order to avoid an 
imputation of ‘poetry’ I think it is important to point out that Plato’s cosmology does 
not attempt to describe ‘a beginning’ either before or at the time of the Cosmos’s 
generation, although he does state that the Universe had a beginning.399 As the 
passage at Ti. 48c2-dl clearly shows, he eschews describing first principles of the 
Universe altogether, on the basis that they are too difficult to explain in the context 
of the present discussion, leaving the earliest stages of both the chaos and the 
397 See Ti. 19c8-20a5 and 27a3-6. 
See Socrates ’ Defense (Apology), 22a6-c9, trans. by Hugh Tredennick; also, The Republic, 377d3- 
379a5, trans. by Paul Shorey, in the Collected Dialogues of Plato. Although both passages contain 
speeches purported to be by Socrates concerning the poets, Plato no doubt shared a similar view. See 
also Laws X, 885c7-e6, trans. by A. E. Taylor, where Plato again voices caution with regard to the 
poets although this time through his central character, the Athenian. 
399 Ti. 28b2-c2. 
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generated Cosmos alone. An “earlier stage” is the earliest he dares to Plato’s 
cosmology, therefore, consciously avoids what cannot be presented as ‘likely’, 
whereupon he must begin anew with each new stage of the Cosmos he wishes to 
explore, but never at its very beginning and rarely in exact chronological order. 
See the translation of Ti. 48dl-4 at 5 1.2 of this thesis. At 48d3-4 Plato writes ~ a i  kpnpooe&v 
&n’ &pxfis n ~ p i  k~&ozov  ~ a i  oupn&vzov h k y ~ t v ,  where he introduces the adverb 
kpnpoo&v with the temporal meaning of ‘earlier’. The use of this word brings into focus Plato’s 
intention to start afresh and to delve even further back in time than he had done previously. Thus, it is 




4 TI. 41A3 - 41B6 
TI. 4237 - 43A3 
TI. 68C7 - 68D7 
4.1/2 Original Greek and Translation 
TI. 41A3 - 41B6 
Now when all the gods, both those that wander about manifestly and those that 
appear only as they will, had come to birth, He who brought forth this universe said 
to them the following: “Gods, gods and works of whom I am Maker and Father, 
being created by me, are indissoluble except by my will.40’ For although everything 
that is bound can be dissolved, yet to loose that which is beautifully harmonised and 
well-formed is the will of that which is evil. Wherefore you also, seeing that you 
have been generated, are neither immortal nor entirely indissoluble. Yet, by no 
means will you be dissolved, nor participate in death, possessing in my will a greater 
and more sovereign bond than those to which you were bound when you came into 
being. 
TI. 42E7 - 43A3 
The text is corrupt; see Cornford, PC, p. 137 and his Appendix 3, pp. 367-70; also Bury, p.88. 40 I 
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And having taken hold of an [the]402 immortal principle of a mortal living being, 
imitating their own Maker, borrowing portions of fire and earth, and also water and 
air from the cosmos, as though to be given back, cemented together what they took, 
not by the indissoluble bonds with which they were held together, but rather, fused 
into one mass through numerous pegs, invisible for smallness. 
TI. 68C7 - 68D7 
And as to the others, from these examples it is quite clear which combinations should 
be brought together so as to preserve the likely account. But if someone were to 
seize upon a practical test to ascertain these things, the difference between the human 
and divine nature would not be known, because God, being both wise and powerful, 
is able to mix the many into one and again, to break up the one into many. On the 
contrary, of mankind no one is able, neither now nor in the future, to do either of 
these tasks. 
4.3 Commentary and Notes 
4.3.1 A division of powers 
These three short passages taken together articulate what for Plato was a clear 
divide between the creative ability of the Demiurge and that of the natural order, 
which order at its top or highest end included the divine, 
divine or gods in heaven having been created or ordered 
I but not the Demiurge, the 
by the Demiurge. Plato's 
No definite article is present in the Greek. 402 
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cosmology also appeals to two ‘Wills’ which were present at the outset of this 
ordering process, not just one, but rather, that of the Demiurge and that of a prior 
non-ordering Will,4°3 identifiable in other passages as Ananke or the ‘Wandering 
Cause’. Thus, turning first to this latter point, in the initial passage of the three listed 
above reference is made to an original bonding together of primordial matter by a 
Will which did not take harmonisation or beauty of form into account. Plato further 
asserts, through a declaration made by the Demiurge, that his bond is a stronger and 
more sovereign Will than that of the other non-ordering Will. Plato’s appeal 
therefore is not only to a sharp division of powers between the Demiurge and what is 
created or ordered, but also between a primal Will that chooses and chose to order 
and harmonise and a primal Will that does and did not. Further, while the position in 
these passages supports the view that the universe existed in some non-ordered form 
before its ordering by the Demiurge, Plato refrains from giving greater detail, 
keeping in line with his constantly reiterated stricture that the account be likely and 
thus refraining from giving either a generally speculative or a mythic cosmology. 
Plato can reason back as far as this point, but not earlier without recourse to either 
speculation or mythic symbolism. Thus, to refer to him as being a realist in this 
regard would be accurate. 
The first passage quoted (Ti. 41a3-b6) does not commit Plato to the notion of a morally ‘evil’ or 
negative ‘will’, which is a more developed idea than simply a metaphysical power whose will it is to 
maintain disorder in a pre-generative universe or potentially bring disorder into a post-generative one. 
However, for Plato, once the Universe has been generated, unnatural disorder, i.e. disorder within 
nature that does not contribute to any of its rational ends, is evil, since it would be against the will of 
the Demiurge, whose will with respect to the Cosmos is always one of organisation or order, 
composed of reasonable or noetic ends throughout. Accordingly, not only will unnatural disorder 
within the generated Cosmos be considered evil, the source or cause of this disorder will also be 
considered evil. Plato will develop this idea of good and evil further in Laws X where he introduces 
the idea of at least two primal Souls, a Soul that is good and brings about good works in the world and 
one that is evil and brings about bad. See Part I, $3.3.2. See also Part I1 (on Laws X), 53.3.1-3. 
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4.3.2 The creative powers and their consequent metaphysics 
With regard now to the first point, that is to the sharp division which Plato draws 
between the creative powers of the Demiurge and the powers within the natural 
order, the question of the robustness of the consequent metaphysics can now be 
raised. It has been argued by C ~ r n f o r d ~ ' ~  and suggested by others that the Demiurge 
is a mythic figure, in other words, that the metaphysics which would necessarily 
follow upon the Demiurge not being mythic must somehow fail. However, to depict 
the Demiurge as a causal power outwith the natural order, whose being is not 
generated and whose powers are wholly noetic, as Plato has done, is to deny outright 
that it is simply a mythic figure representing some aspect of that order, as the 
metaphysics given in relation to this cause, in fact to either cause, the Demiurge or 
Ananke, are ultimately not reducible to physical phenomena. Thus, a description of 
any mythic configuration would have to include an explanation of Plato's 
metaphysics with regard to these causes, and not just his physics or implied physics, 
to remain true to the text and thus, viable. However, in doing this, the explanation 
would lead back to where it began, with two primary causes standing in need of an 
adequate explanation, physical causation proving too reductive to be satisfactory. 
From the passages under discussion and from other passages in the Timaeus, it is 
clear that Plato wishes to articulate within his metaphysical scheme a causal power, 
in fact two causal powers, one which orders, the Demiurge and one which does not, 
Ananke, whose ontology and powers are entirely distinct from physical causation 
and its effects. This thesis has earlier denied a mythic interpretation for either of 
404 Cornford, PC, pp. 3 1-32,34. 
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these causal powers, arguing on several occasions for the position that neither the 
Demiurge nor Ananke are simply mythic figures. In other words, they are not 
imaginary beings introduced by Plato to explain difficult and poorly or not 
understood scientific phenomena. 
Granting this earlier position has been sufficiently argued, a look, nonetheless, at 
the supposed failure of a metaphysical position, which posits causal powers outside 
of the generated Universe, is still in order. For the sake of argument, moreover, a 
further look at the question of whether or not a more sophisticated interpretation of 
the Demiurge and Ananke as mythic figures, and not simply as literary figures acting 
as substitutes for physical phenomena, is also in order and of whether or not it 
provides an adequate understanding of what Plato intended. With regard to the first 
concern, namely, that of the failure of Plato’s metaphysics should it be taken at face 
value, there is little to substantiate this claim other than a sceptical approach 
generally to a priori ideas of this sort and especially to a metaphysics involving 
supra-human type or divine beings, and therefore a denial outright of these causes 
and the metaphysics which support them. However, the intuition that Plato’s move is 
weak and thus fails, is a different matter. What would be of concern here, therefore, 
would be if there were in place a stronger and equally applicable proposal as the one 
which Plato has offered. The supposed failure of a prima facie interpretation 
seemingly lies in the fact that known physical phenomena can now be substituted for 
Plato’s supposed metaphysical players-the ‘meta’ becomes physical or primordial 
matter and the players become phenomena-with the result that an adequate 
description of the physical world is deployed without recourse to fantasy. However, 
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Plato’s concern was not merely a description of the physical world, although indeed 
that was part of his plan and a culminating part, but rather he also wanted to show 
just how the physical world would have come about, not exactly perhaps but 
plausibly, given his knowledge of first principles and his understanding of their 
powers from a reflection on the effect of those powers. The one would not be valid 
without the other. The first principles intimated by the existence of the Cosmos 
would logically have had to exist prior to the Cosmos itself, as cause (the primal 
powers) is to effect (the Cosmos). In order to give a likely account, moreover, as 
was Plato’s explicit intention, he required to show just how these primary causes 
existed in relation to the Cosmos (not apart from the generated Cosmos, which he 
claims would be very difficult, if not impossible)405 and this he painstakingly sets out 
to do. The effect or Cosmos itself would ultimately be described at length by Plato, 
indicative of where his interest in the Timaeus began. However, while this could be 
described in detail, the primary causes, which brought the Cosmos about could only 
be hypothesised, their provenance denying further appeal beyond what an 
understanding of the existent Cosmos required of them. It is noteworthy that Plato 
does not appeal to either a theory of Forms or to religious belief in postulating his 
primary causes-any references to the Forms and to religious belief appear 
separately-rather, he is moved directly by considerations of the Cosmos and by 
further logical deductions which he draws when hypothesising the existence of these 
causal powers. In this way, Plato is able to bridge his core belief in such powers with 
Ti. 28c3-5. It is clear from this passage that Plato’s hesitancy to discuss the Demiurge separately 
from consideration of the generated Cosmos is primarily because of the limitations of his audience, 
i.e. “all men,” and not because he did not believe himself to have such knowledge. 
405 
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a rational structure relative to the Cosmos, each supporting the other and confirmed 
by the workings of the Cosmos. 
4.3.3 An axiology emerges 
Plato’s pivotal consideration was his observation of the ordering and hence, 
goodness of the Cosmos, which led him to an axiology or valuing of everything he 
saw or hypothesised, both of the physical world and of the metaphysical, which latter 
he envisioned to have preceded the physical. Plato’s Cosmos, therefore, was not just 
a cosmos, it was a moral Cosmos. It was good because it was ordered, harmonious, 
reasonable, intelligible, beautiful and balanced. Thus, so, too, was its maker, the 
Demiurge, necessarily (like begetting like) a supremely good ‘Will’ and Ananke, its 
opposite, a wicked or supremely bad ‘Will’, ever ready to return the Cosmos to its 
original disorder or chaos, which lacking in form was inharmonious and 
~nintelligible.~’~ The possible charge also, therefore, of undue anthropomorphisms 
is, I would argue, vacuous. What is really at issue here are ‘divine-isms’ or ‘primal 
cause-isms’ applied to the generated Cosmos and not the other way around, since 
Plato argues it is the divine or primary cause which was the source of the generated 
Cosmos and which Cosmos he tried “to make as like himself as possible. ,7407 
4.3.4 Order from a disordered cosmos 
A difficulty does arise, however, when consideration is given to Plato’s notion of 
the cosmos pre-existing in a disordered fashion before its ordering.4o* The cosmos 
~ ~~ ~~ ~ 
Ti. 41b2-6. 
407 Ti. 29el-30a2. 
408 Ti. 30a4-5. 
406 
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seemingly had always existed, but not always in an ordered state. The argument 
could then follow that Plato, relying on an ancient taxonomy and a science still in its 
infancy and which had not yet divested itself of other concerns, i.e religious and 
moral, is really presenting an ancient version of, for instance, the Darwinian scheme 
andor the Big Bang Theory (or some other modem theory), which was yet to be 
informed by the world he was trying to describe (e.g. the conclusions of science 
today, which don’t require primal powers) and at the same time, was burdened by the 
past (e.g. by the accepted, but transient religious and moral views influencing his 
belief in the gods and primal powers, as well as the standards of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, 
which followed thereon). Plato’s metaphysical causes, it could then be argued, are 
unnecessary, he just didn’t know it. A First Mover is not required - infinity is a very 
long time. I would concede that although there is myth going on here in the sense of 
presenting what cannot be fully known or be depicted in any other way, when Plato 
attempts to give a likely account, it is an unconscious and necessary mythology 
which Plato’s draws upon and not a conscious one. In other words, he is not 
presenting myth for myth’s sake within his cosmology, but because there is no other 
way to describe its metaphysical and to a lesser degree, its physical components. 
The Demiurge, although most assuredly not a father, is all of this and much more. 
The Nurse of Becoming, although not a nurse, serves this function in the physical 
realm. However large the mythic portrayals emerge, it is their minimum reality and 
not their maximum, which Plato is trylng to capture. 
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4.3.5 Myth and Plato’s cosmology 
While the possible argument that Plato is really presenting a pre-scientific 
scenario in mythic form is in some ways compelling, it breaks down and fairly 
quickly when the claims Plato actually makes are revisited and are consequently 
subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination. I would like to suggest, first, that 
Plato’s metaphysics would have failed had he not proposed at least two causal 
powers, that of the ordering Cause and that of the disordering Cause. One causal 
power was not enough to satisfy Plato’s claims with regard to the original disorder in 
the Cosmos. The importance of Plato’s axiological assumptions cannot be 
underestimated or dismissed in this regard. The world was not just there, it was there 
in a good, beautiful and perfectly harmonised way, except, of course, where it was 
not and where it was not, unnatural disorder resulted and this, too, had to be 
explained. A cosmological interpretation which does not take into consideration the 
valuing which Plato places upon the Cosmos with regard to the good (or ill) of the 
Universe and its contents radically alters the metaphysical requirements, since such a 
position does not necessarily require a metaphysical cause, let alone two. Physical 
causes could alone account for the occurrence of all events. However, such a 
position presents a cosmology radically different from the one Plato envisioned and 
would, given his understanding and assessment of the generated Cosmos and its 
 generator(^),^'^ be viewed as incomplete and as it stood, false. For Plato, physical 
I wish to reiterate my position that Ananke did not have a direct ‘hand’, so-to-speak, in the 
generation of the Universe as did the Demiurge, but rather, was the cause of its pre-generative 




causes were not true causes, as they were entirely dependent on other causes and 
ultimately on higher-order causation outwith the generated world itself or a primary 
cause. 4 1 0  Even the World Soul, which Plato introduced to account for causal 
movement within the generated world, could not account for either its own inception 
or for the generation of the physical world, since generation required not only 
movement, but also ‘nous’ or intelligence, nor could it account for the apparent 
goodness or overall perfection of the generated world of which the World Soul was 
only a part, except in a purely functional way as means to an end, the end being the 
world’s own perfection and existence. The physical world for Plato offered causes 
only of a strictly physical and accessory nature and because of this, represented for 
him an incomplete, although important, part of the cosmic assay. This required that 
Plato look elsewhere, outwith the generated cosmos, to find causes of a non-physical 
nature which could account not only for the generation of the Cosmos, but also for its 
goodness and perfection, as well as for its residual disorder and dishannony and for 
the source of its ongoing ordered movement once generated. These causes emerged 
as the Demiurge and Ananke outwith the generated Universe and as ‘soul’ later 
infused within in it. 
4.3.6 
One of the principles at work in Plato’s thought was that ‘like generated like’-- 
goodness comes from evil from evil:’* soul from the physical 
‘Like generating like’ - a causal hierarchy 
In the Timaeus Plato does not argue specifically in his cosmology for a ‘First Cause’, but rather, for 
his present purposes, is satisfied with positing two primary causes, with the primal ‘stuff of the 
universe also described as being present in a disordered form at the beginning being described, its 
provenance left unexplained. 
4 ’ 1  ‘Goodness’ was equated with the perfection of the Demiurge, who because of such goodness 
generated all things, which in turn also participated in this goodness (Ti. 29e2-5). 
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from the phy~ical~~~-which idea leads to the next point, namely, that a cosmological 
explanation for Plato had to take into consideration not only that the Universe existed 
(the physical from the physical), moved (soul from Soul) and was beautiful and 
perfectly harmonised (evidence of a perfectly good Demiurge or maker) for the most 
part (which when lacking was evidence of the disordering cause Ananke), but it was 
also reasonable. It is here that Plato’s axiological assumptions again come into play 
and help determine the reach of his metaphysics. What is reasonable415 is deemed by 
Plato to always be better than that which is not, leading to a hierarchy of perfection 
according to the degree to which nous is or is not present in a particular object, 
thereby determining its place within the overarching hierarchy. At the lowest end of 
the causal,41 non-physical hierarchy is Ananke, a pure disordering force containing 
4 1 2  Ti. 29e2-5. Just as the Demiurge, the ordering cause, was the source of the generated universe and 
its goodness, so, too, Ananke was its opposite, which, as the disordering cause and the antithesis of 
perfection, was the source of ‘evil’ or disorder in the Cosmos. 
4 1 3  Ti. 41c2-3. 
Plato’s adherence to the principle of ‘like from like’ is again evident in his requirement that the 
Cosmos was generated from pre-existing material (Ti. 52d4-53a9). The idea of creating something 
from nothing would have contravened that principle. I would suggest, too, therefore, that it is 
precisely because of the firmness with which Plato held this principle that the Demiurge was 
understood by him as having generated, in the sense of having ‘arranged’, the original cosmic 
material, rather than having created it from nothing. In other words, the Demiurge’s act of generating 
or arranging the Cosmos from pre-existing chaos, rather than having created it from nothing, was not, 
as has been argued, because it lacked any sort of power or was not possibly omnipotent-Plato 
already declared that the Demiurge was perfect, which perfection included every good-rather, the 
Demiurge’s course of action would have been because of the very power Plato declared he wielded. 
Thus, just as omnipotence or perfection carries with it the notion and requirement of perfect ordering, 
so too, a hierarchy of being and action would have been put in place to reflect this, which Plato 
adhered to by the principle of ‘like from like’ and which is subsequently carried out within his 
cosmology by the Demiurge, as Nous par excellence, in generating the world as a visible god, 




Causal hierarchy is meant here in the sense of a force for order (the Demiurge) being at one end of 
the hierarchy and a force for disorder (Ananke) being at the other. Thus, while both are forces, they 
are causal opposites with regard to the end they bring about. Although in the Timaeus Plato argues 
that the Demiurge is superior to Ananke for having ordered the Cosmos and for that order prevailing, 
the causal powers presented in Laws X, namely, the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, are 
considered to be on a more equal footing by Plato. Thus, in this later dialogue the Non-beneficent 




no nous, whose presence Plato postulates by the physical chaos he deems was 
requisite for an ordered Cosmos to have taken place and which alone is attributable 
by Plato for all unnatural disorder. At the highest end of this hierarchy is the 
Demiurge, a pure ordering force, from which all nous originates and which alone is 
designated as the source of all natural order. Natural disorder, it should be noted, is 
distinguished by Plato from unnatural disorder in that the former was determined by 
Plato to be part of the ordered pattern of generation and decay, and not brought about 
by Ananke. Likewise, unnatural order is distinguished by Plato from natural order 
by being solely attributable to chance, whereas the latter is attributable to design.417 
Further, whereas Plato does not strictly identify the Demiurge with nous, it is the 
most singular quality attributable to the Demiurge and acts as an umbrella for the 
other qualities or modes attributed to this cause. Thus, whereas the Demiurge is 
described as being good, it is in the degree to which the Demiurge is identified with 
nous that he is judged to be good and which principle of identification also holds for 
the other qualities assigned to the Demiurge. 
In summary, any understanding of Plato’s cosmology which chooses to do away 
with either or both of the Demiurge and Ananke as genuine primary causes has first 
to abandon Plato’s axiology or at the very least, greatly reduce its importance, but in 
so doing, and in both cases, radically reduce its richness and with that, the overall 
robustness which a moral universe, such as Plato’s, offers. Accordingly, to 
understand the Demiurge as representing ‘intelligibility’ in the world andor the 
‘Reason’ in man and nothing more, and hence, as not existing prior to the Cosmos as 
~~~ ~ 
4 ’7  Ti. 28b2-7. 
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the source of its intelligibility and reason, but rather, having existence only in the 
abstract as ‘intelligibility’ itself in an already existing universe (and hence, the need 
for mythic characterisation) is mistaken. Equally mistaken, and again grossly 
reductive, is the view that Ananke is either mechanical motion or disorder in a 
universe that has always existed. Plato flatly denies this latter, arguing from the start 
for a generated Universe ( Y ~ Y O U E V . )  and for the powers, which such generation 
Given the above and prior arguments, I again strongly suggest that 
choosing to interpret either the Demiurge or Ananke as mythic or representational is 
clearly not what Plato had in mind. For in so doing, much of what Plato wrote 
concerning the Demiurge and Ananke as strictly first order causes within his 
metaphysics and physics, and so too, within his axiological account, must be 
abandoned and to the degree that it is, such an interpretation becomes 
misinterpretation. 
4.3.7 
Finally, and importantly where myth is concerned, as part of its literary aspect, 
neither the Demiurge nor Ananke are given proper names as one might expect in a 
mythic account, but rather, these first-order causes are given names which are always 
descriptive of and are limited to their function andor nature. For example, at the 
beginning of the Timaeus (20d-25d), Plato does relate a myth through the ancient 
voice of the poet Solon, where the lost continent is named ‘Atlantis’. It is important, 
Mythic names versus descriptive names 
too, that this myth is told through the eyes of a poet, 
indicative of its status as myth or story-telling, which is 
which for Plato would be 
in contrast to the Timaeus 
4 1 8  Ti. 28b3-7 
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proper where the story of the Cosmos is stressed to be a ‘likely account’ and is told 
through the eyes of an astronomer, deriving from a well-developed science. Another 
example is a myth told at the very end of The Republic, Bk. X (6 14b-62 1 d), where the 
hero is a warrior named ‘Er’. Also within The Republic is the well-known myth of 
the Ring of Gyges in Bk. I1 (359d-360d), where once again, the main mythic 
character, Gyges, is given a proper name. These examples are typical of the myth 
genre as used by Plato in his giving of proper names to the main characters or in the 
case of ‘Atlantis’, to the key mythic feature. 
This is not the case, however, as regards either the Demiurge or Ananke. The 
word ‘Demiurge’ in the Timaeus is essentially a descriptive term (b 6qptoupy6<), 
meaning ‘craftsman’, ‘maker’ or ‘author’, and is not a proper name when used by 
Plato, although functionally the name is apt and is likely the reason why it has been 
widely adopted by scholars when referring to this primary cause. What actually 
takes place in the Timaeus is that the primary ordering cause or ‘Demiurge’ is 
referred to in several different ways by Plato, but none of which are proper names, 
for example, as ‘the God’ (Ti. 30a1, b e&<), as the Constructor (Ti. 29el; ‘He that 
constructed it’: O GWLGT&<), in predicative terms, “he was good” (Ti. 29el: 
&yaeb< fp) and then more directly identified with the ‘good’, as in ‘for Him who is 
most good’ (Ti. 30a7, 067’ EoTt T@ & p h ~ )  and as ‘the Father’ (TZ. 37c7, O 
~ a ~ f p ) ,  with similar varied references continuing to the end of this work. 
’419 This cause is also referred to three times as the ‘Demiurge in the Timaeus. The 
first time it is pronounced by the Demiurge himself, when he announces in a 
See Ti. 4 1 a7-8 and the two subsequent instances at Ti. 68e2 and 69c3. 419 
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markedly dramatic passage that he is ‘kyd 8qpto~py6<’ (Ti. 4 1 a7-8), immediately 
qualifying this by co-joining it with ‘father’ (n;a%fip) and thus further refining the 
meaning. It is clear from this passage, however, that he is putting this descriptive 
forward as an example to the other gods who are being instructed to carry out similar 
‘demiurgic activity in their fashioning of the remaining mortal beings. Thus, it is 
purely as a mode of activity that this term is employed and to this extent it is also 
used in reference to the lesser Gods (Ti. 41c4-5, %QU Z ~ U  @OU 6qptoupyia~). 
What is relevant here is that besides being a ‘Constructor’, the Demiurge is equally 
referred to as a ‘God’ and as being ‘very good’ or ‘the best’. Thus, the name 
‘Demiurge’ by itself would have been far too narrow a term to have properly named 
or fully designated this primary cause. In strikingly similar fashion, the term 
‘6qptoupy6~’ also appears in the later passage at Ti. 68e2, followed closely a third 
time at 69c3, 421 where once again the role of the Demiurge as divine craftsman is 
being emphasised and where the lesser gods are likewise enjoined (%& 6& 6vq%6v 
%QV Y ~ U E G I V  ZO;~ k a ~ 0 6  ~ E U U ~ ~ ~ G L U  8qptoupy&^tv n;po&%at&~). Here, 
too, the Demiurge is referred to as b 6 ~ 0 ~  (Ti. 69b3) when his role as craftsman is 
being singled out, reaffirming Plato’s use of the term ‘6qptoupy6<’ as a descriptive 
rather as than a name. 
7 420 
Ananke (from &u&YK~ ,  meaning ‘force’ or ‘violence’ which causes disorder), on 
the other hand, while equally a primary cause with the Demiurge, but not its equal, is 
captured even less with a descriptive by Plato than the Demiurge, being offered 
Ti. 41c3-6. 420 
42’ See Chapter 5 of Part I. 
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neither exemplary role-model status in the Timaeus, as was the Demiurge, nor moral 
praise. Ananke as a primary cause is referred to by Plato as ‘force’ or ‘necessity’ 
(&v&YK~)  when he wishes to make reference to its causal power (e.g. Ti. 47e6, 61.‘ 
&v&YK?~<) or alternatively, as the ‘errant’ or ‘wandering cause’ (Ti. 48a6-7) when he 
wants to refer specifically to its disordering power. Again, in a previous passage (Ti. 
41b2, K O C K O ~ )  where there is reference to an ‘evil Will’, I have argued that this also 
refers to Ananke. However, references to Ananke are always brief or only hinted at. 
Like the Demiurge, no single term fully captures the identity or essence of Ananke. 
Thus, another atypical feature as regards a mythic interpretation for the Demiurge 
and Ananke in the Timaeus is that not only were these causes not given proper 
names, as was the usual treatment of mythic characters by Plato (and with it, a 
granting of imaginary stability), their designations constantly changed. Thus, what 
descriptive terms were used by Plato when capturing their hnction or essence 
changed as he began anew a fuller or further description of his cosmology. A mythic 
interpretation, therefore, on any of the suggested accounts, cannot be easily or 
consistently sustained. Thus, the divide, I suggest, between the Demiurge and the 
generated cosmos, Ananke and the pre-cosmic chaos, remains metaphysically intact. 
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Chapter 5 
5 TI. 68El-  69C6 
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5.2 Translation 
All these things, then, which had been brought forth in this manner out of Necessity, 
the Maker [Demiurge] of both the most fair and the best amongst the things 
generated took them over when he was begetting the self-sufficient and most perfect 
God, using them422 as subordinate causes of all things, while He himself formed the 
good in all things generated. On which account, then, it is necessary to distinguish 
two kinds of cause, the necessary and the divine, and to seek the divine, on the one 
hand, in all things for the sake of the acquisition of a happy life to the extent that our 
nature allows, while the necessary, for the sake of those things [in which we seek the 
divine], discerning how, without the former, it is impossible to observe by 
themselves alone those divine things after which we make haste, neither, moreover, 
to understand them, nor to grasp them otherwise at all. 
Now that the kinds of causes lie sorted, all ready before us like wood to joiners, out 
of which it is necessary to weave together the remaining speech, let us return once 
again briefly to the beginning and in quick review go over where, up until now, we 
have arrived. At this time it is fitting that we should make an attempt to add to the 
story an ending and climax for what has gone before. For indeed, just as was also 
said at the beginning, all things being in a state of disorder, God worked in 
symmetries, both in each thing with respect to itself and with respect to one another, 
in as many ways it was thought possible to be proportionate and symmetrical. For at 
that time neither did any of these partake of this, except by chance, nor was there 
anything at all worthy to be called like those now named as ‘fire’ and ‘water’ or as 
any of the others: But first of all He set all of these in order, and then out of them He 
generated this universe, one living being having all living beings within itself, both 
mortal and immortal. The divine, the Maker [Demiurge] crafted himself, but He 
appointed his children to work out the birth of the mortal, and they, in imitation, 
having received the immortal principle of soul, . . . . 
5.3 Commentary and Notes 
5.3.1 The generation of man - a causal proem 
This passage forms a final and major transition point in the Timaeus, where once 
again Plato moves forward to a new and this time culminating object of enquiry, the 
In this passage it is the fairest and best amongst things generated which Plato describes the 
Demiurge as using for secondary causes with respect to other things. What makes them best in 
Plato’s overall scheme is their participation in rationality. This is fully in line with his high regard for 
and understanding of rationality and its ends. Accordingly, the more integral something is to a 
specific rational end (and even these are valued, e.g. the pursuit of philosophy is seen as the highest 
end with respect to eyesight as a secondary cause), the higher it will be in the hierarchy of generated 
things, since, with respect to purpose (which is to bring about the particular rational ends which 
constitute a fully rational Universe), it is closer in kind to the Demiurge, who, as ‘nous’ and 
intelligence par excellence, is the ultimate genitor of all rational ends. 
422 
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generation of man. Before doing this, however, Plato recapitulates his present 
position regarding kinds of causes and in so doing slightly revamps his previous 
position regarding ‘Ananke’ and ‘the Demiurge’. This is followed by a brief 
summary of what has gone before. It is now ‘the necessary’ (implying, for the most 
part, the physically necessary, although occasionally the logically necessary) to 
which Plato will refer and not ‘Necessity’ or the primal cause, Ananke. Likewise, 
except for the two references to the Demiurge as &p.oupyb< at the opening and 
close of this passage (which positioning and reiteration reaffirms this God’s place 
always as the ultimate source of generation), it is no longer the Demiurge to which 
Plato will refer in the subsequent dialogue (with the exception of divine praise noted 
in his closing statement), but instead, his references will be in more general terms of 
‘the divine’. Moreover, the Divinities, 01 &o\, the gods generated by the Demiurge 
(his “children”), will likewise drop out of the picture once the generation of man is 
complete. 
This passage, therefore, is essentially divisible into two parts (shown both in the 
Greek and in its translation as two paragraphs). The part first represents Plato’s 
position regarding the kinds of causes operative within the generated cosmos, while 
the second is a summary of his previous position up to this point regarding the 
primordial causes, Ananke and the Demiurge, and their role in the generation of the 
Cosmos. The first passage, however, is prefaced by a brief citing of the primary 
causes, while the second, by an equally brief reference (now that all the causes have 
been named) to the totality of causes. 
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5.3.2 
The change which is effected at this juncture is not a material change. Plato does 
Change, but not a material change 
not alter his original understanding of Ananke as a ‘wandering’ or ‘wayward’ cause 
or of the Demiurge as the ‘generative’ or ‘constructor’ god. These two powers 
remain for him the primary causes. In fact, as noted above, Plato reiterates his 
position with regard to the latter, describing now for the second time the Maker of 
the Cosmos as the 671p10upybq.~~~ The task undertaken by the Demiurge of 
generating the Cosmos is now complete. What are then subsequently presented as 
causes within the generated Universe are described by Plato as kinds of causes or 
causes of a general sort, since both the Demiurge and Ananke as metaphysical causes 
exist outside of all physical causation occurring in place and time. Plato will now 
therefore speak of divine causes when referring to the good in the Cosmos. As such, 
these causes do not refer to either the Demiurge or God, itself, or to the divine or 
gods (the Heavens), whose own task set by the Demiurge will be complete with the 
generation of man. Rather, these divine ends are those things in which man will find 
happiness or the good, and therefore are causal in respect of directing or having 
directed an individual’s actions. 
5.3.3 Ananke poses a problem 
Ananke, on the other hand, poses a problem for Plato. As a primordial 
disordering cause it has been rendered essentially powerless by the Demiurge due to 
the ordering of the Cosmos. Yet, as a true primal cause, it remains a force, albeit, 
one whose role is greatly altered with respect to the generated Cosmos. However, if 
See my discussion in Part I at $4.3.7 423 
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the Demiurge alone brings about the good in the Universe and as a whole, this living 
visible God (the Universe) is completely good, the question remains of where 
Ananke fits into the finished cosmic picture. As a true causal power for disorder, as 
long as there is order, the answer can only be nowhere. However, having been 
subdued by the power and workings of the Demiurge, the idea of a disempowered 
Ananke (or mostly, since individual instances of disorder are still possible), at least 
with respect to its ability to maintain or bring about global disorder, is nevertheless 
borrowed by Plato and its role with regard to the finished Cosmos transformed. He 
now incorporates the name of this disordering cause into the ordered Cosmos, but as 
a term only, symbolic of its submission, using it to describe in general terms the 
accessory or physical causes within the generated Cosmos, causes which, not being 
unmoved movers (i.e. the primary causes) or self-moved movers (‘soul’), have no 
causal power of their own. Up to this point in Plato’s cosmology, although the 
accessory causes had been previously described,424 Plato did not at that time 
associate these causes directly with Ananke, since as a power it had not yet been 
subdued by the D e m i ~ r g e . ~ ~ ~  However, now, with its power relinquished, the force 
alone of Ananke has been borrowed by Plato, thus its submission acknowledged and 
as a final consequence, all future references to the primal disordering cause in the 
Timaeus are abandoned. 
See Ti. 46c3-d7. 424 
425 Ti. 47e3-48a5. 
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5.3.4 A transition - from metaphysical to physical realm 
With the Universe now fully formed and with only the ordering of man left for 
him to describe, Plato chooses to leave the metaphysical realm behind. Accordingly, 
with the exceptions of brief mentions of ‘soul’ in relation to the body, followed by a 
call to the philosophical life lest one should become a woman or animal and a final 
pause for divine exaltation of the Universe as a “visible god, again prefaced by a 
warning to choose the philosophical life, the remaining dialogue, to the end of the 
Timaeus, is written almost exclusively in terms of the physical universe. Thus, with 
the earliest stages of the ordering of the Cosmos over, so, too, is Plato’s mention of 
them. This move to the exclusive realm of the physical world, however, which is 
now complete, requires from Plato a statement of the chief kinds of causes active 
within it in order to carry out the further description of man as fully formed, the 
culminating goal of the Timaeus. This he carries out, but not without some difficulty 
as to the meaning of his terms, leaving room for equivocation by the reader. Plato 
borrows and adapts previously used causal terms, namely, those used for his primary 
metaphysical causes, ‘Ananke’ (or ‘Necessity’) and the ‘God’ (in the above passage 
referred to as the ‘Demiurgos’ or the ‘Demiurge’), re-introducing these same terms 
as ‘the necessary’ and ‘the divine’ respectively, but which are now causes within the 
physical realm. From Plato’s present perspective, it is essential that he discuss only 
the causes active within the generated Cosmos and hence, leave out, except in 
summary passages, all mention of the metaphysical causes from the subsequent 
discussion, since as causes, their provenance and functions are entirely separate. The 
7,426 
426 Ti. 92~4-9 .  
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latter, as metaphysical causes, are entirely outwith the physical realm, having 
conspired in its generation, while the former are integral to it as regards both 
provenance and function. 
5.3.5 
The problem for Plato is to discover and retain a relationship between these 
causes without compromising their integnty both as separate causal powers and as 
separate kinds of causes. To achieve this, he chooses to adapt the causal terms as 
much as possible. Accordingly, his primary causal powers, the Demiurge and 
Ananke, now beget kznds of causes in the generated Cosmos. Ananke, having been 
subdued by the Demiurge and left essentially powerless as a causal force in light of 
the actual generation of the Cosmos, allows Plato to then safely incorporate its name 
for the secondary causes within that Cosmos, having already declared these auxiliary 
causes not to be true causes, i.e. unmoved movers (the primary causes) or self-moved 
movers ( % o u ~ ’ ) , ~ ~ ’  in any event. Thus, as a true causal power for disorder, Ananke 
(Necessity) has been ultimately overridden by the ordering cause, the Demiurge, by 
the very fact of the ordering of the Cosmos. However, the further idea closely bound 
to Ananke, that of brute force, is nonetheless retained by Plato and is later 
resurrected as a kind of cause in the Cosmos, namely, carte the secondary 
Primary Causes versus Kinds of Causes 
The notion of ‘soul’ as a self-moved mover does not fully emerge until Laws X. Rather, in the 
Timaeus the role of the ‘World Soul’ is more that of a ‘moved mover’, where its noetic movements 
have been designed by the Demiurge to bring about particular ends within the generated Cosmos. 
With regard to the human soul, however, also designed, the idea of self-movement, although not yet 
hlly articulated or developed (which will not happen until Laws X), is nonetheless assumed in this 
work to the degree that Plato recognises or assumes choices involving the human ‘will,. 
The ‘necessary’ now acts as a kind of genus for the secondary causes, under which every physical 
process or descriptive category when understood as either a process, e.g. ‘eyesight’, or as the cause of 




or mechanical causes, which he now identifies as ‘the necessary’. The Demiurge, on 
the other hand, remains the principal metaphysical causal power in the generation of 
the Universe and therefore cannot be used by Plato as a kind of cause in the physical 
world. He consequently decides to show its relationship to the Cosmos by referring 
instead, not to the Demiurge, but to ‘the divine’ as causes or good ends in the world 
which man chooses for the sake of his own happiness, which ends in man, according 
to Plato, are produced only by the proper functioning or ordering of the human soul, 
just as the world about him (man) is ordered. These good ends, moreover, whether 
in relation to man’s soul or the world’s soul, have been generated solely by the 
Demiurge or God for their optimum well-being and continuance, as reflections and in 
imitation of its own perfection and immortality. The divine causes in the Cosmos, 
therefore, correspond like-to-like with the Demiurge’s generative handiwork of the 
Cosmos. 
It is essential to note, however, that although the terms ‘necessity’ and ‘divine’ are 
used in earlier passages of the Timaeus, this present passage does not offer a restating 
of any previous position. This would have been fruitless, given that according to 
Plato’s cosmology the metaphysical causes described earlier are entirely outwith the 
Cosmos or physical world they have shaped. Rather, as a preface to his description 
of man, what Plato does is to describe in familiar terms certain aspects of the Cosmos 
already in place. Thus, he now introduces the ‘necessary’ and the ‘divine’ as kznds 
of causes. In so doing, he chooses first to acknowledge the larger picture, of which 
man forms a part and within which he moves, in terms of some of the processes of 
the physical world and a description of their causes. Only then will Plato embark on 
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the final and principal aim of his work, a description of man himself, which he then 
carries out. 
5.3.6 
Thus, a completely new statement coincident with the finished Universe is now 
given, albeit in familiar terms. Plato writes: “on which account, then, it is necessary 
to distinguish two kinds of causes. The account to which Plato is now referring is 
that of thefinished Cosmos, a world capable of being inhabited by man, whom he is 
about to describe in detail. The two kinds of causes referred to by Plato as now being 
in place in the Universe are indeed reflective of and dependent upon the two primary 
causes responsible for the ordering of the Cosmos in the first place-and this is no 
doubt the reason why Plato borrowed these previously used causal terms, namely, to 
retain some carry-over of meaning. Thus, ‘the necessary’ and ‘the divine’ become 
kznds of causal movements linked to, but not the same as, their causal predecessors, 
Ananke (Ne~essity),~~’ the disordering force and the Demiurge or God, the ordering 
force, Plato’s two primal and pre-generative causal beings. 
The finished Universe - a new causal statement 
7,429 
429 Ti. 68e6. 
As explained earlier, although I have retained ‘Necessity’ at certain places as an alternative English 
translation of the Greek word dcu&y~q or Ananke, I have done this chiefly for ease of reference, 
‘Necessity’ having been used by all three aforementioned commentators extensively, regardless of 
whether primary or secondary causes were being considered. The reason I suggest for such broad 
usage by these commentators is its mistaken identity solely with the secondary causes of this passage 
or TO pku &uay~a^tou, Ananke, as a primary cause, having been dismissed early on as myth. As 
suggested at fn. 134, ‘Anarchy’ is a better English translation for the disordering cause Ananke, with 
its inherent meaning of ‘lawlessness’ or ‘disorder’, than ‘Necessity’, the term ‘the necessary’ on the 
other hand being a suitable translation for the secondary causes. The word ‘Anarchy’, however, like 
‘Necessity’, remains somewhat misleading as a name for Ananke, inasmuch it could mistakenly be 
identified with the effect that such a force produces and not with the causal force itself. 
430 
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5.3.7 7C&@UK6Za kc &V&yK?l< - produced out of Anankehecessity 
However, not only is there a carry over or association of prior meaning taking 
place within this passage, there is also a change of meaning occurring here with 
respect to these terms. When introducing this passage Plato allows for the possibility 
of some play on the meaning of his primal causal term, ‘Ananke’ (Necessity). 
Although he states that “all these things” were “produced out of Ananke,” by 
choosing to use the common prepositional phrase kk &v&YK~< ,  which in all its 
subsequent occurrences to the very end of the Timaeus is used exclusively with the 
adverbial meaning of ‘necessarily’, thereby attaching a kind of ‘causal’ necessity (i.e. 
a certain action must take place or else violate a natural law) to the physical 
processes being referred to, the meaning of & V & Y K ~  in this opening remark can be 
read in one of two ways, either as the primal cause, ‘Ananke’, i.e. on account of 
In Ananke having been “persuaded” (subdued) or as the adverb, ‘necessarily. 
either case, the phrase ‘all these things’ refers to the preceding processes which have 
just been discussed by Plato, presented, depending on which reading, either as a 
result of the Demiurge having taken over the visible Universe on account of (‘out 
o f )  Ananke having been first subdued or alternatively, when kc &v&YK‘~~< is read 
adverbially (as with the remainder of the account), so as to stress their dependent or 
mechanical nature. 
7 431 
The meaning of ‘necessarily’ or ‘out of necessity’ for the Greek phrase kc dcudy~qq arises from 
the following line of reasoning: The idea of brute force follows from the idea of a disempowered 
Ananke. The Universe was ordered and the power of Ananke overridden, but not destroyed. 
Consequently, this previously disordering force, now anchored to and overridden by the natural logic 
or presence of ‘nous’ inherent within the ordered Universe becomes a passive tool or accessory causal 
force for that very ordering. Thus, Ananke, in being subdued by the Demiurge, ultimately becomes a 
passive causal tool of Nous within the ordered Universe and its power or force appropriated to causal 
ends, which flow ‘necessarily’ by virtue of the end envisioned. 
43 1 
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Further, while these necessary processes are described earlier by Plato as causes 
(here referred to as “all these things.. .being produced out of Ananke”), such causes 
are not considered by Plato to be true causes, in the sense of directing their own 
movement, but rather, are physical objects moved by and moving other physical 
objects. Thus, besides a change taking place with regard to the meaning of a familiar 
term, a thematic change has also occurred. Accordingly, as regards change of 
meaning, the ‘wayward cause’, Ananke, in being subdued by the Demiurge, has 
become its opposite, the ‘necessarily caused’ (the events of process), which in both 
cases can be expressed by the prepositional phrase &k &v&YK~< .  As to the 
suggested change of theme, Plato’s vision is likewise now earthward. Dropped is his 
interest in the primary causes, Ananke and the Demiurge, and stressed are the 
secondary causes or those which serve another end, namely, the happiness of man. 
These subordinate causes are therefore classed as kznds of causes and named 
respectively ‘the necessary’ and ‘the divine’, thereby becoming at once vestigial 
reminders of their ancient primogeniture in the primary causes, Ananke (Necessity) 
and the Demiurge (the God). 
5.3.8 
Plato presents this thematic change subtly, as is his style in the Timaeus, relying 
on the reader’s previous understanding thus far assumed and then proceeds anew 
from a streamlined conceptual platform towards a new vision within his cosmic 
landscape. He initiates this move, moreover, as he has done previously in the 
Timaeus, by dropping previously depicted cosmological features or players no longer 
zb @U &U~YKCC;OU,  zb &2 e&;OV - the necessary and the divine 
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required. Ananke, for instance, as a brute causal force is not required for the present 
discussion and is therefore dropped. The reason for this is that in his subsequent 
discussion of man, Plato assumes a post-generative Cosmos, in other words, a 
Cosmos in which Ananke has already been subdued or over powered by the 
Demiurge. Assuming any earlier state of the Cosmos, other than a fully realised one, 
would have made the task of describing man a much more difficult one. 
Consequently, the idea of Ananke with its original and full meaning of a disordering 
metaphysical causal power has been laid aside. Its associated meanings, however, of 
chaotic particular movement (which movement has now been ordered to a good 
endhkeeping in mind that initially this disordered movement of mostly incoherent 
mass was all there was to the Universe-and the subsequent causal force of that 
movement (now overpowered) have been broadly retained. Thus, with this shift of 
emphasis from an emerging Cosmos to a fully emerged one, and with only man left 
to fully describe, Plato re-assigns his vocabulary in order to accommodate this move. 
Hence, he now talks of “all these things.. .produced of necessity,” i.e. the effects of a 
subdued Ananke or Necessity or alternatively, the physical processes which occur 
necessarizy after a certain manner, and not specifically of ‘Necessity’, the Wayward 
Cause, itself. Likewise, the Demiurge as a primal cause can only be reminisced 
upon. Instead, it is now ‘the divine’ which Plato will seek to find in the finished 
Cosmos or in other words, that which points to the good and which brings about 
man’s happiness. Thus, this is the first passage in the Timaeus where Plato now 
refers to ‘the necessary’ or ~b p k ~  &UCX~KCX?OU as a kznd of cause, while 
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contrasting it with another kind of cause, the divine or ~b 6k ~ E ~ O U :  6tb 6fi xpfi 
63 dtziaq EYt67.l. 
5.3.9 
It is essential, moreover, when investigating this passage and Plato’s 
understanding of it, that his use of the plural “all these things ...p roduced of 
necessity” in the opening phrase is not ignored, nor his choice of mere association 
with Ananke, rather than direct reference to Ananke, itself. Likewise, his reference 
to the divine as a kznd of cause, rather than to the Demiurge, itself, as a cause, is also 
T a k a  &I) I T & V ~ ~  - ‘Now all these things’ 
important. These are significant markers indicative of the causal aspect which 
Plato’s investigation has now taken, namely, that of the physical realm and as 
indicators of aspect or perspective, are not themselves to be taken as objects of it. To 
make ‘all these things’ objects of his investigation results in this passage being taken 
as a summary passage, which it is not. The summary passage is clearly in the next 
paragraph beginning:” OT’ OGU 61) ~ d c  U ~ U  .T;&KTOOLU. Rather, this first paragraph 
is a continuation of and conclusion to his previous ongoing description of the 
physical processes in a fully working and viable Cosmos, set now as the platform 
from which Plato will soon describe man. 
Similarly, Plato’s declaration that ‘all these things’ form the subordinate causes 
must be explained in light of what he has already proposed regarding such causes. 
His previous explanation concerning the auxiliary causes, therefore, must be taken 
into consideration. What potentially happens when this passage is glossed over is 
that the entire pericope comprised of both paragraphs is then understood as and 
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paraphrased into the singular, with the consequence that ‘all these things’ are then 
wrongly re-interpreted as the effects of a single cause, Ananke. As a further result, 
Ananke is then understood as a subordinate cause to the Demiurge, and ‘all these 
things’ are likewise subsumed as relatively unimportant effects of Ananke. This new 
physical understanding of Ananke as a subordinate cause is then wrongly applied to 
all of the Timaeus by way of the summary in the second paragraph, with the outcome 
that Plato’s metaphysics is essentially abandoned and is now replaced with a purely 
physical explanation of the Cosmos, the exact position which he angnly condemns in 
the To avoid such a misreading, this passage, comprised of two very 
distinct parts, must not be taken in isolation, but must be seen in the light of both the 
content and style of what has gone before, the first paragraph in light of the physical 
processes described over the last several pages and the second paragraph, as a 
summary reminder of Plato’s original metaphysical explanation. Moreover, Plato’s 
lack of reference to Ananke or Necessity as a primary cause in this second paragraph, 
referring now only to the Demiurge as a causal power, is not indicative of the non- 
existence of Ananke. Rather, I suggest, it is a hrther reminder of Plato’s revulsion 
of evil, with as little consideration given to it as possible, since, as he later expresses, 
n;Gu &Q TO &yaebv 1cak6u, TO SE ~ahOu O ~ K  & ~ E T P O V ,  “it is better to devote 
our attention to good than to evil. ”433 
Thus, although there is a change taking place here, the above-noted mistaken 
interpretation wrongly assumes that rather than initiating change at this juncture, 





Plato has simply been sloppy in his writing, not only generally, but also in the 
particulars of his earlier cosmology, as well as with regard to his referents. The 
consequence that ensues, however, is that upon scrutiny new and quite ingenious 
problems are now presented. What exactly are “all these things” constituted of 
Ananke? Moreover, how can Ananke be a subordinate cause within the Cosmos, 
when it has already been presented as a primary cause outwith the generated 
Universe? Further, how is it that without the so-called ‘necessary’ causes, we cannot 
perceive, comprehend or in any way attain our objective. These questions are 
inevitably raised by the above interpretation. Plato, however, has already discussed 
perception or sight, in some depth, under the topic of the subordinate or assistant 
causes, which subordinate causes are quite separate from the primary causes, namely, 
the Demiurge and Ananke. Clearly there is a problem here given the above reading 
in which Ananke is deemed to be the subordinate cause of the Demiurge, rather than 
the second of the two primary causes. 
3434 
Read as written, however, and not glossed over, where in fact ‘all these things’ 
and not the metaphysical cause, Ananke, are deemed to be the subordinate causes of 
the Demiurge, this passage requires no such interpretation to be fully comprehensible 
both in situ and in relation the Timaeus as a whole. A closer inspection of the 
relevant passages supports this view. Very early on in the Timaeus Plato presents 
two primary causes, the Demiurge and Ananke, whereby he gives a likely account of 
the metaphysical basis for the generation of the Cosmos. He gives further summary 
accounts of these causal figures when he plies layer upon layer to the cosmic story as 
Lee, Ti., p. 96. 434 
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he fleshes out its many implications. Although Ananke is described as having been 
subdued by the Demiurge by virtue of the fact that ordering had taken place, at no 
place and in none of the summaries is Ananke ever described as being a subordinate 
cause within the Cosmos. To the contrary, Plato does distinguish what he describes 
in some detail as being the subordinate or assistance causes within the generated 
cosmos. Thus, he first provides an example of an accessory cause beginning at Ti. 
45b2. Here he gives a detailed account of the eyes, presenting them as the physical 
organs for the mechanism of vision, and latterly, a little further on (Ti. 46c7), as a 
prime example of the subordinate or accessory causes, which latter he notes are 
often, however, mistaken for true or primary causes. Prefacing this passage at Ti. 
45a6, Plato further writes: 
They [the gods] set the face in the front thereof and bound within it its 
organs for the all the forethought of the Soul. 
The eyes in this passage, soon after described as accessory causes, are positioned on 
the body for the benefit of the Soul, man’s divine or best part, and the source of his 
beneficence or happiness. Thus, in physical terms, Plato has already stated what he 
will later restate, but now in freshly re-drawn causal terms: 
On which account, then, it is necessary to distinguish two kinds of 
causes, the necessary and the divine, and the divine, on the one hand, to 
be sought in all things for the sake of the acquisition of a happy life to the 
extent that our nature allows, while the necessary for the sake of those 
things [in which we seek the divine]. 
Plato explains that these ‘organs for the sake of the Soul’ or latterly, these ‘necessary 
causes for the sake of the divine’ are not true causal powers, since they (and their 
parts) are purely physical in nature, their causal efficacy depending entirely on 
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movement from without, which the ‘divine’ and irrational powers do not, being 
noetic and anoetic respectively. 
To summarise, it must be ruled out categorically that ‘all these things’ in this 
passage refer to Ananke itself, as nowhere is there reference to Ananke in the long 
section which precedes this opening remark, which remark alludes to and gives 
closure to what has just preceded. Given the text, it is clear that reference is indeed 
being made to the previous section. In this section, beginning at TZ. 65b5 and 
comprised of several smaller passages, Plato gives an account of the sensations that 
occur in particular organs of the body and their causative agents. As in his earlier 
description of the eyes and their related mechanism of vision, these new descriptions 
follow with similar appeal. He therefore first deals with the tongue and the sensation 
of taste, followed by the nose and the sensation of smell, the ears and the sensation of 
hearing, and finally, the eyes and this time round, the sensation, as Plato understands 
it, of colour. He prefaces this entire pericope with an explanation of the physical 
basis of sensation (Ti. 64a2), and within this, offers a further explanation of how 
bodily sensations as a whole give rise to pleasurable and painful feelings. Thus, 
what is to hand is a physical account of bodily sensations as a whole, of their relation 
to pleasurable and painful feelings, and then more specifically, an account of what 
happens within the physical organs themselves to enact these sensations and the 
feelings consequent upon them. How far one should go back within the dialogue to 
encompass the full scope of ‘all these things’ is left up to the reader, the point being 
that the content of ‘all these things’ is in fact all of the physical processes accruing to 
the formation of man and certain of those-the senses-proceeding therefrom. This 
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description, I suggest, therefore, follows from and comprises the whole of the 
organisation of the primordial triangles into the basic elements by the Demiurge, up 
to and including man’s ongoing experience of physical sensations. A further 
description of the mortal parts of the soul (emotion and appetite) will follow later, as 
will the functioning of various internal organs, i.e. the heart, lung, liver, spleen and 
intestines. 
5.3.10 The Markers 
As noted above, there are a number of markers showing Plato’s change in causal 
aspect as he moves from the metaphysical to the physical realm. He has also put into 
place literary markers indicative of this same thematic move. First, this is the last 
time the primal cause ‘Necessity’ is referred to by Plato as a cause, and the first time, 
it is so directly addressed. Instead, the prepositional phrase &k & v & Y K ~ ~ ,  with its 
adverbial meaning of ‘necessarily’, will be solely used for the remainder of this 
work. Second, and similarly, this passage, other than Ti. 41a7-8, presents the only 
other two direct references to the Demiurge (6qptoupybq) with all future references 
being dropped and instead, Plato, in naming his two causes, will now refer 
exclusively to two kznds of causes, namely, ‘the necessary’ (Tb pkV &VayK&oV) 
and ‘the divine’ ( ~ b  6k OEriOll). Thus, in so doing, Plato moves away from the larger 
metaphysical enquiry of his earlier writing and to the end of the Timaeus now 
addresses exclusively a physical description of man, with the metaphysical powers 
refocused and reshaped into general terms relative to the physical sphere. Third, it is 
also noteworthy that along with this move from the metaphysical to the physical, 
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Plato, except for his account of the generation of the sexes, is able to carry out the 
remainder of his discussion primarily in the present, whereas earlier his writing has 
been largely in the historic tenses, indicative of the past. The primary significance of 
this well-marked move from the metaphysical to the physical world of man is 
twofold. Firstly, it cautions against dismissing out of hand Plato's primary causes, 
the Demiurge and Ananke, as merely mythic entities symbolic of their supposed 
physical counterparts. As his writing clearly shows, Plato is more than capable of 
providing physical explanations to phenomena according to the knowledge of his 
time and given this, he has no need to resort to fantastic ones. Equally important is 
the fact that his metaphysical explanations have often so little bearing to physical 
processes that if they are nonetheless so construed, they have to be interpreted as 
mythic and hence, symbolic, to make any sense of them at all. Secondly, and 
singularly important as regards the overall integrity of the work as a literary entity, 
by this move from the metaphysical to the physical, from primary causes to 
secondary causes, from pre-Cosmic chaos to man, Plato is able to complete and thus 
accommodate perfectly the task Timaeus was asked to carry out by Critias, namely, 
7CpGzou hkyetu &px6p&uou &KO zijq TO6 K6qL02) y&u&o&coq, %&h&uz&U 8& 
~ i q  &uepdn;ou 4hc~ tu , "~~  which is to give an account beginning first with the origin 
of the Cosmos and ending with the nature of man. Thus, there is no need now but to 
believe that Plato achieved the fbll complement of his undertaking. 




Of the several passages studied from the Timaeus, this passage in particular (Ti. 
Causal Conclusions - the Commentators: 
68el-69c6) brings to completion the causal views concerning this work of the 
classical commentators chosen for comparison, namely, those of Cornford, Archer- 
Hind and Taylor. Cornford quite rightly divides this passage into a “Conclusion” 
and “Recapitulation, which division I have shown above as two paragraphs. The 97436 
main problem with the conclusion which Cornford subsequently draws, however, is 
that he fails to negotiate the several markers set by Plato in the Timaeus with regard 
to its theme and as a consequence, oversteps the parameters of this work’s 
conclusion. Thus, with regard to the first of these two paragraphs (Ti. 69e-69a) 
Cornford refers to “necessary causes” or “what comes about of Necessity,” 
explaining that according to Plato we must study these as the only way of 
approaching the manifestations of rational purpose in nature. However, as I have 
argued above, Plato does not refer to ‘necessary causes’ in his conclusion here, but 
rather, to ‘seconday causes’ and notably, to those which are of particular interest to 
man, several of which Plato had been discussing over the prior few pages, namely, 
the tongue and taste, the nose and smell, the ears and hearing, the eyes and sensation 
of colour, prefaced in turn by an explanation of the physical basis of sensation, with a 
further explanation of pleasurable and painful feelings. Although Cornford correctly 
observes that the subsidiary causes are the ones being discussed, he obfuscates, 
without sufficient clarification, the ‘necessary’ with the purely ‘secondary’, which 
436 See Cornford, PC, pp. 279-280. 
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latter according to Plato are not true causes at all. I have, however, argued above that 
Plato does in fact introduce a decisive change of theme at this juncture, wherein 
‘Necessity’ as a primary cause drops out and ‘the necessary’ as in the ‘logically 
necessary’ or conditions of process become the focus through to the end of the 
Timaeus, but given this, it is not a thematic move which Plato has visited earlier or 
To the contrary, up to this ’’437 one for which he has been “concerned throughout. 
point Plato has been concerned primarily with the metaphysics of his cosmological 
position, interspersing metaphor with natural accounts to capture the breadth of a 
Cosmos about which he can only speculate (hence, his overall driving vision of a 
‘likely’ account). Moreover, it is a metaphysics that postulates quite candidly at least 
two primal causal figures, Necessity (Ananke) and the Demiurge. Thus, except for 
his earlier discussion of eyesight438 in which he specifically denies that its process is 
truly causal in any way (lacking in self-motion) and subsequently separates this type 
of cause unequivocally from the sort cause which he considers to be a true cause, 
Plato has shown minimal interest in the secondary causes. Moreover, the two kinds 
of causes which he then contrasts in this earlier passage concerning eyesight, 
distinguishing ‘those which, with Mind, are makers of the beautiful and good’ from 
‘those which, being devoid of thought, bring about random disorder each time they 
have nothing in common with the secondary causes. Conversely, the 
secondary or ancillary causes, which Plato subsequently goes into great detail about 
Cornford, PC, p. 279. 
438 Ti. 45b246d3. 
Ti. 46e3-6. These two causal powers are also translated as “those that operate intelligently and 
produce results that are good” and “those that operate without reason and produce effects which are 




later on in the Timaeus through to its end are never random and produce nothing of 
themselves. In the context of this passage concerning eyesight, it and the other 
secondary causes, whose discussion take up the latter part of the Timaeus, form part 
of ‘the beautihl and the good’ and hence, as argued by Plato, are themselves not 
causal, but rather, are the caused. 
A definitive argument against identifying the secondary causes with those that 
“bring about random disorder each time they produce” is that they are ultimately 
traceable by Plato back to the Demiurge as their source, the cause of order and not of 
random disorder. In this regard Plato cites eyesight and the good which it brings 
Mankind440 as exemplary of the secondary causes and enumerates from there other 
important secondary causes in relation to Man, i.e. speech, hearing and the sensing of 
rhythm, all of which are given to Man as “heaven sent ally in reducing to order and 
These, Plato explains, are harmony any disharmony in the revolutions within us. 
given to us by the divinities, who in turn have been generated and instructed by the 
Demiurge to carry out their tasks. A consequence, therefore, of this two-fold tier of 
generation, traceable first to the gods and then back to the Demiurge, is that both 
they (the divinities) and their works (the soul and body of man, and all the secondary 
causes in which they participate) are necessarily wholly good, which goodness, in 
being founded upon the twin notions of reason and intelligence, can in no way be the 
cause of randomness or disorder, its contrary. Hence, Plato writes: 
,944 1 
Plato explains that the god (the Demiurge) invented and gave us (Man) sight (gifted to us through 
the Divinities) in order that we could observe the ordered revolutions of the heavens and in this way 
guide the troubled revolutions in our own understanding (Tz. 47b5-c3). 
440 
Lee, p. 65 (Tz. 47d4-7). 441 
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And with regard to the things before these, concerning bodies according 
to parts of their generation and concerning soul, how, through the agency 
and providence of the gods they were wrought, we must put forth the best 
possible account and thus proceed for these to accordingly be given [Ti. 
44c7-d2]. . . . Of the organs, they first constructed the light-bearing eyes, 
fixing them in place for the following reason [45b3-5]. ... Accordingly, 
these are all assistant causes which serve God who uses them in carrying 
out, as far as it is possible, the idea of the best [46c8-d2]. 
As far as what is not possible, the primordial force Ananke and its residual effects 
are the only cause of unnatural or true disorder within Plato’s cosmology.442 
The brunt of Plato’s prior discussions up to the beginning of this present speech 
concerning the various processes has been almost entirely theoretical or speculative 
in nature, which to list some of the topics, include: ‘being’ and ‘becoming’; whether 
the Cosmos began or always was; the nature of its Maker, ‘the Demiurge’; the reason 
for its generation; the extant materials and existent power, ‘Ananke’, both of which 
the Demiurge had to work and contend; the formation of the body of the world; the 
soul of the world; time; the formation of the first of the living creatures, the celestial 
gods; the traditional Greek gods; the remaining three forms of living creatures, which 
include birds, fish and land animals; the formation and destiny of the human soul; the 
human body; and plants.443 Some of these topics Plato discusses only briefly, while 
For a discussion of the different kinds of order and disorder, see 54.3.5 and $4.3.6 of Part I. 
Plato’s later discussion at Ti. 90el-92c3 of the formation of the sexes, birds, fish and certain land 
animals resulting from the inept behaviour on the part of individual men (i.e. they were not generated 
distinctly by the gods, but instead de-generated into their species from generated man) is, I suggest, 
not a serious discussion by Plato, but rather, is a tongue and cheek account, given the literary markers 
at the beginning of this particular pericope (Ti. 90el-6) and from a philosophical perspective. 
Although a reasonable account is given within this later pericope of the process of reproduction, this is 
a separate matter from that of the generation of the sexes, which latter is largely an historical 
consideration. Plato’s much earlier statement at Ti. 41a7-d3 states that three distinct kinds of mortal 
creatures were generated by the celestial gods so that the cosmos might be perfect. The idea of the 
perfection of the cosmos as the reason for the generation of these creatures (both men and women) 
against this later closing account, a plausibly inserted aside, of the imperfections of men as part of a 
degenerative process for their appearance, are wholly incompatible. Whilst the former is in keeping 
with the overall tenor of the Timaeus in its description of the world as a visible god, supreme in 
excellence and perfection, the latter is not. Moreover, the implicit assumption in the last sentence of 
the earlier passage (Ti. 41d2-3) is that these creatures were capable of proliferating at the outset of 
their generation, in that it is decreed that they should partake of a cyclical pattern, which without 




others, he revisits in greater detail. He stops rather abruptly after discussing vision to 
begin anew with a further metaphysical description in which he separates very 
sharply the secondary causes, such as that just discussed of vision, from the true 
primal causes already mentioned, the Demiurge and Ananke. Thus, acknowledging 
that a body must have a receptacle to receive it, Plato thereby resumes his prior 
metaphysical description, describing now the receptacle of becoming,444 the nature of 
becoming and all change, i.e. the elements understood as qualities, the difference in 
kind between intelligence and true opinion as a basis for postulating the existence of 
‘being’ and ‘becoming’ respectively, followed by a discussion of being and 
becoming as ‘form’ and ‘copy’. Only at this juncture does Plato begin to move into 
the predominantly physical or natural realm, starting first with a discussion of the 
process which takes place between the sexes in order for a full human being to be born, which process 
he later describes in his passage at Ti. 90e6-91d6. This is clearly indicative of the separation of such 
creatures into the two separate sexes at the generative stage, but beyond this assumed fact, Plato 
remains silent. The reason I would suggest for the derisive but fairly jocular banter at the end of the 
Timaeus regarding the degeneration of men into the female sex and other creatures is an unabashed 
call to the philosophical life, which for Plato is a masculine and idealistic venture, and in this respect 
remains Platonic, but clearly, given what has been stated in the Timaeus regarding creatures generally, 
is not part of his cosmology per se. Although Plato does briefly discuss the generation of the sexes 
earlier at Ti. 41d4-42d2, he does so in very similar terms as his later account, first announcing human- 
kind as being of two sexes (in the later account this i s  assumed in his discussion of the reproductive 
processes) and only then, as at Ti. 90el-92c3, instead of attempting a more detailed physical 
explanation, offers instead a brief explanation of the de-generation of men into the two sexes and 
certain animals in the context of the theory of the transmigration of souls. This, I would proffer, 
therefore, like the later passage, is a philosophical and didactic account of the generation of man, 
rather than a physical or historical one, which non-physical and a-historical accounts, following upon 
the heels of the generation of the soul and body respectively, are intended to call the whole of man, 
both body and soul, to the philosophical life. 
With regard to the literary markers, there are two. The first is Plato’s mention that his account of 
the Universe is now complete (Tz. 90e1-3). This is decisive and there is no need to question this 
statement. The second marker lies in what immediately follows (Tz. 90e3-6), which passage Lee has 
captured well in his translation “a brief account along the following lines seems more in keeping with 
the subject” (Lee, Ti. p. 122); see also Cornford, PC, p. 356. In other words, if Plato is going to give 
any further account, it will be more in keeping with his interest in philosophy, rather than that of 
metaphysics or the natural world, which accounts are now complete, thus bringing Timaeus’s 
discussion full round to that of philosophy. Plato’s discussion of plants, on the other hand, is 
reasonable given his account thus far and therefore is to be taken at face value. 
The closest of which is the modem motion of ‘space’. 444 
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primitive chaos, followed by a long description of the formation of solid bodies fi-om 
basic triangles, from which he then turns to his description of the physical basis of 
sensation and the organs of sensation, etc., bringing the reader full forward to the 
present passage, soon to be crowned by the formation of man, and which physical 
processes Plato will remain primarily vested to the end of the T i r n a e ~ s . ~ ~ ~  
‘The necessary’ in this passage (TO p&v & u o ~ ~ K o ~ ’ ~ v ) ,  therefore, whose meaning 
is consequently summed up adverbially within the context of the prepositional phrase 
kk &v&yKqq (‘necessarily’ = the logically necessary or end result of process) 
through to the end of the Timaeus, while far removed from the original causal figure 
‘Necessity’ or more precisely, ‘Ananke’, with its inherent meaning of disorder or 
‘anarchy’ from the earlier passages dealing with Plato’s metaphysical theory, it is 
equally distanced from Cornford’s understanding of it as a ‘necessary cause’. 
5.3.1 1.2 Archer-Hind 
Archer-Hind’s understanding of this passage with regard to ‘the necessary’ is 
similar to that of C ~ r n f o r d . ~ ~ ~  Thus, although Archer-Hind correctly identifies ~b 
p&v & V ~ ~ K O ~ U  as referring to the class of secondary causes, rather than to the 
‘necessary causes’ of Cornford’s reading, like Comford, he fails to explain how this 
is so. In other words, Archer-Hind fails to explain how &v&yKq completely gives 
Although Plato will still refer to God (the Demiurge), his ‘sons’ (the celestial divinities), ‘things 
divine’ and the human soul, notably at Ti. 68el-72d8, he does so specifically with reference to what 
he will describe as the ‘mortal’ parts of the tripartite soul, namely, the emotive and appetitive or 
sensual parts and how these are placed and interact with the organs of the body, while also giving 
brief mention to the divine part of the soul in comparison. The dualism which Plato’s account 
espouses in embracing both a metaphysical and physical basis is not philosophically problematic for 
Plato. Rather, the latter requires the former in Plato’s theory, in other words, the physical Cosmos is 
incumbent upon such a metaphysical basis and therefore both are philosophically necessary, 
regardless of the attendant difficulties for human understanding. 
446 A-H, TP, pp. 252-253. 
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way to the idea of TO ... & U ~ ~ K C X ~ O V  given Plato’s earlier metaphysical description 
and strong injunction against understanding these secondary causes as truly causal. 
The consequence of this reading is that Archer-Hind, like Cornford, assumes the 
same meaning for the causal force & V & Y K ~  as it appears or is referred to in the 
whole of the preceding text of the Timaeus as what is now understood for TO ... 
&VayKa’kv, in this latter, quite different closing section of the Timaeus, where 
metaphysics has given way to physics or the study of the natural world. What 
follows from this move is that, along with Cornford, Archer-Hind greatly extenuates 
Plato’s grounding metaphysics in the light of this ~nderstanding.~~’ Moreover, 
Archer-Hind’s reading of ~ d c  T ~ V  dt~iov Y & U ~  at Ti. 69a6 as ‘secondary causes’, 
rather than ‘kinds of causes’, is not a correct translation and further exacerbates the 
problem of retaining Plato’s full cosmological causal account, which account 
includes not only secondary causes, but also the primary causes, which latter are 
specifically recalled at the beginning of this passage, namely, Ananke and the 
D e m i ~ r g e . ~ ~ ’  The main problem with failing to include these previously drawn 
metaphysical causal powers and not just the secondary causes into the summary 
passage which next follows is that a mythical or metaphorical reading of the true 
causal powers, the Demiurge and Ananke, inevitably follows, since these causal 
powers are no longer included as ‘wood for the joiner’ in the retelling and final 
telling of the story of the Cosmos. Thus, in the wake of such a reading, the whole of 
the Timaeus is then reinterpreted in this light and the secondary causes become 
See Archer-Hind’s alternative translation of Ti. 69a-70d in his running notes on p. 253. Here he 
fails to distinguish kinds of causes generally fiom the specifically secondary kind in this further 
recounting of the early generation of the Cosmos. 
447 
See Ti. 68e1-2. 448 
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inured with a causal importance which Plato has already not only soundly rejected, 
but explicitly denied.449 Although Archer-Hind is quite right in noting the 
importance and interest which Plato now gives to the secondary causes or the 
“investigation of phenomena as a means of attaining to higher truths or ‘the 
divine’, this is not of causal importance, but rather, it is one of means to an end. In 
assigning importance to the world of becoming, Plato, for the first time, is giving to 
the world of phenomena a purpose and hence, value, in the overall scheme of human 
happiness, which hitherto has been absent. It is noteworthy in this respect, however, 
that contrary to Archer-Hind’s further explanation that this is an injunction to study 
the copy in order to get to the form or in Aristotelian terms, to study particulars in 
order to gain knowledge of the ideal, Plato does not refer here to the Forms or to any 
of his previous theory in this respect, but rather, he stops short of this, referring now 
only to ‘the divine’, ~b &‘bl). Thus, he states that for mankind to attain ‘the divine’, 
wherein consists the happy life, and to the degree that it is possible for him to do so, 
there is no other way for him to achieve this goal except through the study of the 
world of change or physical process, in other words, he must study the natural world 
with its plethora of secondary causes. What the ‘divine’ specifically refers to in this 
passage is not further explained by Plato, but what is clear is that it something which 
can be observed apart from the phenomenal world by some sort of mental abstraction 
and can also be understood or apprehended through such study. Moreover, the 
divine is desirable, as something after which ‘we make haste’. In this respect, Plato 
7,450 
Ti. 46c7-e6. 449 
450 A-H, TP, p. 253. 
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appears to move beyond earlier passages in the Timaeus, where the divine is drawn 
up in more restricted terms as having a direct correlation with the ‘Soul’ or the best 
part of a man. In the light of Plato’s consideration in this present passage of the 
secondary causes as the sole medium through which we attain to the divine, it is not 
surprising that at the end of the Timaeus, immediately following his explication of 
the various secondary causes and their effects, he should remind his readers, through 
his allegory of how the sexes451 and creatures other than man came into being, that 
the philosophical life must be the end of such study and nothing short of this, lest the 
hapless student of these degenerates into a lesser being. 
5.3.11.3 Taylor 
Taylor’s approach to the passage at Ti. 68el-69c6 is largely dependent upon his 
understanding of the earlier passage at Ti. 48al ff. Although he correctly understands 
the Demiurge in this previous passage as the true cause of the o b p a ~ 6 ~  or Cosmos, 
his interpretation of Ananke as 
a collective name for the sum-total of the ‘conjunctions’ or ‘collocations’ 
which we have to accept as so much ultimate and unexplained bare fact- 
as conjunctions, to use Hume’s phrase, in which we can see no 
‘connexion’-because we4j2 cannot see what they are g o o d f ~ r . ~ ~ ~  
Within this second explanation of how the sexes came about (Ti. 90e6-9 1 d6; see also 4 1 d4-42d2), 
Plato includes this time round a reasonable account of the process of physical reproduction. However, 
his comment upon entering into this explanation that ‘it is reasonable to suppose’ ( K O I Z ~  hoyov) that 
the first generation of men who lived cowardly or immoral lives were reborn in the second generation 
as women is not reasonable given what he has assumed and said earlier in the Timaeus (see my 
comments within the previous footnote on the sexes). Its obvious unreasonableness and lack of 
historicity is why, I would suggest, Plato has said this, namely, as a marker that what he is saying is 
not to be taken as a reasonable part of his explanation, but rather, is a tongue-in-cheek aside given for 
other purposes than for its purported rationale of explication, i.e. is a part, the final part, of his 
extended exhortation to follow the philosophical life. 
45 I 
The italics are Taylor’s own. 




is highly interpretative with regard to the text, which at best leaves Ananke 
unexplained and at worst, is wrong. I have argued with regard to this prior passage 
that Ananke is as truly causal as the Demiurge, but that it is a disordering cause, not 
an ordering one, and as such, is the cause of all disorder before the Universe was 
ordered, is the cause of all remaining disorder within the ordered Cosmos and is also 
the cause of any unnatural disorder thereafter. Given this, Taylor is quite correct in 
since stating that God (the Demiurge) is the “true ‘cause’ of the obpa~bg, 
Ananke has no ordering power whatsoever, leaving the Demiurge alone to order the 
Cosmos, having overridden, by the very fact of the existence of the ordered Cosmos, 
the disordering power-for the most part-of Ananke. Unlike Cornford and Archer- 
Hind, moreover, Taylor has not obfuscated Ananke with the secondary causes, TO ... 
& U ~ ~ K C X ? . O U  , in the later passage at Ti. 68el-69c6 now under discussion. Thus, the 
secondary causes in this passage, at least initially, remain distinct from Taylor’s 
“ultimate and unexplained bare fact.” 
”454 
However, this does not long remain the case. Taylor is very quick in assuming an 
identification between this earlier ‘unexplained bare fact’ and the later subsidiary or 
secondary causes at Ti. 68el-69c6. The former is assumed to be the latter. A 
problem with such an identification is that in many, if not all, of the cases where the 
‘secondary causes’ are so identified by Taylor, these same accessory causes are 
explained quite well in the Timaeus. In other words, mankind has an immediate and 
quite controlling command and understanding of secondary causes, so much so that 
Plato complains that these causes are often attributed with powers which they do not 
Taylor, PT, p. 491. 454 
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have.455 Thus, I would argue that Taylor has made an illicit ‘leap of faith’ in his 
understanding, namely, from “unexplained bare fact’’ to the idea of the subsidiary 
cause or ‘the necessary’, which move, moreover, his initial understanding of Ananke 
does not sustain. 
Taylor’s reason for doing so, nonetheless, remains curious. He suggests that 
Plato’s character, Timaeus, recognises that “faith has its legitimate place in our view 
Thus, such a move is a call to ‘faith’. of the world, no less than demonstration. 
Further, by immediately suggesting that there is no ultimate dualism between God 
and the ‘subsidiary causes’ and also, that the obpa~bq or Cosmos is imperfect by 
it is way of it being generated and not “from any ‘radical evil’ in its ingredients, 
clear that Taylor has now ultimately identified the secondary causes with Ananke, 
wherein he is rejecting certain interpretations of the latter and is at the same time 
assuming identification of the causal power Ananke with ‘the necessary’, TO ... 
& u ~ ~ K ~ ? . o v ,  or secondary causes of this later pa~sage.~” 
7,456 
”457 
Finally, with regard to the %hq or ‘wood’ at Ti. 69a6, following upon the above- 
noted identification of Ananke with ‘the necessary’, Taylor affirms this identification 
when he writes: 
455 Ti. 46c7-d4. 
Taylor, PT, p. 491. 
See Taylor, PT, p. 499. It is highly unlikely that at Ti. 69d1, when Plato refers to ‘pleasure’ as 
being the “strongest lure to evil,” what he really means here is that pleasure is the “strongest lure to 
secondary causes.” However, Taylor’s ultimate interpretation of & v & y ~ q  as merely an early 
reference to ‘the necessary’ or the secondary causes, leaves him with this very odd reading. 
Moreover, Taylor avoids answering this call, preferring to refer to K ~ K O ~  as ‘sin’ or ‘moral mischief 
than to its basic meaning of ‘evil’, but again, the question of the connection of ‘moral mischief to 
secondary causes is left unasked and unanswered. 
456 
457 
Taylor, PT, p. 492. 458 
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The Ghq we have before us is the two kinds of cause, the primary, God, 
and the subsidiary, d t ~ d t y ~ q . 4 " ~  
Although this metaphor describes the requisite causes as now lyng before us as 
'wood to the joiner', at this juncture Plato does not move immediately back into his 
ongoing description of 'the necessary', but offers first this brief reference to the 
whole of his causal position, followed by a summary survey of the metaphysical or 
pre-Cosmic state. I would suggest, therefore, given Plato's previous treatment of all 
the causes up to this point, that, if he had wanted to distinguish not merely kinds of 
causes but specifically two kinds of causes, he would have done so:@ enumerating 
and specifying these causes here also. Rather, I would suggest, that what Plato is 
doing here is making a general statement concerning the various causes before 
introducing his final summary passage and then resuming his explanation of the 
secondary causes. Moreover, Plato's choice in the prior paragraph (of this pericope) 
of referring to the secondary cause as 'the necessary', TO ... & u ~ ~ K ~ ? o u  and not as 
a o u ~ a t ~ i a  or subsidiary cause as he had done earlier,46' is significant, but not as a 
signal to amalgamate this later meaning with the previously discussed primal cause, 
Ananke, rendering the latter as non-existent, but rather, to distinguish it from 
Ananke, which disordering cause has, for the most part, been subdued with respect to 
the generated Cosmos. Thus, Plato has now placed his readers entirely within the 
realm of that completed Cosmos, where neither primal cause, not the Demiurge or 
Ananke, have an active role. Instead, what now become significant to man in Plato's 
459 Ibid. p. 493. 
68e6: 6to 6Q xpQ 66 a'tziaq E%T 6topirEcr8at. 
461 See Ti. 46c7-e6; in the last line at 46e6 Plato also uses the alternate Greek term: o ~ p p ~ z a h t a  
for the secondary cause. 
See Ti. 46e3: ~ E K T & ~  pku &p@bz~pa ~a zGu ~ 'LTLGV y k q ;  see also the above passage at Ti. 460 
254 
cosmology are ‘the necessary’ and ‘the divine’, vestiges each of their more powerful 
primal source, through and to which man must learn and journey to find his present 
and ultimate happiness. 
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PART I1 
COMMENTARY on LA WSX 
The ‘Ananke’ (Necessity) and ‘Demiurge’ Dichotomy 
and a Journey into ‘Soul’ 
INTRODUCTION 
The Laws, BookX 
The passages relating to & U & Y K ~  in Book X from The Laws by Plato or as I argue, 
relating to a thoroughly overhauled, but at the same time derivative understanding of 
&u&YK~ ,  will be presented in the order in which they appear. This is in keeping 
with Plato’s written intention at the outset of Laws X to build an explicit argument 
against impiety462 and in so doing, present a polemic463 which might lead to the 
conversion of or at least reflection by the impious. The passages chosen are at least 
indirectly related, either individually or together, to the notion of & V & Y K ~  as it 
appears in 47e3 - 48d6 of the Timaeus and as argued for in Part I of this thesis. 
However, should any ideas mentioned in Laws X be found to relate directly to the 
above notion of &u&YK~ ,  it and their relevance will be noted and explained. 
The basic translation of the text from Laws X is that of A. E. T a y l ~ r , ~ @  with 
comparisons also made with those of Trevor S a ~ n d e r s ~ ~ ~  and Thomas Pangle466 
where their translations diverge. These ultimately present no significant difficulties. 
An original translation of the whole of these passages, therefore, will not be given. 
462 Laws X, 887 (Laws, hereafter abbreviated Lg.). 
464 Taylor, The Laws of Plato, Book X ,  pp. 274-304 passim. 
465 Saunders, (Plato) The Laws, Book 10, pp. 4 10-447 passim. 
Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Book X ,  pp. 280-3 1 1 passim. 
Lg. 907. 463 
466 
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Should a specific word or section of a passage come into question, however, the 
original Greek and its translation will be examined with respect to that particular 
pericope. 
In Book X of the Laws & u & Y K ~ ,  or a close cognate or derivative, appears 17 
times. All of these instances represent the ordinary, conversational use of this word 
as it had developed over time and do not refer to the primal disordering cause, 
Ananke. Accordingly, & U & Y K ~  is variously translated and understood from the 
different contexts and in its various forms in this work as indicating some degree of 
necessity or force, but not in any metaphysical or causal sense. The form and 
meaning of the word ‘ananke’ as it appears in BookXcan be listed as follows: In its 
nominal form (&u&YK~ )  used as a modifier, ‘to be sure’, ‘bound’, ‘must’ (= 
‘necessarily’), ‘is sure’ (Lg. 887~8,  896e1, 898e4, 899a5); in a nominal phrase, ‘they 
cannot be dispensed with’ ( U ~ U  & & U & Y K ~  = ‘are now necessary’) (891b4); a verb 
form (&u~~K&(owIu),  ‘are forcing’ (887e9); in a prepositional phrase (kc 
&~&yKq<), ‘inevitable’ (889c1/2); ‘must’ (892a7, 895a8), ‘(is) bound’ (898~3); the 
nominal form (&u&YK~)  used as a one-word indication of strong and necessary 
agreement, ‘Why, necessarily’, ‘Inevitably so’, ‘No doubt, we must’ (892b2, 896d4, 
900e5); as an adverb ( & u ~ ~ K c x ~ < ) ,  ‘necessarily’ (895b5); and finally, as an 
adjective ( & u ~ ~ K c x ’ ~ u ) ,  ‘in the consequence’ (= ‘unavoidable’), ‘to be sure’, 
‘inevitably’ (896d5, 905e2, 906~8).  These passages will not be explicated with 
respect to the Greek word &u&YK~ ,  since at this later stage of Plato’s writing any 
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metaphysical rendering of this word has significantly diminished or di~appeared.~~’ 
What does become metaphysically significant, however, with regard to the powers of 
‘order’ and ‘disorder’ as primal forces in their own right or as discussed in Part I, the 
primary causes in the form of the Demiurge and Ananke as found in the Timaeus, is 
Plato’s understanding in Laws X of vqq or ‘soul’. It is within the developed 
notion of ‘soul’ as a self-moved mover found in Laws X that Plato passes on the idea 
of causal power. Thus, primary causal power now takes the form of Beneficent and 
Non-beneficent Soul(s) and human causal power takes the form of individual souls 
either departing from or aligning themselves with the Beneficent Soul (the ordering 
Soul), which by the end of this work is referred to as ‘God’ or alternatively, with the 
Non-beneficent or disordering Soul. It is this elevated and transformed notion of 
 SOU^' which Part I1 of this thesis will explore and discuss. 
As already seen in the Timaeus, when Plato leaves aside the purely metaphysical background of the 
generation of the Cosmos, concentrating thereafter solely on the physical description of certain of its 





1 LG. 887C5 - 888A2 
1.1 Original Greek 
A@. EbXOU pot ~ O K E ~  :pa ah&iv 0 h 
1.2 Translation 
The earnestness and passion of your speech are, I feel, an invitation to prayer; they 
leave no further room for postponement of the argument. Come then; how shall we 
plead for the existence of gods dispassionately? To be sure, no man can help feeling 
some resentment and disgust with the parties who now, as in the past, impose the 
burden of the argument on us by their want of faith in the stones heard so often in 
earliest infancy, while still at the breast, from their mothers and nurses- stones you 
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may say, crooned over them, in sport and in earnest, like spells-and heard again in 
prayers offered over sacrifices, in conjunction with the spectacle which gives such 
intense delight to the eye and ear of children, as it is enacted at a sacrifice, the 
spectacle of our parents addressing their gods, with assured belief in their 
existence, in earnest prayer and supplication for themselves and their children. 
Then, again, at rising and setting of sun and moon, they have heard and seen the 
universal prostrations and devotions of mankind, Greeks and non-Greeks alike, in 
all the varied circumstances of evil fortune and good, with their implication that gods 
are not fictions, but the most certain of realities, and their being beyond the 
remotest shadow of a doubt. When we see all this evidence treated with contempt 
by the persons who are forcing us into our present argument, and that, as any man 
with a grain of intelligence will admit, without a single respectable reason, how, I 
ask, is a man to find gentle language in which to combine reproof with instruction in 
the initial truth about the gods-that of their existence? Still, the task is to be faced; 
. . .  
1.3 Commentary and Notes 
1.3.1 An argument against impiety 
This passage vividly portrays Plato’s impassioned plea against impiety that offsets 
Laws X. This work bears little resemblance to the Timaeus except in being a later, 
and possibly his last, work. Whereas in the Timaeus the existence of the gods is 
assumed as a premise at the outset of his cosmology and throughout that work, in 
Laws X Plato positions himself to argue for their existence against all naysayers. 
However, the decision to enter into rational debate against the contentious arguments 
of non-believers requires from Plato a more developed notion of ‘soul’. As a 
consequence, the idea of soul as originally presented in the Timaeus now appears 
greatly transformed.468 Plato has moved away from the notion of ‘soul as generated’ 
to that of ‘soul which generates’. This will be discussed in some depth later. 
Moreover, this move in Laws X to the idea of soul as a causal force makes no amends 
for its impingement on other metaphysical features in the cosmic scheme of things, 
468 This understanding of soul differs not only from that found in the Timaeus, but from other earlier 
works as well, e.g. The Republic. 
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notably Plato’s earlier understanding of the primary causes, the Demiurge and 
Ananke, as the primary causal forces. As I have previously argued with respect to 
the Timaeus, only these two causes have any true causal power for Plato. Thus, any 
implications arising from the developed notion of soul now taking place in Laws X 
must be carefully examined. 
The causal scope in Laws X, therefore, appears to have broadened. Causal powers 
previously given only to the primary powers, the Demiurge and Ananke, in the 
Timaeus, and only secondarily to ‘soul’ through its generation and sharing in ‘nous’, 
are now delegated exclusively to soul, with no mention given to either its source or 
to generation. In order to avoid conhsion, therefore, ‘soul’ in Laws X must be 
understood in the light of Plato’s earlier metaphysical assumptions regarding 
causality found in the Timaeus. 
1.3.2 
Plato sets out fiom the beginning of Laws X to defend the gods in whom the 
legislators would have the world believe. He attempts to prove that there really are 
gods, that they are not detached from human concerns and that they are “too good to 
be diverted from the path of justice by the attraction of gifts, which beliefs, Plato 
contends, have led to the wilful choosing of “unhallowed deeds and lawless 
discourse.” In particular, Plato seems to be directing his arguments against the 
opinions of the “first-rate poets, orators, prophets and priests, and countless others,” 
who encourage and incite such moral di~order.~” Thus, to a large extent Laws Xis  a 
The Cosmotheogony of Laws X 
9,469 
Lg. 885c5-e6. 469 
470 Ibid. 
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polemic, centred round a philosophical discussion. A necessary question to raise, 
therefore, is to ask in what ways this cosmotheological discussion, written perhaps 
up to thirty years later than the Timaeus, presents new philosophical material, 
specifically metaphysical material, beyond that of the Timaeus. It is also necessary 
to assess the quality of this material and its impact on our understanding of the causal 
powers, the Demiurge and Ananke. 
1.3.3 
In the Timaeus Plato offers no arguments for the existence of God or the 
Demiurge. This is a given upon which his cosmology rests, derived, albeit, from the 
logical assumption that all organised objects of becoming, including the Cosmos, 
must have a maker. Likewise, whereas Plato acknowledges the presence of Ananke 
as a disordering power before the generation of the Cosmos, its existence is assumed 
and not argued for. Thus, according to Plato’s metaphysical scheme, not only 
ordered objects, but also disordered objects of becoming must have a power behind 
their existence. In one sense, therefore, the Timaeus is more ‘theological’ than Laws 
X, taking as its basic premise that there are two primal powers, first, a powerful, 
designing god or Demiurge, supreme over all, including both the lesser gods4’* and 
the Universe which it has generated and second, a less powerful, non-generative, 
disordering primal force, Ananke, responsible for all disorder both before and after 
the Universe came into being. In contrast to the Timaeus, however, Plato does not 
take the gods for granted in Laws X, but rather, sets out, as one of his three primary 
A comparison with the Timaeus 
~ 
Although Plato discusses in some detail the generation by the Demiurge of the Heavenly Gods (the 
sun, moon, stars and planets, etc), he also acknowledges quite separately in the Timaeus the existence 
of the traditional gods, but offers little explanation or comment about them. 
47 1 
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goals, toprove that they (at least two) The number of gods is not at issue in 
Laws X. In this dialogue it is the fact of the gods’ existence, all gods, which has been 
questioned and accordingly, it is their rejection that Plato wishes to adamantly 
oppose as being irrational. 
To this end, in Laws X Plato offers four preliminary arguments for the existence 
of the gods, beginning with (1) the cosmological (Lg. 886a2-5): observance of the 
earth, the sun and the planets, and the ordering and beauty of the seasons, the 
implication being that there is design and hence, intelligence and care behind this. 
He also offers three further dialectical argument~,4’~ namely: (2) the belief that all 
mankind, Greeks and non-Greeks alike, believe in the gods, thus, an argument from 
number; here, true belief, in this case the observance that all mankind believes in the 
gods, is allowed to function as a dialectical axiom or unproved, single proposition 
argument-not everyone can be wrong (ibid.); (3) an argument from tradition: “the 
spectacle of our parents addressing their gods, . . .they have heard the universal 
prostrations and devotions of mankind” (Lg. 887d-e), similar to argument (2) above; 
and (4) an argument from faith: non-believers lack faith (Lg. 887e); ‘faith’ or true 
belief itself (in the gods), again, an unproved proposition (dialectical axiom), is 
accepted as the basis of this argument. In this way Plato leads up to what he 
472 Lg. 896e4-7. Reference is made in this passage to at least two souls (“we must not assume fewer 
than two”), rather than to two gods. From the ensuing argument, however, it is clear that these souls, 
because they are self-moving, are identified by Plato as ‘gods’. 
473 As distinguished by Aristotle, this is reasoning which proceeds syllogistically from opinions 
generally accepted, whereas demonstrative reasoning begins with primary and true causes. However, 
for Plato, dialectic, strictly speaking, is the science of first principals, differing from the other sciences 
by dispensing with hypotheses. It forms the basis from which the other sciences proceed and for 
which there is no proof. True opinions as objects of belief or faith, however weak (with respect to 
evidence) or scanty (as to content), would for Plato point to the truth of that which they profess. Thus, 
arguments (2), (3) and (4) above remain as arguments, however unsatisfactory, in favour of the 
existence of the gods, given this understanding. 
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considers his most persuasive argument in support of the “old traditional belief of the 
being of the gods [Lg. 890d1,” namely, ( 5 )  his argument for the primacy of soul. He 
soon begins to present this fifth and final argument, taking him through to the end of 
Laws X. Thus, it is argued, as “elder-born than all bodies [that is, ‘soul’] and prime 
source of all their changes and transformations [Lg. 892a1,” all that is akin to soul 
must therefore be prior to all that is proper to bodies. Plato supports his position by 
defining ‘soul’ in terms of ‘being alive’ or ‘self-movement’ (Lg. 896a4). By this 
identification ‘soul’ is then assumed to be the source of all movement and therefore 
prior to the bodies being so moved (Lg. 896b1-4). The soul, moreover, which has 
control over the heaven and earth and their whole circuit is described as the 
‘supremely good soul’ (Lg. 897~7).  Hence, Plato argues that this soul and other 
soul(s), which direct the universe by inhabiting bodies like animated beings, give 
evidence that all things are “full of gods’’ (Lg. 899b2-8). 
1.3.4 
This passage is important in presenting an introduction to the context of Plato’s 
later discussion of ‘soul’ in Laws X. Although proof of the existence of the 
‘wayward cause’ (Ananke) as depicted in the Timaeus is not specifically enjoined- 
proof general& of the existence of the gods is-it is within the subsequent key 
discussion of soul that Plato will make reference to a ‘non-beneficent soul’, thereby 
re-introducing the notion of evil and providing a link to its predecessor (Ananke) 
from the Timaeus. The nature and extent of this link in relation to the individual 
ontologies of each of these sources of ‘evil’ (i.e. Ananke and the ‘non-beneficent 
Comment on Lg. 887~5 - 888a2 
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soul’) or as regards a possible sharing of identity will become crucial. Initially, 
however, Laws X gives little mention to the notion of evil save indirectly in terms of 
‘evil fortune and good’ (&b O U ~ @ ~ C X ~ S .  . . K ~ L  &b &bn;payia~~, Lg.887e4-5). It 
remains for later passages, beginning at Lg. 896d5-8, as the concept of soul is 
presented and then developed to include the notion of evil, that the sources of 
misfortunate and good luck are brought to bear on Plato’s metaphysics. 
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Chapter 2 
2 LG. 895310 - 897B5 (omitting Clinias’ perfunctory responses) 
2.1/2 Original Greek and Translation 
Well, then, what is the definition of the thing for which soul is the name? Can we 
find any but the phrase we have just used, ‘the motion which can set itself moving’? 
(Clinias has just sought affirmation that what the Athenian means is that sod has 
self-movement as its definition:) 
I do. But if this is indeed so, is there anything we can de~iderate:’~ anything further 
towards complete demonstration of the identity of soul with the primal becoming and 
movement of all that is, has been, or shall be, and of all their contraries, seeing it has 
disclosed itself as the universal cause of all change and motion? 
~~~~~~ ~ 
‘Desiderate’ has the meaning of ‘to still want.’ Thus, this passage might read, “I do. But if this is 
indeed so, is there anything we can still want, etc.” Saunders translates this passage: “I do. And if 
this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is 
identical with the original source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things 
and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in 
everything [p. 4261.” 
414 
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Then must not the motion which, wherever it arises, is induced by something else, 
but never confers the power of self-motion on anything, come second in the scale, or 
as low down as you please to put it, being, in fact, change in a truly soulless body? 
Consequently it will be a right, decisive, true and final statement to assert, as we did, 
that soul is prior to body, body secondary and derivative, soul governing in the real 
order of things, and body being subject to governance. 
But we have not, I imagine, forgotten our earlier agreement that if soul could be 
proved older than body, the characters of soul must also be older than those of body. 
And so moods and habits of mind, wishes, calculations, and true judgments, 
purposes, and memories, will all be prior to physical lengths, breadths, and depths, in 
virtue of the priority of the soul itself to body. 
267 
Hence we are driven, are we not, to agree in the consequence that soul is the cause of 
good and evil, fair and foul, right and wrong; in fact of all contraries, if we mean to 
assert it as the universal cause? 
Well then, if indwelling soul thus controls all things universally that move anywhere, 
are we not bound to say it controls heaven itself? 
(ix) Lg. 896e4 - 896e6 
And is this done by one single soul, or by more than one? I will give the answer for 
both of you, 'by more than one'. At least we must assume not fewer than two, one 
beneficent, the other capable of the contrary effect? 
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So far, so good. Soul, then, by her own motions stirs all things in sky, earth, or sea 
(and the names of these motions are wish, reflection, foresight, counsel, judgment- 
true or false-pleasure, pain, hope, fear, hate, love), stirs them, I say, by these and 
whatever other kindred, or primary, motions there may be. They, in turn, bring in 
their train secondary and corporeal movements, and so guide all things to increase 
and decrease, disgregation and integrati~n,~’~ with their attendant characters of heat 
and cold, weight and lightness, hardness and softness, white and black, dry and 
sweet. By these and all her instruments, when wisdom is her helper, . . .she conducts 
all things to the right and happy issue, whereas when she companies with folly, the 
effect is clean contrary. Shall we set it down that this is so, or have we still our 
doubts that it may be otherwise? 
2.3 Commentary and Notes 
2.3.1 Soul as the source of all change and movement 
These 10 passages from Laws X together form the core and substance of Plato’s 
views on ‘soul’ in this work. Important to this thesis, they also incorporate a view on 
the nature of evil not hitherto visited in the Timaeus, connecting evil to when the soul 
‘companies with folly’ and also to the movements of a particular ‘non-beneficent 
soul’. Moreover, Plato’s understanding of soul in Laws X has changed considerably 
from that held in the T i r n a e ~ s . ~ ’ ~  Not only is soul now presented as that which 
generates, rather than as that which was generated, the tripartite understanding of 
soul from his earlier works gives way to the idea of soul as a complex, but whole 
entity with clear divisions of the soul noticeably absent. 
2.3.2 The Demiurge and soul 
2.3.2.1 The Timaeus 
475 Also translated “separate or combine”; see Saunders, p 428. 
divergence in Laws X away from his earlier view in the Timaeus also applies to The Republic. 
Due to similarities in Plato’s understanding of the soul in the Timaeus and The Republic, the 476 
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2.3.2.1.1 Soul as generated and not begotten 
In the Timaeus the Demiurge is not equated with ‘soul’, although one might draw 
the conclusion that it is, since the World Soul, although wrought by the Demiurge, is 
wrought directly and as a consequence is described as being both divine and 
Likewise, the human soul, its initial divine part also formed by the 
Demiurge (although from less pure ingredients than the World Soul), is, at the same 
time, the one immortal, divine part, which the Demiurge bestows to Mankind.47g 
Thus, there are similarities between the Demiurge and ‘soul’, whether speaking of 
the World Soul or the human soul, namely, of being both divine and immortal. 
However, this is where further identity between the Demiurge and ‘soul’ ends. 
Firstly, not only is ‘soul’ described in the Timaeus as having been generated, whereas 
the Demiurge is clearly not generated, ‘soul’ is cited as having been generated by the 
Demiurge. Thus, the Demiurge is depicted as the causal agent of the soul’s 
generation, but the reverse is not true. Soul is never described in the Timaeus as 
generating anything, its relation with respect to the causal powers of ‘nous’ being 
limited solely to that of providing movement within the generated Universe and thus, 
as a causal source, its powers are exclusive of any others (e.g. the power of 
Thus, I agree with R. D. Mohr in asserting that “the prima facie evidence is that the Demiurge is 
not [a soul].” ... “Rather souls, and especially the World-Soul and what rationality souls have are 
viewed as products of the Demiurge (Timaeus, 35a, 36d-e, Philebus 30c-d, Statesman 269c-d)” in The 
Platonic Cosmology (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985). For his argument see Chapter 10, pp. 178-183. 
Ti. 4 1 c6-d 1. However, in the Timaeus, as in The Republic, the soul is described as being tripartite. 
Thus, in addition to the immortal part of the soul described here, there were also two additional mortal 
parts added later by the gods when they took over the immortal principle of soul given to them by the 
Demiurge and after generating the body, joined it with the human soul (Ti. 69cSd6). The immortal 
part of the human soul was consequently encased in a globe (the ‘head’). These additional mortal 
parts of the soul, however, emotion and appetite, were wrought by the gods as “indispensable 
equipment” for the whole of the body, which in turn acted as a vehicle for ‘immortal soul’ and 
accordingly were placed appropriately elsewhere in the body (Ti. 69d6-72d8). Not having been 




generation). Consequently, soul is presented in Plato’s cosmology as being the 
primary source of movement within the Cosmos, but never of generation or of 
movement outwith the generated Cosmos.479 The Demiurge, on the other hand, is 
inclusive with respect to its possession of the causal powers of nous, delegating its 
powers as it sees fit and in particular, the power of movement within the generated 
Cosmos, which it delegates to ‘soul.’ 
The ontology of soul, moreover, as it is presented in the Timaeus is complex, 
where identity with the Demiurge would belie the latter’s supreme simplicity480 and 
causal priority with respect to soul. Soul is described in this work as being wrought 
by the Demiurge and enjoined to the world, acting as the causal agent for the world’s 
movement. However, although soul is described by Plato as the causal agent for the 
physical movement of the Universe, like the Demiurge, soul itself does not 
physically move the Universe as, for instance, a first mover in a chain of events. As 
Plato explains,”” the Universe existed in chaotic flux before its generation and 
therefore, was never in a static state before being organised by the Demiurge. 
Rather, this chaotic movement was ordered by the Demiurge through its powers of 
reason or ‘nous’ and which ordering-not physical movement itself-was then 
delegated to the generated soul, either to the World Soul or the human soul, whereby 
It would appear that movement outwith the generated Cosmos, being disordered, was due not to the 
causal power of nous (‘nous’ depicting the kind of causal power) associated with the Demiurge, but to 
the disordering causal power (lacking in ‘nous’) of Ananke. Thus, the only movement outwith the 
Cosmos of which the Demiurge could be the causal agent would be generation itself (whether of the 
Cosmos or some other generated object). 
480 The Demiurge is ungenerated and perfect, neither proceeding from nor being a part of anything 
greater, nor does it have any parts. Moreover, its movement, as I argue, is entirely noetic. 
481 Ti. 52d2-53a7. 
479 
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through its purely n ~ e t i c ~ ~ ~  movements soul impacted directly the generated world, 
bringing about an ordered physical equivalent with respect to its movement.483 
However, depending on whether the World Soul was the cause of the movement 
or the human soul was, this movement was one of either pure reasoning and 
intelligence or it could also involve the emotions and lower appetitive motions.484 
The less pure mixture485 given to the human soul was possibly meant to 
accommodate the impact that the emotions and senses could have on the soul, while 
its immortal, divine part, unless so impacted, like the World Soul, remained purely 
rational. Thus, the type of movement assigned to soul, while aligning with a 
particular physical movement, is not itself physical, but is entirely noetic, just as the 
Demiurge’s agency is noetic. The only exception to this pure noetic movement is 
where the human soul participates in its lower emotive and appetitive motions or its 
mortal which ‘lower’ noetic motions are due to and dependent on the human 
soul’s less pure origins. The description, therefore, which Plato gives to the soul as 
being compounded of the Same, Different and Being so as to embrace the 
complexities of the world in its own parallel or sympathetic noetic form, was not so 
482 By ‘noetic’ is meant the character some entities have due to their resulting from ‘nous’ or reason 
alone; thus, they are non-sensual and non-empirical in nature. According to Plato’s cosmology these 
entities are also non-physical in nature, being either non-generated or divinely generated in origin. 
Thus, the movements of immortal soul are noetic and so are those of the Demiurge. I refer to the 
movements of the mortal parts of the soul as being “lower” noetic movements, inasmuch as like noetic 
entities they are non-physical in nature and account for movement and can be directed by noetic 
movements to rational ends, but are ‘lower’ inasmuch as they do not proceed from ‘nous’ or reason 
themselves, but from the emotions and the senses and thus, are impacted by the physical, empirical 
world. As a result, they are not by nature rational entities, but can only be directed to rational ends by 
the ‘higher’, rational part of soul (e.g. see Ti. 7Oa2-7). 
Ti. 34a1-3. In this passage the noetic movement of the Demiurge is being aligned with its physical 
counterpart. Thus, of the seven physical motions, uniform circular motion on the same spot “most 
properly belongs to intelligence and reason.” 
485 Ti. 41d4-7. 
483 





that soul could be a source of physical motion (this being impossible), but rather, in 
order that soul could provide “a divine source of unending and rational life for all 
time.”487 
Plato does not address in the Timaeus any concerns over the actual source of the 
seven physical motions488 (i.e. demanding a first mover) or suggest any further 
alignment of the remaining six motions with similar movements of the soul, as he did 
for the “uniform circular motion in the same place” with the Demiurge’s reason and 
intelligence. In his ontology the soul was generated before the body of the 
Universe.489 This preempts the idea that ‘soul’ is some descriptive feature of the 
physical world. In Plato’s cosmology, moreover, physical movement existed as part 
of the chaotic flux before either the generation of the soul or the ordering of the body 
of the world out of pre-existing chaos, ruled only by Ananke, had taken place. This 
further preempts any idea that ‘soul’ has the role of first mover for any of the 
physical motions with respect to the world. is entirely noetic in nature and 
was fashioned by the Demiurge for an already dynamic universe, so that its chaotic 
nature might be transformed and become informed by the principle of rationality, of 
which soul consisted, and thus, become an organised and sustainable Universe. 
Movement would now have ends towards which it was focused, but this would be the 
Ti. 36e2-5. 
The remaining six physical motions are: up and down, backwards and forwards, and right and left. 
Ti. 34c4-35al. 
Here, ‘immortal’ soul is meant. The two mortal parts of the human soul, fashioned not by the 
Demiurge, but by the Divinities when they fashioned the mortal body, had a ‘lower’ noetic function 
with respect to the human body, providing “indispensable” or “necessary” equipment for man’s mortal 






only way in which soul ‘moved’ the physical universe. Physically speaking, soul had 
no input whatsoever, nor does Plato suggest as much. 
When Plato next addresses the physical motions after constructing the body of the 
Universe, the movement discussed is in relation to the ‘divine form’ (made of fire 
and surrounding the visual Universe), described as a “universal cosmic embroidery,” 
and also the heavenly gods (planets and stars) or divine beings. Again, this 
movement is part of the generated Cosmos and thus, is ordered. The movement of 
the ‘divine form’ is described as following that of the Universe and highest 
intelligence, namely, uniform circular motion in the same place. In this same 
passage,491 he also gives the heavenly bodies two motions at the time of their 
generation, namely, uniform motion in the same place and forward motion, again 
imitating noetic or thought functions. Uniform motion is connected to “always 
thinking the same thoughts about the same things” and forward motion as being 
Thus, ,9492 subject to movement (of soul) which calculates “the Same and uniform. 
not only has the Universe become organised, so has its motion, but not without a 
noetic counterpart imitating the Demiurge, its organising force, to carry this out, 
namely, ‘soul’, generated by the Demiurge for this express purpose. The remaining 
~~ ~~ 
491 Ti. 40a2-b4. 
For the idea of ‘sameness’ as a noetic movement of soul see Ti. 37a5-b3. “Whenever the soul 
comes in contact with anything whose being is either dispersed or indivisible, it is moved throughout 
and calculates similarity and difference . . . .’, Plato’s discussion of the noetic movements of soul and 
their relation to the movements of the heavenly bodies is notoriously difficult, as is his equally 
difficult description of the heavenly bodies themselves. Cornford, for instance, does not translate the 
passage at Ti. 4Oa2-7 as referring to the bright aura surrounding the earth (which latter was thought to 
form the centre of the Universe and be stationary [see Bury, Ti. p, 35, fn. 61 and thus, fit well with the 
imagery), and above, in which also resides the fixed stars, but rather to the material makeup of the 
stars themselves (PC, p. 1 18). My reading of this passage, however, follows Lee’s translation (Ti. p. 
5 9 ,  where the ‘divine form’ in   TO^ pku &iou zQu .nh~iozr\v ’t6Eav ...”, is understood as 
referring to something specific (i.e. the firey aura surrounding the earth) and hence, is not simply 
referring to what is generic (i.e. the material form of the stars). 
492 
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five motions, being less perfect, are unassigned, but reappear as normal physical 
movements within the earth, “our foster-mother.” 
2.3.2.1.2 Primary causal movement, self-movement and secondary 
movement. 
When considering movement with respect to the generated universe, there are 
three kinds of movement at issue: primary causal movement, self-movement and 
secondary movement. The idea of ‘self-movement’ is not raised until Laws X as 
Plato hrther develops his ontology of ‘soul’ and soul’s ability to move (again, 
through its organisational ability with respect to movement and not through any 
innate physical power) whatever comes into contact with it. This leaves only 
primary movement and secondary movement as the two sources of motion within 
Plato’s cosmology. 
In the Timaeus the primary movement of the Demiurge is never equated with the 
movement of ‘soul’. Soul, although participating in the divine nature and ‘nous’, 
having been wrought by the divine, is nevertheless generated and is always attached 
to a body, whereas the causal force identified with the Demiurge is that of the 
organising power of nous, unlimited, unembodied and ungenerated. Thus, the causal 
movement of the Demiurge is not the ‘self-movement’ (due to the noetic powers of 
soul contained therein or however soul moves such bodies - Plato himself is not 
sure) of the heavenly bodies or the secondary movement-physical motion-of the 
organised Universe. Rather, the movement of the Demiurge, having no physical 
nature, is understood by Plato as solely that of the organising principle of 
generation-the workings of ‘nous’ unembodied and unlimited, carrying out the 
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precept of ‘like begetting like’. Having perceived the organisation of the world as 
being wholly perfect from a rational perspective (i.e. with respect to ends) and thus, 
wholly good, Plato hypothesises that it must have a maker and that its maker must be 
the same. The causal movement ascribed to the Demiurge, therefore, is that of the 
invisible organising force behind the Universe (evidenced by the organising principle 
found within it), for which there is no connecting evidence, since only ipso facto 
does the world’s existence require that of the Demiurge. The Demiurge, itself, 
however, is perceived by Plato as more than just a principle, it is the primal power 
behind that principle, entirely separate from the Universe, and thus, is the power 
behind its organisation and the organising principle of ‘nous’ or Mind found within 
it. With regard to the generating power of ‘nous’ as a metaphysical principle, 
therefore, and as analogous to the organising power of human thought, the world as 
generated is, I suggest, an eternal afterthought by the Demiurge (a noetic movement), 
which has a beginning but no end, whereas chaos was an eternal forethought by 
Ananke (an anoetic movement), which had an end, but no beginning. However, 
having now accounted for the organisation of the Universe as a whole on the 
principle of noetic movement by a primal, non-physical power(s), Plato must still 
account for the physical movement of the Universe itself, which he consequently sets 
about doing. 
2.3.2.1.3 Physical movement and the question of dualism 
Plato achieves this in the Timaeus, but only in rough sketch form, where the soul 
(not described as self-moving until Laws X) is fabricated by the Demiurge as the 
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closest analogue to itself. Although soul is made up of the rational powers of nous, 
and to this extent is divine and shares with the Demiurge its powers, being complex 
(having been fabricated), soul is nonetheless necessarily inferior to the Demiurge, 
since perfection, according to Plato’s understanding, is singular (“residing happily in 
itself’). Soul, moreover, unlike the Demiurge, does not reside in itself, rather it 
resides in and is formed for a body, whether the body of the world or a human 
body,493 which latter, depending upon its aspiration or lack of it, might ultimately 
reside in a heavenly body (i.e. its own star) or lower animal (see Ti. 41d4-42e4).494 
Although made prior to the body, it is formed so as to be its dominating and 
controlling partner.495 The Demiurge, moreover, is still or unchanging, in that is 
does not participate in the movement of becoming. The World Soul, on the other 
hand, once it has been intertwined with the world (the Universe or Cosmos), is 
described by Plato as “revolving upon itself’ (Lee) or “revolving within its own 
limit” (Comford). This is not a description of a self-mover. The meaning of this 
passage is made clearer from the context of an earlier one, where at Ti. 34a1-5, in 
discussing the body of the Cosmos (the World Soul not yet having been considered) 
According to Plato’s cosmology, the idea of a soul residing in a non-human body or without a body 
(i.e. in its own star or other heavenly body) is understood by him as being in either a degraded 
secondary state or in its primary state (“its first and best form”, Ti. 42b3-d2), whereby the soul has 
either been demoted from or promoted to its original state, respectively, according to the moral life 
which it has led following its first human and consequent later incarnations. The human state, 
although a secondary state and thus subject to deterioration, is considered a “necessary incarnation” 
for the sake of the existence of Man-not for the soul’s sake-and thus is not a degraded state per se, 
but becomes degraded. 
It is possible that for Plato a star represented a more rarefied and attenuated body than a human 
body, since, unlike the human body, a star (or other heavenly body, e.g. the moon) was capable of 
releasing a soul (to inhabit a living being) without itself being destroyed in the process. He does not 
discuss this, no doubt believing such knowledge to be either speculative in nature and therefore, 
outwith the parameters of his ‘likely’ account or alternatively, perhaps closer to the mythic aspect of 
this account. 




Plato writes, “For of the seven physical motions he [the Demiurge] allotted to it the 
one which most properly belongs to intelligence and reason, and made it move with a 
uniform circular motion on the same spot; any deviation into movement of the other 
six kinds he entirely precluded [Lee].” Thus, Plato’s depiction now of the movement 
of the World Soul follows closely the metaphor already in place concerning the 
movement of the Cosmos, whereby Soul is imitated analogously by the movement of 
the world with which and for which it has been woven, not, however, as initiator and 
perpetuator of the latter’s physicaZ movement, but rather, as a psychic power, the 
source of ‘nous’ within the cosmos and the cause of its rational ends. As such, 
although there is physical movement of the world, moving as it does in uniform 
circular motion in the same place, the sympathetic movement of the soul is entirely 
psychical, carrying no physical motion of its own. 
Physical motion, on the other hand, completely lacking in rational powers, is not 
only inferior, it is also always secondary and accessory. Plato makes no attempt in 
the Timaeus to directly connect the physical power or motion in the world with its 
noetic counterpart or to a first causal principle other than to introduce the notion of 
soul and souls as being present in the world, no doubt helping to impart to Plato (on 
an initially separate issue from that of the Forms496) the long-held and rightly (as I 
will argue) title of dualist. 
Crucial for understanding Plato’s account of causality in the world is the fact that 
there is no beginning to physical movement in his cosmology, there is only a 
That “extreme dualism” with regard to the body-soul relationship can be found in Plato is also 496 
noted by T.M. Robinson (see Plato s Psychology, p. 159). 
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beginning to organised physical movement, where previously the Universe moved in 
chaotic disarray. Neither primary power, the Demiurge nor Ananke, bringing about 
generation or chaos respectively, enter into the sphere of physical causality directly. 
Theirs, I suggest is a noetic and anoetic counterpart to this movement, impacting it 
with order or disorder by being co-aligned with it, but which counterparts are never 
identified with the movement itself.497 Thus, as far as Plato’s description of the 
world is concerned, to describe the first organised movement, even if he cared to 
(which he did not, no doubt believing such guesswork to be outwith the sights of 
probability or a “likely account”), would not lead to pure causality or to an unmoved 
mover. Rather, it would lead only to further movement, albeit chaotic, disorganised 
movement. 
What the Timaeus offers, therefore, is aparaZZeZ account of causality, a dualistic 
understanding introduced by a soul-body dichotomy, in which the organisation of the 
physical world is completely dependent upon the invisible presence of a soul or soul 
infused within it. Moreover, it is the soul’s participation in ‘nous’, of which the 
Demiurge is the sole benefactor, that gives soul its organising power or intelligence. 
Although Platonic dualism is traditionally associated with the Forms, as Plato 
~~~ ~ 
Vlastos, in “Creation in the Timaeus: is it a Fiction?” from Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, R. E. 
Allen, ed. (pp. 401-419), grapples with the problem of the pre-existence of motion as it existed in the 
chaotic pre-organised universe with Plato’s understanding of ‘soul7 as self-generating motion and 
being the first cause of all motion (as quoted of and understood by Cherniss, p. 417). Vlastos 
correctly approaches this problem by suggesting (although I do not agree with his understanding of 
the Craftsman as in any way having a soul) that “the self-motions of his soul [that of the Craftsman] 
then, no less than ours, supervene on material motions which he does not generate but only harnesses 
to the fulfillment of his creative purposes [p. 4 181.” Unfortunately, Vlastos does not go the one step 
further, which is to qualify the type of motion being supervened. This question is left unasked and 
unanswered. I argue, however, that the answer to this can only be the pure noetic motion of ‘nous’, 
whether impacted directly by the Demiurge outwith a ‘soul’, harnessed within a generated ‘soul’ or 
brought about by Plato’s latest causal player (from Laws X), the non-generated ‘soul’. 
497 
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develops his theory of causality in the Timaeus, the Forms acquire a second-order 
noetic reality in relation to the importance and first-order noetic reality of the soul. 
The difficulty of a dualistic causal account which does not take into consideration 
the fact of pre-existing motion, but which at the same time takes into account Plato’s 
claim that the soul is the cause of all motion, so as to mean physical motion, is that 
the physical and psychical (the soul) must then somehow meet up. Dualism becomes 
a paradox. The soul moves the body, literally. The enigma of dualism, however, is 
that this appears irrational and viewed as a paradox it is irrational. However, 
according to the logic of ancient Greek thought, like moves like. The sensible and 
intelligible worlds, therefore, are two independent and mutually irreducible domains 
or worlds. With body and soul sitting at opposite poles, both as to their ontology and 
metaphysics, such direct interaction would be impossible and therefore, is 
imp0 s si b le. 
As I have argued, a reading of dualism involving the direct interaction between 
body and soul is wrong. According to Plato’s cosmology movement has always 
existed, although not always in an organised form. Moreover, once the Cosmos has 
been generated, things, too, as accessory causes, move other things, but at no point is 
an unmoved mover introduced to take over or carry out this task. What I have 
suggested, therefore, in place of this reading is a ‘parallel’ account of body and soul, 
which is a dualistic understanding of causality in which the human soul does not 
physically move a body, although it is able to rationally impact upon it and thus, 
indirectly influence its movement towards ordered ends. As such, soul always exists 
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parallel with a body as long as there is discernible intelligence or ends within that 
body. When there is not, it is simply ‘soulless’. Thus, whereas soul is imitated by 
the physical movement of a body, in that intelligent design toward some end 
necessarily follows its presence, soul is not to be identified with the movement of 
that body itself, since, when movement is entirely irrational (as in the pre-generation 
chaotic state), although there is still movement, there is no longer a soul or an 
organised body. Thus, it is not a lack of movement that renders an object soulless, 
but rather, a lack of ‘nous’ or intelligence directing its movement so as to sustain it as 
that object. Accordingly, all physical movement in this reading has a noetic 
counterpart or movement of nous or soul to account for its intelligent end(s). 
By the time Plato wrote Laws X, however, not only is soul (the ‘World Soul’ in 
the Timaeus) understood as being generally present within the Cosmos, impacting 
the functioning of all bodies towards ends supporting their individual functioning as 
bodies and the Cosmos as whole, but the human soul, as an individual noetic entity, 
now becomes closely associated with its own ‘will’ and of its ability to bring about 
secondary ends for itself, which may or may not be good. Accordingly, Plato is fully 
aware that the human soul, in exercising its ‘will’, can and does at times act 
irrationally, bringing about ‘bad’ ends for that individual, e.g. greed or sloth, which 
represent an imbalance with respect to its overall good. However, being originally 
generated by the Demiurge, who is all good (the Timaeus) and as such, the work of a 
God (Laws x), the human soul, itself, is, according to Plato, also wholly good. He 
therefore must account for the irrational behaviour of an individual (soul), which he 
does by positing its alignment with a ‘Non-beneficent Soul’ or as I argue, an aspect 
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of Ananke redrawn as immanent. This again is an example of parallel psychic 
movement, in which the individual human soul, impacted by one of two souls, either 
the Beneficent Soul (as with Ananke, an aspect of the Demiurge redrawn as 
immanent) or the Non-beneficent Soul, through its own ‘will’, directs the body’s 
motions noetically towards secondary ends (those ends which can co-exist with the 
primary human ends keeping the body alive so as to house the human soul). 
Although Plato does not elucidate his causal landscape so as to hypothesise the 
interaction of body and soul more specifically in either the Timaeus or Laws X 
(leaving alone such details in the former and declaring them to be unknown in the 
latter) or yet, for his causal understanding to span over these two important works 
(which proved not his style to do so), the above scenario is close to, I suggest, what 
is ultimately presumed. 
2.3.2.1.4 The Forms and the question of dualism 
The Forms for Plato remain bare objects of thought which are unchanging, 
uncreated, indestructible, admit of no modification, enter no combination and are 
imperceptible to sight or the other senses.498 It is noteworthy that beyond this 
description, Plato never discusses their metaphysics in the Timaeus or the how of 
their existence and with that, their connection to causality or the primary causal 
powers.499 Moreover, although the Forms are a powerful tool in Plato’s metaphysics 
Ti. 5 1 e6-52a4. 
I disagree, however, with W.  Lutoslawski’s perfunctory claim that “taking this for granted, we 
shall easily recognise that the ideas were nothing else for Plato when he wrote the Timaeus than God’s 
thoughts,’’ (The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic, p. 477) or at least his initial claim, as he soon 
qualifies what he means by this. To wit, soon after Lutoslawski distinguishes between God’s thought 
and of what it is understood to be comprised or its objects. Thus, the eternal models (the &i6ta of 
Ti. 29a and 37d and the .nap~&typa of 28a, 37c, 39e, 48e, etc) are existent as objects of God’s 




in that they stabilise reality for the observer and allow a measure for discerning truth 
(intelligence) over true opinion, Plato does not provide support in his ontology for 
their separate existence5oo apart fi-om the existence of the thinkers who perceive 
them, and in so doing, fails to present a full dualistic account of reality in which the 
Forms actually exist separately from the thinker.501 A proper dualistic account of the 
Forms, however, demands this. Alternatively, a different understanding is required. 
souls of men (ibid.) As with Plato’s ‘likely’ account, it is difficult to remove all anthropomorphic 
material when describing the primary cause and is why, in trying to minimise this difficulty, I have 
described the Forms, as understood by Plato, as the result of God reflecting upon himself and when 
similarly qualified by Lutoslawski, as particularised in the reflective souls of men (i.e. models 
recognised by the soul’s activity, p. 478). Essentially, therefore, I do not disagree with Lutoslawski’s 
more in depth understanding of the Forms, which is that they are the reflective objects of God’s 
thought. His idea, moreover, that the Forms exist solely in the soul and can never exist as separate 
entities apart from the soul is particularly valuable in gaining a deeper understanding of Plato’s 
extensive development of the notion of ‘soul’ in Laws X. For an excellent discussion of this view see 
W. Lutoslawski, “111. Latest Works: Laws” in The Growth and Origin of Plato’s Logic, 491-516. 
Thus, he writes, “No conclusion can be drawn from the use or absence of the terms E&CJ or ’&a 
which Plato borrowed from earlier writers and used himself in many different meanings, ‘very seldom 
with a pronounced metaphysical meaning’ (p. 294). Plato’s philosophy is not a mere theory of 
knowledge, and his theory of knowledge is not limited to the conception of ideas. The soul is not an 
idea, and acts a more important part in later Platonism than all ideas of Middle Platonism. It is the 
soul, and not the ideas, which is the central point of Plato’s later theory of knowledge” (p. 494) and 
concludes, both because of Plato’s argument for the priority of soul, as well as the close relationship 
drawn between soul and knowledge that “the world of eternal notions forming the system of human 
and divine knowledge.. .can only exist in souls’’ (p.496). 
Lutoslawski writes: “This close relation between soul and knowledge is here [in the Timaeus] 
insisted upon as in the Sophist, and makes it evident that Plato no longer dreamed of separate ideas” 
(The Origin and Growth of Plato ’s Logic, p. 474). “Objectivity does not require substantial existence: 
anything that by its logical nature must be universally admitted is an objective truth,” admitting that 
in the Symposium and Phaedo, as well as in the Republic and Phaedrus, the difference between this 
objectivity and the objectivity of substances may not yet have been fully realised by Plato (p. 521). 
By late Platonism, however, this was not the case, where the idea of soul and movement formed the 
ultimate explanation of everything that happened, brought forward by the Sophist, Politicus and 
Philebus and maintained by the Timaeus, Critias and Laws: ”Knowledge is acquired by each soul 
through its own exertions, increased by constant exercise and imparted by teaching. Ideas exist only 
in souls-they are eternal and unchangeable because their first model is created by God in his own 
thought. Thus ideas are the patterns of reality, and their existence in souls is named true Being. But 
they are not now suddenly perceived in ecstatic visions, as in the period of Middle Platonism. They 
must be created and elaborated by each soul in its own turn, and sought for the by the logical exercises 
of classification, generalisation, and division” (p.523-524). 
Teloh argues for the radical separation of Forms from phenomena in the Timaeus where for the 
first time there are Forms for both attributive, relational and incomplete characteristics, as well as for 
sortals ( e.g. man, fish) , which results, he suggests, in the “desubstantialization of phenomena” 
(DPM, p. 12, 13). He further states that phenomena are in toto mere reflections of the Forms and are 
“totally dependent on the Forms and the receptacle for their existence.” Although Plato does state that 
the Demiurge used the ‘Living Creature’ as a model for the Cosmos, there is no basis in Plato’s 




2.3.2.1.5 A parallel account 
In a ‘parallel’ account of body and soul, the Forms do not require that they have a 
separate existence apart from soul, since in this account, their totality, if enumerated, 
would simply comprise the para1 
organised body.jo2 The Forms, as 
mind503 and accordingly, act as a 
e1 noetic counterparts of soul in relation to the 
known, are the objects of nous as reflected in the 
hnction of soul, i.e. in its impacting of physical 
objects with those of nous. The Forms, therefore, are how the intelligence of nous 
manifests itself, either in the mind as noetic objects or correspondingly, in the 
physical world as organised objects. Thus, an ontological position arguing for the 
separate existence of the Forms is not required, since they are dependent upon ‘nous’ 
for their existence, found only in the Demiurge and ‘soul’. Accordingly, Plato’s 
ontology need only account for the separate existence of the Demiurge and soul, and 
not for the Forms, which this ‘parallel’ reading of Plato’s metaphysics provides. 
What effectively takes place, therefore, is that when the noetic counterparts of soul, 
formed by the movement of soul as directed by nous in tandem with the body, are 
reflected upon by mind and are consequently conceived as separate entities, these 
become for Plato the Forms or pattern after which something is formed. Plato does 
not argue that the Forms existed before the generation of the Cosmos, only that all 
things which are good must have an intelligent pattern. Although Plato describes 
‘being’ as existing before the generation of the Cosmos, he also describes 
receptacle, and not the phenomena, the latter alone remaining substantial, if not fleeting, its matter 
made up of space encapsuled by polyhedra (see Vlastos, PU, p. 90) and its movement borrowed from 
chaos and transformed by ‘nous’. 
A doctrine of parallelism appears much later in Spinoza (Ethics, Bk. 11; prop. 7 schol. and props. 
11 and 12). 




‘becoming’ and ‘space’ as existing before its generation?04 Whereas the latter two 
can be accounted for within a chaotic universe, the former cannot. I would suggest, 
therefore, that ‘being’ here comprises ‘nous’ generally or en masse and only refers to 
separate distinctive Forms later, when ‘nous’ is disseminated by soul as it aligns with 
body and is reflected upon by the human mind.505 
The singularity of the Demiurge, moreover, and hence, of ‘Nous’ in its totality, 
would pre-empt any notion of a pre-existing plurality of Forms. Before the 
generation of the Cosmos, the only pattern after which the Demiurge could reflect, 
would be upon itself and therefore, of ‘Nous’ in all its perfection and goodness.506 
Thus, the individual Forms, in reality, are contingent on Plato’s understanding of the 
Demiurge as a primal causal force and hence, on his theory of causality of the 
generated Cosmos and not the other way round, i.e. that the generated Cosmos is 
dependent upon the pre-existence of the Forms. The necessity of mythmaking has 
confused the order. Plato, moreover, did not analyse the Forms as such, preferring in 
the Timaeus to refer only to pure being (having no movement) and to patterns (which 
presuppose noetic movement).”’ Their existence can be hypothesised, however, by 
abstraction, without their full story being told, as the workings of soul and nous are 
’04 Ti. 52d2-4. 
505Similar to Lutoslawski, but without drawing on the close connection between ‘soul’ and ‘nous’ (and 
subsequently ‘ thought’), C. Ritter affirms that “I repeat, the Idea is nothing more than the designation 
of the objective basis of a conception; this objective basis assures validity to the conception and gives 
certitude to it” (p. 379,  The Essence of PZato ’s Philosophy, trans. Adam Alles (London: George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd, 1933). He further clarifies his position, stating that: “According to their logical content 
the Ideas are divine thoughts, a part of the content of God’s way of doing things. Only by abstraction 
can we separate and distinguish the two; just as we can separate God from the world by abstraction. 
. . . The conclusion of the Timaeus confirms us in this conception. . . . In short, the world stands before 
us as ‘the visible image of God whom we can conceive in thought alone.’ From this statement we can 
see that God’s will to give to this world the best possible form was completely realized. We may, 
therefore, say that God’s power is adequate for the realization of his thoughts” (p. 376). 
506 See Ti. 29a2-bl. 
See Ti. 28~5-29c3; see also Ti. 5 1 b6-52d4. 507 
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observed. This accounts for Plato’s reference to the Forms outwith the confines of a 
cosmology and hence, before his writing of the Tirnae~s .~~*  In modem terms, much 
in the way language markers work, the Forms became by default ancient analytic 
tools. Thus, with the existence of the Forms having already been conceived by 
reflection upon the interplay of soul with nous, Plato was able to stabilise reality, 
while the function and form of causality and the fact of the physical Universe were 
yet to be explained or having been explained, drop from the discussion. It was from 
this process, I would suggest, that Plato’s universals were born.509 
2.3.2.1.6 The soul 
In Laws XPlato tackles the problem of the relationship of the primary causes to 
the world and of causal power within the world anew, shifting his “likely account” 
now to a ‘likelier’ one. Thus, he moves away from the earliest stages of the 
formation of the Cosmos towards a later, more developed stage. Accordingly, Plato 
Burnet’s historical argument (see Platonism, passim, particularly Ch. 111, ‘The Theory of Ideas’) 
that the ‘Forms’ were principally a belief of Socrates, which doctrine Plato faithfully reproduced in his 
early and middle dialogues, not as a philosopher presenting his own ideas, but as an artist and great 
admirer of Socrates, thereby bringing to life his mentor’s teachings and person for a new generation, 
and only later presented his own ideas (e.g. in the Timaeus and Laws X, which, with the exception of a 
single reference in the Timaeus, do not mention the Forms) is convincing given the complete lack of 
serious discussion in either of these works concerning the Forms, where, in fact, such a discussion 
would have been warranted had they been a integral part of Plato’s own belief system. 
509 Vlastos, by way of improvement, offers an alternative to Plato’s degrees-of-reality theory, by 
suggesting a kinds-of-reality theory in which both particulars and universals are real in their different 
ways. I would suggest, however, that it is possible by the time Plato wrote the Timaeus (if not before, 
should the Forms, as Burnet argues, be Socratic in origin) that a kinds-of-reality theory was already to 
some degree assumed by Plato. There is no strong sense in the Timaeus in which the generated world 
is depicted as being in any real way inferior to a more perfect one. Its imperfections, rather, are 
understood as the remains or intrusion of ananke and its own perfection is assumed in spite of this. 
Moreover, any fleetingness of appearance is ignored, with Plato indeed pointing out ‘this’ and ‘that’ 
while describing various objects within the world. Thus, contrary to the idea of a lesser reality, upon 
its completion the Universe is described as a visible god, “supreme in greatness and excellence, 
beauty and perfection” (Ti. 92c4-9). Its model, being exactly that, but no more and no less, becomes 
simply the intelligent pattern upon which the Universe was fashioned. See Gregory Vlastos, “Degrees 
of Reality in Plato,” in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1965), 1-1 9. 
508 
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abandons his earlier metaphor of the primary causal powers, consisting of the 
supreme craftsman or Demiurge and its antithesis, Ananke, the work of these key 
metaphysical figures having been completed with the generation of the Universe. 
The entire backdrop of this metaphor therefore also disappears. With the 
metaphysics now greatly diminished, but with causation still requiring a source 
within the Cosmos, ‘soul’, the only metaphysical entity generated for the world, 
becomes its only player, albeit greatly transformed and enhanced by new causal 
powers. Thus, in Laws X Plato re-introduces ‘soul’ as the “universal cause of all 
change and motion 9 3 5  10 in an already generated world. 
In the Timaeus, however, there is no argument or evidence to suggest that the 
causal movement of the Demiurge is identical with the movement of the soul or that 
soul is to be identified with the Demiurge. In this work, the generation of the soul 
(by the Demiurge, which, by causal priority, becomes an argument against identity 
between the soul and the Demiurge) is described in obscure, abstract terms (various 
combinations of the ‘different’, the ‘same’ and ‘e~is tence’) .~~ The soul’s movement 
is just touched upon and how it apparently moves a body is not addressed. Similarly, 
however, neither is the movement of the Demiurge (or Ananke) discussed. The 
obscure terms used in the Timaeus to describe the soul’s generation, moreover, have 
not been used before by Plato, nor are they used for any other purpose aften~ards.”~ 
510 Lg. 896a5-896b1. 
Ti. 34b10-35b3; see also Ti. 41d4-8 regarding the human soul. 
There is no reason to believe that for Plato this noetic prescription of the generated soul from the 
Timaeus does not still hold true for the human souls or the World Soul in Laws X, although this is not 
explicitly stated. Where he differs in Laws X is in his introduction of two singularly powerful 
‘beneficent’ and ‘non-beneficent’ souls, as well as in his introduction of divinities as souls, no longer 




This “likely tale”, therefore, argues for an opposite conclusion to that of identity, 
namely, that there can never be complete identity between the generated soul and the 
Demiurge or their respective movements. 
The initial argument for this conclusion is the above-noted one of causal priority, 
which notion has two aspects. Not only is the Demiurge described as the agent who 
generates the soul, thus, is prior to the soul, but the Demiurge is also depicted as 
being ungenerated. We are therefore left with the intimation that the Demiurge is 
wholly simple, and its being and movement ultimately ~nknowable.”~ The 
generated soul, on the other hand, precisely because of its generation, is complex, 
and its being and movement, albeit with difficulty, are knowable. Unlike the 
Demiurge, the soul’s ability to ‘know’ is through a complexity of noetic moves as it 
reflects upon itself impacted by the external world. The soul, moreover, must have 
an external world with which to interact. It is never bodiless. Its movement is 
dependent upon this, whether in a star or in a human person. Thus, because of its 
very makeup, being made out of portions of e ~ i s t e n c e , ~ ’ ~  difference and sameness, as 
well as its interwovenness with the world and its objects, i.e. the heavens and human 
beings,  SOU^' is able to observe what has existence (on the principle that ‘like knows 
like’) and the kind of existence it has and then differentiate between what is different 
and what is the same, thereby enabling it to make judgements and move the world it 
‘Knowing’ is an entirely noetic function of the human soul in the Timaeus (Ti. 46d5-6) involving 
movement between the knower and the thing known. Accordingly, knowledge is acquired through the 
senses with special emphasis on the role of the eyes. See Ti. 46e6-47e2. 
‘Existence’, as described by Plato, can be one of three things, (1) the “indivisible, eternally 
unchanging existence” of perfect being, i.e. of ‘nous’ or the same reflected upon by the human mind 
and conceived of as the ‘Forms’; (2) the “divisible, changing Existence of the external world,” i.e. of 




impacts to certain ends. The causal movement of the Demiurge, on the other hand, is 
not dependent upon the external world with which it interacts, i.e. on chaos, and 
therefore does not need a body. It reflects only upon itself in its totality and oneness, 
thus, only upon its own simplicity. In other words, the Demiurge reflects upon 
In so ‘Nous’ undifferentiated or as described by Plato, upon perfect ‘Being . 
doing, the Demiurge is able to bring about its desired end, that is, to bring into 
existence the generated world, which at a perceived noetic level results in ‘Nous’ 
differentiated or the Forms. Again, the issue of priority is raised. The Demiurge not 
only constructed the soul, but also constructed the Cosmos for which ‘soul’ was 
made and whose purpose was to bring about constructive ends within it. 
9 515 
A second argument against identifying the Demiurge with the soul only becomes 
apparent in Laws X, where Plato reintroduces the noetic functioning and movement 
of the soul. Here we are introduced to the concept of the ‘self-moved mover’, a 
completely different notion from the so-called ‘unmoved mover’ of the Timaeus. 
Although I have argued against either of these notions being actually present in the 
Timaeus with regard to physical motion, as explained above, a distinction can still be 
made between the Demiurge and the soul at the noetic level. Accordingly, to drop 
the idea of the ‘unmoved mover’ in Laws X, even at the noetic level, still requires an 
explanation to account for the organisation of the world as it stands, as well as for the 
existence of ‘soul’. As a consequence, either the idea of the world as having been 
generated must be abandoned or the existence of the primal causal powers must be 
assumed. I would suggest that the latter is more likely, given that the Timaeus was 
”’See Ti. 52d2. 
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written with a metaphysical understanding of the generation of the Cosmos 
specifically in mind, while Laws X, which challenges its premises, is a polemic, by 
Plato’s own admission, against impiety, addressing metaphysical issues in light of 
this need well after the generation of the Cosmos. In either case, the soul cannot be 
identified with the Demiurge (or Ananke). 
Soul, moreover, according to the Timaeus, comes into being with the generation 
of the world and yet is both immortal and divine. Although there is a sense in which 
the expressions ‘immortality’ and ‘divinity’ remain the same with regard to their 
meaning, apart from these qualities, the objects so described can be quite different. 
Thus, although the Demiurge and the soul are both immortal and divine in the sense 
that they will never die and the whole of their activity is noetic (rational) and not 
physical, as objects of that immortality and divinity they may otherwise be very 
different. For example, in the Timaeus, whereas the Demiurge can generate the soul, 
the soul cannot generate itself or generate the Demiurge, nor can soul generate the 
world, but the Demiurge can and did. If this were not the case, Plato would have left 
the Demiurge out of his cosmology, since all players within the Timaeus are essential 
to it. There are no exceptions. Therefore, although soul has been called immortal 
and divine, there are no grounds, other than the sharing of these two characteristics, 
for identification of ‘soul’ with the Demiurge. 
Plato, moreover, never defines the Demiurge or God as a soul in the Timaeus. 
Rather, in this work the Demiurge is defined as the “best of causes” (Ti. 29a5-6) and 
the “best of intelligible and eternal things” (Ti. 37al-2). There is also the intimation 
that the Demiurge is supremely one or simple. Soul, on the other hand, is never 
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described in this way. Rather, it is fabricated and complex, which, in this same 
passage is described as “the best of things generated.” Minimally, therefore, there is 
a strong case of priority of existence with regard to the Demiurge over ‘soul’, 
arguing once more against identity. Moreover, while in the Timaeus the Demiurge is 
never defined in terms of self-movement, the soul is generated by the Demiurge in 
such a way so as to embody this very attribute, albeit, at a noetic level. Furthermore, 
Plato offers no epistemology in the Timaeus by which to understand the Demiurge, 
stating only that “to discover the maker and father of this Universe is indeed a hard 
task, and having found him it would be impossible to tell everyone about him” (Ti. 
28c3-5). With regard to the epistemology of the soul, however, Plato readily draws 
upon the tripartite figure, which he has already set out in The Republic. As a 
consequence, therefore, of the clear separation which Plato had made between the 
Demiurge and soul in the Timaeus, his later reassignment in Laws X of all causal 
power and movement to soul alone, provides a strong argument for understanding 
soul in this later work as a telescoping, at least to some extent, of Plato’s key 
metaphysical players from the Timaeus. Thus, what is now presented in Laws X as 
‘soul’, comprising at least two souls, the Beneficent Soul and the Non-beneficent 
Soul, as well as the human soul(s), had been presented earlier (at the generation of 
the Cosmos) as separate metaphysical entities, namely, the Demiurge and Ananke, as 
well as ‘soul’, which latter was comprised of the World Soul and the human soul(s). 
29 1 
2.3.2.2 Laws X 
As stated above, Laws X moves on from Plato’s earlier understanding of soul in 
the Timaeus. The Demiurge, which in this “likely story” depicted both the Universe 
and soul as his handicrafts, is no longer referred to. In this subsequent work, Plato’s 
discussion of God is pre-empted by a discussion of ‘the supremely good soul . 
This ‘best of souls’ is described as a self-moved mover, who is able to move and 
direct the whole of the Universe, and in this sense is the ‘Universal Cause . Thus, 
by apposition, the ‘supremely good soul’ and ‘God’, as far as they are discussed, take 
on the same identity. What is clearly evident from Laws X i s  that at no point is the 
movement which is ascribed to this ‘supremely good soul’ ever equated with 
physical movement. Rather, this self-movement, drawing from a similar image of 
‘soul’ from the Timaeus and shared by souls generally, remains a movement of nous, 
now directing the generated world. Earlier, in the Timaeus, however, it was the 
World Soul which directed the Universe, the Demiurge having first generated it to 
carry out this task. The generated soul, moreover, was never described as being 
“supremely good,” a descriptive reserved only for the Demiurge or God. Thus, the 
quite separate notions of the primary cause or God (the Demiurge), the World Soul 
and individual souls from the Timaeus collapse in Laws X, with the notion of ‘soul’ 
9 516 
9 517 
Lg. 8 9 7 ~ 6  (trans. by Taylor). Saunders translates this same phrase as ‘the best of souls’. I prefer 
the reading by Taylor, as Plato abandons all mention of soul in Laws X shortly thereafter, referring 
directly to the gods, arguing by apposition for identity between the souls previously mentioned and 
the gods. As Plato begins to discuss the gods, he now also refers to ‘the God’ (Lg. 902e4) and ‘the 
King’ (Lg. 904a6), which together argue for a ‘supremely good soul’, rather than the more generic 
‘best of souls’, which may be read as comprising more than one. 
517 Lg. 895e10-896a2. 
516 
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now subsuming these ideas and reformulating them anew as Plato further develops 
his understanding of soul. 
2.3.3 
There is no point in Plato’s causal account, either in the Timaeus or Laws X, 
where he is concerned with how a seemingly non-material Demiurge or God 
(equated closely with ‘nous’ in the Timaeus and the ‘supremely good soul’ in Laws 
X )  is able to interact with the material of the generated world and thus be the cause of 
any kind of physical movement, organised or otherwise.”’ This, however, does not 
present a problem for Plato. From his perspective all physical movement in the 
Universe is due to secondary causes and thus, is not the kznd of movement 
attributable to the Demiurge or soul. Although it would still be possible to take a 
determinist reading of accessory movement, in which case all action necessarily 
relates back to a first cause, i.e. to the Demiurge in the case of the generated world as 
a whole or to ‘soul’ in the case of things within the generated world, I would suggest 
that this reading is wrong. 
The Demiurge and mechanical movement 
First, such a reading requires either an inexplicable dualist position in which the 
non-physical Demiurge or ‘supremely good soul’ somehow interacts with the 
physical world, thus pointing to the causal players, but providing little explanation as 
518  Vlastos’s assertion that “by thinking and willing it[soul] can move the body to which it is attached 
and, through this, other bodies” (Plato’s Universe, p. 31) is not one which Plato’s makes or one that 
he assumes. In Laws X Plato has the Athenian admit that he does not know how soul moves a body 
(Lg. 898e8-899a4). I would suggest, therefore, that if Plato had thought that by simply thinking or 
willing it ‘soul’ could effect physical motion, Plato would have said so, but did not precisely because 
he has already claimed and deeply believed that only physical motion can effect physical motion. See 
Lg. 895a5-b7. In this passage Plato describes self-generating motion as the primary source in both 
stationary and moving objects, while all movement transmitted between objects is described as 
secondary. Clearly self-generating motion is a special kind of motion (i.e. I have argued that it is 
entirely noetic) and not simply a more complex notion of physical motion (or as argued by Vlastos, 
the unexplained linking of the psychic with the physical). 
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to what or how this actually happens and thereby remaining unsatisfactory as an 
answer or alternatively, the Demiurge or supremely good soul must be reduced to 
some aspect of the physical world, a position not supported by the “likely account” 
given in the Timaeus, as well as vehemently denied and explicitly argued against in 
Laws X Plato is fastidious in clarifying physical connections, however erroneous, in 
the Timaeus. He does not attempt, however, to explain ever how the Demiurge 
‘pushed’, so to speak, the first dice or how the World Soul or individual souls give 
initial movement to things or individuals within the Universe. This is not, I would 
suggest, carelessness on Plato’s part, but an acute awareness of the metaphysical 
reality and philosophical problem he was dealing with, namely, that movement did 
not begin with the generated world, but continued within it, only now, with the 
generation of the Cosmos, this movement is impacted by the Nous of the Demiurge, 
toward organised ends. 
The problem which causal determinism raises in Plato’s account, given his 
understanding of physical movement as accessory, focuses upon how movement 
within the generated world can be ultimately connected to the Demiurge as the 
‘unmoved mover’ or in other words, the problem of dualism. However, I would 
challenge the view that physical movement in Plato’s Cosmos is determined by a 
non-physical cause, just as, at its opposite pole, I would challenge the verdict of 
physical determinism, akin to the atomism of Democr i tu~ .~’~  The question central to 
In countering Vlastos, Sorabji writes: “Aristotle does not postulate that every event conforms to 
high-level regularities. I doubt if Plato does either.” (See Necessity, Cause and Blame, p. 62.) His 
interesting argument follows upon an earlier one by G. E. M. Anscombe that events can be caused 
without being necessitated, although likely differing where Sorabji adds to his argument that desires 
and beliefs cause actions (ibid. pp. 28-29). Apart fi-om Sorabji’s argument against a deterministic 
position for these philosophers, this idea is potentially valuable in determining how a disordering 
5 19 
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this debate is to ask what metaphysical reality was Plato trying to describe? It is only 
in Laws X, however, with Plato’s unreserved rejection of the strictly physicalist 
position, that the picture becomes clearer and a possible answer emerges. 
We have already seen from the Timaeus that there is a considerable degree to 
which Plato agrees with the atomist understanding of the physical universe, differing 
with the atomists, however, with respect to his opposing causal views and their 
attendant metaphysics. Although Plato has a theory of soul by which he accounts for 
motion in the Universe, he has no answer for how soul interacts with things or people 
or how the World Soul moves the Universe, as the motions initiated by soul are not 
physical. Rather, their movements have been described by Plato as the various 
motions earlier associated with the different regions of the tripartite soul, namely, 
wish reflection, foresight, counsel, judgement-true or false-pleasure, pain, hope, 
fear, hate, love, and “whatever other kindred, or primary, motions there may be. 
By his own admission, Plato makes it clear that he does not know how ‘rational 
motion interacts with the Universe, offering instead the proviso (as he similarly 
did in the Timaeus) that “we mustn’t assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to 
look upon reason and get to know it adequately. 
What follows in this passage is important. Plato once again recalls the image of 
the sun and the need, due to the limitation of the human intellect, to look at these 




cause, which I argue is completely without ‘nous’, might bring about and maintain disorder at a 
cosmic level. 
520 Lg. 896e8-897b5. 
Lg. 897e4. 
522 Lg. 897d8-e2. 
This is not an allusion to the Forms. 523 
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discussion of the various physical motions and their parallel with the rational 
motions, accordingly, is meant to serve this purpose. His further discussion of how 
psychic movement (noetic or anoetic depending on which soul) interacts with the 
physical world soon follows, but again, obliquely. Consequently, Plato offers three 
possible ways in which soul interacts with the world. These remain, however, at a 
descriptive level, rather than providing the reader with a full causal explanation. 
Thus, at Lg. 898e8-899a4, using the sun as an example of a physical body, Plato 
suggests with regard to the motion of the soul (‘rational motion’) that either (a) the 
soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes, just as 
our soul takes us around from one place to another, or (b) it acquires its own body of 
fire or air of some kind (as certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the 
external contact of body with body, or (c) it is entirely immaterial, but guides the sun 
along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful 
powers.524 In (a) Plato does not provide an explanation of how the various psychic 
motions associated with the soul would be able to achieve this. In similar fashion, 
(b) does not mention how the soul would acquire its own physical body and even if it 
did, how the soul would interact with this body. Finally, (c), similar to (a) but with 
soul not residing in the object moved, similarly begs the question of how soul moves 
a body by offering a description of this unexplained dualist position in place of an 
answer. What this passage clearly enumerates, I would suggest, are not causal 
explanations for the interface between the non-physical soul and a physical body, but 
rather, alternative descriptive guises for the ‘parallel’ causal relationship suggested 
Saunders, The Laws, p. 43 1 .  524 
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earlier, which exists between them. Moreover, precisely because of this parallel 
relationship existing between the soul and the physical world, Plato cannot offer a 
more thorough or in-depth causal explanation, as one, I would suggest, does not exist 
that is easily comprehensible. Plato’s consistent lack of any such explanation attests 
to his awareness of this fact. Where there is a self-moving physical body, there is 
also a soul. This much Plato will say. He also chooses to affirm this, stating that by 
definition ‘soul’ is self-moving motion525 or it is that which makes something 
‘alive’ .526 Thus, soul for Plato encapsulates and articulates the very self-movingness 
of the physical world, which he has argued in both the Timaeus and Laws X cannot 
belong to the physical world itself. The physical world, on the other hand, and its 
contents, inasmuch as they may (i.e. the Cosmos as a whole, the heavenly bodies, 
living beings) or may not (i.e. individual inanimate objects in the world) be self- 
moving, attest to the hypothesised existence of soul, but more than this, especially 
with respect to the ‘parallel’ relationship which exists between soul and the Cosmos, 
Plato does not and cannot say. 
2.3.4 
In the second passage cited at 42.1/2, Lg. 896a5-896b1, Plato seeks to complete 
his demonstration that not only is soul the universal cause of all change and motion, 
it is also to be identified with the primal becoming and movement of “all that is, has 
been, or shall be, and of their contraries.” To achieve this he first eliminates the 
accessory causes or “motion induced by something else” as possible contenders for 
The identity of soul with primal becoming and universal causality 
Lg. 895e10-896a5; passage (i) from §2.1/2. 
Lg. 895~7-10. 
525 
526 A body can be dead or alive. For this reason Plato hypothesises that self- 
movingness is, in some way, a separate entity apart from the body, positing thereby the idea of ‘soul’. 
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this position (passages iii and iv at §2.1/2), as he had done previously in the Timaeus 
when tryrng to discern the primary causal powers from the secondary causes. In an 
even stronger move, however, Plato drops the entire metaphor of generation from 
Laws X, as it is no longer needed and with that, and for the same reason, he drops, 
too, its primary causal powers, the Demiurge and Ananke. Plato’s earlier purview 
from the Timaeus, therefore, has been completely dropped from Laws X, replaced 
now by a wholly post-generation vantage. As a consequence, the workings of 
generation and its key players are now deleted from the discussion currently taking 
place. This must be borne in mind when considering causality in Laws X. This is not 
to say, however, that Plato’s metaphysics do not remain contiguous with the 
Timaeus, for they do, since by the end of this earlier work, Plato’s vantage, too, had 
become post-generative, with all discussion of generation and its key causal players 
having similarly been dropped. 
As a consequence of this change of focus, however, which begins in the Timaeus 
and culminates in Laws X, two related problems arise, namely, first, discerning the 
degree to which ‘soul’ in Laws X i s  distinguishable from the primal powers as they 
were articulated earlier in the Timaeus and second, the degree to which ‘soul’ in 
Laws X can be identified with the generated ‘soul’. The reasons for these problems 
arising are fairly obvious. With regard to the first problem, in Laws XPlato is clearly 
wanting to give ‘soul’ causal powers not earlier specified or ascribed to it in the 
Timaeus. As far as the second problem is concerned, with the metaphor of 
generation having been completely dropped from Laws X, the ontology and 
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epistemology of ‘soul’ are more imprecise, as there is now an amassing of ideas 
previously articulated separately in Plato’s earlier metaphysics. 
On closer inspection, however, these problems resolve. Accordingly, in Laws X, 
passage (iv) above (Lg. 896b10-896~3), it is not the primary causes which are being 
distinguished from the secondary causes, but rather, ‘soul’ as aprior cause over that 
which it governs, namely, body, a position which Plato has already affirmed in the 
Timae~s?~’ Thus, the earlier depiction of ‘soul’ in the metaphor from the Timaeus as 
having been generated by the Demiurge, which latter forms the first of two primary 
causes, the other being Ananke, is not contradicted by this later passage in Laws X. 
‘Soul’ as understood in this passage is not a primary cause-it did not generate the 
Universe-rather, after its own generation (discussed in the Timaeus, but not in Laws 
X), soul provides the noetic movement for the generated Universe. As mentioned, 
this change to a post-generative focus is contiguous between these two works, where 
by the latter half of the Timaeus all mention of the primary causes has ceased, with 
the remaining description having ceded to an explanation of certain aspects of the 
already generated world and its accessory causes, as well as to the workings of the 
human ‘soul’. This change in causal vantage is prompted, I suggest, by a desire on 
Plato’s part to give greater emphasis to the efficacious role of ‘soul’ in the generated 
world, combined with a development of his earlier view that ‘nous’ unembodied 
(‘rational motion’ in Laws X) is to be identified with the Demiurge or Ananke (but 
the latter in a wholly negative sense as a power lacking in ‘nous’), but when made 
particular and immanent, with ‘soul’. Plato would have reasoned that if soul can be 
See Ti. 34b10-35al. 521 
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made particular and immanent (in the world), then it is begotten from that which is 
universal and transcendent. Accordingly, the Demiurge and Ananke become 
transformed in Laws X, represented metaphysically in this work as the Beneficent 
and Non-beneficent Souls, re~pectively.~~’ 
What Laws X does not do is define the boundaries of soul within the Cosmos, as 
seemingly, there are no boundaries-as a cause, soul is all pervasive and all 
powerful, always operating at a ‘parallel’, psychic level with the Universe itself. 
Moreover, being all-powerful, it is limitless with regard to its impact on change and 
motion. As such, there is no immediate requirement to understand soul as having 
been generated in Laws X, since there is nothing outside of the soul or the Universe, 
which is being considered. A distinction with respect to this to which I wish to draw 
attention is Plato’s use of the phrase ‘universal cause’ in Laws X ( ~ L T ~ C X  &KCXGW in 
passage (ii) above) as distinct from the idea of ‘primary cause’ in the Timaeus. We 
know from the Timaeus that the &‘TCCXOLU or ‘all’ has already been generated and is 
in place. We also know from the Timaeus that the Demiurge was the primal cause of 
the generated world. Thus, successful in its task of offsetting the powers of the other 
primary power, Ananke, the Demiurge, I suggest, was depicted as pre-universal in its 
causal powers and not universal. According to the Timaeus, moreover, ‘soul’, in the 
form of the World Soul, assisted by individual souls, was generated so as to be the 
primary causal power within the generated Universe and therefore, to this extent, act 
as the ‘universal cause’. In accordance with this understanding, ‘soul’ in Laws X, 
therefore, is not pre-universal as a cause, nor is it generative, having neither the 
See passages (ix) Lg. 896e4-6 and (x) Lg. 896e8-897b5 above. 528 
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scope nor the power of the Demiurge. Thus, just as ‘soul’ was understood in the 
Timaeus as the primary causal power within the generated Universe, so, too, ‘soul’ is 
aptly described in Laws X as the ‘universal cause’. 
As argued above, soul has ‘parallel’ causative powers in relation to the world it 
impacts, informing the Cosmos rationally while existing separately with regards to 
its ontology, having being derived (begotten) by the Demiurge from ‘nous’ and 
existing entirely at a noetic level. The Demiurge, on the other hand, is necessarizy 
metaphysically distinct from both ‘soul’ and the Cosmos, being prior to both and not 
identifiable with either the Cosmos or its ongoing movement (physical or noetic). Its 
role, therefore, with regard to Plato’s cosmology begins and ends with the generation 
of the Universe. 
Laws X, however, makes no mention of this earlier process or to its players, e.g. 
the Demiurge and Ananke, beginning with the Universe as already fully alive and 
informed by soul. This can be summarised as follows: 
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The Timaeus 
There is a chaos, out of which the Universe 
is generated. 
The Demiurge is apre-universal cause and 
so is Ananke. 
Soul is generated, but not out of chaos; 
rather, it is formed from ‘nous?. Soul, 
moreover, being formed by the Demiurge 
shares in its divinity and to this extent is 
also eternal. It remains, however, 
metaphysically distinct from the Demiurge 
by virtue of its ontology. 
The soul is the source of all causal power 
(rational movement) within the physical 
universe. 
The soul exists in a parallel causal 
relationshiD to the world. 
Soul is identified with the movement of 
primal becoming. 
The purview of Laws X is entirely within 
the scoDe of an alreadv existinrr Universe. 
The Demiurge is not mentioned, nor is the 
generation of the Cosmos or any of its 
other players, e.g. Ananke. 
There is no mention of the soul being 
generated. Rather, it is cited as the 
universal cause of all that is, has been or 
will be, with no mention being made of its 
history. The soul is divine and therefore, 
is also eternal. 
The soul is the source of all causal power 
(rational movement) within the physical 
universe. 
The soul exists in a parallel causal 
relationship to the world. 
Soul is identified with the movement of 
primal becoming. 
As this chart shows, the scope of the subject matter is the major factor differentiating 
these works with regard to soul. To wit, whereas the Timaeus takes ‘being’, ‘space’ 
and ‘becoming’ into consideration, Laws X takes only the latter two, ‘space’ and 
‘becoming’, and not ‘being’. 
2.3.5 
In Laws X, Plato drops all imagery of the soul as having been generated. This 
move, I suggest, is not at odds with the mythic representation of the soul’s generation 
in the Timaeus, where its description is written in entirely different terms from that of 
The soul begotten and not generated 
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the rest of generation, since, rather than being described as having been generated 
from the physical chaos as was the rest of the Universe, ‘soul’ is described as being 
generated from mixtures of ‘difference’, ‘sameness’ and ‘existence’, which entities 
are purely noetic and metaphysical in kind and not physical. Thus, whereas the 
simple imagery of generation is appropriate for the physical world, it remains 
awkward for ‘soul’, which is not an object per se. Plato’s intention, however, 
because of this imagery must be seen within the act of generation itself. Clearly its 
purpose was to show that soul, like the rest of the generated Cosmos, was designed 
by the Demiurge and for a purpose, but nothing more was intended, since, unlike the 
‘stuff of the Universe, soul was not made up out of various arrangements of 
triangles. Rather, and importantly, it was made up of noetic material, metaphysical 
in nature, taken or begotten from nous, which latter was not subject to generation. 529 
That ‘soul’, therefore, was begotten and not generated, while at the same time 
with the generated Cosmos was designed, is the position, I suggest, which is 
ultimately argued for by Plato in both the Timaeus and Laws X. To wit, first, in the 
Timaeus the World Soul is described as contrived by the Demiurge before the body 
of the world, in other words, before the generation of the world and therefore cames 
no connotation of physical generation. Second, the Demiurge made this soul the 
“dominating and controlling partner” in its relation to the generated Cosmos. This 
carries with it the notion of authority, passed on by the Demiurge, but not the 
authority of brute force of which the Demiurge has no part, but of intelligence 
‘nous’. Third, soul, as generated, is described as being composed, in part, 
or 
of 
For the generation of the World Soul see Ti. 34b10-37~5; for the human soul see Ti. 4 ld4-42e4. 529 
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indivisible, eternally unchanging ‘Existence’, a concept closely associated with nous. 
Although in the Timaeus eternally unchanging existence is directly descriptive only 
of ‘the unchanging to the degree that both the ‘unchanging form’ and the 
Demiurge participate in nous, this description is applicable to both the D e m i ~ r g e ~ ~  * 
as the direct agent and source of ‘nous’, and ‘the unchanging form’ as the object of 
thought, its indirect agent. Thus, although the Demiurge is described as having used 
the “highest and completely perfect of intelligent things’’ as the model after which 
it532 generated the Universe and which model is later described as having unchanging 
and uncreated existence, this perfectly intelligent form or ‘being’ (which according 
to Plato is inclusive all of the forms or ideas after which things have their intelligent 
pattern) remains the object of the Demiurge’s own reflection upon itself or ‘nous . 
Soul is also now described as composed of divisible, changing ‘Existence’. This 
had only been descriptive of ‘Becoming’, which existed before the generation of the 
Cosmos and itself was not generated. This element was presumably incorporated by 
Plato to capture the ability of soul to remain and operate within the world of 
’ 533 
becoming as it was being organised, i.e. as the Cosmos was being generated. The 
third kind of ‘Existence’, intermediary between the other two, of which the soul is 
~ ~~ 
Ti. 5 le6-52a4. 
See Ti. 30b4cl. 




533 Although it has been argued that the Demiurge, understood as ‘nous’, is simply metaphoric 
language within strictly mythic material for intelligence or reason within the Cosmos, a position 
which Cornford maintains, this view does not take into consideration that the Demiurge is also the 
agent of nous and as a causal agent does not have strict identity with it. Furthermore, this view also 
omits the fact that the intelligent being or ‘nous’, upon which the Demiurge reflects to bring about 
generation, is never described as being inclusive of everything on which the Demiurge couZd reflect 
and further, of any discussion of what the Demiurge itself is comprised. Although we do know that 
the Demiurge participates in ‘nous’, it could be that anything else of which the Demiurge is comprised 
is beyond the intelligence of man to comprehend, which position concerning the limitation of the 
human intellect is well-documented by Plato. 
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composed, simply captures, I suggest, the soul’s operative role or otherwise put, the 
compromised position of ‘nous’ within the generated physical sphere. Thus, Plato’s 
reference to the three kinds of ‘Existence’ give voice to the complexity of the 
metaphysics of soul as it was designed by the Demiurge to operate within the 
generated Cosmos. Plato’s reference, on the other hand, to the three kinds of 
‘Sameness’ and three kinds of ‘Difference’ refer directly, I further suggest, to the 
noetic elements of nous (the ability to discern difference and sameness) from which 
the Demiurge chose to design the soul, listing them according to the three kinds of 
Existence which soul would require to become fully functional. Accordingly, these 
noetic elements in turn align and correspond to the complex metaphysics (of 
existence), which soul as a designed noetic object has been given by the Demiurge in 
order to exist before, during and after the generation of the Cosmos or specific object 
it inhabits (i.e. a living being). What is clear is that soul is comprised of noetic 
elements and is given a complex existence, but neither of which, the elements out of 
which it is composed or its existence, are themselves objects subject to generation. 
Plato’s description, therefore, of the generation of soul is a metaphor giving voice to 
the above and imaginative substance to his ‘likely’ account. Thus, although in the 
Timaeus, Plato goes into considerable detail regarding the composition and 
mathematical structure of the soul, having done so similarly for the physical objects 
within the generated Cosmos, he does this, I suggest, to preserve the imagery and 
vitality of this likely account, and also perhaps to capture the general tenor of the 
soul’s nature as complex and designed, but not to reflect in any way actual 
knowledge of the soul’s structure. 
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2.3.6 
Plato’s understanding of the generation of the soul in the Timaeus, therefore, is 
congruent with his later understanding of soul as eternal and ungenerated in Laws X, 
the difference lying primarily in Plato’s use of metaphor within his cosmology, but 
which is absent from the later work. Where greater clarification is still needed, 
however, is with regard to Plato’s understanding of the Beneficent and Non- 
beneficent Souls in Laws X as they might relate to the Demiurge and Ananke of the 
Timaeus. There are a number of possibilities to consider regarding any purported 
relationship which might exist between these key causal players: (first) that the 
Demiurge and Ananke were purely mythic entities and the only causal force which 
exists for Plato is ‘soul’ of which the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls are 
specific players, whose ends have moral significance; (second) that the Demiurge 
and Ananke remain as causal forces for Plato at the time of the generation of the 
Cosmos, but drop out after generation is completed, leaving only soul as agent(s) in a 
Universe which has long had existence; (third) that by the time Laws X had been 
written, Plato had concluded that the Demiurge and Ananke were in fact, if not 
mythic, to be identified with soul, since upon reflection they seem to share identical 
attributes of ‘nous’ when considered in the light of an already-generated Universe; or 
(fourth) that Plato’s understanding of workings of the Demiurge and Ananke as 
forces has broadened to include their ongoing causal impact at the level of ‘nous’ in 
the generated world, but only at the level of ‘nous’ (or lack of it) and thus, only in 
part (not the generative sphere), as the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, which, 
moreover, exist separate from the notion of the World Soul. It is with respect to this 
God (the Demiurge), not begotten 
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latter proposal that I will offer support, the challenge remaining, however, that if this 
is correct, is there some degree to which the Demiurge and Ananke, extending into 
the world as Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, like all souls, are begotten or 
conversely, are these Souls in Laws X, like the Demiurge and Ananke, begetters and 
not begotten? 
With regard to the first proposal, I have argued throughout this thesis that the 
Demiurge and Ananke were not mythic entities for Plato, but were understood by 
him as the primary metaphysical causal forces behind the generation of the Universe. 
Although Plato does use mythic material in the Timaeus, it is not with regard to 
either of these key figures in his cosmology. With regard to the second proposal, that 
the Demiurge and Ananke are causal forces during generation, but play no further 
role after that and therefore are in no way related to the Beneficent and Non- 
Beneficent Souls respectively of Laws X, I offer the following objections. First, 
although I would agree there is not a direct one-to-one correlation between these two 
sets of causal players, on a closer look the similarities are too great to deny a link at 
least (and possibly, at most) at the noetic level or that of ‘nous’. My claim, however, 
is not that the Demiurge or Ananke have now become elevated Souls for Plato, but 
rather, that the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls give voice to Plato’s 
recognition and acknowledgement of the continuing presence of the Demiurge and 
Ananke in the generated world at the level of nous, distinct fi-om those activities, 
moreover, originally given to the World Soul. A number of points must be kept in 
mind, however. Plato’s presentation and understanding of soul has changed 
considerably fi-om the Timaeus. Passage 52.112 (vi) quoted above from Laws X 
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shows the type of movement of which soul is now capable. The Timaeus, on the 
other hand, does not specify the soul’s movements other than those associated with 
intelligence and reason.534 Its three-tiered structure of soul carried over from The 
Republic, moreover, is no longer mentioned in Laws X. Memories, moods and 
wishes are listed alongside calculations and true judgements in this latter work. 
Thus, soul appears now to be viewed as a complex noetic whole, rather than as a neat 
supra-physical structure. Further, whereas the concept of ‘will’ is not viewed as a 
characteristic of soul in the Timaeus, but is attributed to the Demiurge and 
as Unmoved Movers, in Laws X the idea of ‘will’ is now acknowledged as part of the 
notion of soul as a ‘self-moved mover’. It is with particular attention to this last 
change that I note Plato’s possible inclusion of the primary causal powers into the 
world of becoming as Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, albeit, whilst 
maintaining the strictly parallel relationship of the soul’s movement to the world’s 
physical movement and the existence of the Demiurge and Ananke as the primal 
powers, from which, I argue, the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls have 
emerged. By the time Plato wrote Laws X, the particular work of a World Soul, i.e. 
to give rationality to physical movement so as to direct it towards an end, appears to 
be assumed and therefore is not highlighted, nor does this 
have become subsumed under the larger concept of the 
particular role appear to 
Beneficent Soul, which 
534 Ti. 34a1-5. 
See Ti. 41a7-b6. Although the World Soul is described in the Timaeus by Plato as having been 
generated so as to be the “dominating and controlling partner” over the body of the world to which it 
is attached, he soon specifies the activity which the World Soul has, which is to provide the Cosmos 
with “a divine source of unending and rational life for all time,” a much more static role than that 
deigned of the Beneficent or Non-beneficent Souls of Laws X, where most certainly the concept of an 
active ‘will’ is now assumed and so, too, non-rationality (i.e. activity of the Non-beneficent Soul). 
See Lg. 896e4-6. 
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according to Plato has quite broad powers, whereas the World Soul was specifically 
begot (generated) at the time of the generation of the World for the above-noted 
purpose. Thus, my objection to proposal two is that Plato, in presenting his notion of 
soul not simply as a supra-physical structure closely aligned to the body in or to 
which it is attached, thereby enabling intelligent movement, as it was in the Timaeus, 
but now cast as whole and complex psychic entities capable of self-movement, 
especially as regards the existence of the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, 
imitates too closely those movements of which the Demiurge and Ananke would be 
capable in a post-generative world, to not in fact have some relation one to the other. 
It would appear, moreover, that although the specific concept of a World Soul has 
dropped fi-om Plato’s metaphysical pallet, the role of ‘World Soul’, although clearly 
not its inception or generation, could easily be subsumed under the broader concept 
of ‘sou~(s)~ now in place in Laws x . ~ ~ ~  
This brings me to the third proposal, which I also reject but with qualification, 
namely, that the concept of soul in Laws X is now identifiable with what were 
formerly described by Plato as the Demiurge and Ananke in the Timaeus. The 
reasons why this position is untenable are the following. First, Laws X is not a 
cosmology and deals in no way with the generation of the Universe. Its vantage, 
therefore, lies entirely within the scope of an already generated Cosmos of which the 
viewer has no perspective of its earliest beginnings. Hence, its understanding of the 
536 See §2.1/2 (viii), Lg. 896dlO-e2. In the case of the World Soul, although its ongoing rational 
powers appear to be subsumed under those of the Beneficent Soul (clearly not those of Non- 
beneficent Soul), its inception remains the work of the Demiurge or father of the Universe. In other 
words, it did not beget (generate) itself or, as a discrete entity, has it always been in existence. Plato 
has not worked out all of the details relating to this change of viewpoint, as sometimes can be the case 
in his writings, leaving awkward loose ends. 
309 
soul is at all times post-generative and from this perspective ‘soul’ is the only causal 
power. This vantage, however, does not automatically subsume the earlier primal 
causes, nor does it assume that they did not exist or deny a beginning to the Cosmos. 
Second, there is a qualitative difference between the idea of ‘universal cause’ as it 
appears in Laws X and that of ‘Cause of the Universe’ which is referred to in the 
Timaeus. The first idea of ‘universal cause’ leaves the question ‘of what’ open, 
although we are told that with reference to the soul the answer is ‘movement’. The 
same question, however, is not raised by the second idea, ‘Cause of the Universe’, 
since as stated, it is clearly not movement, but is ‘the Universe’ itself wherein 
movement takes place and which includes soul as another element or causal factor 
within it. Although I have argued that soul was actually begotten by the Demiurge 
and not generated, it nonetheless was described by Plato as having been generated, 
intimating the idea that it was designed by the Demiurge as part of the Universe. 
Thus, soul, which according to the Timaeus is clearly not self-generated, cannot 
possibly be the cause of what it is claimed to be a part. Accordingly, the idea of a 
universal cause of all motion, which is the role of soul in both Laws X and the 
Timaeus, is not the same thing as a primal cause, which is the role given to the 
Demiurge (and Ananke indirectly) in the Timaeus as cause of the Universe. With 
regard to the above-noted qualification in respect of this third proposal, there are, 
nonetheless, grounds for claiming that the Beneficent and Non-beneficent souls are 
in some way related to the primal causes Demiurge and Ananke, but the relationship 
is not one, I would suggest, of strict identity, nor is it entirely congruent, but remains 
for Plato a loose or free adaptation in which he is able to incorporate new ideas, 
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while abandoning those which are no longer useful. This, therefore, suggests a 
fourth and final proposal. 
In this proposal the Demiurge and Ananke are understood as being present (to the 
degree and manner in which it is possible) in the generated world, manifest now as 
the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, extending from their primal source into the 
Cosmos. This idea of the Demiurge and Ananke as emergent souls in the Cosmos 
presupposes not only the presence of ‘nous, in the world (or its absence, as in the 
case of Ananke) from which ‘soul’ has consistently been understood to derive its 
rationality (or irrationality), but also the presence of active ‘primal wills’ or powers 
within the Universe, who, in the form of ‘Souls’ or self-moved movers, desire and 
are able to bring about certain ends within it, either of order or disorder. 
2.3.6.1 
In the Timaeus, the idea of ‘will, is understood as something, which is possessed 
by both the Demiurge and Ananke, as well as by the generated soul. As an unmoved 
mover, the Demiurge desires and sets out to achieve order or, as in the case of 
Ananke, maintain disorder. The idea of ‘will’, therefore, is based on the notion of 
desire and the ability or power of this desire to achieve its object. Timaeus describes 
the ‘will, or &8&hov%o< of the Father of the Universe (the Demiurge) as being a 
“stronger and more sovereign bond than that which existed before its generation” 
(that latter being the ‘will’ of Ananke which previously held the Universe in 
disorder).537 The human soul is also described in the Timaeus as possessing a ‘will’ 
or of desiring good ends and of attempting to bring these about, although usually in 
The power of ‘will’ and the achieving of ends 
~ ~ ~~ 
537 Ti. 4 1 a7-b6. 
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the somewhat weaker guise of ‘not desiring’ bad ends. 538 Thus, having been 
generated (‘begotten’) by the Demiurge and subject to the principle of ‘like from 
like’, the human ‘will’ shares infinitesimally with the divine will, limited by its own 
finiteness and human condition, but like the Demiurge, always desiring good and 
never its own destruction. The human soul’s capacity, however, to know what is 
good for itself is described by Plato as being greatly limited both by its incarnate 
state and its later sloth, resulting in ignorance and error and accordingly, requiring 
careful tendance. The idea of ‘will’ is not developed further in the Timaeus. It 
reappears, however, in Laws X, where the idea of ‘will’ or the desire and power to 
bring about certain ends, good or evil, depending on the agent, is again introduced, 
but this time brokered by Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls interacting with an 
already generated Cosmos. Again, there is a call to careful vigilance, but this time 
not towards one’s own soul, but to the outside influence of other Souls. Thus, human 
souls continue to desire good ends, but depending on their alignment with wisdom or 
folly, either achieve these or fail. Although ‘soul’ is referred to in Laws X, and not 
specifically ‘will’, this aspect or function of the human soul is most certainly meant. 
See Ti. 73a7 ( ~ . v u ~ . c ~ ~ K o o u ) ,  ‘ nwilling’ as in ‘disobedient’; see also Ti. 87b3 (C~KOUCYLC~TCXTCX), 
‘involuntary’. The idea of the human soul possessing a ‘will’, although present, is a fairly weak 
notion in the Timaeus and almost invariably it is the negative idea of ‘not willing’ which is being 
invoked. The reason for this is that for Plato the soul can only desire what is good (‘evil’ for man is 
&KOUZL [Ti. 86e2] or something which is never achieved with human effort or toil, in other words, is 
never ‘willed’). Moreover, because the soul’s understanding of what is good for it is dependent upon 
its different parts exercising their corresponding motions proportionately, the soul sometimes 
mistakenly wills or desires what is evil or is not good for it. Accordingly, whenever these motions, 
due to unfavourable conditions, are imbalanced, they suggest to the soul equally imbalanced ends 
from which to choose its good. but falsely. Thus, the soul can inadvertently choose as an end that it 
does not desire, which is a corruption of the idea of will as desire and the ability to achieve its object. 
The positive notion of ‘willing’, however, does enter here indirectly with respect to the human soul, 
namely, in Plato’s insistence that attention be given to the proper proportioning of the soul’s various 
motions or in other words, by introducing the idea of choosing to keep the soul’s motions in their 
proper balance by proper attendance, regardless of any unpropitious circumstances (Ti. 90c6-d7). 
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Later in Laws X Plato will point to the source of this wisdom or folly, where order 
and disorder have now become immanently infused into daily life by the assistance 
of powerful Souls robustly or dangerously present. 
2.3.6.2 
The idea of primal souls existing within the Cosmos itself as ‘self-moved movers’ 
does not contradict or duplicate the idea of a World Soul also being present, nor does 
the concept of ‘World Soul’ in any way require modification, although as I have 
argued earlier, its existence simply appears to be assumed in Laws X and not 
discussed. The World Soul, as understood from the Timaeus, is the matrix of 
rationality which saturates the world with its countless natural ends. This idea is still 
extant in Laws X and does not extend to the activities ascribed to the Benevolent 
Likewise, the existence of individual human souls is also assumed in Laws 
X5‘0 and is mentioned, but only in passing, in Plato’s description of the soul’s ability 
to company with wisdom or folly. This ability of the human soul to sometimes 
choose wrongly was noted in the Timaeus, but with the soul’s integrity stalwartly 
defended by Plato against ever knowingly choosing evil. The source of this evil, 
however innocently chosen, is left open. Imbalance, sloth and overindulgence are 
descriptions of disorder and do not name the cause. Equally, in Laws X, the source 
of the wisdom or folly which befall the human soul again raises questions. These 
questions and their answers, however, are anticipated by Plato as he begins to focus 
Primal Souls (causal), not begotten 
539 The ‘Benevolent Soul’ is to be understood as being synonymous with the ‘Beneficent Soul’. 
See Lg. 903d3-5. 540 
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on and centre his discussion upon the idea of soul as primal cause, presented now in 
the form of two distinct causal powers, the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls. 
The provenance of the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, or their ontological 
histories, although not explicitly stated, can be to some extent extracted and further 
hypothesised. With respect to Plato’s metaphysics, their ontologies are, in a way, 
eschatological, not having existed in the Timaeus or the earliest stages of generation, 
appearing for the first time in the fully functional world of Laws X. An essential 
difference, therefore, between these Souls as distinct from the World Soul and the 
human soul, is that whereas it is congruent to understand these latter as having been 
begotten (generated) by the Demiurge and existing in both the Timaeus and Laws X, 
their ontologies intact in both works and requiring no emendation, this is not the case 
for the Beneficent or Non-beneficent Souls, which did not apparently even exist in 
the Timaeus. Is their existence due to the earlier ‘likely tale’ having turned fanciful 
over time or forgetful or alternatively, found to be fanciful and thus, forgotten, so 
that now the truth of causality can be told? Such conclusions require specious 
partiality with regard to Plato’s metaphysics, abandoning one part or another. The 
fourth proposal noted above, however, approaches Plato’s metaphysics with an 
inclusive view of causality in mind and for this reason, I suggest, is preferable, 
requiring little, if any, amendment to Plato’s causal theory. According to this theory, 
the primal (causal) souls introduced in Laws X, rather than being designed by the 
Demiurge (who would never design a Non-beneficent Soul, being unlike itself) or 
becoming de facto a replacement or refinement of the earlier notion of generative 
primal powers, are the psychic counterparts of the Demiurge and Ananke, noetic and 
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anoetic respectively, as they manifest themselves in the generated world or in other 
words, as they extend themselves, not as ‘unmoved movers’ outside of the Universe, 
but as ‘self-moved movers’ within the Universe after its completion.541 
Although the idea of the primal powers extending their influence into the daily 
life of the generated Universe was a possibility in the Timaeus, Plato would not have 
and did not develop this idea, as it required a contemporary timeframe, which, being 
beyond the requirements of his cosmology, did not interest him. By the time Plato 
wrote Laws X, however, matters had changed. Contemporary life and its exigencies 
pressed down upon the philosopher. Moral vacuity in the form of false belief, 
agnosticism and atheism demanded redress. It is within this redress and its appeal to 
reason that Plato chose to identify what he believed to be the sources of wisdom and 
folly within the world. This could not be the World Soul (the source of rationality 
within the world), nor could it be human souls (who sometimes mistook folly for 
wisdom and never knowingly chose ‘evil’). Accordingly, Plato was moved to 
introduce new players into his post-generative causal scheme, the Beneficent and 
Non-beneficent Souls, as the causes, respectively, of good and evil within the 
Cosmos, while not concerning himself with how their causal agency tallied up with 
his earlier cosmology. The physical world of the Timaeus was far removed from the 
religious concerns of Laws X. Thus, here, for the moment at hand, Plato delved 
exclusively into the world of soul, where only moral truths mattered and their impact 
on the human 
See Lg. 894e4-895a3. 54 1 
542 See the speech of the Athenian at Lg. 887bl-888d5: “the greatest of these ... is that of thinking 
rightly about the gods and so living well or, the reverse.” Lg. 888b2-4 in Laws X, Taylor, p. 278. 
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With regard to gaining an understanding, however, of what appear to be 
unresolvable differences in causal agency between these two works, this fourth 
proposal again provides clarity. According to this view, the Beneficent and Non- 
beneficent Souls are not only an extension of the key causal players from the 
Timaeus into the generated world, but are also an amalgamation of certain 
metaphysical ideas from this work, namely, of the immanence of soul within the 
Universe with the power of the causal forces outwith it. By this extension and 
amalgamation, moreover, Plato, in developing his metaphysical theory, is able to 
introduce his moral theory, in other words, primal metaphysical movement in the 
Timaeus becomes the source of wisdom and folly in Laws X and their association by 
human souls becomes moral choice. In this way continuity is achieved, but without 
destroying the integrity of either explanation, the cosmological or the religious.543 
The idea of ‘self-movingness’, both in the Timaeus and Laws X, appears as a 
feature of anything possessed of a soul, wherein both ‘nous’ and ‘will’ (a function of 
nous) reside. The principle of being a ‘mover’, however, unless it is an inanimate 
object or accessory cause,544 requires something else. The primal powers in the 
Timaeus, the Demiurge and Ananke, did not possess a ‘soul’ or a body, yet they were 
movers. The Beneficent Soul and Non-beneficent Soul from Laws X, although souls, 
are also movers. What these ‘movers’ in fact share is the desire and ability to 
achieve ends, good or evil, independently of inhabiting a body themselves. 
Accordingly, the essential difference between them, I would suggest, is one of 
543 By the end of Laws X, Plato refers to these primal Souls as ‘gods’, omitting all hrther references to 
these gods as ‘Souls’. 
544 In this case the accessory cause or object, e.g. a hammer, is moved, which in turn moves something 
else, e.g. a nail. It has, however, no intrinsic power itself to move anything without first being moved. 
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aspect. When these primal powers, ultimately of order and disorder, are viewed 
outwith the organised Cosmos and understood in terms of generation, they are known 
as Ananke and the Demiurge. These same powers, however, manifest within the 
finished Cosmos and affecting its moral agency, become Beneficent and Non- 
beneficent Souls. 
Plato’s description of ‘soul’ in Laws X, quoted at §2.1/2(x) above (Lg. 896e8- 
897b5), is a general one, capturing the essence of soul as it manifests itself 
prodigiously and diversely within the Cosmos, whether (according to this fourth 
proposal) emanating directly from the Demiurge in the form of the Beneficent Soul 
or having been generated (begotten), as in the case of the human soul (where it will 
company with Wisdom or Folly, i.e. the Beneficent or Non-beneficent Souls) or 
conversely, emanating from Ananke (the Non-beneficent Soul) or simply 
manifesting itself as the World Soul. Although, there is a metaphorical or 
anthropomorphic component to the above-noted passage, even a generic quality, I 
would suggest that this is due to the generality of its appeal, or its breadth, and not to 
any other reason. Thus, although admitting to all of the following kinds of souls, it is 
not the Beneficent Soul or the Non-beneficent, the World Soul or individual souls 
that Plato is discussing here, rather it is a passage attempting to capture the essence 
of ‘soul’, however it might manifest itself. The view that the Beneficent and Non- 
beneficent Souls represent the Demiurge and Ananke as they exist emergent in the 
generated Cosmos argues against the possibility that these souls are begotten 
(generated) by the Demiurge, as, for example, were the World Soul and individual 
souls in the Timaeus, since not only would this be impossible (the Demiurge could 
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not generate anything unlike itself, i.e. a soul that was a source of folly), this is also 
prevented by the fact of their ontology, whereby ‘soul’ is described in similar terms 
to the primal movers, namely, as “the first cause of the birth and destruction of all 
Although Plato describes ‘soul’ near the beginning of Laws X as being things. 
“one of the first creations before all physical things,” this is not at odds with Plato’s 
,9545 
understanding of primal Souls, since the World Soul and individual souls are still 
assumed to have been generated (begotten).546 It is only later in Laws X, as Plato 
develops his idea of soul as being prior and as “either the best kind of soul or the 
other sort, that he introduces the notion of the Beneficent and Non-beneficent 
Souls. These Souls are not described as being either born or generated by Plato, 
since by his own account this kind of ‘soul’ is now defined as ‘self-generating 
Neither the World Soul nor the human soul were described in the motion . 
Timaeus as ‘self-generating motion’, although they were recognised as the source of 
motion in living things. Finally, just before his discussion of the ‘god’ or gods in 
Laws X, in what becomes a very strong move for Plato, given his understanding of 
the generated (begotten) soul from the Timaeus, he soon identifies the Beneficent and 
Non-beneficent Souls or these ‘self-moving movers’ as gods.’49 In this way, Plato 
leaves broad rein for both the Beneficent Soul and the Non-beneficent Soul, now 
described as gods, to assume complete identity with the Demiurge and Ananke of the 
’9547 
7 548 
See Lg. 891e4-9. In this passage the prior division between ‘soul’ (as now described) and the gods 545 
breaks down, preparing by the end of this work for a certain identity between them. 
546 Lg. 892a2-bl. 
547 Lg. 898c 1-5. 
548 Lg. 895e 10-896a2. 
Lg. 899b3-10. See also Lg. 903e3-5, where, in Plato’s discussion of the gods, he describes their 
work in exactly the same terms as he did earlier the Soul, namely, in their controlling the Universe. 
Nowhere in Laws X, however, are these gods ever described in terms of having been generated, as 
were the heavenly bodies (understood as gods) in the Timaeus. 
549 
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Timaeus, where, like their predecessors, these Primal Souls stretch back into infinity, 
ungenerated and unbegotten. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Lg. 897b7 - 897d1 (omitting 897d2 - 898a2); 
Lg. 898a3 - 898c5 
3.1/2 Original Greek and Translation 
Then which manner of soul, must we say, has control of heaven and earth and their 
whole circuit? That which is prudent and replete with goodness, or that which has 
neither virtue? Shall we, if you please, give the question this answer? 
Why, man, if the whole path and movement of heaven and all its contents are of like 
nature with the motion, revolution, and calculations of wisdom, and proceed after 
that kind, plainly we must say it is the supremely good soul that takes forethought for 
the universe and guides it along that path. 
But the evil [soul], if the procedure is distraught and without order. 
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Of these two movements, that confined to one place must in every case be performed 
about a center, after the fashion of a well-turned cartwheel, and it is this which must 
surely have the closest affinity and resemblance that may be to the revolution of 
intelligence. 
Why, of course, that if we say that intelligence and movement performed in one 
place are both like the revolutions of a well-made globe, in moving regularly and 
uniformly in one compass about one centre, and in one sense, according to one single 
law and plan, we need have no fear of proving unskilled artists in imagery. 
And again, motion which is never regular or uniform, never in the same compass, nor 
about the same centre, or in one place, motion which has no order, plan, or law, will 
have kinship with folly of every kind. 
Now there can be no further obstacle to positive assertion, since we have found that 
it is soul which conducts the revolutions of all things, and are also bound to say that 
the soul by which the circle of the heavens is turned about with all foresight and 
order is either the supremely good, or its contrary- 
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3.3 Commentary and Notes 
3.3.1 The nature of soul 
These seven passages together raise and answer the question of the nature of soul, 
the existence of which Plato has just previously argued in Laws X as that whose 
activities are behind the various movements of the Cosmos. It is for the most part, 
however, an idea of soul quite removed from that of the Timaeus, finding few 
similarities with either the World Soul or the human soul. The key question Plato 
now asks is which manner of soul, that is, what kind of soul controls the Universe, 
that which exhibits prudence and goodness or that which has neither virtue? Thus, 
just as the Demiurge was the ultimate source of all ordered motion in the Timaeus, in 
Laws X Plato posits a soul, or possibly more than one, souls, within the generated 
Universe as responsible for all ordered motion. Similarly, just as Ananke was the 
source of all disordered motion before the generation of the Cosmos, he now assigns 
in Laws X a soul, or souls, as responsible for all disordered motion within the 
Cosmos. The ‘likely tale’ and its key players which Plato relied so heavily on in the 
Timaeus to explicate his cosmology there are now left within a distant past no longer 
needed or referred to. Thus, he requires to explain the causality of the Cosmos once 
more, which he does, but with new players and in slightly different terms. In Laws X 
Plato’s major concern is not the Cosmos per se, but the soul of man in a Cosmos 
long generated and his diminishing belief in gods long held to be active in the world. 
Something has gone wrong within the soul of man, he contends, not to believe in the 
gods. Thus, it is now Plato’s passionate concern to search out and name the source 
of this disbelief and in doing so, to appeal both to man’s reason, which for Plato is all 
322 
good and seeks only the soul’s good, and to man’s ‘will’, but which is weakened and 
mistaken by the lower (but integrated) powers of soul, warning him (‘man’) of a non- 
benevolent source, its evil intent and to stay clear. 
There is a gap, however, between these two works which Plato does not clearly 
articulate. Somewhere between his understanding of a generated soul and a soul 
which generates, or between the Timaeus and Laws X, is Plato’s realisation that there 
are more than mere vestigial remains of Ananke in the Cosmos, there is also a source 
of disorder or evil within the Cosmos, a powerful one, which is able to attach itself to 
and influence the soul of man if he (‘man’) is not careful. This raised a problem, 
however. If Ananke is not a soul, which at no time is Plato’s claim, and soul is the 
only source of non-physical or psychic movement within the Cosmos, which in both 
the Timaeus and Laws Xis  Plato’s position, then the evil power now referred to is a 
soul. There is no other option. However, this soul cannot possibly be made by the 
Demiurge, who cannot create (or beget) anything evil or unlike itself. Therefore, this 
soul and equally the benevolent soul, who are never described in Laws X as 
generated, must each extend into that ancient past which Plato has left behind with 
the Timaeus. 
In the Timaeus the question of the kind of soul would never have been raised, 
except perhaps to distinguish between the World Soul and the human soul as regards 
their function and separate ontologies. The soul that was generated, precisely 
because it was generated by an altogether good causal power or Demiurge, was 
entirely good, be it the World Soul or the human soul. Although Plato allowed in the 
Timaeus for vestiges of Ananke to remain within the Cosmos as residual effects of 
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this disordering cause,sso the principle of evil as an active power within the generated 
Cosmos had not been developed at the time of the writing of this earlier work. 
Rather, the ‘likely tale’ explains the remaining disorder within the generated Cosmos 
as a result of the disordering power, Ananke, having not been wholly subdued and 
thus, as primarily residual. It is possible that Plato did not believe that such a 
separate power existed within the world prior to his writing of Laws X, believing 
earlier only in the vestigial remnants of an ancient disordered past and equally 
disordering power, but not the power itself to have entered into the worldly domain. 
The World Soul was no doubt entirely good, having been generated by the 
Demiurge, and as explained in the last chapter, can still be presumed to be extant in 
the generated world in Laws X, although not specifically referred to, being the 
underlying rationality in the natural world and never straying from this role. 
Moreover, although the World Soul is described in the Timaeus as the cause of 
motion in the world, it is never described as a primal causal power or an independent 
power capable of anything other than natural ordering. It does nothing but execute 
the rationality of the Demiurge within the natural world and is given precisely this 
role of bringing about ends within the world and nothing else. The human soul, 
moreover, is not influenced by the World Soul, being an entirely separate noetic 
entity and having its own realm of ordering. Plato’s introduction in Laws X, 
therefore, of causal souls empowered to interact with human souls, thereby 
550 See my discussion of the phrase “as far as he could” in Part I, 52.3.4.1-5 of this thesis; see also 
53.3.1 concerning the idea of Ananke being “persuaded” and my earlier discussion at 5 1.3.20 on the 
“persuasion” being only “for the most part.” 
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influencing them towards good or evil ends, is an entirely new idea for Plato, not 
found in the Timaeus or felt even necessary to develop until now. 
The passages cited above from Laws X include powers of soul, which in the 
Timaeus lie entirely within the scope of the World Soul, with one exception. 
Although Plato would ascribe goodness to the World Soul, never would he ascribe to 
it the prudence or foresight of discerning the good ends, which are to be carried out. 
This power belongs solely to the Demiurge, who, as the source of all goodness 
discerns what is good and disseminates the power to carry out these ends to others, in 
this case, the World Soul. I would suggest, therefore, that in Laws X an 
amalgamation of players and roles has taken place. Thus, the role of the World Soul, 
rather than being articulated, is now subsumed under the powers of the Beneficent 
Soul(s), just as the Demiurge is drawn upon as its unspoken primal source outwith 
the Cosmos. Accordingly, the metaphysical realm in Laws X becomes less populated 
as its characters become more complicated. A similar amalgamation also takes place 
between the vestigial remains of Ananke under the auspices of the Non-beneficent 
Soul, as indeed the Non-beneficent Soul echoes similar refrains of disorder as did its 
ancient primogenitor outwith the Cosmos, Ananke. The human soul in Laws X is 
also similarly affected, no longer understood as tripartite, but whole and complexly 
so, free of easy divisions. The entire mood of Laws Xwith regard to its metaphysics, 
therefore, carries an undertone of worldly sophistication and a slightly modem touch. 
The divides of category and characterisation permissible of a perspective speculating 
from beyond the generated world have been removed, giving voice to a distinctively 
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Platonic trait found in both the Timaeus and Laws X, that all elements be pertinent to 
the story at hand and to ensure this, when necessary, telling the story anew. 
3.3.2 The hypothetical non-virtuous soul 
In this retelling, therefore, there is also another element which is introduced, but at 
first only hinted at and whose immediate presence, at least with regard to the 
ordering of the Cosmos, is flatly denied and that is the presence of the hypothetical 
non-virtuous soul. Plato asks in the first passage cited above whether a soul without 
prudence or goodness could possibly control the heavens and their circuit. The 
answer is, of course, no, where he explains at passage (ii) that the motions in 
question proceed of like nature and kind requiring forethought and the wisdom of 
calculation and therefore, require a supremely good soul and no other kind. We are 
reminded here of the Timaeus in which until the Demiurge had set the world in order 
according to number and calculation,551 there had been no such order. In Laws X we 
are now told similarly, but not in detail and this time with the supremely good soul 
held responsible for this order. Denied as ever being a source of order in the prior 
two passages, but which is nonetheless fully articulated in passage (iii), is the notion 
of an evil soul existent in the world as the source of disorder or any procedure which 
is distraught (imbalanced) and without order. Thus, rather than settling with the 
answer to the source of order in the world, Plato chooses to introduce a power 
capable of the very opposite causal effect. Moreover, he further prepares the reader 
for the possible existence of such a soul as he compares these opposite powers. 
Accordingly, in passages (iv) and (v) the motions of the supremely good soul, as 
Ti. 53a7-b6. 55 1 
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distinct from the non-virtuous soul, are described as being akin to that of a well- 
turned cartwheel and thereby having the closer affinity to the revolutions of 
intelligence (than that of the so far hypothetical non-virtuous soul, which presumably 
would only be akin to something without form and quite useless). In the framing of 
the motions of the Universe at least, posits the Athenian, we have no fear of an 
unskilled artist at work. According to Laws X, therefore, perceived now as the 
powers and works of a supremely good soul, the foresight of the Demiurge in its 
ordering of the world as understood from the Timaeus, along with its work carried 
out by the World Soul, both remain intact, their respective powers (that of the 
Demiurge and the World Soul) having in no way been breached, but now understood, 
rather, from within the world as belonging to and thus acquiesced by (when 
compared), the composite notion of a supremely good soul. 
3 -3 -3 The Non-benevolent Soul, the hypothetical becomes real 
It is within the next two passages, (vi) and (vii), where Plato moves to a more 
serious consideration of the irregular motions previously mentioned and their source, 
making way for his pending introduction of the Non-beneficent Soul within his 
metaphysical scheme and Cosmos, in addition to the supremely good or Beneficent 
Soul. Plato does not allow for the revolutions of the heavens to be influenced in any 
way by disorder. However, in passage (vi) he does admit to the possibility of motion 
which is never regular or uniform, existing separately from the ordered motion of the 
Cosmos and the ordered revolutions of the heavens, akin, he suggests, to every kind 
of folly in the world, with foolishness in the moral order reflecting similar confusion 
327 
and lawlessness to disorder in the physical realm. In passage (vii), however, Plato 
reaffirms that it is “soul which conducts the revolutions of all things” and as a 
consequence, what is ordered (or disordered) in the world must be ordered by either 
the “supremely good soul” or “its contrary.” Having already admitted to the 
possibility of disordered motion in the world, it takes very few further steps for Plato 
to also introduce the existence of this “contrary” power. Thus, soon to be introduced 
as the disordering or Non-beneficent Soul, this metaphysical power is no longer 
hypothetical, but emerges fully existent and powerful, perhaps, Plato suggests, even 
more powerful than the Beneficent Soul. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Lg. 898d9 - 898e3; 
Lg. 905d8 - 905e3; 
Lg. 906a2 - 906~6  
Lg. 899b3 - 899b10; 
4.1/2 Original Greek and Translation 
The sun, whose body can be seen by any man, but his soul by no man, any more than 
that of any other creature’s body is to be seen, during life or at the time of death. We 
have every reason to believe that it enfolds us in a fashion utterly imperceptible to all 
bodily senses, and is only to be discerned by the understanding. So here is a relevant 
consideration, which we must apprehend by an act of pure understanding and 
thought. 
Of all the planets, of the moon, of years and months and all season, what other story 
shall we have to tell than just this same, that since soul, or souls, and those souls 
good with perfect goodness, have proved to be the causes of all, these souls we hold 
to be gods, whether they direct the universe by inhabiting bodies, like animated 
The accent in England (p. 162) is unclear here, appearing as b.nop&v&i. Therefore, I have inserted 552 
the accent as it appears in the Oxford Classical Texts edition, b n o p ~ u ~ i .  
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beings, or whatever the manner of their action? Will any man who shares this belief 
bear to hear it said that all things are not ‘hl l  of gods’? 
Why, then, I ask you, in the name of these same gods, what can be the mode of the 
perversion, if indeed they are to be perverted? And what or what manner of beings 
must they be themselves? Governors, to be sure, they must be supposed to be, if they 
are to have effective control of the whole universe. 
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For since, as we have agreed among ourselves, the world5j3 is full of good things, but 
no less full of their contraries, and those that are amiss are the more numerous, the 
fight we have in mind is, we maintain, undying and calls for a wondrous 
watchfulness; gods and spirits are our allies in the warfare and we, moreover, the 
property of these gods and spirits. Wrong, arrogance, and folly are our undoing, 
righteousness, temperance, and wisdom our salvation, and these have their home in 
the living might of the gods, though some faint trace of them is also plainly to be 
seen dwelling here within ourselves. Yet it should seem there are souls inhabiting 
our earth in possession of unrighteous spoil-bestial souls, these, beyond a doubt- 
who grovel before the souls of our guardians-watch-dogs, shepherds, supreme 
masters of all, alike-and would fain persuade them by fawning speeches and 
witcheries of supplication-such is the tale told by the wicked-that it is lawful for 
them to encroach upon mankind without grievous consequence. But our contention, 
I take it, is that this vice I have just named of encroachment when found in bodies of 
flesh and blood is what is called disease, when found in seasons and whole years, 
pestilence, while in societies and politics it shows itself once more under the changed 
designation of iniquity. 
4.3 Commentary and Notes 
4.3.1 A theory of disorder 
The above four passages together summarise succinctly Plato’s understanding or 
‘theory’ of disorder: its epistemological origins, its metaphysical relationship with 
the generated world and lastly, its effect upon the generated world. In response to 
the latter is also Plato’s call to constant vigilance against this power(s) of disorder, 
understood now from a different perspective, thus, not as a brute disorganising force 
outwith the Universe, but as a Non-beneficent Soul(s) within the Cosmos fully 
capable of engaging the world in its &pdtp~qpa or erroneous ways. 
553 I would suggest that ‘world’ here does not mean ‘earth’, but carries the broader meaning of 
‘Universe’, particularly the ‘heavens’ as in the ‘seat’ or ‘dwelling place’ of the gods above the 
firmament, wherein the gods (“souls”) which bring about good and evil, are pictured to exist. Thus, in 
using the word ‘0bpau0~’ Plato is emphasising a particular aspect of the world, its heavenly 
component. 
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4.3.2 An epistemology 
In this first passage the Athenian explains that the soul is “utterly imperceptible’’ 
to all bodily senses. As such, ‘soul’ can only be discerned by the understanding, and 
further, apprehended by an act of pure understanding and thought. In the Timaeus, 
through similar acts of understanding (reasoned discourse setting out premises 
leading to a conclusion, which in turn may become a further premise), Plato had 
discerned both the existence of a World Soul, as well as human souls, hypothesising 
in each case their generation and existence. A full mapping of ‘soul’, however, was 
not Plato’s principal concern in this work. Rather, his main project here was a 
description of the Cosmos as a whole, from its very early beginnings down to the 
origins of Man, which included the postulation of ‘soul’, but little beyond that. To 
achieve this Plato thoroughly ensconced his cosmology in the imagery of story- 
telling, importantly ‘likely’ storytelling, theorising not only the existence of souls, 
but also a Maker of souls and of gods, the Demiurge, and postulating a power which 
sustained original chaos and constantly sought its return, Ananke. Thus, the work of 
apprehending ‘soul’ or of acquiring a deeper knowledge of it in the light of “pure” 
reasoning was inhibited by the necessity and prerequisite of telling the larger story of 
the Cosmos through myth-making and the telling of a ‘likely tale’. Accordingly, it 
was not possible to instigate an inquiry into a purer understanding of ‘soul’ without 
compromising these venerable, albeit inexact, modes of description. This imagery 
made possible the working out of a vastly larger subject, namely, a cosmology of the 
whole Universe, in which both its physics and its metaphysics could be broadly 
depicted. If Plato wanted a more exact understanding or comprehension of   SOU^', 
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this would have to wait. It is also possible that at the time of writing the Timaeus 
Plato did not feel a need to develop his theory of soul to the degree that he does in 
Laws X. Nonetheless, the Timaeus, through the hypothesising of both souls and the 
metaphysical players which preceded them-the Demiurge and Ananke-paved the 
way for his more formal investigation of  SOU^' in Laws X. Now, not only would 
Plato’s understanding of the soul have a more thoroughgoing rational base, but 
importantly, because of this, it would also become more inclusive. 
Plato’s claim in Laws X is that the soul cannot be discerned or known to exist 
through the senses and to this degree he is in accord with his supposed opponents 
(non-believers or those who believe erroneously). On this basis, however, Plato does 
not then deny the existence of ‘soul’ altogether (which ‘souls’ he will later identify 
with and refer to as ‘gods’), as do certain “young men of Athens,” whom he points 
out and so bitterly opposes. Rather, Plato makes the further claim that ‘soul’ can 
indeed be apprehended, but onZy through pure understanding. This proposal goes 
beyond what he was able to say in the Timaeus. In this earlier work all his 
metaphysical players were hypothesised and the rationale which was brought to bear 
bore a certain congruence with “likeliness” as it related to the world, thus, was a 
component of rational imagery, but was not an act of pure reasoning per se. The 
rational imagery which Plato used was of the sort, e.g. all things which have 
discernible ends have a maker; the Cosmos is comprised almost wholly of 
discernible ends; therefore, the Cosmos also had a maker. The same sort of reasoned 
imagery was also behind Plato’s postulation of the figure Ananke, i.e. since all 
intelligent things are designed and being designed, had a beginning, then the world 
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had a beginning. If the world had a beginning, then what existed beforehand could 
not have been designed and what was not designed was disordered. Since there is a 
power behind all movement, there is also a power behind disordered movement, 
namely, Ananke. Thus, for his imagery of disorder outwith the world, Plato has 
alluded to, as its basis, the imagery of power within the world. All things which 
move in the world, whether the end of this movement is organised or random, do not 
move of their own accord, but through the causal force of some power. 
What Plato does in Laws X i s  to add to this vision of movement in the world a 
rational basis or, as he writes, an apprehension of it through “pure understanding.” 
The end result of this new investigation becomes his acknowledgement of ‘soul(s)’, 
both as primal powers and as individual movers, within the Cosmos. Moreover, 
because Plato is also intending to use the argument which follows from this for 
postulating the existence of metaphysical powers which are active within the 
Universe, in order to avoid circular reasoning,554 it becomes necessary for him to 
abandon the notion of “likeliness” or as I have named it, ‘reasoned imagery’, in 
favour of reasoning alone. He therefore now proposes and deduces premises, which 
earlier had been merely aspects of imagery, within the context of argumentation. In 
this way he lays the foundation for a “pure understanding” with regard to ‘soul’, 
which ultimately also becomes the basis of his argument for the existence of the 
‘gods’. Accordingly, Plato offers a proof for the existence of the gods by first 
Whereas in the Timaeus Plato used the imagery of force in the world to postulate by analogy force 
outwith the world, he now needs a stronger basis for his argument, since in Laws X he is trying to 
postulate the existence of metaphysical forces within the world as well. Thus, it does not suffice as an 
argument to move by analogy from physical force in the world to metaphysical force also within the 
world-something more i s  needed. 
554 
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proving the priority of soul, by then defining it in terms of being a ‘self-moved 
mover’ and finally, by equating our understanding of the gods with this type of 
movement. After satisfying himself that he has achieved a satisfactory proof, he then 
drops all further reference to ‘soul’, using ‘god’ instead, thereby equating the 
meaning of these two terms by apposition, simply exchanging the word ‘god’ where 
earlier he would have used the word ‘soul’. 
4.3.3 Arguing for the divine and primal souls - an ontology 
In the second passage quoted above Plato pleads passionately for confidence in 
the belief that the gods must exist, providing various arguments for the basis of this 
confidence. There are four minor arguments in Laws X which Plato first puts 
forward as proofs for the existence and goodness of the gods before embarking on 
his main argument, the priority of soul, which will take up the rest of Laws X. These 
initial arguments are at best weak and at worst false, and include the following: (1) 
the cosmological: observation of the earth, the sun and the planets, and the ordering 
and beauty of the seasons, the implication being that design and intelligence are 
behind this (Lg. 886a2-6); (2) the belief that all humankind, Greeks and non-Greeks 
alike, believe in the gods, from which Plato derives an argument from numbers: not 
everyone can be wrong (ibid.); (3) an argument from faith: non-believers lack faith 
(Lg. 887c5-888a7); and finally, (4) an argument from tradition: “the spectacle of 
parents addressing their gods. . .they have heard the universal prostrations and 
devotions of Mankind” (ibid.).555 In this way Plato leads up to what he considers to 
This fourth argument is possibly a fallacy of the type: A is a reliable authority concerning P; A 555 
asserts P; therefore P, also known in informal logic as the ad Verecundiam fallacy. 
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be the most persuasive argument in support of the “old traditional belief in the gods” 
(Lg. 890d1-8), namely, (5) the primacy of the soul as “elder-born than all bodies and 
prime source of all their changes and transformations” (Lg. 892a2-b2). In this final 
and main argument he proposes that all which is akin to soul must therefore be prior 
to all which is proper to bodies (ibid.). He supports his position by first equating the 
word ‘soul’ with the definition of “being alive” or “self-movement” (Lg. 895e 10- 
896a4). Thus, by identifying ‘soul’ with being alive, ‘soul’ is then argued to be the 
source of all movement (Lg. 896a5-bl) and hence, is prior. Moreover, the soul that 
has control over the heavens and earth and their whole circuit is the supremely good 
soul (Lg. 897b7-c9). Hence, this soul and the other soul(s) directing the Universe, 
either by inhabiting bodies like animated beings, by acquiring their own body, or as 
entirely immaterial beings, guiding the heavens by some wonderfbl power, give 
evidence that all things are “full of gods” (Lg. 898e8-899b10). 
Plato’s principal argument for the existence of the gods in Laws X ends by 
equating god with ‘soul’ afier first defining ‘soul as being alive or a ‘self-moved 
mover’. In the ‘Timaeus, however, Plato did not equate the primal powers, the 
Demiurge or Ananke, with ‘soul’, although such an inference would not have been 
unreasonable given that the human soul, although formed by the Demiurge, was the 
one immortal, divine part that he bestowed to human beings, and thus had a divine 
origin (Ti. 69c3-c6). Instead, in this work, God was defined as the “best of causes” 
(Ti. 29a5-6) and “the best of intelligible and eternal things” (TZ. 37a1-2), by whose 
agency ‘soul’ ultimately came into existence. By the time Plato wrote Laws X, 
however, the idea of ‘God’ as the source of the “one immortal divine part” (or ‘soul’) 
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and as the “best of intelligible and eternal things” had met a further development 
since his writing of the Timaeus. God is now understood by Plato to be an active 
power within the Cosmos as well556 and thus is no longer limited to the role of 
Demiurge or in solely having generated the Universe externally. A change of 
perspective also takes place in Laws X, from that of timeless eternity to timely 
events, with the consequence that in this retelling the ‘unmoved mover’ of generation 
ultimately gives way to the ‘self-moved mover’ of regenerat i~n.~~’  Accordingly, 
God is now identified by Plato within the world as the “the supremely good soul,” 
since it is only the self-moved which is able to move and direct the whole Universe 
internally (be definition), becoming in this sense both the Cause within the Universe 
and the “universal cause.” 
This is not to say that the World Soul of the Timaeus has been removed from 
Laws X. Rather, I suggest, it has been surpassed in importance by a dynamic new 
notion of the divine Cause as ‘soul’, not earlier envisaged or indeed required in 
Plato’s nascent cosmology. The World Soul would still, therefore, be understood by 
Plato as having been constructed (understood differently, however, from the physical 
generation of things within the Cosmos) by the Demiurge and “appointed” the 
particulars of its motion (i.e. the direction and speed of its circular strips558) when the 
Cosmos was first made (at the very least, not denied), thereby accounting for its 
556 Plato never denies, however, the existence or role of the Demiurge as an ‘unmoved mover’ in the 
generation o f  the Cosmos. 
See my discussion at 52.3.2.1.3 on ‘Physical movement and the question of dualism.’ 
See Ti. 36c2-d7. This physical description forms part of  Plato’s mythic imagery. The nature of 
soul at all times remains entirely psychical and its movement noetic. See 83.3.1 of  Part 11. Moreover, 
since ‘soul’ is not a physical object, there is no question o f  it being “made to move.” See my later 




rational basis. By the time of Laws X, however, the world that is being addressed has 
long been operational as an intelligible entity, its reasonableness not in question. 
What Plato attempts to account for here is the unreasonable behaviour of man, whose 
noetic powers are governed not by the World Soul, but each by his own individual 
soul and the soul’s will. The World Soul, therefore, is allowed to slip away 
unaddressed into obscurity. There are power( s), however, according to Plato which 
are capable of interacting with and thus influencing the human soul, namely, the 
primal powers themselves (formerly understood as the Demiurge and Ananke in the 
Timaeus), but transformed into supremely good and bad souls post-generatively, 
bringing to bear the principle of ‘like with like’ as regards such influence. In this 
way Plato is able to account for the freedom of human souls to make rational and 
irrational choices (the irrational choices mistakenly thought to be rational or good 
with respect to the indi~idual).~” It is this noetic ‘freedom’, moreover, existing 
within the world through the human soul, which is subsequently focused upon. 
559 The determinism which Ritter (The Essence of Plato’s Philosophy, p. 381 ff; see also pp. 389-90) 
understands to be present in Plato’s philosophy is not supported by the Timaeus or Laws X, except 
when it is subject to an interpretation leaving out the fuller picture. He writes: “With the purpose of 
establishing the perfect happiness of the whole, the fundamental laws of all Being and Becoming are 
so determined [italics my own] that the infinite, individual motions and changes of each thing follow 
of themselves from them, and that all the consequences ensuing from these motions result from 
meeting other changing objects. Even freedom of choice, which the human soul retains, cannot 
interfere with the fixed, divine order of things, cannot annul divine plans. Every decision and action, 
which transforms the soul, in that they move it, have predetermined consequences for it. At the most, 
there remains for the demiurge, who beholds human activity which takes place within fixed bounds, 
the task of moving the individual soul from place to place, as a player moves a pawn in chess in 
accordance with rules which he himself has laid down.” This analogy of a “divine Chess Player” is 
also picked up by T.M. Robinson (Plato’s Psychology, Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 
1970, p. 153) when trying to understand Plato’s notion of the god, understood as the Demiurge’s 
counterpart, in Laws X (Lg. 902e4-5). I would suggest that the determinism which is argued by Ritter 
to be in place in Plato’s metaphysics, depicted through this ‘divine chess player’ metaphor, is not what 
Plato had in mind in discussing either the “superintendence of the gods” or a god whose work is “not 
inferior to human workmen.” Rather, Plato’s purpose in drawing up his cosmology as being the work 
of a divine craftsman was to show the noetic nature of the Universe, which he could demonstrate, but 
only for the most part, as well as its causal bases. The idea of a ‘will’ or active participation by a 
generated being in that noetic structure is a different matter. If a ‘divine chess player’ analogy is to be 
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With this further idea of ‘freedom’, in the form of participation in or departure 
‘ evi 
as a 
from reason (‘rational freedom’), in mind, not only is the idea of God as ‘Soul’ 
introduced in Laws X, but so, too, is the idea of Ananke as ‘Soul’, whereby Plato 
acknowledges the existence of and introduces the notion of the ‘non-beneficent’ or 
’ soul(s). As with the Demiurge, Ananke is primarily understood in the Timaeus 
causal force outwith the Universe,560 with only vestiges of its power for disorder 
remaining within the generated Cosmos. In Laws X, however, Ananke re-emerges as 
a self-moving cause or ‘Soul’, whose power and effects, like those of the Demiurge 
(also re-emergent as ‘Soul’), are now felt dynamically within the Universe. In the 
Timaeus, moreover, although Ananke is presented as a co-generator of the Universe 
along with the Demiurge, it is nonetheless considered to be a lesser power, since it 
was ultimately subdued (for the most part) by the Demiurge upon order taking 
precedence over disorder. In Laws X, however, the disordering power of Ananke is 
set up in direct contrast to the supremely good soul, now also cast as a soul, but in 
keeping with its nature, one which brings about results “without forethought” (Lg. 
~~ 
employed, then it would have to be a version of the game where the ‘soul stuff’ (whatever that would 
entail) of the divine chess player was given to the chessmen by the divine chess player, so that they 
could discover the rules and follow them or mess up the game (by ignorance or design) if they so 
chose. That Plato did not and could not highlight this aspect of the ‘divine game’ in the Timaeus is 
clear-without a greater development of the idea of ‘soul’ he did not have the means to do this. 
However, by the time Plato wrote Laws X ,  the notion of ‘soul’ was more fully developed and the 
divine chess game could now be taken over by the divinely wrought chessmen themselves. I would 
also suggest in this divine chess game that for Plato there is not one, but two chess players, the 
Demiurge and Ananke, or by the time he wrote Laws X ,  the Beneficent Soul and Non-beneficent Soul, 
who avail themselves noetically (but how Plato can only venture) to the chessmen. 
560 The primary power from the Timaeus has also been understood as the ‘Unmoved Mover’. This 
concept, I suggest, has been notoriously misunderstood, where attempts are made to trace all 
subsequent physical movement within the Cosmos back to the first physical movement initiated by a 
metaphysical God or Demiurge. What results is that either the pure dualism inherent in Plato’s 
cosmology is compromised or alternatively, in opting for a mythic interpretation of the God and for 
discrete metaphysical powers generally, it is denied. However, nowhere in the Timaeus does Plato 
offer support for such compromise and in Laws X he vehemently argues against the non-existence of 
the gods. If Plato’s God is to be accurately described as an ‘Unmoved Mover’, this movement must 
be strictly understood solely in the sense of noetic movement. 
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897~4-9) and which are “contrary to beneficence” (Lg. 896e4-6). Thus, Ananke, as a 
metaphysical power, is ultimately also understood by Plato to be active within the 
world and is accordingly transformed into a ‘Non-beneficent Soul’ which “effects 
evil and disorder” (Lg. 897dl), challenging its earlier position as a lesser power. 
4.3.4 The metaphysics of disorder 
In the third passage quoted above Plato is disarming the last of the arguments 
which has been put to him concerning the nature of the gods, namely, that the gods 
can be perverted. To achieve this he first offers an argument for why the gods are 
good. Their goodness, he explains, pertains to them by definition of what is good or 
beneficent, which is always, according to Plato, some activity that brings about an 
‘ordered’ or rationally discernible end, which end is understood as a particular good 
with respect to the activity. In the case of the gods, their ‘goodness’ (virtuous 
activity) takes the form of watching over the entire Universe, which is both their 
principal virtue and principal activity. It is within their overall care of the Universe, 
moreover, that all particular acts of caring lie, with the latter constituting the former. 
The gods, therefore, Plato argues, must give greater attention to small things than to 
g~-eat,~%ince it is only through instances of individual care, such as caring for 
mankind, of which the totality of the gods’ care is comprised.562 In other words, you 
cannot care for the whole without first caring for its individual parts. Accordingly, in 
order to care for the generated Universe, the gods must first care for its many ordered 
parts, of which mankind forms one. 
Lg. 900~8-d3. 56 1 
562 Lg. 902e4-903a3. 
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Thus far Plato has argued that the gods are completely good and as an expression 
of their perfect virtue, their special job is to watch over the Universe. However, 
when he begins to name the particular virtues which qualify the gods as being good, 
e.g. moderation, possession of reason, courage, i.e. naming their ‘admirable’ 
qualities, thereby distinguishing these from those which are their opposite or vices 
(i.e. those qualities which are ‘disgraceful’), Plato, by default, is forced to introduce 
into his post-generative metaphysics the source of these vices or evil and its 
existence, since not only are these disgraceful traits the proposed opposites of 
admirable qualities, they are clearly present in man and must have a source. He 
denies that any of these negative qualities could ever belong to the gods or yet other 
bad qualities, such as neglect and idleness or riotous living (or indeed any of the 
‘disgraceful’ qualities), since the gods, it is argued, are defined by their good 
qualities and could not love (and therefore possess) what is opposite in nature to their 
being. Mankind, moreover, being the handiwork of the gods,563 although displaying 
at times these bad qualities and thus, participating in evil, could never themselves be 
the source of that evil. As a consequence, Plato must look elsewhere for its source, 
involving neither man nor gods. 
Within his argument for the gods having care for mankind, Plato has also 
acknowledged as premises (1) that the gods know, see and hear everything, and that 
nothing within the range of our senses or intelligence escapes them;564 (2) that they 
Whereas in the Timaeus man is understood to be generated by the Demiurge (God), who is a noetic 
organising power external to the world, in Laws X the primal causal power is understood to be active 
within the Universe as a Self-moved Mover in the form of a Beneficent Soul, since according to 
Plato’s understanding it is ‘soul’ alone which actively participates within the generated Universe as a 
noetic causal force. 
563 
Lg. 901d2-6. 564 
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can do anything within the power of mortals and immortals;565 and his earlier agreed- 
upon premise, namely, (3) that the gods are supremely good? In arguing now for 
what is effectively the omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence and the goodness of 
the gods, Plato does not at the same time deny the existence, and hence, a source for, 
the aforementioned ‘disgraceful’ qualities, having admitted that they exist at the very 
least in mankind. Thus, on account of his acknowledgement of the existence of these 
“disgraceful” qualities in mankind, he must also acknowledge a source for this evil. 
What had earlier been tacitly accepted by Plato, that evil exists in the world, is now 
searched out as to its source. 
Mankind, as previously noted, on account of its generation by the Demiurge (now 
understood from the perspective of a Beneficent Soul) is exonerated from ever being 
a source of its own evil, except perhaps as an unwitting accomplice in seeking out 
what is wrongly thought to be good. The gods, too, are made exempt by the fact of 
their nature having been qualified as ‘goodness’ itself. Accordingly, in Laws X Plato 
must look not to a generated being, but to another causal power within his 
metaphysics567 as the source of all disordered ends or ‘evil’ within the world. As a 
consequence, this power for disorder, understood earlier outwith the Cosmos as 
Ananke, is subsequently encountered within the world as the Non-beneficent Soul. 568 




As with the Timaeus, in Laws X all secondary movement, which is inclusive of all physical 
movement, is dependent on a primary metaphysical source, be it for order or disorder, within the 
Cosmos. In the Timaeus this source was understood to be the Demiurge and Ananke respectively and 
in Laws X, the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls. In both works, moreover, in the Timaeus 
explicitly and in Laws X implicitly, the physical movement of the Universe and its basic building 
blocks or triangular material are understood to have always existed. See Lg. 895a1 -b7. 
568 In the Timaeus, although Plato acknowledged that remnants of disorder remained in the world 
(Ananke was not completely subdued by the Demiurge) he did not acknowledge any further activity 
of either causal power within the Cosmos. In fact they drop out of the story completely once the 
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4.3.5 Evil and the generated world 
In this fourth and final passage for consideration Plato confronts what he views as 
the “contrary” to those good things, which along with the good, exist in the world. 
He states not only that the world is as full of the things which are amiss as it is of the 
good, but that the “bad” are more numerous. In so doing, he removes all 
complacency that in presuming the good to be more prolific, they necessarily prevail. 
In the Timaeus, where the ordering of the Universe and its generation are the chief 
concerns, Plato’s position was that, of the two primal powers, the Demiurge was a 
greater power than Ananke, having for the most part subdued the original chaos 
when organising it into a Universe, with only remnants of disorder remaining. Thus, 
from the perspective of the Timaeus, at the outset of generation, the world was 
exceedingly good. There is no question in this work of “bad things” being 
addressed, let alone of their being prevalent. Moreover, the possibility of there being 
anything “contrary” to the good was only hinted at within the idea of there being a 
“remnant” of disorder left in the world, since no focus was given at this time by Plato 
to “disordered” things or to their realisation. Accordingly, the moral consequence of 
the world being fully operational over time and as a consequence of this, being 
divisible into good and bad things or events (the ordered versus disordered) was not a 
consideration in the Timaeus, nor was it addressed by Plato until Laws X where he 
confronts his opponents against the non-belief or wrong belief in the gods. 
Universe has been generated, with the World Soul taking over as the metaphysical power active 
within the world. In Laws X, however, the primal causal powers are now acknowledged to be active 
within the world in the form of good (beneficent) and bad (non-beneficent) souls. This, I suggest, is a 
further development of Plato’s metaphysics, which was necessitated by his acknowledgement of 
ongoing evil in the world (no longer merely remnants of disorder, but of fresh disorder, particularly 
where the human soul was concerned). See Lg. 904a6-905d6. 
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In Laws X Plato’s chief concern and hence his perspective have now both 
changed. In this work, although he considers the world to still be full of good things, 
he nonetheless now considers there to be more “bad things” in it, the non-believer 
being a prime example of wrong thinking and the efficacy of evil. Thus, no longer 
content with viewing the world from outwith the Universe through the idealistic eyes 
of a believer, this very world and perspective being challenged, his main job in Laws 
X i s  to take to task the non-believer or those who have wrong ideas about the gods. 
By viewing it through their eyes and with their understanding, from within the world, 
a world, moreover, presumed long in existence, he sets out to prove them wrong. To 
this view, however, he now adds a carefully chiselled argument concerning the 
existence of ‘soul’ and more importantly, powerful and influential ‘Souls’. I would 
suggest that Plato’s position with regard to the primal powers has not essentially 
changed, rather, his understanding has enlarged to include how they interact with the 
world. Thus, what has changed is Plato’s perspective and because of this he 
introduces into his metaphysics once again the primal powers, but this time 
transformed, as ‘Souls’ interacting with the world they had earlier generated.569 
4.3.6 Primal powers and primal souls-the persistence of evil 
From the outset of the debate in Laws X Plato refuses to allow into the argument 
the notion that evil stems from weakness of will, i.e. of not choosing the good when a 
man knows what it is. Thus, he has the Athenian state, “You think it’s just because 
they can’t resist temptation and desire that they are attracted to the godless life 
See Lg. 899b3-10 and 899c6-d2. 569 
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Slowly, the remaining dialogue of Laws X.. almost to ’9 570 [refemng to the atheists]. 
its end, forges an answer to the question which Cleinias raises back, “what other 
reason could there be, Sir?” Initially the Athenian answers Cleinias with the obvious 
reason for disbelief, namely, the philosophic influence of the pundits, particularly the 
modem ones, where the gods and divine beings are said to be just “earth and 
However, in explaining what he believes to be the truth concerning the 9,571 stones. 
gods (which ‘gods’ are presented initially as ‘souls’), namely, that they exist, they 
care for mankind and cannot be bribed (or in Cleinias’s terms, that they exist, are 
good and respect justice more than men Plato’s enquiry soon points to a 
deeper reason for the non or wrong belief in the gods. To wit, by retaining from his 
earlier works, in the Meno, the view that men choose wrongly when they mistakenly 
think something is good when in fact it is and in the Republic, the view that no 
god or man would of his own will worsen himself in any way,574 and by adding to 
these views a belief in good and evil souls which exist prior to the material world, 575 
Plato provides an argument for how wrong belief in the gods takes place. The true 





572 Lg. 887b5-8. 
573 Plato, Meno, trans. W. K. Guthrie, in Plato: Collected Dialogues, eds. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 353-384. In this much 
earlier work, the Meno, Plato states his position regarding whether a man chooses evil. Through 
lengthy dialectic the central character, Meno, admits to the view that some people wish for evil things. 
Moreover, while some individuals suppose such evils to be good, others will still desire them although 
aware that they are evil (Men. 77c). Through Socrates’s character, however, Plato opposes this view, 
when Socrates concludes that the people who suppose evils to be good are mistaken. Further, the 
people who desire something evil knowing that it is evil are unhappy, since this, he proclaims, is all 
that unhappiness is: “desiring evil things and getting them.” He concludes that since no one wants to 
be unhappy and unfortunate, “nobody desires what is evil” (Men. 78b). 





belief in a false opinion. It is more complex than this. Rather, wrong belief is the 
result of the human soul freely participating in the same motion as an evil or non- 
beneficent soul, whose particular motion in this case is ‘false opinion’, the human 
soul mistakenly thinking it to be a true opinion or good m ~ t i o n . ” ~  Plato’s essential 
argument for positing at least one evil soul, in addition to the good, is that although 
‘soul’ is the cause of all things,577 just as good qualities can only be ascribed to a 
soul’s virtue, so, too, bad qualities can only be ascribed to a soul’s vice. Since God 
(identified with the Beneficent Soul) is perfectly good and is the cause of everything 
which is good,578 he cannot have precisely the sort of character which he detests.579 
Therefore, the source of vice must lie elsewhere, which source is ultimately 
identified by Plato as being that of a Non-beneficent Soul(s). 
To show this, Plato has had to redraw his metaphysical scheme, depicting it from 
a different perspective, with the primal powers now intervening in human affairs, 
where earlier they remained as pure forces outwith the generated Hence, 
with respect to their perceived form but not, I suggest, to their essential form581 or 
Lg. 896e8-897b5. 
See also Rep. Bk. II(380c) in Plato: Collected Dialogues, p. 629. 
See Lg. 900e6-90 1 a9. 
See Lg. 891e4-9. In this passage Plato refers to the soul as being prior, describing it as “the first 
cause of the birth and destruction of all things.” Here also, which is very near to the beginning of the 
dialogue, he begins to interchange the word ‘soul’ with that of ‘god’, finally exchanging the word 
‘god’ for ‘soul’ towards the end of the dialogue. To wit, at the end of this passage when Plato refers 
to the doctrine which produces an impious soul, he states that ‘soul’ is asserted to have come later 
when it actually came first, explaining further that this is “the mistake these people have made about 
the real nature of the gods.” Towards the end of the dialogue, after proving the existence and priority 
of soul, the word ‘soul’ is dropped, favouring the use of the word ‘god’ alone. Plato makes the 
identity between the actions of ‘soul’ and our understanding of what a ‘god’ is at Lg. 899a7-bI0, after 
which Plato drops all references to ‘soul(s)’, and instead uses the word ‘god(s)’. 
581 Plato’s argument from the Republic, Bk. 11, (380d -381c) that God (and everything that belongs to 
god), being in every way the best possible state, would not change or alter himself and thus, being the 
fairest and best possible forever abides simply in his own form, does not exclude the idea of God 








their power,582 within the generated world the infinite (the Demiurge and Ananke) 
now enter into the finite as Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls5s3 or as they are 
latterly referred to in Laws X, as “gods” within the world, the chief god (understood 
to be the ‘Demiurge’ in the Timaeus) also referred to as ‘King’ and ‘Supervisor of 
the Universe . Accordingly, these powers are now understood as primal souls 
engaged within the world effecting ongoing change. Any changes which take place, 
moreover, and their respective ends, are determined in part by the choices and 
associations of the human soul as it participates in the various motions of these 
primal souls. Plato does not fully articulate his views on how the human soul 
interacts with the primal souls, leaving the reader to fill in or assume part of the 
process. He abjures, moreover, on the human mind ever knowing exactly how ‘soul’ 
is able to move a body, or as he describes it, rational (or irrational) motion,588” 
presenting instead three possibilities describing the relationship of the soul to the 
body.”‘ What Plato does say concerning ‘primal soul’ is that “soul, by virtue of its 
motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea,” 
having prefaced this by stating that there are at least two souls, a Beneficent Soul and 
one that has “the opposite capacity. 
9 584 
77 587 
a Soul within the Cosmos, since it is only the perspective which has changed, and not the essential 
form of God as the immaterial primal cause of everything which is good. 
By positing ‘soul’ as “the cause of all things” in Laws X (see Lg. 896d5-8), Plato challenges the 
equally powerful primal powers, the Demiurge and Ananke, found in the Timaeus. These causal souls 
match the causal powers in the Timaeus in everything except their form and thus, their role, making a 
causal link between the two possible and, as I argue in this thesis, likely. 
582 
Lg. 896e4-6. 
See Lg. 904a6 and 904a3-4 (“Supervisor of the Universe” is also more literally translated as “He 
583 
584 
who provides for the Universe.” See Taylor, Laws X, p. 297.) 
585 Lg. 897d3-e2. 
587 See Lg. 896e8-897b5. The three possibilities Plato presents are: (a) the soul resides within the 
visible body, e.g. the sun; just as our (the human) soul takes us around from place to place; (b) 
Lg. 898e5-899a4. 586 
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Two problems arise, however, in identifying the primal souls of Laws X with the 
primal powers of the Timaeus. The first problem is that Plato refers twice in Laws X, 
and in close proximity (Lg. 892a2-bl and 892c2-7), to the soul being the first 
(“elder-born”) of generated things. If this is so, how can a claim be made that the 
‘self-moved movers’ or primal souls which Plato now refers to have any direct 
relation to the ‘unmoved movers’ or primal powers of the Timaeus? My proposal, 
both earlier in this thesis and now, is that Plato does not consider that any souls, 
primary (which he ultimately differentiates as ‘Beneficent’ and ‘Non-beneficent’ 
Souls) or otherwise, were created or generated in the same sense that the things in the 
Universe were generated, i.e. from pre-existing triangles. Rather ‘sou s’, whether 
primal or those which have been begotten by the Demiurge, as is the case of the 
World Soul and the human soul, are eternal and divine according to their proximity 
and thus, identity with their particular primal source.588 This ranges, I suggest, from 
acquires its own physical body; or (c) [soul] is entirely immaterial carrying the body along its path by 
virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful (miraculous) powers. 
588 There are several factors which argue against the position that because ‘soul’ was generated (i.e. 
the World Soul and human souls), it is therefore not eternal. These can be listed as follows: (1) the 
description of the construction of the ‘soul’ is written entirely in metaphorical and mythic terms, 
which terms do not indicate a finite object (see Ti. 34b10-37c5 for the construction of the ‘World 
Soul’ and 41d4-42e4 for construction of the ‘human soul’); (2) ‘soul’ was not generated in the same 
sense as the physical world, namely, out of arrangements of triangles; thus, although Plato states at Ti. 
41a7-8 that what is bonded together can be dissolved, clearly what he is referring to here are the 
triangles which make up the physical objects in the world and not of what soul is composed. Soul, 
rather, was constructed within Plato’s myth largely along noetic and hence, metaphysical or psychic 
lines (i.e. out of different mixtures of ‘Existence’, whether of what is eternally unchanging or of the 
material world, ‘Sameness’ and ‘Difference’); this was done in such a way, I suggest, so as to 
accommodate the eternal in what was not eternal, namely, a physical body; (3) at no place in the 
Timaeus does Plato state that the ‘soul’ is finite or not eternal; to the contrary, he specifically states 
within the passage Ti. 41d4-42e4 noted above, as well as at Lg. 904~6-905~4,  that the human soul is 
subject to transmigration between bodies and while the body is referred to as entirely mortal, the soul 
is not so described, which, moreover, according to certain laws of destiny, if it controls the mortal 
creature with which it is bound for the best, will itself ultimately reside in its first and best form, 
namely, with its appointed star apart from a body, which stars in turn are previously described as 
being eternal and divine (Ti. 4Ob4-8); (4) in Laws X Plato argues unequivocally for the position that 
not only is ‘soul’ prior to matter, but is the most ancient thing there is (Lg. 896b2-3) and hence, is also 
master of matter (Lg. 896blO-c3), concluding that in truth ‘soul’ is a divinity (see Lg. 897bl-b4 and 
899b3-10) and as a god is in possession of mortal creatures and the universe as a whole (Lg. 902b8-9), 
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complete or near complete identity as is the case of the Beneficent Soul with the 
Demiurge and the Non-Beneficent with Ananke (aspect being the only real 
difference), as well as the lesser divinities with the heavenly gods, to being a divinely 
wrought mixture as was the World Soul (not mentioned in Laws X), to an even less 
pure mixture as was the human soul. Plato’s purpose, I suggest, in depicting ‘soul’ 
in Laws X as being “the elder-borne” was to enable him to show that ‘soul’ was pre- 
eminently natural, existing before what the atheists regarded as the primary natural 
substances, e.g. fire or air589 and thus, as primary creations, did not derive later from 
art or reason. Having taken, therefore, the perspective of his opponents in order to 
win them over, it would have defeated Plato’s purpose to depict ‘soul’ as being 
divine or primal to start out with, as that was precisely what he was setting out to 
prove, namely, that the gods exist. Rather, by first proving that the soul exists and by 
way of being a self-moved mover was divine, he could then argue, by way of 
identity, that the gods existed. Thus, after establishing that the soul by definition was 
and as First Cause (Lg. 8 9 9 ~ 6 4 2 )  is ultimately immortal itself, running the entire universe for ever 
(Lg. 905dS-e3); (5) similarly, at Ti. 36e2-5 Plato states that on its completion, the ‘World Soul’ 
provided “a divine source of unending and rational life for all time” - for Plato, what is divine is 
eternal, whether placed within an instrument of time or outside of time; (6) the ‘World Soul’ is 
described by Plato as “the best creation of the best of intelligible and eternal things” (Ti. 36e5-37a2); 
however, see Cornford’s discussion of this passage in PC , fn. 2 on p. 94; (7) when Plato refers to the 
‘mortal creatures’ which the Demiurge is about to generate at Ti. 4 1 b7, ‘soul’ is not described as one 
of these. Furthermore, at Ti. 41c6-d4, when the Demiurge announces to the Gods that: 
in so far as there ought to be something in them [the mortal creatures] that can be 
named immortal, something called divine, to guide those of them ready to follow 
you and the right, I will begin by sowing the seed of it and then hand it on to you; it 
remains for you to weave mortal and immortal together and create living creatures. 
Bring them to birth, give them food and growth, and when they perish receive them 
again ( Lee, p. 57), 
‘soul’ is the only object which the Demiurge could be referring to as being immortal in relation to 
living creatures; (8) at Ti. 41e4-42a1, the Demiurge announces that each soul will be sown in its 
appropriate instrument of time,” implying that the soul itself resides outside of time. What is eternal, 
therefore, is the soul itself, but not the combination of body and soul (see Lg. 904a6-c4). 
Lg. 892~2-7. 589 
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the ‘self-moved mover’ in living things,590 Plato then quickly asserts that the soul, in 
cleaving to divine reason, was itself a divinity or in cleaving to unreason, the 
opposite 
Plato rarely differentiates in Laws X between the different kinds of souls, i.e. 
between human souls, the primal souls and heavenly souls, or between souls and 
gods, nor does he mention the World Soul, moving seamlessly from a discussion of 
‘souls’ which move the world to ‘gods’ which also move the world. What this 
suggests is that Plato’s primary concern in this work with regard to ‘soul’ is its nature 
generally as the self-moved mover within all things that make up the Universe. Only 
secondarily does he become interested in the individual powers of the primal souls, 
namely, the Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, as they relate to the world and to 
other souls. The brevity of the discussion of the cause(s) of ‘evil’ which sporadically 
surface in this dialogue, although important and slightly more forthcoming than in 
the Timaeus, is in keeping with a similar stance or aversion Plato has to all such 
discussions of this kind (i.e. involving ‘evil’). 
The second problem concerns the parameters or identity of ‘soul’ as it is 
understood in Laws X when compared to the Timaeus. My position is that a problem 
only arises if one attempts to carry the comparison of soul from Laws X with that of 
the Timaeus rigorously through. This cannot be done, chiefly because the 
considerations undertaken in Laws X never extend to a point outside of the 
generation of the Cosmos, whereas more than half of the Timaeus is concerned with 
~ 
Lg. 895a5-b7. 
59’ Lg. 896e8-897b5. 
590 
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either the pre-generative Cosmos or the process of generation. Thus, the Demiurge 
and Ananke, understood as primary causes existing outside of the material Universe 
in the Timaeus, are indiscernible in the post-generative Cosmos of Laws X. What 
Plato is able to discern, however, and thus postulate in Laws X, is the existence of 
‘self-moved movers’ or ‘primal souls’ within the Cosmos, which he explains are the 
“initial principle[s]” behind the sequences of movements which take place in the 
generated 
This apparent gap between the idea of ‘primal souls’ in Laws X and ‘primal 
powers’ in the Timaeus, or between that of the ‘self-moved movers’ and that of 
‘unmoved movers’, is effectively closed, I suggest, with one merging into the 
identity of the other, as the pre-generative perspective or aspect changes into the 
post-generative. These powers are essentially the same, although formally different. 
In the Timaeus, because it is a cosmology dealing with ancient beginnings the causal 
powers are understood as transcendent and impersonal with respect to the world they 
generate, their role in the world, if any, unrealised and hence, yet to be 
comprehended or recorded. In Laws A’, however, these same powers viewed from 
within a world now long in existence, but often forgotten, misunderstood or denied 
by mankind as its source and unrecognised as causes of ongoing noetic or anoetic 
movement (Plato’s understanding as it has developed since the Timaeus), are argued 
by Plato to be immanent and mindful of creation. Thus, at Lg. 896a5-9 the Athenian 
asks: “Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the 
original source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things and 
See Lg. 894e4-895a3. 592 
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their contraries?” Cleinias agrees, replying that ‘soul’ being the source of motion, is 
the most ancient things there is. The Athenian’s final word on this is that since soul 
has been proven to be prior to matter, then soul is the master and matter is its natural 
subject (Lg. 896b 0-c3). Although, as pointed out earlier, Plato does not always 
distinguish clearly when he moves from a general discussion about ‘soul’ to a more 
specific account, as, for instance, when he discusses ‘primal souls’, he does 
nonetheless occasionally do this, making a comparison with the primal powers of the 
Timaeus possible. Moreover, in the Timaeus neither the World Soul nor the human 
soul are ever described as “masters” of the generated world, rather their description 
is always one of ‘moved movers’, their movement having been organised by the 
Demiurge and in this sense ‘moved’. I would suggest, therefore, that the concept of 
the ‘primal soul’ in Laws X as a “self-moved mover” (although it is said to move 
itself, like the primal powers in the Timaeus it is not moved by any other power) and 
“master” is closely linked to the idea of the ‘primal power’ in the Timaeus 
(understood as an “unmoved mover” and in the case of the Demiurge, “generator”) 
but not to the World Soul, which although not discussed can be assumed to still exist 
in LawsX, or to human souls. 
What I suggest transpires, therefore, is that when the Demiurge and Ananke, 
although initially understood solely as the primal powers and unmoved movers 
within the metaphysical realm of the Timaeus and hence, the masters of generation, 
are later understood to also be active within the post-generative world of Laws X, 
they are transformed by Plato for that purpose into self-moved movers (as sources of 
noetic or anoetic movement) or ‘primal souls’. Hence, in this way, by not only 
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generating the Universe, but by directly influencing the works of generation as well, 
they retain their status as its ultimate masters. A strong indication that, in addition to 
the primal souls now proposed, Plato still retains his original idea of the generative 
unmoved movers, the Demiurge (Reason or Nous) and Ananke (Unreason), is the 
passage at Lg. 897b 1-4 where he states: 
These are the instruments soul uses, whether it cleaves to divine reason 
(soul itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity), and guides 
everything to an appropriate and successful conclusion, or allies itself 
with unreason and produces completely opposite results. 
With regard to the idea of the human soul “cleaving” to divine reason or unreason 
Plato explains that “a soul is allied with different bodies at different times, and 
perpetually undergoes all sorts of changes, either self-imposed or produced by some 
With respect to these changes being self-imposed, Plato introduces ”593 other soul. 
here an element of ‘will’ operating within the human soul to effect its own changes, 
e.g. as it cleaves to ‘reason’ or ‘unreason’. Thus, he states that “Our King.. .[has] left 
it to the individual’s acts of will to determine the direction of these changes” (Lg. 
904a2-c4). He firther writes: “Take a soul that becomes particularly full of vice or 
virtue as a result of its own acts of will and the powerful influence of social 
intercourse’’ (Lg. 904d4-6). 
4.3.7 A call to vigilance 
This leaves the question of the precise role of the primal soul open, in particular, 
the role of the Non-beneficent Soul as it relates to the human soul. If the human soul 
cannot choose what it believes to be evil, which is Plato’s long-held position, how is 
Lg. 903d3-5. 593 
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it possible that it can be influenced by an ‘evil’ soul or by the ‘unreason’ of Ananke? 
If it has a ‘will’, moreover, to act according to its own desires and these desires are 
for its own good, how is it possible that it can be coerced to the contrary? The 
answers, I suggest, to these questions lie in the nature of ‘soul’ itself. Soul, from the 
perspective of the Timaeus, is, I have argued, begotten (generated) from its primal 
source, the Demiurge, and being generated by the Demiurge and therefore ordered, is 
completely good. Soul, from the perspective of Laws X, however, is described as a 
‘self-moved mover’ which moves everything in the Universe in either an organised 
or disorganised way, and thus, can be linked, in part, to the concept of Ananke, the 
force for disorder, as its progenitor. Plato never discusses ‘soul’ in the Timaeus as in 
any way emanating from Ananke, although he does talk of Ananke as being not 
completely subdued and therefore of remnants of disorder being left in the Cosmos. 
What these diverse descriptions presume is not that the human soul was also 
generated from Ananke (as containing an element of evil or as evil souls) and thus 
naturally contains disorder within itself-this is impossible, given that Ananke by 
definition is the disorganising force and does not generate anything-rather, Plato, in 
Laws X, is prepared to admit that primal and powerful souls, whose principal and 
only movement is either order or disorder, have been in existence fkom the very 
outset of generation of the Universe and have the power, by their rational or 
irrational movements, to influence the movement of human souls. 
In the Timaeus Plato did not admit to the generation of souls other than the World 
Soul and human souls. Moreover, whereas in this earlier work the human soul as a 
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7 594 ‘moved mover exhibits little of the freedom that Plato now gives it in Laws Xand 
in which latter work the World Soul is never discussed, Plato does not give any 
indication in Laws X that he has substantially changed his position with regard to the 
generation of these souls or that they are no longer ‘moved movers’ with respect to 
their general make-up, although the developed notion in Laws X of the ‘will’ as a 
dynamic aspect of the human soul in choosing secondary ends makes the move to 
‘self-moved mover’ an appropriate description of the human soul. Rather, by 
admitting to the ongoing presence of non-generated selflmoved movers, to wit, in the 
form of Beneficent and Non-beneficent Souls, Plato introduces into Laws X the idea 
of powerful souls capable of influencing human souls and impacting on the World 
Soul (‘soul’ as now generally understood), thereby accounting for perpetual change 
in the Universe, which change results in both good and bad ends. In this way, by 
initially seeking for an explanation of how belief in a false opinion takes place, i.e. 
non or wrong belief in the gods-a decidedly bad end from Plato’s perspective, Plato 
has moved from the ideal to the real and in so doing, has enriched his metaphysics 
with regard to the Cosmos, extending the notion of causal powers into the Universe 
as causal souls. 
9,595 Whether the actual number of “divine [italics my own] draughts-player[s] in 
the Universe has changed is another issue. I would suggest that it has not - only the 
perspective has changed. When Plato uses the term ‘divine’, he undoubtedly is 
referring to either the Demiurge, the ungenerated gods, the generated gods or the 
594 Moved by the very nature of its construction and with such movement as its purpose. 
See Lg. 903b4-el . 595 
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Beneficent Soul. However, implicit to the idea of a ‘draughts-player’ is the idea of a 
game and thus, the other player and although left unacknowledged, is, I suggest, very 
much an active but silent player in the cosmic game. This “undivine draughts- 
player,” therefore, taking the form of Ananke in the Timaeus and the Non-beneficent 
or ‘Evil’ Soul(s) in Laws X, has also been given a powerful role by Plato, namely, of 
maintaining disorder and effecting ongoing disorder in the Universe and thus, of 
challenging its fellow player(s) in the latter’s desire for the triumph of virtue and 
defeat of vice.596 
The question of exactly how this disorder is effected in the human soul is left 
unanswered, but there are clues as to the direction, which Plato wishes to go. A soul 
becomes “full of vice” (or ~irtue)’~’ by acts of its own will as an individual 
determines the direction of changes in its Plato also talks, as he nears the end 
of Laws X, of there being a good element as a constitutional part of the soul and a 
bad element. It is possible that Plato understands the human soul in terms of it being 
a receptacle for motion, whereby it receives the motions of another soul according to 
the direction of its will or alternatively, where it is able to copy the motions of the 
soul it wishes to imitate (i.e. of a ‘good’ or ‘evil’ soul) or again, where it picks up 
sympathetically the motions of a soul simply by being in proximity to it. 
What is certain is that neither the ‘Beneficent Soul’ nor the ‘Non-beneficent Soul’ 
is understood to be passive. On the contrary “our King” wishes for the triumph of 
virtue, but in this game of virtue over vice, the bad outnumber the good, with Plato 






stating that “the battle we have on our hands is never finished, and demands 
The question remains of vigilance against what. There is tremendous vigilance. 
only one answer according to Plato and that is the disordered motions of the Non- 
beneficent Soul, the successor, I argue, of Ananke. What ruins us, Plato states, is 
injustice and senseless aggression and what saves us is justice and sensible 
moderation. He hints that in possessing a ‘will’ (for good), we are able to learn from 
our mistakes, not wishing to be destroyed or our lives to be imbalanced. Such 
injustice and aggression result, Plato suggests, from the ‘will’ at times following 
untoward, naive movements of the soul, seeking good where there is none. And 
what are these mistakes? Plato cites ‘excess’ and ‘acquisitiveness’ as prime 
examples of the motions, which destroy or imbalance and when left unchecked 
become disease in the body, piague in the land, injustice in society and ultimately, 
‘evil’ in man!’ 
99599 
Lg. 906a2-6. 599 





A. E. Taylor on ~ 0 6 q ~ ~ ~  
Page in CommentarjdComments 
29b6 pkza vo6 p. 74 /None. 
Translation 
‘by thought’ 
3Oc2-3 lb3 vO6G p. 82 / Reference is not actually being made to vO6G itself, 
but rather to its relation to UOT@ cs at 30c3 and 31a5 as 
held by the Neo-Platonists, whose interpretation 
distinguishes between the Demiurge and creator, i.e. vO6c 
and the supreme God, i.e. U O ~ Z &  6s. From the latter or the 
One proceeds ~06s and from ~06s proceeds the Soul of the 
World, which three form the so-called ‘trinity’ of Plotinus. 
Taylor concedes that they are right enough. It is his next 
comment where he informs us of his understanding of 
~06s. He rejects the position that the U O ~ Z &  66 is a ‘god’ 
superior “to the mind which creates the obpa~6<,” stating 
that this is a development for which the dialogues provide 
no support. Thus, in this passage ~06s is understood as a 
mind which creates. Taylor further states that God, in the 
dialogues, is the &pi~~l;q Y V X ~ ,  whereas the UO@V @V 
is not a Y V X ~  at all, but a system of ~‘t6q [forms]. Hence, 
“the Demiurge of the Timaeus is exactly the ‘best Y U X ~ ’  
which is said in the Laws to be the source of the great /. . . 




3Oc2-3 1 b3 VOGG 
(cont.) 
35bl-3 VOGS 
Paee in Commentaw/Comments Translation 
cosmic orderly movements, that is, he is God, and if we are 
to use the word God in the sense it has in Plato’s natural 
theology, the only God there is.” From this passage it can 
be ascertained that for Taylor ~06s is not only the mind 
which creates, but as “the only God there is” can correctly 
be translated as ‘Mind’. 
p. 117 / This is another passage in which ~06s does not 
appear itself, but where Taylor refers to it obliquely, 
appealing to Plutarch. In discussing &~dcyl~r\, Plutarch is 
quoted as describing it “in plain words a disorderly and 
maleficent soul. This was what soul was by itself, but it 
received intelligence ( V O ~ S )  and reason ( h o y ~ p 6 ~ )  and 
sane attunement ( k p $ p ~ ~  &ppo~ia) that it might be the 
soul of an ordered world ( K ~ o ~ o s ) . ”  Although Taylor 
disagrees with Plutarch on other grounds, he does not 
quibble with his understanding of UOGG as intelligence. 
Also, the distinction of hoy1op6~ as ‘reason’ is valuable to 
note. 602 
p. 123 / NOGG is again brought into Taylor’s discussion, 
this time with respect to vuxq, in which his understanding 
is further aided by the psychological acumen of Proclus. 
Thus, while referring to soul (vwq) and paraphrasing 
Proclus, and at times quoting him, Taylor writes “it is not a 
pure unity without plurality, like U O ~ S  (intelligence).” 
Further, what “he [Plato] means by the Indivisible [35a3]/. . . 





Page in CommentaryKomments Translation 
( T ~ o  &~EP~OZOU) is an intelligence or U O ~ < .  But he does 
not mean any Y O ~ G  he means the ~06s which belongs to 
the I C ~ G ~ O ~  in particular ... and what he [Plato] is saying 
is that the cosmic soul is the connecting link between the 
~ 0 6 ~  or ‘understanding’ of the K ~ G ~ O <  and the organic life 
which the I C ~ O ~ O S  enjoys. Now, understanding in its own 
nature is eternal and possesses truth once for all and all at 
once. But souls do not.. .So the soul may be said to be at 
once eternal-in so far as it enjoys intelligence-and a 
Taylor’s method of using the exegesis of thing of time. 
others is to let his paraphrase or quote of their words stand 
unless he explicitly states that he disagrees or cares to 
explain further. In this case he is in agreement with 
Proclus. Thus, u O ~ <  is to be understood as ‘understanding’ 
9,603 
or ‘intelligence’, which ‘intelligence’ is eternal and 
possessing truth “once for all and all at once” and is “a pure 
unity without plurality.” 
36d1-2 ZbU UOGU p. 153 / ‘Intelligence’ 
In this section Taylor is quoting Aristotle’s criticism in De 
Anima (A 406b 26ff.) of 36b5-d3 in the Timaeus. Taylor 
argues that Aristotle falls foul here in his criticism of Plato 
and that as a lecturer he was “only talking for victory” 
feeling the need for “a little judicious levity” (p.154). 
Aristotle's interpretation of Z ~ U  UOGV as ‘Intelligence’ 
when he is trying to reason out Plato’s thought, however, is 
not questioned. 
Proclus, In Tim. ii. 120 (Diehl). 603 
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Timaeus Greek Page in CommentaryKomments Translation 
36d8 KaZ& uo6u 
37c2 uo6q 
37c3-5 UOGS 
p. 175/ ‘to his mind’ 
“Simply, in the usual sense of the phrase.” Taylor rejects as 
“an unfortunate fancy’’ Archer-Hind’ s604 suggestion that 
“Probably, as in Phaedo 97 D, there is a double meaning in 
these words ‘to his mind’ and ‘according to reason’,’’ since 
‘as he intended’ 
A.-H offers no support for the ‘probability’ of the second 
meaning. 
p. 182 / “~06q kn;~o~fipq ZE is rather to be regarded as a 
single concept, ‘knowledge’, as opposed to ‘belief or 
‘opinion’, which may or may not be true.’’ 
p. 183 / Again, this is a passage which does not contain 
U O ~ G ,  but is one in which U O C ~  figures predominantly in 
the discussion, providing an important clue to Taylor’s 
understanding of it as ‘Mind’ both in the context of this 
discussion and in the passages which follow. In this section 
Plato is talking about the v ~ ~ f i  o  the 0bpa~6~.  
Moreover, Timaeus throughout is thinking of the u/ux-~\ as 
self-moving. With reference to two contrasted expressions, 
665a1 K ~ O Z E L ~  and UO.?>~ kn;~o~fipq ZE, 665a and 
k n ; ~ ~ ~ f i p q  are both described as not being capable of 
existing outside a VUXfi, equivalent to the doctrine that 
thinking and knowledge are only to be found in a v v~ f i ,  
rendering, Taylor argues, such phrases as ‘impersonal 
thought’ or ‘unconscious mind’ nonsense.605 He further 
states that although in Ionic UO.?>S means ‘Mind’, e.g. in /. . . 
A-H, TP, p.115. 604 
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Page in Commentary/Comment Translation 
Anaxagoras, it rarely, if ever, means that in classical Attic 
prose, where its meaning “is much more often the ‘sense’ of 
a statement, the ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ of an act, or a plan 
of policy, or the like.” Thus, so far as there is a classical 
Attic equivalent for ‘the Mind’, when tpxq itself is not 
used, the word is more commonly 8tdc~ota. The point that 
Taylor is making is that when ~06s is used in connection 
with tpxq it means ‘Mind’, i.e. at 37c2. The implication 
of this inference is that even where the connection between 
U O ~ <  and vuxfi is less obvious, i.e. where uOG< is being 
discussed and prior discussions of the U / U X ~  of the 
oi>pa~i>< or its self-moving attribute are presumed, in these 
passages ‘Mind’ should be taken as the meaning of ~06s 
and not the ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ of an act, or ‘reason’ 
with a capital “R” as in Cornford.606 
p. 247 / NOG< does not figure in this passage, nor does 
Taylor directly talk about it. However, he does discuss the 
“drift of the Creator’s speech,” noting that it is the Creator’s 
will, the same power which put them [the newly fashioned 
gods] together, which will also assure their continuance. 
Thus v06<, which Taylor has already connected very 
closely to both the ‘understanding’ of the K ~ O ~ O <  and the 
‘self-moving v%q7 of the o i > p ~ 6 < ,  by proximity to the 
Creator also acquiesces the nuance of ‘will’. What is 
understood as ‘will’ by Plato is this power which the/. . . 
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PaPe in CommentawKomments Translation 
Creator, the “best VuxQ”, uses to create and sustain (and a 
‘wicked one’, to dissolve607) the Cosmos. However, 
whereas this idea of ‘will’ is easily incorporated into the 
notion of ‘Mind’, since the idea of mind and the ‘power’ of 
mind are closely associated, such is not the case with either 
‘Reason’ or ‘Intelligence’. ‘Reason’ of itself is without 
power, e.g. a person can act and think unreasonably. 
Rather, it is a mode of understanding whereby events or 
existents are connected logically one to another by the 
human mind, whereupon the mind reflects and if it so 
chooses, acts. ‘Intelligence’, on the other hand, although 
closer in meaning to ‘Mind’ than ‘Reason’ (we can speak of 
‘an intelligence’ as having being), must be rejected on 
similar grounds. Wherever there is human life there is 
‘intelligence’, but the possibility always remains implicit to 
this notion that there is intelligence other than human, since 
primarily it is an indicator of design, whether of a rational 
or creative nature, or issues directly or indirectly (bees build 
hives) from its source. The fact that ‘an intelligence’ could 
be less than human does not accord well with the notion of 
the ‘best ~ u x f i ’  possible. The idea of the power to sustain, 
moreover, is altogether missing with the end result that it is 
often used simply as a synonym for ‘reason’. Thus, because 
of the idea of power which is associated with ‘will’ and the 
close association of with the ‘self-moving V U X ~ ’  
whose ‘will’ generated the Cosmos, ‘Mind’ is a better 
choice for VO<< over ‘Reason’ or ‘Intelligence’. 




Page in ComrnentarjWomments Translation 
pp. 292-293 / mind 
Like several of the above passages, ~06s figures in the 
discussion, but does not occur in the passage itself. It is 
worth quoting Taylor in full here: “This point that ~ ~ ~ x f i ,  
‘the self-moving’, is the onZy thing which exhibits ~06s is
repeated because of its philosophical and theological 
significance. It is meant to exclude what we call 
‘pantheism’, ‘de facto teleology’, ‘unconscious purpose’. 
Plato, no less than Timaeus, holds it fundamental that where 
there is regular orderly motion subserving a ‘good’ purpose, 
there is also real and actual mind. The most important 
proposition about VUXI) in the Platonic philosophy is 
precisely the ‘synthetic a priori’ proposition that the ‘self- 
moved’ . . . is the only purposive agent, the only thing which 
exhibits VO<<.” 
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ovuiozqptl ovuiozapat 
O W Z q U a t  (and noun formations) 



























(3sg2aor) there existed a confederation / 
a dynasty had arisen [Atlantis myth] 
He that constructed (it) [the universe] 
constructed [becoming and the all] 
constructed [reason within soul] 
the Constructor [of the Cosmos] 
(did) construct (it) [Cosmos] 
that have been fashioned [living creatures] 
constructed (it) [cosmos as a living creature] 
to construct [the body of All] 
should be conjoined [two things alone] 
had constructed it [the Cosmos] 
the Constructor of it (it's) [Cosmos] 
(he) made [her = Soul] 
(he) compounded it [intermediate existence] 
of its Constructor 
the construction [of the Heaven] 
it [the stream of vision] forms 
was wrought [the Universe] 
constructed them [the four elements] 
is composed [of triangles] 
is constructed [as a third] 
are combined [four equilateral triangles] 
is constructed [the first solid figure] 
combined [four] 
(it) is composed 
(unite to) make [two corpuscles of fire] 
to be re-compounded 
[a few of the smaller corpuscles] 
is that composed [fairer sort of stone] 
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( o~ iqpt  = to understand) 










(God) constructed the form of [the liver] 
its construction [the remainder of the body] 
he compounded [the bone] 
moulded [flesh] 
he fashioned [the flesh] 
those who were constructing (us) [the Gods] 
(all bodies) composed (of smaller particles) 
(all things) composed (thereof) 
(He) constructed 
[inward parts of the veil/ body irrigation] 
preserves its structure [the mortal living creature] 
the origidcreation [= putting together of disease] 
(in order) of construction 
[structures naturally secondary] 
is formed [whey of phlegm = sweat and tears] 
(the triangles of each creature) are constructed 
the construction [of the Cosmos] 
composite [surround a . . .body] 
(this) that he had put together 
the construction [of the Soul] 
(and when) he had compounded [the whole] 
a battlinghtriving together 
[of both Might and Mind] 
the construction [of these bodies] 
will form themselves [many small bodies] 
(second solid) [is] constructed [out of.. .] 
(thus) constructed [the shape of the body] 
(one other) compound [figure] 
(becoming ) a compound [of one corpuscle] 
has been re-composed [any of the other Kinds] 
is due to the construction 
[of each two elemental triangles] 
in their construction 
[Kinds with larger constituent parts] 
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WORD OCCURRENCE/USAGE in the TIMAEUS 
OuViGzqpll ouuiozapall mmijuat  
being compounded 
[bright and solid waters = bronze] 
in its composition [fairer sort of stone] 
(the interstices of) its structure/ texture 
[Lee, p. 861 
(earth) not condensed 
(earth) is condensed 
the composition [of the particles] 
[they who] constructed [us] 
the structure [of the organ] 
the structure [of the head] 
its (own) structure [the belly’s] 
(in) the structures [of diseases] 
(bubbles) are formed [serum] 
renovations [of the body] 
(in its) structure [of every disease] 
(with respect to) the structure [of diseases] 
(the gods) by constructing 
[an animate creature/men/women] 
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was due [i.e. was the cause] to chance 
[mating] 
And this is the cause 
[lack of historical knowledge] 
for these reasons [facts of history] 
owing to some Cause 
[everything comes to be] 
without a Cause [nothing can become] 
state the cause [the reason why] 
He constructed Becoming and the All 
For this reason 
[the world was fashioned a single whole] 
And for what reasons 
[placement of heavenly bodies] 
From this cause (origin) 
[came into being the fixed stars] 
a cause of evil to itself 
[the mortal creature] 
the causes and divine counsels 
[existence of soul] 
the auxiliary causes 
(supposed to be not) auxiliary causes, but.. . 
primary Causes [of all things] 
the Causes [which belong to intelligent nature] 
(must declare both kinds) of Causes 
accessory causes [which give eyes their power] 
(vision) . . .is the cause 
[of the greatest benefit to us] 
the Cause (and purpose of that best good) 
(the form of) the WanderingErrant Cause 
(Such are the) causes 
[of the pure primary bodies] 
is due to 
[the construction of two elemental triangles] 
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a’t zia t q 
a’tziaq 























( fem . ) 
610.. . 
(fern.) 
Z G U  
zt . .  . 
they are the sole causes [i.e. portions of fire] 
the causes which 
[account for qualities of Four Kinds] 
the agents which cause them [the bodily affections] 
the cause (of these processes is termed “acid”) 
the causes 
[whereby affections of hearing are produced] 
the causes which produce it [the visual stream] 
(appear different) for reasons [causes] stated 
(but are really identical affections) 
and their inherent properties, he (the Artificer) 
used as subservient [dt~iatq bn;~p&Toi>oatq] 
causes; 68el-69a5 is an important summary 
passage in the Timaeus re the causes and is discussed 
at length within Chapter 5 of Part I of this thesis. 
two kinds of causes [the & U ~ ~ I C ~ ~ O U  and 
the Ba’?ov, the necessary and the divine] 
the various kinds of causes 
of the causes mentioned 
[i.e processes re growing of hair] 
(whereas these were) the auxiliary causes 
(it was wrought by) the greatest of Causes, 
(divine Purpose) 
the causes [concerning the process of respiration] 
(all of us who are wicked, become wicked 
owing to two quite involuntary) causes. 
and the causes which serve this 
[remedial treatment of body and mind] 
(and makes them [the doctors] ascribe 















(see Bibliography for h l l  details) 
Archer-Hind (whose work is The Timaeus of Plato) 
Democritus - Fragments, H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der 
Vorsokratiker 
Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato 
Teloh, The Development of Plato ’s Metaphysics 
J. Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy 
Laws (Plato) 
Liddell & Scott, Greek-English Lexicon 
Cornford, Plato j. Cosmology 
Taylor, Commentary on Plato ’s “Timaeus ” 
Vlastos, Plato j. Universe 
Timaeus (Plato) 
Archer-Hind (A-H), The Timaeus of Plato 
Note: I refer to translations of the Timaeus as Ti. preceded by the translator’s name 
or simply to the translator’s name followed by the page number(s) or line within the 
Greek text. This also applies to Plato’s Laws, which is abbreviated Lg. 
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